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Dissertation
ABStRACt
In conventional economic and social analyses of political struggles, the actions 
taken by actors are usually explained by their motivation to maximize their mate-
rial or political self-interest. This study is based on the institutional view that hu-
man action is driven not only by interests but also by ideas. Especially in complex 
situations of ‘Knightean uncertainty’, such as global poverty reduction, where 
nobody can really calculate his or her self-interest based on complete information 
and rational calculus, people tend to base their choices on shortcuts and coping 
devices of ‘bounded rationality’ such as habits, worldviews and mental maps, 
rather than on rational calculus.  
What has been missing in institutional analysis is theorizing on the interac-
tion of interests, ideas and identities. This study makes and verifies the following 
propositions: 1) Ideas are important economic goods with highly asymmetric 
markets; 2) Professional identity constrains the effective use of ideas; 3) Not only 
material interests but also professional identities and interests determine how 
agents behave; 4) Interests are socially constructed – strong organizations can 
change what individuals and states  want; 5) Individuals and organisations are 
motivated by a complex mix of sometimes conflicting preferences; 6) In situations 
of great uncertainty ideas and identities, rather than interests determine how 
agents act; 7) Aid implementation should not be left to economists and diplomats 
alone; 8) A ‘rare moment’ at the turn of the Millennium cracked the illusion of 
consent among the development economists; 9) Professionals of development and 
care should be aware of the crisis within the economics profession – and not take 
for granted routine assumptions based on outdated economics.
A gradual but irreversible shift seems to be taking place in the politics and 
practice of global poverty reduction: from a monopolistic dominance of pover-
ty economics towards multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary Global Social 
Policy, always tailored to the context. 
Keywords: poverty, development, economics, development economics, social 
policy, global social policy, World Bank, Tanzania, institutional analysis, histori-
cal institutionalism, interest, idea, identity
A b s t r A k t i
Poliittisten kamppailujen taloudellisessa ja sosiaalisessa analyysissä toimijoiden 
valintoja selitetään yleensä heidän pyrkimyksellään maksimoida aineellisia tai 
poliittisia etujaan. Tämä tutkimus lähtee institutionalismin ajatuksesta, jonka 
mukaan intressit eivät ohjaakaan kaikkea toimintaa vaan että myös ideat eli aja-
tukset vaikuttavat valintoihin. Erityisesti monimutkaisissa tilanteissa (Knightin 
epävarmuus), joissa yksikään toimija ei pysty varmuudella rationaalisesti laske-
maan kokonaisetuaan, ihmiset luottavat ”rajatun rationaliteetin” (bounded ra-
tionality) keinoihin ja oikopolkuihin, kuten totunnaisuuksiin, maailmankuviin 
ja mielikuviin. Globaalin köyhyyden vähentäminen on juuri tällainen monimut-
kainen, kompleksinen haaste. 
Institutionaalisesta analyysista on toistaiseksi puuttunut teoria siitä, miten 
intressit, ideat ja identiteetit vaikuttavat toisiinsa. Tämä tutkimus täydentää in-
stitutionaalista teoriaa osoittamalla, että globaalissa köyhyyspolitiikassa ”aja-
tukset ovat toimintaa” ja “sanat ovat tekoja”. Toimijoiden valinnat eivät ohjaudu 
ainoastaan heidän aineellisten etujensa vaan myös heidän ideoittensa – ja aivan 
erityisesti heidän ammatillisten, tieteenalakohtaisten ja organisatoristen iden-
titeettiensä - perusteella. Välittävinä mekanismeina toimivat maailmankuvat, 
subjekti-positiot, polkuriippuvuudet ja muut mekanismit¸ joita voidaan tutkia 
institutionaalisen analyysin lähestymistavoin, menetelmin ja työkaluin. 
Tutkimus esittää ja todentaa seuraavat väitteet köyhyyden taloustieteen poli-
tiikasta: 1) Ideat ovat tärkeitä taloudellisia hyödykkeitä – mutta niiden markkinat 
ovat epätasapainossa; 2) Ammatillinen identiteetti rajoittaa ideoiden tuloksel-
lista hyödyntämistä köyhyyden vähentämisessä; 3) Ei ainoastaan aineelliset ja 
poliittiset intressit vaan myös ammatilliset identiteetit ja intressit määrittävät 
toimijoiden valintoja; 4) Intressit rakentuvat sosiaalisesti: Vahvat organisaatiot 
pystyvät vaikuttamaan siihen, mitä yksilöt tai hallitukset haluavat; 5) Yksilöiden 
ja organisaatioiden toimintaa ohjaa usein joukko keskenään ristiriitaisia prefe-
renssejä; 6) Monimutkaisissa, epävarmoissa tilanteissa ideat (ajatukset) ja identi-
teetit määrittävät usein sen, miten toimijat toimivat; 7) Kehitysavun suunnittelua 
ja toimeenpanoa ei pitäisi jättää vain ekonomistien ja diplomaattien vastuulle; 
8) ’Harvinainen hetki’ vuosituhannen vaihteessa rikkoi kehitystaloustieteilijöi-
den keskinäisen yksimielisyyden illuusion; 9) Kehityksen ja huolenpidon am-
mattilaisten olisi tärkeää ymmärtää taloustieteen sisäistä kriisiä ja kieltäytyä hy-
väksymästä ratkaisuehdotuksia, jotka perustuvat vanhentuneen taloustieteen 
vakiintuneisiin oletuksiin. 
Globaalissa köyhyyden vähentämisessä on meneillään peruuttamaton muu-
tos köyhyystaloustieteen yksinvallasta kohti moniulotteista, monitieteistä ja aina 
kontekstin mukaan sovellettavaa globaalia sosiaalipolitiikkaa.  
Avainsanat: köyhyys, kehitys, taloustiede, kehitystaloustiede, sosiaalipoli-
tiikka, globaali sosiaalipolitiikka, Maailmanpankki, Tansania, institutionaalinen 
analyysi, historiallinen institutionalismi, intressi, idea, identiteetti.
Foreword 
“Written history is - in epistemological sense - a narrative, written by the historian for him- 
(or her-) self, in order to define where he stands and what is his mission in his own world. 
Towards the end of the 20th century this mission calls for changes of course in research: 
‘broadening’ of the past. This paradigm shift leads to multi-disciplinarity, breaking through 
the barriers to other disciplines.”1
It has been a wonderful privilege to be able to do all the reading, research, think-
ing and writing that has gone into this study. Throughout these years, academic 
research has been more of a hobby, or intellectual therapy, for me, than full-time 
occupation. I have earned my living from - and given my passion to – develop-
ment cooperation for poverty reduction and global social policy, in several dif-
ferent roles: as field worker in rural Tanzania, as research manager of an inter-
national organization in Geneva, as chair of an inter-governmental network of 
experts in Paris, and as policy maker and senior adviser at the Finnish Ministry 
for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki.2
Academic research has given me an alternative perspective to observe and 
analyse what I do professionally in global governance and development coopera-
tion. Looking at it from the ‘academic ivory tower’ has raised my doubts about 
the relevance and effectiveness of some parts of the work that we are doing as 
development technocrats, while it has also given me greater confidence in driving 
some new ideas and approaches to aid for poverty reduction, decent work, social 
protection and global social policy 
It seems that I haven’t ever quite found my academic home: My first degree 
was in journalism.3 My master’s-level studies consisted of degrees (in four differ-
ent faculties) in economic and social history, environmental economics, environ-
mental studies and adult education.  Economics – or more precisely the history, 
sociology and politics of economic thought - is clearly the main object of my PhD 
dissertation, but I conducted my research for it at the departments of develop-
ment studies, economic and social history, social policy and welfare sociology. 
Encouraged by Prof. Haapala’s quotation above, I have written this essay in 
order to better define for myself, where I stand and what is my mission in the 
world.  In my case this mission has clearly called for changes in the way of con-
1 Haapala (1990). Professor Haapala was my teacher of methodology in the early years of my studies 
at the Department of Economic and Social History of the University of Helsinki. 
2 I have written this book during my free time and unpaid leaves of absence from the Ministry, ILO, and 
the RIPS-Programme in Tanzania. The views expressed in it should be only attributed to the author, 
not to his current or past employers.
3 Sanoma School of Journalism (1983).
ducting research, and breaking the barriers between disciplines. I have great 
respect for academic colleagues who reach deeper and ever-deeper knowledge 
by strictly focusing their work on narrower and ever-narrower questions of their 
own academic discipline. I have personally put my trust on a multi-disciplinary 
research strategy, believing that much of the important innovation takes place in 
the grey areas – and in the cross-fertilisation - between disciplines.
Reinhard Koselleck, a famous German historian of concepts once wrote: 
“Every historical revision serves as a potentially subverting instance that dethrones some-
thing of that which we have believed to be ‘given’, ‘hard facts’ or ‘simply there’. Revisiting 
our space of experience also challenges our interpretation of what it is possible to do in the 
present.”4
My essay challenges some ‘givens’ about poverty and aid for poverty reduction, 
and thereby hopefully encourages us to rethink our interpretation of what it is 
possible to do to it in the present – and future.
4 Koselleck (1979)
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1 Preface:                        
The Long Journey
1.1 the milleNNium CoNSeNSuS
Poverty reduction is the Number One development policy goal of the world 
community at the beginning of the Third Millennium. A remarkable con-
sensus emerged around the year 2000 among all development agencies and 
organisations onthe priority of poverty reduction among the goals of global 
development. 
Poverty reduction was chosen as the first of the United Nations Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs). It became the overriding mission of the World 
Bank, and the common core commitment of the development cooperation agen-
cies of the rich OECD-country governments.1 Poverty reduction was declared 
the key objective of the national development strategies of most poor country 
governments (including Tanzania, the country I know best in the Global South). 
Substantial public resources have been targeted at analysing the reasons for and 
consequences of poverty, and at identifying the most appropriate strategies and 
ways to reduce it. A date (year 2015) and concrete benchmarks (MDGs) were set 
against which progress can be measured. Five years to the prior to the 2015 dead-
line, however, most low-income countries of the world seemed to be seriously 
off-track for achieving the poverty-MDGs.2
“Poverty amid plenty is the world’s greatest challenge. We at the Bank have made it our 
mission to fight poverty with passion and professionalism, putting it at the center of all the 
work we do.”
- James Wolfensohn, President of the World Bank 1995-20053
This essay is, however, not primarily about poverty, nor about the poor people. 
Its objects of research are the ideas, interests, identities and institutions of non-
poor poverty economists and other non-poor poverty professionals in the leading 
global development institutions, including the most powerful of them, the World 
1 Including the Government of Finland, that I work for. The views presented in this essay are solely 
mine, and should in no way be associated with the Government of Finland. The essay has been written 
during my leaves from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFAF). 
2 See e.g. United Nations (2005a, 2010). See: Millennium Indicators in Websources at the end of the book. 
3 World Bank (2001a), p. v.
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Bank (WB). It is an essay on sociology of poverty economics, or about the political 
use of poverty economics in the donor agencies of rich country governments.4  
1.2 pRoFeSSioNAlS oF CARe
This essay has been written with non-economist social policy professionals5 and 
other professionals of care6 in mind as the imaginary readers. While often very 
influential on the domestic policy scene, these brilliant thinkers and skilful pro-
fessionals seem to have handed over the running of the world to economists. 
They themselves concentrate on ‘smaller circles’, local, national, Nordic and EU-
problems. Gradually, a growing number of them have become aware that the 
most pressing challenges of social injustice and care in our globalizing world 
are those related to global inequality and poverty in the Global South. Global 
inequalities – e.g. global gini index - have become much more alarming than 
those within nation states, including the ones with most unequal distribution of 
incomes, well-being and opportunities. 
No wonder that many professionals of care are asking themselves how much 
of their professional capacities they should devote to hair-splitting about minor 
changes to the better or worse in the sophisticated social policy instruments 
available to the increasingly wealthy non-poor minority of the human kind, or 
whether they, too, should try to contribute towards solving the Big Issues - the 
global poverty and inequality problems.
But it is not easy for non-economists to enter into professional discussions 
about global poverty. The position of economists in the global market of poverty 
reduction ideas is so overwhelming and monopolistic that propositions made in 
any other than the language of economics are most likely to be ignored.  It takes 
4 We shall also trace the shifts in the thinking of non-poor poverty professionals at various United 
Nations bodies and within the OECD-DAC (Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation 
for Economic Cooperation and Development), the joint think-tank of bilateral development agencies. 
I have elsewhere (Voipio 1998a) written in greater detail about how the Finnish aid administration has 
conceived poverty as a planning problem. I have also analysed the poverty reduction approaches of 
various European donor agencies in Tanzania (Voipio and Hoebink 1999) and in Nepal (Gsänger and 
Voipio 2000) and synthesized the findings into a European comparative synthesis (Cox, Healey and 
Voipio 1999; Cox, Healey, Hoebink and Voipio 2000). 
5 In my home country, Finland, as well as in the UK and a small number of other countries ‘social 
policy’ exists as an independent academic discipline. In many other countries such an academic 
subject does not exist, and social policy professionals (SPP) are trained either as sociologists, political 
scientists, economists, etc. Surprisingly (and regrettably) few of the – professionally highly competent 
– Finnish SPPs have thus far contributed seriously to the efforts that aim at solving the most pressing 
social policy challenges of the world of today and tomorrow, i.e. the challenges of global poverty. 
6 Most of the care work, all over the world, is unpaid work done mainly by women. In most of 
the countries that have succeeded in sustainable reduction of absolute poverty, there are also 
large numbers of social workers and other professionals of care. By professionals of care I mean a 
broad category of social policy/social development full-timers such as e.g. nurses, social workers, 
environmentalists, development activists, civil servants in ministries of social affairs, health and 
labour, environment, representatives of deprived population groups (e.g. people with disabilities or 
HIV/AIDS, ethnic minorities, etc.), mothers, social and environmental policy scholars and politicians, 
as well as social development professionals and environmental experts in the multi- and bilateral 
development agencies and in NGOs. See: UNRISD (2010d). See also IFSW and ICSW in Websources 
at the end of the book.
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time for the non-economists even to understand which dimensions of poverty the 
poverty economists actively deal with and which dimensions they tacitly assume 
away in order to keep their equations manageable.7  
This essay is an ‘easy-reader’ for professionals of care to the politics of global 
poverty economics. It will introduce the mainstream theses of the global poverty 
thinking, dominated by ‘orthodox’ neoclassical economics and the Washington-
based international financial institutions, the IMF and the World Bank, and the 
counter-veiling anti-theses (by dissidents within the World Bank8 as well as by 
‘heterodox’ economists and non-economists within poor country governments, 
UN-agencies9, bilateral donor agencies, INGOs10 and universities). This continu-
ous dialectics towards (often short-lived) syntheses (and new theses, anti-theses 
and syntheses…) is what the politics of global poverty ideas is about.  
This essay has served its purpose if it encourages social policy professionals 
and other professionals of care to monitor the politics of global poverty, and to 
season their own professional contributions in ways that make them palatable for 
opinion leaders among poverty economists. 
One major limitation (or a strength) of this essay is that it has been written in 
Finland and partly in Tanzania (i.e. in the Northern and Southern peripheries of 
the world), but not in The Core, for instance, in Washington D.C. Therefore, there 
are many observations in the text that a poverty economist based in Washington 
D.C. could have easily made just by talking to colleagues at the World Bank can-
teen. On the other hand, maybe you need some distance to see broadly, and to see 
that some of the ‘core’ messages of the ‘core’ development institutions as global 
universal ‘truths’ are easier to interpret if you realize that they, too, arise from a 
specific, somewhat parochial (most often Anglo-American) social context, which 
is not necessarily similar to the majority of the other contexts of the world. 
There are interesting books, written by poverty professionals in Washington 
D.C.  discussing the same issues, processes and time-periods that I do, e.g. 
Mallaby’s The World’s Banker, Stiglitz’s Globalization and Its Discontents; and 
The Roaring Nineties, Kanbur’s several excellent, professionally constructively 
self-critical articles, Wolfensohn’s Voice for the World’s Poor, as well as a num-
ber of World Bank publications.11  My contribution provides another perspective: 
How it all looked like for a relatively well-informed non-poor poverty profes-
sional living and working in world’s northern and southern ‘peripheries’.12 
7 A newcomer in the field may also get surprised by the prevailing conceptions about what makes 
sources of information ‘robust’ and methods of analysis ‘rigorous’: Just give him ‘the data’ and a 
macro econometrician will be perfectly glad to run his regressions and to ‘tease out’ serious policy 
recommendations for nations whose territory he has never  even visited.  
8 Some of the at very high levels in the organization. See World Bank (2010) and Zoellick (2010).
9 UN = United Nations. 
10 INGO = International Non-Governmental Organization. 
11 Kagia (ed.2005), Kanbur (1991,1999, 2000a, 2001a,b,c, ed.2001, 2002b,d, 2003a, ed.2003), Kanbur & 
Lustig (1999), Kanbur & Squire (1999), Kanbur & Riles (2004), Mallaby (2004), Stiglitz (2002, 2003), 
Wolfensohn (2005), World Bank (2004a,c and 2005a,c).
12 Bøas and Neill (eds. 2004) is another excellent analysis written from a non-Washington D.C. 
viewpoint.
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1.3 RuRAl tANZANiA – heARt oF poveRtY ?
I started my research in Tanzania in 1993-94.  I was working there as socio-econ-
omist and facilitator of participatory action research and planning in a Finnish-
funded ‘Rural Integrated Project Support’ (RIPS) programme in Mtwara-Lindi, 
the remote rural corner of South-Eastern Tanzania.13 My decision to start this 
intellectual journey was primarily motivated by the mismatch between the ‘of-
ficial poverty maps’ (World Bank’s World Development Report 1990) and my own 
reading of the landscape in Tanzania. If the World Bank statistics were to be 
trusted, Mtwara-Lindi was nearly the poorest area in the entire world. It had for 
long had the questionable reputation of being the poorest corner of Tanzania, 
and Tanzania was then rated second from the bottom in the World Bank’s list of 
world’s nations in terms of GNP per capita.14 Mozambique, Mtwara’s southern 
neighbour just across the Ruvuma River, was  rated the poorest. 
So there I was, in the ‘centre of absolute statistical poverty’. But I was not convinced: 
I worked a lot in the villages with men and women, young and old, disabled and ‘able-
bodied’. Most of them surely belonged to the group of people the World Bank and the 
UN-Conferences were talking about when they solemnly declared that…
“…over one-fifth of the world population, i.e. 1.3 billion members of the human race still 
live in poverty, with incomes of less than one dollar per day, without jobs, without basic 
necessities, without hope, in short: in conditions below human dignity.”15
I was puzzled and disturbed: Yes, most of the men and women, boys and girls 
of Mtwara and Lindi regions did not have jobs in the Western urban sense of the 
word (with formal employment contracts, social security and taxable salaries). 
Barely any of them possessed what my neighbours in Riihimäki, Finland, would 
consider basic necessities. And yes, the statistics revealed that most of the people 
I worked with earned less than one dollar per day. (In fact, if the official statistics 
are to be trusted, they only earned an average of 0.15 USD per day of statistically 
registered incomes). But to say – as the World Bank’s most authoritative poverty 
report (World Development Report 1990) did - that they lived “without hope”, and 
“below human dignity”??16 
13 My first visit to Mtwara and Lindi had been already in 1985. I worked again in RIPS-Programme in 
Mtwara-Lindi of Tanzania in 1999-2000, as Adviser of Participatory Methods and Media. 
14 In 1993-94 I was reading the statistics of World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR) 1992 (World 
Bank 1992a), which used GNP per capita (not PPP), and ranked Tanzania second from the bottom, after 
the (still then) war-torn Mozambique. I was intuitively sure already then, that it must be wrong to use the 
GNP/GNI per capita as the main metric of the relative achievements of nations in poverty reduction. Yet, 
in spite of the strong efforts by the UNDP and the IFAD during the 1990s – and the Governments of France 
(the Stiglitz/Sen Commission) and Bhutan in the 2000s - to introduce alternative poverty indicators, such 
as e.g. Human Poverty Index, Gender Empowerment Measure, Integrated Poverty Index, Basic Needs 
Index and Gross National Happiness, the GNP/GNI per capita (PPP) still prevails as the development 
econometricians’ favourite (and most commonly used) poverty indicator.
15 See e.g. World Bank (1990), UN (1995a). 
16 It was in fact Robert McNamara, then president of the World Bank, who in his famous Nairobi speech 
in 1973 popularised the meaning of ‘absolute poverty’ as a condition of deprivation that ‘falls below 
any rational definition of human decency.”. See Loungani (2003), p. 38.
  25
– No: what I observed with my own eyes was in sharp contradiction with 
the ‘Official Map’ provided by the World Bank’s authoritative poverty publica-
tion.17 Since I’m not a poet, I shall not try to describe here how joy, hope and bal-
anced, humble human dignity manifested themselves in the lives of the people of 
Southern Tanzania.  But they did, and still do, most of the time, in most cases.18 I 
could agree that the livelihoods of the people of Mtwara-Lindi were much riskier 
and more vulnerable than in countries such as Finland, with reliable social pro-
tection systems. In fact, the observations I made through participatory action 
research19 in Tanzania convinced me that the main challenge of global poverty 
reduction was probably not to lift ‘masses’ of totally hopeless and helpless pau-
pers out of deep poverty 365 days per year, year after year, but rather to support 
the development of permanent reliable social protection systems, that would have 
the capacity to help - mostly active but at times potentially vulnerable – people to 
avoid a fall into destitution by being able to manage their livelihood risks at some 
particularly difficult times of the year20 or lifecycle events.21      
But I also observed that on some aspects of human dignity many of us in the 
North are surely poorer than the Tanzanians I was working with. Who had given 
the World Bank the mandate and right to define what ‘dignified human living’ 
should consist of?
So, in order to be able to work with the rural Tanzanians I felt I needed new 
and better maps. One of the objectives of my research process thereafter has been 
17 Nobel economist Joseph Stiglitz told in his Nobel lecture in 2001 about his similar experience during 
his first lengthier visits to a developing country, Kenya: “My first visits to the developing world in 1967, 
and a more extensive stay in Kenya in 1969, made an indelible impression on me. Models of perfect markets, 
as badly flawed as they might seem for Europe or America, seemed truly inappropriate for these countries… I 
had seen cyclical unemployment – sometimes quite large…but I had not seen the massive unemployment that 
characterized African cities…Again, there was a massive discrepancy between the models we had been taught 
and what I saw”. See Stiglitz (2001b), p. 473.
18 The World Bank economists who authored the WDR-1990 had probably not read – or had forgotten – 
what the great British economist Alfred Marshall (who probably was a greater ‘poet’ than I am) wrote 
about the ‘human dignity’ of poor people . In his ‘Principles of Economics’ (1890/1920/1997, p. 2-3) he 
wrote as wisely as follows: “Their life is not necessarily unhealthy or unhappy. Rejoicing in their affections 
towards God and man, and perhaps even possessing some natural refinement of feeling, they may lead lives 
that are far less incomplete than those of many, who have more material wealth.” But, on the other hand, as 
Marshall continued: “But, for all that, their poverty is a great and almost unmixed evil to them. Even when 
they are well, their weariness often amounts to pain, while their pleasures are few; and when sickness comes, 
the suffering caused by poverty increases tenfold…Overworked and undertaught, weary and careworn, without 
quiet and without leisure, they have no chance of making the best of their mental faculties.” 
19 At that time, in rural Tanzania, we called it ‘Participatory Rural Appraisal’ (PRA). See. Chambers 
(1994a,b,c,d, 1995, 1997).
20 As revealed by the participatory action research, the most difficult time of the year for most people 
in the Mtwara and Lindi regions of Tanzania was the rainy season in March-April, when their own 
food stocks from the previous harvest (June-August) were already short, and money earned through 
the sale of cashew-nuts in October-November was already gone. Not only did the people not have 
food, or money to buy food, with the rains came malaria and high health care (and travel) costs, which 
were the number one impoverishing factor in Mtwara-Lindi at that time. Thus, the main challenge 
in poverty reduction in that rural corner of Tanzania was not to lift people’s incomes over the 1 USD/
day level throughout the year, but to find mechanisms to help people cope over the particularly hard 
4-6 week period each spring. 
21 The most common lifecycle events when – otherwise non-poor Tanzanian people – face the risk of 
falling into poverty are occupational accident, ill health (of oneself or of a family member), parent’s 
death, the moment of becoming a parent, unemployment and crop loss. Therefore, most social 
protection / social security systems – in all countries of the world - seek to help people manage the risks 
related to occupational accidents, ill health, death, parenthood and unemployment / loss of livelihood. 
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the search for better (mental) maps of poverty. Another one has been to under-
stand, why the international aid organisations use and actively disseminate pov-
erty maps, which do not correspond with the realities, at least not the reality I 
observed in the South of Tanzania.22 Later I found that the ‘poverty reduction 
guidelines’ used by the dominant international donors do not even correspond 
well with the historical experiences Finland has had.  Whose experiences and 
frameworks of thinking were they then based on? Where on earth are there coun-
tries that have escaped poverty using the poverty maps recommended by the 
opinion-leaders of the international donor community? 
Over the 17 years that I spent on this research project – side by side with my 
main work as development worker, aid administrator, development policy ad-
viser and social security research manager - I recognized, to my satisfaction, that 
the aid agencies are, indeed, engaged in an intensive work to renew their poverty 
maps, and that the maps of year 201023 are in fact rather different, in important 
respects, from the maps I could access in the early 1990s. This ideational evolu-
tion makes a good story, and I wanted to narrate it in this essay. I have noticedin-
dications that the non-economist professionals of care are gradually becoming 
interested in making a contribution to the global struggle against poverty, which 
I am very glad about. To be able to work constructively together with the leading 
experts of global poverty (economists), the social policy professionals will have 
to understand how the poverty economists think. 
1.4 hiStoRiCAl iNStitutioNAliSm
Theoretically, the roots of this essay are in the academic discourse of historical 
institutionalism, which is one of the three versions of new institutional analysis 
in the study of organizations, economic and political sociology, economics, com-
parative political economy, politics and international relations. To a lesser extent, 
the essay also draws from the other two versions of new institutional analysis: 
rational choice and organizational institutionalism.24
All institutionalists agree that institutions are the foundation of social life. 
They consist of formal and informal rules, monitoring and enforcement mecha-
nisms, and systems of meaning that define the context within which individuals, 
corporations, labour unions, governments, as well as local, national and interna-
tional organizations operate and interact with each other. 
Like in other fields, also the institutions of global poverty politics are settle-
ments born from struggle and bargaining. They reflect the resources and power 
of those who made them. They can also change – and be changed - through 
further struggle, bargaining and innovation, moderated by ‘path-dependence’. 
22 Nor in rural Nepal or Vietnam, for that matter. I paid several visits to Nepal in 1997, and to Vietnam 
in 2002.
23 See e.g. World Bank (2001a, 2005b), OECD-DAC (2001c; 2006a,b; 2009a,b,c). 
24 See e.g. Campbell (1998, 2004), Blyth (2002), Steinmo et al. (eds. 1992), Chang (2003b), Saari (ed. 
2003), Mahoney and Thelen (2010).
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The outcome will affect the distribution of resources and power in community, 
society and the world in the future.25
1.5 peRSoNAl CoNCeRN AND pRomiSiNg SigNS 
My personal point of departure is a grave concern about involuntary poverty 
by too many, and about the un-sustainability (over the horizon of my children’s 
lifetime) of the economic growth model that the mainstream development econo-
mists have been prescribing as their single main recipe for poverty reduction 
among the poorest members of human kind. I suspect the realism of the ‘growth-
first’ policies that World Bank economists have been advocating as the correct 
approach to poverty reduction, oriented as they are towards free competition of 
un-equals in limitless markets, and increased consumption of material goods in 
a world that is finite, after all. 
My own interest in public action and social capital lies primarily in the view 
that trust in norms fostering the ideals of equality and solidarity will make the 
inevitable adjustments easier for us all, and that co-operation and networking can 
spur ground-breaking innovations globally, nationally and locally.
I do believe in the ability of people and societies to adjust in the pursuit of a 
good future differing from the current situation, if adjustment really becomes 
necessary. I also trust that the professional community of neo-classical main-
stream economists will be able to do the rethinking required to break free from 
its excessive formalism and rationality assumptions and to become relevant again 
for the real daily challenges of the less privileged majority of the human kind. 
Promising signs are already in the air.
25 Campbell (2004), p. 1-2.
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2 Research Questions 
2.1 FRom pRojeCtS to poliCieS to iNStitutioNS
The poverty professionals of the World Bank and other aid donor agencies spent 
a few decades (1950s-1970s) trying to reduce poverty by implementing projects 
in poor societies. Dissatisfied with the achievements of the project-approach 
they moved to policies. During the next two decades (1980s-1990s) of ‘Structural 
Adjustment Programmes’ (SAPs) the World Bank – funded by OECD-governments 
- tried to persuade poor countries to change their policies by imposing policy re-
form as a condition of development lending and grants. Gradually, however, it 
was recognized that policies alone were not sufficient to secure successful broad-
based – or pro-poor - growth and poverty reduction, unless the institutional 
set-up was ‘conducive’, or ‘enabling’ for pro-poor policy change. Opinions vary 
widely as to what sort of institutional set up would be ‘pro-poor’ or otherwise 
ideal, but there is currently a wide consensus among development professionals 
that (some kind of) institutional development, or institution-building is an es-
sential part of pro-poor policy change, growth and poverty reduction.26
So: “Get the Institutions Right”, became the optimistic fix that poverty econo-
mists started to recommend to developing countries in the first years of the 3rd 
Millennium. Just as optimistic and simplistic as the “Get Prices Right” –recipe 
that their predecessors had imposed on developing countries during the early 
years of the SAP-era. Both were more easily said than done. There are good rea-
sons to believe that the challenge of changing institutions will turn out to be more 
complicated than quick-fix economists have expected: First, as we already noted 
above, institutions are born from struggle and bargaining – that’s never easy. 
Secondly, institutions tend to be ‘sticky’, and once created they tend to constrain 
policy change, even when people’s ideas and/or the political or economic condi-
tions in which they live have changed dramatically.
This is not only bad. It is good, in many ways. Without stable institutions, 
life becomes chaotic and arduous, as people learned, for example, following the 
demise of communist regimes in Eastern Europe after 1989. The sudden weak-
ening of old political constitutions, property rights, law enforcement, and other 
institutions generated tremendous confusion as these countries began to move 
toward capitalism and democracy. After the initial shock, members of those socie-
ties realized that the building of new economic and political institutions would 
be one of their most urgent tasks. As Max Weber, Karl Marx, Emile Durkheim, 
Karl Polanyi, and many other scholars have shown, capitalism itself is impossible 
without a solid institutional base. But, as the experience of the post communist 
26 See e.g. World Bank (2002), Sinha (2005a) and van der Poel (2005).
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societies during the most recent decades indicates, it is possible to create and 
change institutions. This is good news for all those engaged in development.27
2.2 pRoCeSS tRACiNg, pAth-DepeNDeNCieS, RARe 
momeNtS AND CRitiCAl iDeAtioNAl juNCtuReS 
At the turn of the 3rd Millennium there was a strong convergence of agendas 
and languages used at the UN, OECD and World Bank, and a common focus 
on four new elements of the ‘Millennium Consensus’: context-specificity, multi-
dimensionality, coherence and democratic principles. However, at a closer look 
there were also - behind the consensual surface - embarrassing confrontations, 
ideational disagreements and ideological battles between some of the world’s 
leading poverty economists and other poverty professionals (a) within the World 
Bank; (b) between the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
and (c) between the international financial institutions (IFIs)28 and the rest of the 
international development community.29 Economists and other social scientists 
were largely speaking past each other. Economics dominated but failed to work 
the four building blocks of the global Millennium Consensus with equal seri-
ousness, for lack of tools and for lack of genuinely synergetic interdisciplinary 
attitudes and cooperation among the majority of development economists.30 
While development economics stood in beleaguered ascendancy, atop devel-
opment studies and development policy, the analysis and prescriptions of de-
velopment economists were questioned and attacked - particularly in the policy 
field – like never before. In the year 2000, the Governors of the World Bank, whose 
mission it is to eradicate poverty, could meet only under police protection, be-
sieged by masses of street demonstrators who believed instead that the Bank and 
its policies caused poverty. Street demonstrations in Prague, Seattle, Washington, 
Genoa, Gothenburg, etc., represented only the tip of an iceberg of dissatisfaction, 
disillusionment and disagreement, which included vigorous debate among the 
poor and rich country policy makers, legislators, civil society organisations and 
faith based organizations, as well as the press and academia.31   
27 Campbell (2004), p. 1.
28 In development discourse, the term international financial institutions (IFIs) normally refers to the 
IMF and the World Bank. Also regional development banks (e.g. the Asian, the African and the Inter-
American Development Banks) and a few other multilateral institutions (e.g. IFAD, the International 
Fund for Agriculture and Development) belong to this category.
29 Including (most) bilateral development agencies, UN-organisations, NGOs, CSOs and CBOs. 
Bilaterals are the development agencies of individual rich country governments. UN-organisations are 
development agencies such as the UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) and the Unicef, 
as well as the so called specialized agencies such as e.g. the WHO (World Health Organization) and 
the ILO (International Labour Organization). NGOs are non-governmental organisations, CSOs are 
civil-society organizations, and CBOs are community-based organisations. 
30 There were rare exceptions, however, e.g. Kanbur (2002d, 2003a, ed.2003), Nankani (2005), Barcelona 
Consensus (2004). 
31 Kanbur (2001a,b).
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Often the criticism came from other social science disciplines and social sci-
entists, who felt shut out from the ‘commanding heights’ of development policy 
making, and who felt looked down upon by economists, as being ‘soft’ and ‘un-
rigorous’. But increasingly, the criticism was coming also from economists them-
selves, who were finding their tools and techniques, strong as they were, to be 
inadequate in themselves to address pressing policy and analytical problems of 
global poverty. Yet, within the ‘orthodoxy’ of economics32 and global economic 
policy-making the fate of courageous truth-seeking dissidents was not enviable: 
during the process of reaching the ‘Millennium Consensus’, several highly re-
spected, independently thinking professionals were ousted from the world’s lead-
ing poverty reduction agency, the World Bank.33 Why? Due to serious intellectual 
and ideological disagreements. Disagreements about what? 
My approach in research has been to take these disagreements and confron-
tations seriously. Coinciding as they did at a rare moment or critical juncture34 of a 
dramatic transformation of disclosure policies and practices of IFIs (due to the 
new information-technology, internet), these disagreements brought to the sur-
face some previously hidden but extremely essential ideational and institutional 
constraints of effective pro-poor thinking and action. The need to understand the 
roots of - and potential ways out of– these disagreements gave motivation for my 
research. My study gave me an opportunity to take a time-tour into the history 
of economic thought about poverty reduction, especially within the World Bank. 
Journeying backwards, the Bank’s poverty reduction agendas of the 1990s and 
1980s35 appeared simpler and cruder than the poverty reduction strategy for the 
3rd Millennium, as presented in the World Bank’s World Development Report 
(WDR) 2000.36 My early conclusion:  there has been progress. Yet, delving still 
deeper into the history, I discovered that the World Bank’s poverty reduction 
strategy for the 1970s had - to my surprise -  not  been even simpler than the 
strategy of the 1980s, but rather, a comprehensive multi-dimensional framework 
that looked surprisingly similar to the one presented in the WDR 2000. 
This clear discontinuity in the evolution of thought triggered an interest to 
look closer into the history of development economics. Is progress of ideas al-
ways linear, after all? Could disagreements within and around the World Bank be 
better understood – or settled – by going back into the history of thought, into the 
wisdoms of the first generation of development economics? This was a promis-
ing strategy, and there seemed to be interest among some of the sharp-sighted 
32 ‘Orthodox’ was a label that critics frequently put on the mainstream neoclassical (often neoliberal-
leaning) economics taught by most economics departments of the world. The opposite of ‘orthodox’ 
would be ‘heterodox’. 
33 E.g. Herman Daly (environmental economist), Caroline Moser (gender economist), Ravi Kanbur 
(chief editor of WDR-2000 on poverty reduction), Joseph Stiglitz (chief economist) and William 
Easterly (leading growth economist).  
34 Julkunen and Vauhkonen (2005) use the concept ’rare moment’. Pierson (2004) uses the term ‘critical 
juncture’.
35 World Bank (1990 and 1980, respectively).
36 World Bank (2001a).
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economists to revive the development economics of the 1970s.37 I partly agreed with 
these optimistic thinkers: reviving development economics was a necessary 
thing to do. 
But I was afraid it was not enough: As Ravi Kanbur argued, the root of the 
problem was that development economics had become too much like economics. 
Mainstream development economics today is mainstream economics applied to 
poor countries. It has all the strengths and all the weaknesses of the current 
economic way of thinking.38 The real problem lay in the fact that the ‘mother sci-
ence’, i.e. economics itself, had over the years become something that would be 
unrecognisable to its founding fathers such as Adam Smith, Marie-Jean-Antoine 
Condorcet, Friedrich List and Karl Marx, or to its past heroes such as Max Weber, 
Thorstein Veblen, John Maynard Keynes or Gunnar Myrdal. Realizing this, I de-
veloped an interest in understanding how the founding fathers and later gen-
erations of economists – and other social scientists, societal planners and policy 
makers – had in fact conceived the problem of poverty, and the role and oppor-
tunities they saw for public action in poverty reduction. This was my motivation 
for making a lengthy (several years’ and hundreds of written pages’) ‘intellectual 
journey’ into the ‘History of Professional Poverty Reduction Planners’.
 Space in this essay willnot permit a detailed ‘Travel Report’ from this intel-
lectual journey of mine. I have it all saved and printed, however, and one day I am 
going to publish another essay about poverty reduction thinking of the past four 
centuries of economists and other social planners. Suffice to say here that what 
I learned gave me reasons to believe that the crisis of mainstream neo-classical 
economics at the beginning of the 21st century is, in fact, a result of several occa-
sions in the history of economic thought, where – at an ideational juncture – the 
intellectual leaders of the mainstream of economics had chosen paths that had 
taken them further away from the kinds of approaches and tools that would be 
needed in today’s poverty reduction efforts. 
Although these findings are strictly speaking beyond the focus of my disser-
tation, I want to give here just a few brief examples of the ideational junctions I 
found on the way, because they have influenced the way I have been monitoring 
and interpreting the discussions and disagreements between poverty economists 
and non-economist poverty professionals in the years around the Millennium 
turn.
37 See e.g. Bezanson (1995, 1999), Mkandawire (2001b), Cameron (2003), Cameron and Ndhlovu 
(2000), Chang (ed.2003), Ghosh (2001), Kanbur (1999, 2000a. 2001b, 2002a, 2002b, 2003a), Stiglitz 
(2002), Townsend and Gordon (2002), Toye (2003a, b), Sumner (2003a,b). In the context of rich country 
economics there seems to be a parallel longing back to the Keynesian economics. See e.g. Townsend 
(2002) and Stiglitz (2002).  
38 Kanbur (2001a), p. 2.
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2.2.1 Development As Cycles Or As a Linear Progress?
I observed a shift in the late Middle-Ages from the cyclical to the linear con-
ception of time, from holistic to reductionist thinking, and the birth of the idea 
of limitless man-made progress. The more I read about the lives and ideas of 
Descartes, Bacon, Hobbes, Newton, Saint-Simon and the other early ‘progressive 
thinkers’, the less convinced I became about how ‘enlightened’ and suitable their 
ideas would be as ideals for those (large) parts of mankind whose worldviews 
have not yet become so linear, reductionist and results-oriented as our Western 
worldviews are.39
2.2.2 Homo Economicus (Calculating Utilitarianism) or Multi-Dimen-
sional Welfare?
The global development community – dominated by the World Bank - still suf-
fers from the choice of Bentham’s calculative Utilitarianism - rather than e.g. 
Condorcet’s comprehensive Welfare Economics - as the theoretical foundation for 
the management of the poverty problem in the Anglo-Saxon world from the early 
19th century and beyond. Bentham was the ideal-type of a non-poor ‘poverty tech-
nocrat’ whose approach was to manage poverty by classifying and segregating 
the various types of paupers and poor (‘the unfeathered part of the national livestock 
that walks on two legs’) into administrative categories, according to their capacity 
to work, and then to plan different programmes, institutions (e.g. poorhouses) 
and techniques could used by poverty technocrats to ‘normalize’ each category 
of paupers.40 
As extensively described by Rotchild and Sen, Condorcet’s goal – which the 
future generations of non-poor poverty professionals unfortunately decided to 
ignore – was different from Bentham’s. It was a human rights based idea that all 
members of the society should have an assured subsistence each season, each 
year, and wherever they live. The most efficient policies in Condorcet’s view 
would be those whose effect was to prevent people from becoming poor, e.g. 
universal public education, which would help to combat dependency-creating 
inequalities in society, and social savings banks, which could help poor families 
manage their social risks and prevent misery.41 
39 See e.g. Illich (1971, 1992, 1997), Esteva (1992) Esteva and Prakash (1998), Landes (1998), p.52, 
Luukkanen (1994), p. 8-21, Rahnema (1992), Rahnema and Bawntree (eds. 1997), Sachs (1992), Escobar 
(1995), Rich (1994), Rist (1997), p. 30-34, MacEwan (1999), Wolf (1982), p. 195-196. 
40 Bentham (1843/1984).
41 Rothschild (1995), p. 9-11. See also Rothschild (2001), Sen (1999), p. 9-10, 213-216, 509-510, Leisering 
(1989), Dean (1997). The potential of micro-banking and micro-insurance to function exactly as 
Condorcet suggested was (re-) invented by development agencies only in early 1990s. An instrumental 
role in the spread of this ‘new’ innovation was played by the Grameen Bank, a successful micro-finance 
institution founded by Professor Yunus in Bangladesh. See Malkamäki (1991) and Rutherford (2000). 
See also Micro-banking in Websources.  Local savings banks also played an important role in poverty 
reduction in the history of Finland.  See: Kuusterä, (1995).
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2.2.3 Economic ‘Laws’ or Context-Specificity? 
The international community of professional economists suffered from an amaz-
ing ‘amnesia’ in the interwar period during which they ignored and forgot most of 
the key lessons learned during the one century when the context-specific German 
Historical School of Economics was the leading school of economics in the world. 
Also the key lessons of the once influential American Institutional School of 
Economics were sidelined. As a result, mainstream economics has, since Lionel 
Robbins, in 1932, been defined as the ‘science of choice under scarcity’. Economics 
has turned itself into a mathematical ‘equilibrium game’ or ‘Harmonielehre’ of 
exchange (under the artificial assumptions of perfect information and perfect 
foresight, and therefore focused its attention almost completely on the ‘Man the 
Trader’, but ignored the ‘Man the Producer’.42 
2.2.4 Revolution or Social Reform? 
I observed a failure by the mainstream economics to incorporate ‘political pres-
sure’ as one of the key factors in the dynamic economic analysis of poverty and 
its reduction.  As any historian would understand, in no country of the world 
have pro-poor economic and social policy reforms taken place without at least 
some degree of a threat of revolution – or noisy demands for reform - by the dis-
advantaged majorities over the privileged minorities. Well known examples of 
these are e.g. the social reforms in Germany during the times of Bismarck and the 
emerging socialists, in Britain during the New Liberalism and the ‘permeating’ 
Fabians, and in Finland during the days of ‘Fennoman’ social reformers and the 
labour movement, first led by patriarchal social-liberalists, and later by working 
men and women themselves.43
2.2.5 Planning Optimism and Social Policy Master Plans
The post Second World War decades were the Golden Era of Planning not only 
in the central planning economies of the East but equally much in the Capitalist 
West. The Beveridge Master Plan (1942) laid the ground for British Social Policy 
for several decades to come, and Pekka Kuusi’s ‘Social Policy of the 1960s’ (1961) 
did the same for the Finnish welfare state of the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s. In the 
poor countries of the Global South the broadly shared confidence (including by 
the World Bank) in the virtues of ‘scientific’ (i.e. quantitative economic) planning 
42 Robbins (1932), Hodgson (2001), Kliemt (1990). See also: Colander (2009) and Stiglitz (2009 a, b). 
43 The liberal governments of Britain introduced wide-ranging social reforms between 1906-14. The 
political New Liberalism stressed a more ‘organic’ view of society and an increased role for the state in 
ensuring that individuals were not overly disadvantaged by circumstances not of their own making. 
New Liberalism sought to ameliorate the ‘social problem’, so as to make British capitalism more 
efficient in an increasingly hostile and competitive world, as well as acting as an antidote to the rise 
of socialism. Besides the trade union movement and the small group of Marxists, the Fabians were an 
influential group within the British labour movement. The Fabian Society, formed in 1884, put their 
faith not in revolution but in an ‘evolutionary socialism’ through what they called ‘permeation’ of the 
country’s intellectual and political life. See e.g. Stewart (1998), p. 23, 25, Sullivan (1998), p. 109-111, Cole 
(2001), Terrins and Whitehead (n.d.), Woolfe (1975), p. 276. Soikkanen (1961), p. 36-37., Rasila (1982), 
p. 16-17, Tuomioja (1996), p. 21, Yrjö-Koskinen (1874), p., cited in Kettunen (1994a), p. 92, Åkerman 
(1993), p. 187-191. See also Fabianism in Websources.
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led to the formulation and (partial) implementation of more than 300 different 
national development plans in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s.44 The unavoidable end 
result of the unfounded planning optimism was a widespread disillusionment 
and ‘fatique’ with quantitative planning in the 1980s and 1990s. This oscillation 
from one extreme to the other is unfortunate: There should be no reason to doubt 
the value of analytic planning models and simulations as heuristic and didactic 
instruments, as long as planners do not forget that models are but gross simpli-
fications of reality. As underlined in his Nobel lecture by Jan Tinbergen, one of 
the most famous pioneers in the practice of quantitative development planning: 
“Models constitute a framework or a skeleton and the flesh and blood will have to be added 
by a lot of common sense and knowledge of details.”45
2.2.6 The Neo-Liberal Attack and Competing Welfare State Models 
A sharp paradigm shift took place in mainstream economics in the 1980s.   It was 
closely related to the forceful and ideologically motivated ‘coup d’etat’ in nation-
al and global politics by the ‘Thatcherite-Reaganomic’ neo-liberals, whose ‘pro-
market’ (or ‘market-fundamentalist’) economic policy prescriptions were largely 
based on the monetarist philosophy of Friedrich von Hayek, Milton Friedmann 
and the so called Chicago School of Economics.46 In academic economics teach-
ing, too, the neo-liberally oriented monetarist paradigm, combined with highly 
mathematical econometric methods, almost completely marginalized (for a peri-
od of over two decades) the previously influential – more ‘hermeneutic’ - schools 
of ‘Keynesian’ economics in the context of industrialized countries and ‘Myrda-
lian’ development economics in the context of developing countries.47 
2.3 hYpothetiCAl QueStioNS
In the rest of Chapter-2, I am going to introduce my four main research questions. 
As I delved deeper into these questions, nine hypothetical propositions began to 
emerge. These propositions that kept motivating my research will be discussed 
in Chapter-3.
44 Beveridge (1942, 1944). See also Beveridge (1924, 1936, 1943, 1948), Abel-Smith (2001), Daniel and 
Ivatts (1998), p. 9-11. Glynn (1998), p. 186-189,  Kettunen (1994), p. 87-106, Pinker (1998), p. 96, 273-284, 
Saari (1994), p. 115, Saari (1997), Silburn (1995), 87-91, Townsend (1979), Tuomioja (1996),p.  20-88, 
Waris (1954), p. 13-18, Waris (1961), p. v.
45 Tinbergen (1981), p. 15. See also Colander (2009). 
46 Hayek (1944), Friedman (1953). On Chicago School of Economics, see: Valdés (1995). See also: Halimi 
(2002); MacEwan (1999), 
47 Hall (1992), p. 104 and 112, Barlow, Farnham and Horton (1996), p. 100.  For a more extensive 
discussion of Thatcher’s policies, see Riddel (1990), Smith (1988), Maynard (1988) and Holmes (1985). 
On the return of Keynesian economic policy thinking after the financial crisis of 2007-2010, see: 
Skidelsky (2009).
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2.3.1 Question-1: How Do Interests, Ideas and Identities Influence 
Each Other?  
Institutionalist approaches (of economics, political economy, political science and 
economic and social history) have often been better at explaining what is not 
possible in a given institutional context – due e.g. to various constraints, path 
dependence, persistence of institutional patterns and other policy continuities – 
than what is possible. What has been missing is theorizing on the tangible policy 
outcomes of the interaction of ideas, interests, identities and institutions. John L. 
Campbell’s book ‘Institutional Change and Globalization’ fills part of this vacu-
um by discussing the various patterns and mechanisms of institutional change. 
My study will contribute towards broadening the discussion about ideas and 
interests in institutional change and, secondly, introducing the idea that organi-
zational and professional identities, too, may play an important role in the way 
various ideas and interests are translated and transmitted to policy-discussions, 
political struggles and decision-making processes.48 
2.3.2 Question-2: Can Multi-Dimensional Poverty be Reduced by 
Mono-Dimensional Poverty Expertise? 
In my country ‘poverty reduction’ is understood – above all – as a political strug-
gle. At the centre of this political struggle are the various ideas (both ideologies 
and more practical ideas) about the ways in which the existing (formal and in-
formal – local, national and global) institutions should be changed, so that they 
would better reflect and promote the interests of the poor, the less poor and the 
rich. Identities  largely determine into which category each individual citizen 
positions herself in these struggles, and what roles (rights, opportunities, respon-
sibilities) each individual sees for her own action in that struggle.   
In my society, ‘poverty’ is widely conceived not only as lack of income but as 
a problem of simultaneous and cumulative deprivation along several dimensions 
of well-being. Also most development agencies subscribe to a multi-dimensional 
definition of poverty - well described in the joint Poverty Reduction Guidelines 
of the aid agencies of the OECD-Governments (Produced by the DAC-POVNET).49 
(See Figure 1).
Solutions to such a multi-faceted problem have to be multi-dimensional, too. 
Therefore, it is natural that the poverty struggles permeate all fora of economic 
and social policy-making. These poverty debates are informed and facilitated 
in Finland by the multi-disciplinary and multi-dimensional ideas and data of 
all poverty professionals, with diverse academic and professional backgrounds: 
political science, law, statistics, economics, sociology, pedagogy, medicine, nutri-
tion, forestry, engineering, theology, philosophy, environmental studies, architec-
ture, journalism, psychology, management and public administration, etc.  The 
coordinating role in these poverty research and debate processes belongs in my 
country – almost naturally, and without any tendencies or feelings of monopo-
48 Campbell (2004). Thelen and Steinmo (1992), p. 14 and Ikenbury (1988), 242.
49 Heikkilä (1990, 1991). OECD-DAC (2001c), p. 39.  
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listic disciplinary domination – to one specific group of professionals of care, 
trained in an academic discipline called ‘Social Policy’. I call this group Social 
Policy Professionals (SPPs).50  
          
Figure 1. The Multi-Dimensional Framework of Poverty as Presented in the OECD-
DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines 200151
This essay is addressed primarily to SPPs and other Professionals of Care (POC) in 
the Global South and North. By Professionals of Care I mean a very broad cat-
egory of social policy/social development full-timers such as e.g.  nurses, social 
workers, environmentalists, development activists, civil servants in ministries of 
social affairs, health and labour, environment, representatives of deprived popu-
lation groups (e.g. people with disabilities or HIV/AIDS, ethnic minorities, etc.), 
mothers, social and environmental policy scholars and politicians, as well as 
50 The politically sanctioned requirement of crosscutting policy coherence guarantees that the social 
policy professionals cannot be left alone to cope with the poverty problems: Four Ministries (of 
Social Affairs and Health, of Labour, of Environment and of Education) are officially responsible 
for poverty issues in Finland, but in addition to them there are many other active participants in the 
Finnish poverty policy debates and struggles, including all other ministries, especially the Ministry 
of Finance, as well as the social partners (the employers‘ associations, trade unions and farmers’ 
and land-owners’ union), several public and private research institutes, social insurance funds and 
companies, 342 autonomous municipal authorities (2010),  hundreds of civil society organizations, 
including the Lutheran church that most Finns belong to, and the media.
51 OECD-DAC (2001c), p. 39.
 
            PROTECTIVE 
                 Security 
           Vulnerability 
 
 
                 
   ECONOMIC                    POLITICAL 
Consumption                      Rights 
Income             GENDER                 Influence 
 Assets                       Freedom 
 
    ENVIRONMENT 
 
 
      
HUMAN                       SOCIO- 
       Health                   CULTURAL 
                            Education                       Status 
                             Nutrition                                  Dignity 
 
 
 
  37
social development professionals and environmental experts in the multi- and 
bilateral development agencies and in NGOs. Social justice and the reduction of 
unnecessary human suffering are essential elements of the professional – and 
often personal - identity of these professionals. Yet, when it comes to planning 
and deciding how to reduce the greatest sufferings and inequalities of mankind 
today, i.e. how to reduce Global Poverty, these professionals of care are strangely 
marginalized. They play only very marginal roles in a global drama where you 
need a university degree in economics (preferably from an American university) 
to even be considered for audition. 
In global development policy, the ultimate experts of poverty are economists - 
within (and outside) the leading poverty reduction agency World Bank.52 In spite 
of a number of ‘Staff Diversity’ campaigns carried over the years, the number of 
non-economists among the World Bank’s professional staff is small. Knowing that 
the World Bank, too, officially defines poverty as a multi-dimensional problem, 
one might think that the mono-disciplinary bias would be a cause of concern for 
the World Bank, and its shareholders (world’s governments), and its ‘clients’ (poor 
people in poor countries.) 
Yet, it is not considered a problem. One reason for this state of affairs is that 
until very recently no academic subject such as Global Social Policy existed.53 
Secondly, even ‘social policy’ is not known as an academic subject in most coun-
tries of the world, including in the USA and its nine leading universities, from 
which the World Bank recruits most of its staff.54 In Finland, in the UK and in a 
small number of other countries ‘social policy’ exists as an independent academic 
discipline. Another reason may be that despite the Bank’s official commitment to 
using a multi-dimensional definition of poverty, the true, instinctive and institu-
tionalized concept of poverty used by the mainstream World Bank economists 
in their day-to-day work is that of a mono-dimensional, money-metric income 
poverty: You are poor if your daily income falls below the 1,25 US-dollar per day 
poverty line defined by the Bank economists.
52 As noted by the Swedish-American Nobel economist Gunnar Myrdal over thirty years ago (in Myrdal 
1970, p. 438): “The  social scientists represent the main link between rational and actual policy choices. Among 
them we economists, as planners and advisers to peoples and their governments, dominate that interrelation.” 
This situation has not changed. For this reason I have had a special interest in the development of the 
‘Economics of Poverty Reduction’.
53 Jyväskylä University in Finland started Global Social Policy as a full academic study programme 
in 2009. Late Professor Peter Townsend was professor of International Social Policy at the London 
School of Economics. Sheffield University in the UK has had a professorship in International Social 
Policy since late 1990s, and Professor Bob Deacon of Sheffield has been instrumental in establishing 
the academic journal called Global Social Policy. Dr. Nicola Yeates teaches Global Social Policy at the 
Open University in London, Dr. Arjan de Haan at the Institute of Social Studies in the Hague and Prof. 
Lutz Leisering at the University of Bielefeld. Find more about these pioneers of Global Social Policy as 
an academic subject in Websources section after Bibliography (under Townsend, Deacon, Yeates, Haan 
and Leisering). 
54 Mallaby (2004).
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2.3.3 Question-3: One Dollar Per Day – Below Human Dignity?
Methodologically, my approach has been a blend of empirical observation in poor 
countries and within aid organisations, and literature-based desk-research. I have 
spent almost three decades monitoring international development cooperation, 
over half of which as participant observer either ‘in the field’ – in Tanzania, Nepal 
and Vietnam – or in the aid donor headquarters in the capitals, especially the 
Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFAF), the ILO, the World Bank, and the 
OECD-DAC55. I have complemented my personal observations through wide his-
torical and contemporary literature research, conceptual work and institutional 
analysis.  By using a cross-disciplinary comparative research approach I have 
analysed the same empirical findings through different theoretical frames (e.g. 
various schools of economics, political science, sociology, economic and social 
history, development studies and social policy) and assessed the differences – and 
reasons for them.
As I said in the Preface, I started my research in the 1990s in a rural corner of 
Tanzania where I felt a mismatch between what I saw for myself and the ‘official 
poverty maps’ (World Bank statistics) which categorized the people of Mtwara 
and Lindi regions of Tanzania into the category ‘incomes below 1 USD per day’,56 
and therefore as living lives ‘without hope’ and ‘below human dignity’, as the 
World Bank’s most authoritative poverty report (World Development Report 
1990) said. I did not question their disadvantage, vulnerability and poverty, but 
I was asking myself, whether it was really the low monetary incomes (0.15 USD 
per day of statistically registered incomes, on average) that best characterized 
their poverty. 
My own observations and findings from the participatory rural appraisals57 we 
conducted in the villages of Mtwara and Lindi regions showed that for most of 
the time most of those people were living good and dignified lives. The crucial 
difference between their lives and the lives of ordinary Finnish people was in the 
level of serious livelihood risks and capacity to cope with such risks. 
The seasonal calendars  that villagers drew in the villages of Mtwara and 
Lindi showed clearly that most of them were typically doing quite well for about 
11 months each year, but that there was a short period of time each year in the 
rainy season when they were extremely vulnerable to impoverishment.  It was a 
period of 3-6 weeks during which their food stocks from the previous harvest 
were already very low and new harvest was not yet available. The cash incomes 
55 DAC is the Development Assistance Committee of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD), i.e. the most important joint think-tank of the aid agencies of the rich country 
governments. 
56 Until 2008 the official World Bank income poverty definition was, in fact, incomes below 1.08 USD/
day. In 2008 the World Bank revised this definition, raising the daily income poverty line to 1,25 USD/
day, based on the improved price data from the latest (2005) round of the International Comparison 
Program. This new World Bank international poverty line of $1.25 a day at 2005 prices was the mean 
of the national poverty lines for the 10-20 poorest countries of the world. See: Ravallion and Chen 
(2008). See also: World Bank – New Poverty Estimates 2008 in Websources. For a critique of this revision, 
see: Reddy (2008).
57 Voipio (1998d), RIPS (1998, 2002), Chambers (1983, 1994a,b,c, 1997, Mukherjee (1992, 1993), IIED 
(1991). Institute of Development Studies (1994, 2000). 
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they had received from the sales of cashew-nuts in October-November were al-
ready spent by that difficult short period in March-May, and due to the rains it 
was also the time when malaria and other diseases peaked and they would have 
needed money to travel to clinics and dispensaries to get treatment. 
I was shocked to learn that the distress during those few short weeks forced 
many families to resort to highly unsustainable coping strategies, like selling 
their livestock, farming tools or even their land58 - just to be able to buy enough 
food to avoid starvation until the next harvest, or to be able to pay the health-re-
lated consultation, medication and transport fees. This, of course, led to a down-
ward spiral into deeper poverty next year. It was also not uncommon that families 
pulled their children out from school during that difficult period, if one of the 
parents fell ill, and help was needed in the shambas59 (fields) or in managing the 
household chores. The risks were high that such distress coping measures would 
lead to long-term succession of inter-generational poverty.
While this was sad to observe, it was also a highly encouraging realization for 
me: If the rural Tanzanians were actually poor and vulnerable only for a period 
of one month (1/12th of a year), the challenge of poverty reduction would actually 
be far smaller than if they would be really living lives below any human decency 
for 365 days per year, as the World Bank statistics made one think. Wouldn’t it be 
much more manageable a challenge to develop some social protection systems 
that would help people cope with the short stress period each spring - without 
resorting to distress coping mechanisms that further aggravate the long-term 
poverty?
Since then I have been interested in social protection as one of the key ap-
proaches to sustainable poverty eradication. In the WDR-1990 I found some ref-
erence to ‘well-targeted transfers and safety nets’ as a complement to the main 
strategy suggested for poverty reduction, consisting of labour-intensive economic 
growth, basic education and basic health care. This sounded great to me, but I 
soon found out that the reality of what the World Bank was doing on rural pover-
ty reduction in Tanzania was less promising than what I had read in the WDR. In 
reality the Bank still conceived poverty simply as incomes below 1 USD per day, 
and invested the bulk of its huge resources to promoting the GDP-growth – and 
export trade growth - ‘at any cost’ with little consideration on how the measures 
implemented would help rural Tanzanians cope over the difficult period during 
the rainy season.  Ever since, I have been trying to understand why the brilliant 
poverty economists in the World Bank would do so. What was the logic in their 
mind that led them to ignore the annual realities of rural Africans that I had ob-
served in Mtwara and Lindi? This study became a long search for answers but I 
feel I have found some answers by now.
I also realized that not only the World Bank was allocating its development 
credits according to the logic based on the one-dollar-a-day concept of poverty. 
58 There was officially no private ownership of land in Tanzania at that time – because all land belonged 
officially to the state, and was allocated to families for farming by the village councils or village elders 
- but in reality an informal land market existed.
59 Shamba is Kiswahili for field.
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Also my own government and most other OECD governments were allocating 
their development grants to Tanzania and other developing countries so as to 
maximize the national GDP-growth, and growth of exports, with surprisingly 
little analysis on how this would translate into a better capacity of the rural poor 
to cope with the difficult periods of their – otherwise good – lives. 
Because I could not find convincing evidence to show how the donor-driven 
development strategies were in fact expected to reduce the vulnerability of the 
poor households, I developed a tentative – almost instinctive – conclusion that the 
choices of the World Bank economists and other donors must be based on some 
assumptions that they are making about the cause-and-effect chains from GDP 
and export growth to the reduction of vulnerabilities among the rural poor.  So, 
one of the objectives of my research process thereafter has been to understand 
what these assumptions – or mental maps - are, and why policy choices are based 
on assumptions rather than on observed evidence from real life of poor people. 
Unconvinced as I was, based on my own observations in the South of Tanzania60, I 
also felt a need to search for better mental maps of poverty and poverty reduction. 
Later I realized that the ‘poverty reduction guidelines’ used by the bilateral 
donor agencies of industrialised country governments such as Finland do not even 
correspond well with the historical experiences that Finland and other industri-
alised countries have had.  Whose experiences and frameworks of thinking were 
they then based on? Where on earth are there countries that have escaped poverty 
using the poverty maps recommended by the World Bank poverty economists? 
Over the 17 years that I spent on this research project I recognized, to my sat-
isfaction, that the aid agencies are, indeed, engaged in an intensive work to renew 
their poverty maps, and that the maps of 21st century61 are in fact already rather 
different, in important respects, from the maps I could access in the early 1990s. 
This ideational evolution makes a good story, and I wanted to narrate it in this essay. 
I have also seen encouraging indications that the non-economist professionals of 
care are gradually becoming interested in making a contribution to the global 
struggle against poverty, which I am very glad about. To be able to work con-
structively together with the leading experts of global poverty (economists), the 
social policy professionals will have to understand how the poverty economists 
think. This book will make a contribution towards that end. 
2.3.4 Question-4: Futures Beyond Poverty? Rethinking or Recycling 
Poverty Reduction Ideas? 
Widespread poverty is – rightly – conceived as a crisis, but unfortunately no-one 
knows with full certainty how to resolve the crisis. In situations of uncertainty, 
ideas tell agents what to do and what kind of future to construct.62 One of the 
60 And later in rural Nepal or Vietnam. I did some field research work in Nepal in 1997, and in Vietnam 
in 2002.
61 See e.g. World Bank (2001a, 2005b), OECD-DAC (2001c; 2006a,b; 2009a,b,c). UN-DESA (2010), 
UNRISD (2010c), UNDG (2010a, b, c, d), UNDP (2010). Surprisingly, after having published its 
authoritative ‘flagship report’, the World Development Report on the topic of Poverty Reduction in 
the even years of 1980, 1990 and in 2000, the World Bank decided not to publish one in 2010. 
62 Blyth (2002), p. 9-11.
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objectives of my research work has been to try to understand what sorts of ideas 
and visions the international aid agencies and their professional development 
planners have had in their minds about the futures beyond poverty. I.e. what 
kind of societies would Tanzania, Ghana, Nepal or Laos be in year 2025, if the 
aid agencies and professional planners would by then have succeeded in all their 
current plans. 
Obviously, the people of Mtwara-Lindi, or any other poor corner of any poor 
country, are seldom asked whether they agree or not with these official visions, 
definitions and criteria of poverty and progress. In the late 1990s and 2000s there 
have been some encouraging efforts by the Tanzanian government, the UNDP, 
the World Bank and by some bilateral donors, including the Finnish-funded 
RIPS-Programme to engage rural Tanzanians in participatory definitions and 
assessments of poverty?63 Would incomes over the one-dollar-per-day threshold 
relieve them of poverty in their own view? I felt it would also be important for 
the Tanzanians, too, to know what kind of an ideal image of a ‘post-poverty so-
ciety’ the various donors have in mind. Not all ‘wazungu’64 think the same, was 
my assumption, based on my unsystematic observations. If I were a Tanzanian, 
I would ask the foreign donors what sorts of experiences - and results - they had 
achieved in their home societies in reducing the poverty of the weaker segments 
of their populations, e.g. the children and the women.
Interestingly, during my research period, in 1999, the Planning Commission 
of the Government of Tanzania published The Tanzania Development Vision 2025,65 
a document that synthesized the Tanzanian poverty professionals’ visions about 
Tanzania one full generation later.  Since then all of Tanzania’s National Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) and other national strategies have been drafted 
in line with the Vision 2025 document, which aims at achieving by year 2025 a 
“high quality livelihood for Tanzanian people...”  The Tanzanians’ vision was to 
achieve by year 2025 a standard of living comparable to the one that Malaysia had 
achieved by year 1999. A realistic vision, I felt, when I visited Malaysia in 2004. 
Tanzanian policy-makers used the following attributes to define their vision 
of ‘high quality livelihood’: 
 – Food self-sufficiency and food security;
 – Universal primary education...and literacy...and tertiary education com-
mensurate with a critical mass of high quality human resources to ...mas-
ter the development challenges at all levels;
 – Gender equality and empowerment of women;
 – Access to primary health care for all;
 – Access to quality reproductive health services for all;
 – Reduction of infant and maternal infant mortality by 3/4 of current levels;
63 See e.g. Jamhuri ya Muungano wa Tanzania (1998), p. xi;  United Republic of Tanzania (1998), p. ix; 
Narayan (1997), Narayan and Pritchett (1997), Narayan et al (2000a,b, 2002, 2007, 2009), Narayan (2009, 
2010), Narayan and Petesh (2009), Nchimbi and Seppälä (1999), Booth & al. (1999), Ehrhart & co. (2003). 
64 ‘Wazungu’ is Kiswahili for ‘white people’ (plural, the singular would be ‘mzungu’). 
65 United Republic of Tanzania (1999).
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 – Universal access to safe water;
 – Life expectancy comparable to the level attained by typical middle in-
come countries; - and:
 – Absence of abject poverty.
I started my research in Tanzania, in the dusty library room of the Mtwara re-
gional administration. There I found lots of old planning documents for Mtwara 
and Lindi regions written since 1950s by professional development planners from 
Britain, Tanzania, Finland, World Bank and Unicef. Comparing the texts, I felt I 
was able to recognize differences, both between the older and the more recent 
texts, as well as between the texts written by consultants representing various 
professionals groups (agriculturalists, road engineers, economists, sociologists, 
etc.), nationalities (Britons, Tanzanians, Finns) and institutional backgrounds 
(World Bank, Unicef, Finnida66). I wanted to know whether my few observations 
could represent some broader systematic patterns and what such differences - if 
they exist - could be based on.
What had the ‘non-poor poverty professionals’ of various times, professions 
and nationalities thought about poverty reduction and futures beyond poverty? 
Where did the new ideas come from? Did they arise from the local reality? Were 
they borrowed from outside? From other projects in Tanzania or elsewhere? Who 
were the active agents behind the transfer of ideas? Politicians, practitioners or 
academic researchers? 
But I also found large amounts of continuity: Most of the field-level activities 
recommended by the rapidly revolving teams of consultants in Mtwara-Lindi 
were, in fact, ideas ‘inherited’ from the previous generations of consultants work-
ing in the same area.67 I also found that many of the ideas recommended for 
Mtwara-Lindi were simultaneously recommended for other rural areas by other 
consultants. How do ideas travel? Are they deliberately exported by somebody, 
or actively sought and imported by others? Or do ‘good ideas fly with wind’, as 
Robert Chamber says?68
66 The development assistance funded by the Government of Finland (GOF) is in fact currently 
administered by five parallel departments of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFAF). 
However, the government’s aid administration used to be widely known as ‘KYO’ (in Finnish) and 
Finnida (in other languages) for about 30 years.  
67 In fact, after several years of consultancy missions and planning periods between 2007 and 2010, 
all aimed at innovating ‘a completely novel approach’ for Finnish support to rural development 
in Mtwara-Lindi, the new programme, this time called ‘LIMAS’ (Lindi and Mtwara Agribusiness 
Support) and supposed to start implementation in 2011 repeats all the same old ideas (cashew 
processing, chicken, goats) that already several previous generations of British, World Bank and 
Finnish professional development planners had written into their documents in the 1960s, 70s, 80s, 
90s and 2000s.
68 Chambers (1995, personal communication). 
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2.3 plAN oF the eSSAY 
Chapter-3 will explain my theoretical approach in greater detail. Those readers 
with little interest for academic theorizing can jump over Chapter-3 and still find 
the rest of the essay interesting. Chapter-4 will describe a shift of poverty reduc-
tion thinking from serious disagreements related to the structural adjustment 
programmes to the emergence of the Global Millennium Consensus on poverty 
reduction. Chapter-5 will provide a case study of the politics of poverty econom-
ics within one – leading – global institution of poverty economists, the World 
Bank. The World Development Report 2000, a flagship report of the World Bank 
introduced a very strong multi-dimensional conceptual framework for poverty 
reduction. The framework consists of four pillars: (a) Security, (b) Empowerment, 
(c) Opportunity, and (d) Global Governance.69 This innovative approach, however, 
faced resistance, which then turned into a major conflict among professional pov-
erty economists.
In Chapter-6 I revisit the global poverty reduction discourse ten years after 
the Millennium consensus – and conflicts. We observe a shift from neoclassical 
poverty economics to global social policy. Chapter 7 is the place to discuss the 
conclusions. 
I imagine social policy professionals and other professionals of care as my pri-
mary readership. What could they learn from my evidence? How safely can they 
leave the challenges of global poverty and inequality into the hands of poverty 
economists and diplomats? Is there a need – and room – in the global poverty 
reduction challenges for contributions by social policy professionals?  What kinds 
of contributions could they make, for instance in poor countries like Tanzania? Or 
do countries first have to grow rich before they can afford to engage with social 
policies? 
Over the past 10-15 years Tanzania has had as impressive GDP-growth fig-
ures as any World Bank growth economist could imagine. Yet, economic growth 
does not seem to be translating into poverty reduction in terms of MDGs or any 
other multi-dimensional scales of poverty. Is there something wrong in the pat-
tern of growth in Tanzania?  Could growth itself be made more pro-poor? How 
are participation, security and empowerment related to poverty reduction and 
pro-poor growth? Who are the key agents of poverty reduction in a country like 
Tanzania? World Bank and other donors? The national Ministry of Finance? Poor 
individuals? How about the professionals of care? Is there a role in sustainable 
poverty reduction also for social policy professionals in social and labour minis-
tries, social security administrations and civil society organisations working in 
the field of social policy and development? 
Do we always have to see the ‘economic’ and the ‘social’ as two separate ‘pil-
lars’ of development, in a constant battle for hegemony? I shall conclude the es-
69 I deliberately use an order of presentation that is slightly different from the one used in the final 
version of the WDR-2000. The order I use is much more logical, in my view. Also, I have renamed 
the fourth pillar. In the WDR-2000 it was called “International Action”, while I have decided to call it 
“Global Governance”.
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say with a call for coherence and cooperation between economic policies that are 
socially responsible and social policies that are economically responsible. Socio-
economics would be the equivalent academic discipline, or still better, in order not 
to ignore the natural foundations of sustainability on our finite globe, we should 
probably call it socio-ecolo-nomics.
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3 Theory and Propositions: 
Ideas, Interests and 
Identities
Theoretically, this study questions the feasibility of strict methodological individu-
alism and methodological nationalism in social sciences, despite their dominating 
positions in contemporary social sciences.  The work at hand argues in favour of 
methodological globalism. It supports a methodological holism which seeks to identify 
all causes and effects of individual as well as community motivation and behav-
iour, whether they are within or outside the bounds of the nation state/national 
economy concerned. One could also speak of methodological pluralism, leaving 
doors open not only to individual utility maximization as the driving force of 
all human and societal action, but also to various mixes of motivations based on 
group identify, affinity, reciprocity  and solidarity.  
3.1 FRom methoDologiCAl NAtioNAliSm to 
methoDologiCAl gloBAliSm
Social scientists tend to use – almost instinctively, and nearly without exceptions70 
– the nation state as the basic unit of their research and analysis. A society is the 
‘laboratory’ of economists and other social scientists,71 and it is at that level where 
most social science theories find their sought-after equilibrium. Even when try-
ing to solve pragmatic issues such as poverty reduction, social scientists (including 
economists) are ultimately trying to find answers to some of the very basic ques-
tions of their disciplines, e.g. the ‘Social Question’ of how to organise production 
and redistribution in a given society in order to maintain both social cohesion and 
incentive to work. Or the ‘Budget Question’ of how to allocate the scarce GDP and 
70 One of the few exceptions is the World systems approach (WSA), a macro-sociological perspective 
that seeks to explain the dynamics of the ‘capitalist world economy’ as a ‘total social system’. WSA 
was originally formulated by Wallerstein (1974, 1980, 1989), who was inspired by Fernand Braudel 
(1949/1985) of the French Annales School tradition, supported e.g. by Samir Amin (1990, 1991), 
Giovanni Arrighi (1990), and Andre Gunder Frank (1978a,b, 1990a,b, 1991, 1998), and followed by 
– among others - Christopher Chase-Dunn and Thomas Hall (1989, 1991), Timo Voipio (1993) and 
Teivo Teivainen (2002). 
71 Despite the wide consensus about the multi-dimensionality of the global poverty problem (see e.g. 
UNDP 1990 and 1997, OECD-DAC 2001c, and World Bank 2001a) and about the need for inter-dis-
ciplinary solutions to it, a strange and unfruitful distinction between the economists ‘non-economist 
social scientists’ is still stubbornly entertained by the global community of development economists.
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government budgets of a given society in order to best meet the needs of current and 
future members of the ‘basic unit’ of research, i.e. the nation state/national economy.
Even when focusing their research on worldwide questions such as global pov-
erty most social scientists stick to the same methodological nationalism: ‘Inter-
national’ is interpreted at its face value as comparative analysis between self-con-
tained studies of nation states. This is based on the assumption that the reasons 
and remedies for poverty in any single country can be found within that nation-
state. Armed with powerful computers tireless researchers run endless cross-coun-
try regressions in order to identify the crucial single ‘Factor-X’ along which the 
Country Y diverges most from the median of many self-contained nation states. 
Those arguing for methodological globalism, or trans-nationalism, do so be-
cause they fear that a comparison of the individual self-contained country cases 
is never going to provide us with a full picture of the causes and effects of any 
phenomenon, unless we identify and analyse also the transnational/global factors 
behind national developments. Poverty and hunger caused by loss of soil fertil-
ity caused by global climatic change is an example of a poverty-creating process 
where methodological nationalism fails even to ask the relevant questions, not to 
speak of providing meaningful answers. Methodologically global research treats 
the entire world as the basic unit of research. 
Globalization studies, a new inter-disciplinary discipline understandably 
takes a global methodological approach. Global poverty is one of the central re-
search topics of another new academic subject, Global Social Policy, the main dif-
ference of which compared to the ‘ordinary’ social policy is not the global reach 
of its research cases, but its methodological globalism. Global Social Policy is the 
academic ‘home’ of this study.72
3.2 methoDologiCAl iNDiviDuAliSm AND DoNoR 
DiSCouRSeS 
Of all social sciences, economics seems to be the one most deeply wedded into the 
principle of ‘methodological individualism’, i.e. to the study of the rational choices 
of the utility maximizing (selfish) individual under constraints of scarcity.73 In other 
words, economists – and nowadays sociologists and political scientists, too - tend 
to believe that all observable phenomena can be traced back to, and explained by, 
the choices of rational individuals. The opposite of this is ‘methodological holism’, 
which holds that groups have traits, behaviours and outcomes that cannot be 
understood by reducing them to their individual parts.74 
72 On global social policy as an academic discipline, see e.g. Deacon (1997, 2007), Yeates (2001, 2008), Hall 
and Midgley (2004), Yeates and Holder (2009), and the Global Social Policy Journal (available at: gsp.
sagepub.com). The key texts on the subject in Finnish language are probably Voipio (2005 and 2009). 
73 Robbins (1932). Arrow (1994, p. 2) wrote: “Mainstream economics is the purest exemplar of methodological 
individualism.” 
74 Advocates of methodological individualism sometimes use the politically loaded term 
‘methodological collectivism’ for methodological holism. See e.g. Mises (1978), Ch.5, Mises (1998), p. 
41-44 and 145-153, and Mises (1985), p. 250.  
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For me, intuitively, methodological individualism and all the rational choice 
theories of economics, sociology or political science have always appeared as 
excellent heuristic tools – or ideal types - that help to test the probability of some 
very partial and very hypothetical answers to the ‘Big Questions’ of society and 
social theory.75 However, I have serious difficulties, both intuitively and intel-
lectually, with the idea that methodological individualism should be elevated 
to an axiomatic position as the foundational cornerstone of economics, or of any 
other social sciences.  In my opinion methodologically individualistic (or ‘meth-
odologically atomistic’76) theories, e.g. rational choice, provide some helpful, but 
artificially simplistic hints towards the ‘Big Answers’ of society and social theo-
ry.77 Approaches based on methodological holism are, likewise, useful heuristic 
tools.78 But at the end of the day, when the ‘theorizing time’ is out and some prac-
tical conclusions have to be drawn, e.g. for policy-making purposes, I normally 
feel most confident taking a compromise position (i.e. not ‘either-or’ but ‘both’) 
between methodological individualism/atomism and holism. 
I personally abandoned pure methodological individualism at an early stage 
of my research process when I became interested in the ‘professional discourses’.79 
My work approaches something Vuorela has called ‘institutional ethnography’,80 
focusing on the World Bank and some other international bureaucracies involved 
in poverty reduction planning and management. Vuorela’s point of departure is 
the observation that professional discourses provide the categories with which 
‘facts’ can be named and analysed and thus have an important role in ‘constitut-
ing’ the phenomena - e.g. poverty - that an organization - e.g. a government of a 
welfare state or an aid agency - knows and describes.81 
75 Schumpeter emphasized that methodological individualism is only useful for particular social 
explanations. In other words, he regarded methodological individualism as just one possible 
entry point into social analysis and not necessarily appropriate for the explanation of all the social 
phenomena. Schumpeter (1908), p. 90-95, cited in Zwirn (2003), p. 12-13, Hodgson (2001), p. 187-189, 
Jolly et al. (2004), p. 35-38, as well as Schumpeter in Websources.
76 Zwirn (2003).
77 Yes, individuals often seek to maximize their personal rewards…. But, why do parents sacrifice for 
their children? Why do solders risk their lives for their nation? Why do true believers spend their 
resources or lives for a cause? Why do voters take the effort of going to the polling site, even if they 
know that their vote is not going to be the decisive? Yet these things happen…  
78 Yes, Finns are generally less individualistic than US-citizens, and more willing to pay tax in order to 
ensure that equal access to basic social services for all residents can be secured. But on the other hand, 
neither the USA nor the Finnish nation is a monolith. There is a wide range of opinions, and individual 
citizens vote and lobby in both countries in order to move the political balance as close as possible to 
their own favourite position, i.e. in order to maximize their individual utility.
79 See e.g. Voipio (1998a 1998d), Voipio and Hoebink (1999).
80 Vuorela (1994). Escobar (1995), p. 107. See also Foucault (1965, 1970, 1972, 1977, 1979).
81 Note that the whole idea of an organisation knowing, describing, choosing or saying anything is 
in contradiction to the principles of methodological individualism, according to which organisations 
do not think, choose, say or act. ‘Group behaviour’ is simply a ‘false concept’ according to the logic of 
methodological individualism. All events and states of affairs are always to be explained by deducing 
them from, and only from, conjectured principles governing the behaviour of actual individuals. 
Lawson (1997), p. 159. Italics added by Zwirn (2003), p. 4. See also: Chang (2001b), p. 17-20 and Elster 
(1986), p. 3.
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3.3 text AND ReAlitY
I have used a variety of methods to collect the evidence upon which my research 
is based: a long period of participant observation in a variety of roles, interviews, 
literature reviews and huge amounts of grey literature documents. Most of my 
units of observations are extracts of texts. No wonder - a basic feature of the in-
stitutional production of social reality is its reliance on textual and documentary 
forms as a means of representing and preserving a given reality. Documentary 
practices are by no means innocuous. They are embedded in external social rela-
tions and deeply implicated in mechanisms of ruling. The key role of the indi-
vidual planner, manager, adviser or other development professional is that he or 
she has the duty to remove the text from the real social context and to transpose 
the local actualities into standardized conceptual and categorical forms, in line 
with the schemata and methods provided by the official discourse of the organi-
zation – and then possibly to use these ‘lessons learned’ as recommendations for 
another situation in a different primary context.82 
This process is particularly relevant for development agencies due to the great 
distance, both geographical and cultural, between the primary field of work (poor 
countries) and the secondary field (bureaucracies or academia of the rich world). 
The temptation, and tendency, often is for the secondary field, i.e. the techno-
cratic/academic ‘poverty literature’ (especially poverty economics literature), to 
grow in discursive weight, marginalizing the primary, i.e. the life realities of the 
poor people in the poorest countries. It therefore requires special dedication, 
insistence and innovative organisational arrangements and incentive structures 
from the senior managers of the aid agencies (and aid researchers) to keep the 
realities of the poor people at the heart of the institutional focus.83  The purpose 
of institutional ethnography is to unpack the work of institutions and bureaucra-
cies, to train ourselves to see what culturally we have been taught to overlook, 
namely, the participation of institutional practices in the making of the world.84 
Aid donors’ self-evaluations have recently increasingly emphasized the crucial 
82  This is the essence of what I do for living, as global social policy adviser of the Finnish Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs. Escobar (1995), p. 108. 
83 Soon after he started as President of the World Bank, James Wolfensohn decided that every senior 
officer of the World Bank has to spend at least a week per year within some poor community of the 
Global South. Within the British development community, Robert Chambers and Rosalind Eyben have 
explored, developed and spread a similar practice of “immersions”, of people who are influential, 
spending time living with and learning from poor people. Chambers and Eybin call this “REALISE” 
-  “Reflective Experience And Living In Situ Encounters”. (Personal communication with Chambers 
2003.) From my own experience I can confirm that – for institutional, family and logistical reasons – it 
is very difficult for an aid agency professional like myself to arrange anything but extremely short 
visits from the Ministry headquarters in Finland to the poorer partner countries, especially to the 
remote rural areas. As I wrote in 1998: “Finnida personnel … are systematically deprived of exposure to 
and encounters with the realities of life among the poor.”(This was shortly before I resigned the Ministry 
in order to be able to work again really ‘in the field’, i.e. as a facilitator of participatory planning in 
the villages and district towns of Mtwara and Lindi regions in a remote and poor corner of Tanzania.) 
Normally, for the Ministry staff, the nearest they can get to the ‘grassroots’ in poor countries, is an 
Embassy of Finland in a capital city of a developing country. In the Finnish development cooperation 
system, if you want to get really into ‘fieldwork’, you have to quit your job at the Ministry. 
84 See Escobar (1995, p. 106-113) and Smith (1984, p. 63). 
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impact of the donor organizations’ own institutional practices and procedures on 
the effectiveness of aid for poverty reduction.85 
I have certain sympathy towards the critical (but obviously too cynical) state-
ments made by Coggins in his poem ‘The Development Set’86 and by Hancock 
in his book ‘Lords of Poverty’87 and by some other academic and NGO-related 
authors88 according to whom one major barrier to achieving the target of a uni-
versal poverty reduction is that it is important for the institutional continuity of 
aid organisations that this goal never be achieved – i.e. that the work of the aid 
agencies would never end. This kind of short-term selfishness would of course 
be ‘rational’, as James M. Buchanan89 and other ‘public choice’ theoreticians have 
shown. The possible seed of truth in this otherwise exaggerated view has to be 
taken seriously by all aid agencies. I am nevertheless a reformist: I think that it is 
important - and possible – for the development assistance organisations (‘donors’) 
to change and overhaul their structures and operations so as to maximise the 
positive impact of their resources and activities on poverty, and thus to gradually 
make themselves redundant.90
85 See: OECD/DAC (2001a). 
86 Ross Coggins’ poem ‘The Development Set’ is printed in the inner cover of Hancock (1989). The 
poem ridicules the ‘noble’ development professionals (the Development Set) e.g. by the following 
verses: “Although we move with the better classes, our thoughts are always with the masses...  ...We discuss 
malnutrition over steaks, and plan hunger talks during coffee breaks....    ...Just pray to God the biblical promise 
is true: The poor ye shall always have with you.”
87 In his Introduction Hancock (1989) describes his book as “an attack on a group of rich and powerful 
bureaucracies that have hijacked our kindness.” The bureaucracies he refers to are “those official aid 
organisations that administer the West’s aid and then deliver it to the poor of the Third World in a process 
that Bob Geldof once described as ‘a perversion of the act of human generosity’.”  I’m writing basically about 
the same organisations, but mine is not an attack against them. Nor do I try to ridicule anybody  - 
perhaps for self-interested reasons: From the perspective of the world’s poor, I would myself belong 
to the category of the ‘Development Set’, because for over two decades already I have earned most of 
my personal incomes - in one way or the other - from the official Western development aid budgets, 
whose ultimate purpose is not to reduce my poverty but a deeper poverty of some really poor people 
in the Global South.
88 I consider the modernisation-critical – or ‘Post-Development’ writers a category completely different 
from pamphletists such as Coggins, Hancock & co. E.g. Sachs (ed. 1992), Rist (1997), Escobar (1995), 
Rich (1994), Ferguson (1994, 1997), Cooper and Packard (eds. 1997), Finnemore (1996, 1997), Esteva 
& Prakash (1998), Crewe and Harrison (1998), Rahnema and Wickers (1997), Teivainen (2002) and 
Laitinen (1989, 2001), are all excellent critiques of the modernisation philosophy and of development 
aid as its practical tool and application. Their main argument is, however, the inappropriateness of the 
instrumental rationality of the modern economistic project thinking to many non-western cultures, 
not the corruptness and selfishness of the development aid agencies or practitioners, as is Hancock’s. 
89 See Buchanan in Websources.
90 According to regular studies conducted for the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFA), Finns 
are generally satisfied with Finland’s development cooperation policy and its implementation. Seven 
out of ten respondents in 2000 wanted most of Finland’s aid to go to Africa. Also in 2009 Africa was 
the priority geographic region for a majority of Finns. In 2000 the priority purpose was alleviation of 
poverty (71 percent), which was no more given as a choice in the questionnaire 2009. In 2009 education 
was regarded by Finnish tax-payers as the most important purpose for development cooperation, 
followed by health, reproductive health, human rights and equality. Curiously, allocations of Finnish 
development cooperation to these purposes have been substantially reduced through decisions made 
by the current Minister for Development Cooperation. 
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3.4 WoRDS ARe DeeDS – CoNCeptS AND iDeAS AS 
moveS iN ARgumeNt
As every historian – and historical sociologist - knows, the distinction between 
past events and their interpretation is inherently controversial. In this sense, 
every historical revision still serves as a potentially subverting instance that de-
thrones something of that which we have believed to be ‘given’, ‘hard facts’ or 
‘simply there’. Revisiting our space of experience also challenges our interpreta-
tion of what it is possible to do in the present.91
It is in this perspective that we can reassess the relationship between history 
and theoretical sciences such as economics. While approaches such as rational 
choice (in economics as well as in sociology) always search for unity, coherence 
and universal systems, the appeal to plurality, complexity and even imperfection 
in history serves as a further subversive instance against the totalising claims 
of economists and other system-builders, who try to dissolve genuinely politi-
cal questions into operations of calculation. While the ‘system-builders’ conceive 
history at best in the sense of the ‘Rankean’  historiography (‘Wie es eigentlich 
gewesen ist’), a self-conscious and perspectivist historical view gives us an op-
portunity to understand conceptual controversies as a discontinuous series of 
political moves.92
The idea that language not only reflects things that people think and do, but 
that language can also be used to do things (‘speech acts’) was explicitly high-
lighted in 1962 in J.L. Austin’s posthumously published “How to Do Things with 
Words”.93 A text, e.g. a flagship publication of the World Bank, in itself is insuf-
ficient as the object of our inquiry and our understanding of the history of World 
Bank thinking. All tendencies to treat ideas as if they were universally valid or 
widely shared are dubious. A history of ideas should instead consist of the singu-
larisation of the use of words (in statements) in relation to agents, situations and 
intentions. The historisation (conceptualisation) of the uses marks a discontinuity 
between ideas, conceived as moves of the agents. A ‘move’, in the sense of chess 
and other games, is used here to characterize how theories are understood in 
91 Koselleck (1979). Skinner (1988), p. 286. Palonen (2002), p. 94-96, Palonen (2003a), p. 26. Reinhard 
Koselleck is the leading German scholar of ‘Begriffsgeschichte’ (conceptual history). Quentin Skinner 
is the leading British historian of ideas and concepts. 
92 Palonen (2003a), p. 37. My academic home was originally in economic and social history – and 
in development studies. I started to prepare this essay at the Department of Economic and Social 
History of Helsinki University. However, during the process I realized that the ‘political move’ that I 
wanted to use this essay for was to challenge and inspire social policy professionals to conceive global 
poverty as the primary social injustice of our globalizing world, which they shouldn’t leave for the 
global poverty economists alone to solve (with diplomats), but which the professionals of care, too, 
should attack with all their energies, professional capacities and moral rigour. A historical approach 
and method would have resulted in a very bulky report which would not have served the purposes 
of my primary readership. Therefore, I decided to refocus my essay away from history, and to take 
a more sociological – historical institutional - approach, instead. At that junction, I also moved from 
the University of Helsinki to the University of Eastern Finland. Despite this move, I still consider it 
important for my readers to understand the main discoveries that I had made by reading historians 
of ideas and concepts.
93 Austin (1962). See also Palonen (2003a), p. 4, 30.  Austin was Skinner’s teacher.“Wittgenstein had 
instructed us to think about the use of language”, Skinner later told. Skinner (2002d), p. 47-48.
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Skinner’s perspective of linguistic action. A move is a contingent measure, which 
aims less to achieve a definite result than to alter a constellation.94 
I am trying to understand what kinds of ‘futures beyond poverty’ the vari-
ous non-poor poverty economists and other professionals have had in mind. We 
have to remember Wittgenstein’s two phrases: (a) ‘Concepts are tools;’ (b) ‘Words are 
deeds;’ Thus, a thinker’s idea about something, e.g. poverty reduction, is an act, 
or a move - in fact, a plan towards a ‘future beyond poverty’, aimed at altering 
the existing constellations. Collingwood writes: “A plan consists of acts organ-
ized into a coherent whole;” If this is true, it should be possible to identify the 
‘futures beyond poverty’ that professional poverty planners of various times have 
had in mind, from what they have said and written about poverty and poverty 
reduction. But, for a historical explanation it is neither necessary not sufficient 
to identify the causal antecedents of an event (including a speech act), in the 
natural scientific sense of ‘cause’. Historians explain events and speech acts by il-
luminating them from the inside, not by looking for empirical laws governing ‘all 
events of that type’. As historians we may thus want to know, e.g. what ends did 
Condorcet, Bentham, von Bismarck, Kuusi, Stiglitz and Wolfensohn seek when 
they wrote about poverty and ways to reduce it.95
As Skinner96 teaches about ‘histories of  concepts’:  “In spite of the long conti-
nuities that have undoubtedly marked our inherited patterns of thought, I remain 
unrepentant in my belief that there can be no histories of concepts as such; there 
can only be histories of their uses in argument.”97     Thus, to understand a concept 
– e.g. ‘poverty’, or ‘poverty reduction’ – it is necessary to grasp not merely the 
meanings of the terms used to express it, but also the range of things that can be 
done with it, i.e. the potential ‘illocutionary forces’ in a given situation. 
3.5 iNStitutioNS, iDeAS, iNteReStS AND iDeNtitieS 
Institutions are the foundation of social life. Once created, institutions are power-
ful external forces that help determine how people make sense of their world and 
act in it. They channel and regulate conflict and thus ensure stability in society.98
Ideas are one broad sub-set of very important and influential institutions. 
Many institutionalists have become preoccupied recently with figuring out how 
ideas affect institutional change; i.e. to what extent do ideas change institutions; 
or do institutions change ideas? I shall discuss here briefly how I understand 
ideas as part of a long continuum from ideas to interests to identities to institu-
tions and again back to ideas.  
94 Skinner (1969), p. 35. Palonen (2003a), p. 36-37. I.e. the agent A, wishing to achieve N, may argue 
for N+1 in one type of a constellation where the opponent B strives towards N-1. But in another 
constellation, where the opposite view (C) is further away (e.g. N-3), it may be in the interest of the 
agent A to argue for N+3. See e.g. Kanbur (2000a, 2001a).
95 Long (2004), p. 15-16, citing Collingwood (1999), p. 142 and (1989), p. 156-157. 
96 Quentin Skinner (born 1940) is one of the leading British historians of ideas.
97 Palonen (2003a), p. 36-37.
98 Campbell (1998, 2004).
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Scholars have criticized interest-based (‘realist’) theories or organizations, 
politics, political economy, international relations, and economics for neglecting 
how ideas – such as worldviews, norms, identities, values, intellectual paradigms, 
culture, fashion and beliefs – affect decision making and institutional change. 
Even some of the most stalwart defenders of the interest-based approach, rational 
choice theorists, have conceded that ideas like norms and cognitive structures 
matter. Notably, Nobel-laureate Douglas North99 acknowledged that an important 
part of institutional change involves actors trying to interpret the world around 
them through ideologies, norms, and values, which help them to identify their 
interests in the first place.  In other words, what actors believe may be just as im-
portant as what they want.100
However, in the end, this may be a wrong dichotomy: interests are, in fact, one 
particular type of idea among many others. Actors have both interests and other 
types of ideas; both affect their behaviour, and both are socially constructed in the 
sense that they are based on the individual’s or group’s interpretation of their 
situation. However, for ease of presentation, I shall use here the term ‘interest’ 
to refer to something objectively given (‘calculable’) by virtue of the individual’s 
(group’s) political, economic, and social situation, whereas I use ‘idea’ to refer to 
subjective social constructions. 
Boas and McNeill101 start their analysis of ideas and power in multilateral in-
stitutions from a firm materialist foundation. They argue convincingly that their 
‘neo-Gramscian’102 approach provides both an ontological and epistemological 
foundation for the construction of non-deterministic yet structurally grounded 
interpretations of social change. With its emphasis on the transformative capac-
ity of human agents it also offers a path between the pre-determined units of 
neo-realism (i.e. states) and the unexplored domestic foundations of the world-
systems theory.103 Second, the neo-Gramscian approach provides a flexible and 
ultimately historicist reading of institutions and the power of ideas. 
On a theme closely related to the theme of my study, Bøas and McNeill suggest 
that powerful – hegemonic – states (notably the USA), hegemonic organizations 
(such as the IMF and the World Bank) and even hegemonic disciplines (econom-
ics) exercise their power largely by framing: This serves to limit the power of 
potentially radical ideas to achieve change. 104 
Bøas and McNeill, however, keep the door open also for more ideational, 
constructivist and realist explanations. The neo-Gramscian approach seems to 
99 Douglas C. North (born 1920) was awarded the Nobel prize for economic sciences (together with 
Robert W. Fogel) in 1993, “for having renewed research in economic history by applying economic 
theory and quantitative methods in order to explain economic and institutional change.” See: North, 
Douglas in Websources. 
100 E.g. Thelen and Steinmo (1992), Katzenstein (1996), March and Olsen (1990), Campbell (2004). See 
also: Knight and North (1997) and Ostrom (1990). 
101 Bøas and McNeill (2004), p.217-218.
102 The term ‘Gramscian’ refers here to the Italian philosopher, politician and – highly original marxist 
- political theorist Antonio Gramsci (1891-1937), who is best known for his concept of ‘cultural 
hegemony’. 
103 See footnote 1 above, and World-Systems Theory in Websources.
104 Bøas and McNeill (2004), p.1-7. See also Cox (1986, 1992).  More on  framing later in this chapter.
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give an inadequate understanding of the nature of agency in policy making and 
agenda setting. Constructivism, with its emphasis on the social construction of 
politics, can help us understand the construction of political issues as technical 
solutions, whereas realism helps us to expose the political interests and power 
relationships that underwrite such constructions. Interest formation, ultimately, 
has both a material and a social basis. Interests are formed in part by ideas as 
‘inter-subjective meaning’ (independent of material conditions) and in part by 
ideas as ‘collective images’ (influenced by material conditions).  Ideas can be used, 
knowingly or unknowingly, to promote either material interests or even more 
deep-seated worldviews. Where these run counter to the interests or worldviews 
of others, they may be imposed not through the direct use of power, but through 
the exercise of what Gramsci calls ‘hegemony’; through the adoption of shared 
ideas, and agreement concerning collective images. 
Whether or not such a process takes place, depends crucially on institutionali-
zation. This is a way of stabilizing and perpetuating one particular social order 
in the nexus between material conditions, interests and ideas. Bøas and McNeill 
discuss the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) that the IMF and the World 
Bank imposed on a number of countries in the 1980s and 1990s. They conclude 
that material interests alone do not provide a sufficient explanation of why this 
idea was so strongly promoted by the IFIs:105 They suggest that the current multi-
lateral system, including the World Bank, the IMF, the MFAF, etc. should be seen 
as a social construction, not as a pre-existing entity. Institutions within this sys-
tem take a life of their own. They may also become battlefields of opposed ideas, 
and rival institutions may reflect different ideas. These conclusions provide an 
interesting starting position of my study. 
3.6 A tYpologY oF iDeAS AND iDeAtioNAl ACtoRS 
John L. Campbell106 provides a useful typology of ideas that helps to understand 
how various types of ideas affect institutional change. First, ideas can be un-
derlying and often taken-for-granted assumptions residing in the background 
of decision-making debates. However, ideas can also be concepts and theories 
located in the foreground of these debates, where they are explicitly articulated 
by decision-making elites. Background assumptions can be visible to actors yet 
remain largely accepted and unquestioned, almost as ‘principles of faith’, whereas 
ideas in the foreground are routinely contested as normal part of any decision-
making debate. 
Second, ideas can be cognitive or normative. At the cognitive level ideas are 
descriptions and theoretical analyses that specify cause-and-effect relationships, 
whereas at the normative level ideas consist of values, attitudes, and identities.  By 
combining these distinctions (Table 1) we can identify four types of ideas: para-
105 IFI = International Financial Institution. Bøas and McNeill (2004), p. 214-215.
106 Campbell (1998, 2004).
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digms, public sentiments/identities, programmes and frames. Each type of idea exerts 
unique effects on decision making and institutional change. 
Table 1. Types of Ideas and Their Effects on Policy-Making107
Concepts and theories in the 
Foreground of the Debate
underlying Assumptions in the 
Background of the Debate
programmes
(Policy conditions)
paradigms
(World views, Institutional logics)
Cognitive 
level
Ideas as elite prescriptions that 
enable politicians, corporate 
leaders, and other decision 
makers to chart a clear and 
specific course of action.
Ideas as elite assumptions that constrain 
the cognitive range of useful pro-
grammes available to politicians, corpo-
rate leaders, and other decision makers.
Frames
(Discourses)
public sentiments
(Identities, Cultures)
Normative
level
Ideas as symbols and concepts 
that enable decision makers to 
legitimize programmes to their 
constituents.
Ideas as public assumptions (of the 
constituency or professional community) 
that constrain the normative range of 
legitimate frames and programmes avail-
able to decision makers.
3.6.1 Public Sentiments/Identities 
Public sentiments/identities are normative background assumptions that constrain 
decision making and institutional change by limiting the range of frames and pro-
grammes that decision-making elites are likely to perceive as acceptable and legiti-
mate both to their constituents and themselves. Public opinion, values, norms, iden-
tities, and other collectively shared expectations are what we have in mind here.108 
Arguments about the importance of public sentiments emphasize culture and col-
lective identities: Decision makers are often guided as much by their understand-
ing of what is appropriate and fair behaviour as they are by any sort of cost-benefit 
calculation. Professional identity is one important subset of collective identities.109
3.6.2 Paradigms
Paradigms are cognitive background assumptions that constrain decision making 
and institutional change by limiting the range of alternatives that decision-mak-
ing elites are likely to perceive as useful and worth considering. Organisational 
institutionalists have used the term institutional logic in much the same way that 
I am using the concept paradigm. Supporters of the rational choice school of 
thought have suggested that people’s ability to make rational decisions is limited 
by their eagerness to ignore available information if it does not fit their mental 
models, world views or cognitive architecture, i.e. taken-for-granted understandings 
of how the world works.110
107 Campbell (1998), p. 385. Campbell (2004), p. 94.
108 Katzenstein (1996), p. 7. 
109 March and Olsen (1990). 
110 See e.g. Knigth and North (1997), p. 216 and Campbell (2004), p. 95.
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3.6.3 Frames
Frames are normative concepts that reside in the foreground of decision-making 
debates.111 They enable elites to legitimize their programmes, policy recommen-
dations and related institutional changes to their constituents, clients and oc-
casionally to each other. This happened, for instance, when national political 
elites in one country after another in 1980s and 1990s developed a communicative 
discourse to justify or legitimize neoliberal programmes to their citizens. For 
instance, French elite policy-makers successfully legitimized the idea of a single 
European market by resorting to a pro-European integration frame stressing that 
neo-liberalism was necessary to strengthen the European Community that the 
French already favoured. British policy-makers for their part legitimized the idea 
of a single European market by emphasizing how this new institution would 
strengthen liberal economic principles and involve only new rules of exchange 
rather than new property rights or governance that would threaten national sov-
ereignty and the interests of British industrial actors. 
3.6.4 Programmes
Programmes and policy conditions are in the foreground of decision-making de-
bates. They are cognitive concepts and theories that enable or facilitate decision 
making and institutional change by specifying for decision makers how to solve 
specific problems. They are important because they determine most directly how 
institutions change. Decision makers are most likely to embrace programmes or 
policy conditions that are simple and clear ‘policy prescriptions’ or ‘road maps’ 
that offer convincing directions out of a particular dilemma, or ‘focal points’ i.e. 
ideas that have enough appeal to facilitate coalition building and political sup-
port, or ‘weapons’ with which they can struggle to gain power and resources. 
Thus, ideas can both constrain and facilitate institutional change. Sometimes 
ideas constrain change in ways that channel it along evolutionary tracks or block 
it completely. Sometimes ideas facilitate more revolutionary tracks of change.  
Because background ideas are often so taken for granted, they tend to constrain 
change. Because foreground ideas are contested and often used to challenge the 
status quo, they tend to facilitate or enable change. However, as Pierson suggests, 
there is also some temporal dynamics – sequencing - at play between the differ-
ent types of ideas: The implementation of programmes or policy conditions may 
lead to long-lasting institutional legacies that have more subtle, indirect, self-
reinforcing and path-dependent effects that constrain change later on. First, once 
programmes are institutionalized, they generate constituents who defend them if 
111 Framing is a central concept in discource analysis, which concerns itself with how ideas are 
assembled and knitted together by means of framing and promoting (often contested) truths or 
meanings. Discourse is a set of meanings embodied in metaphors, representations, images, narratives 
and statements that advance a particular version of ‘the truth’ about objects, persons, events and the 
relations between them. Discources produce texts – written and spoken – and even non-verbal ‘texts’ like 
the meanings embodied in infrastructure such as asphalt roads, dams and irrigation schemes, and in 
farming styles and technologies. Discourses frame our understanding of life experiences by providing 
representations of ‘reality’ (often take-for-granted) and shape or constitute what we consider to be the 
significant or essential objects, persons and events of our world. See e.g. Long (2004), p. 27.
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alternatives are suggested later. Second, institutionalizing programmes or policy-
conditions often entails establishing a particular set of implementation capacities 
that limit the range of options available to decision-makers in the future.112 
3.7 AgeNCY iN iDeAtioNAliSm: Who ARe the 
ACtoRS AND WhAt ARe theiR RoleS?  
Ideas do not emerge spontaneously or become influential without actors - so it 
is important to situate these actors and theorize their roles vis-à-vis ideas in any 
account of institutional change. Rational choice theorists start from the premise 
that institutional change is driven by actors pursuing their interests. So they have 
a clear place for actors and agency in their analysis, but they pay little attention to 
the role of ideas. Conversely, organisational institutionalists consider ideas in their 
analyses, notably taken-for-granted worldviews and schema, but pay relatively 
little attention to actors and agency. 
Figure 2 below links the two by elaborating more carefully the key actors - 
institutional entrepreneurs in various roles - who embrace, fabricate, manipulate, 
and carry the different types of ideas introduced in Table 1.
Figure 2. Actors and Their Ideational Realms113
112 Campbell (1998), Campbell (2004), p. 90-123. Pierson (2004).
113 Campbell (2004), p. 101.
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3.7.1 Decision Makers  
For ideas to matter at all, high-level public and private decision makers (in gov-
ernments, leading donor agencies and in the business community) must embrace 
programmes (and policy conditions set by financiers) and seek to incorporate 
them into decision making. Thus, decision making elites are the most proximate 
carriers of ideas that affect decision making and institutional change. 
3.7.2 Theorists 
Often programmes do not originate just among decision makers themselves but 
also in the minds of theorists, such as professional academics and other intellec-
tuals. Generally, theorists operate from deriving specific programmes from the 
underlying paradigms that they help to promulgate and sustain in the first place. 
Occasionally, however, these thinkers may alter paradigms in ways that have 
huge consequences for the programmes that they and others are likely to suggest. 
3.7.3 Framers 
For decision makers to embrace them, programmes need to be considered accept-
able or appropriate as well as intellectually appealing, palatable and convincing. 
They must fit not only with the prevailing cognitive paradigm but also with 
dominant norms, values, identities and other public sentiments. This generally 
requires the presence of people who frame programmes in ways that make them 
acceptable to the relevant constituencies. 
3.7.4 Constituents
The targets of framers are the constituents from whom approval and support 
must be obtained in order to carry out a programme and change institutions. 
Constituents may be either the general public, as is often the case in politics, or the 
broader professional community, e.g. the community of all practicing develop-
ment agency economists all over the world, a majority of whom neither take part 
in the political struggles of decision-makers nor follow closely the debates of the 
(fairly limited number of) active theorists or framers. 
3.7.5 Brokers
Brokers’ role is to link, connect, contest or somehow transport ideas from one 
ideational realm to the other. Ideational brokers are often people who operate at 
the intersections of these realms. Corporate consultants act as ideational brokers 
between the worlds or business and ODA. Pollsters play a key role in identifying 
and conveying public sentiments to political framers. Conversely, the media and 
public relations experts convey well-framed messages back to the public in ways 
that may affect public sentiments. In politics, think tanks and policy institutes 
are especially important brokers because they connect several ideational realms. 
Think tanks have learned to transmit ideas to decision makers through pithy 
policy briefs designed to affect programmatic thinking and ultimate policy re-
quirements. And, to influence public sentiments, they transmit these ideas to the 
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public through op-ed pieces and articles in the major newspapers and financial 
press, and through appearances on television and radio talk shows.114  Business 
and trade associations also operate as ideational brokers. 
At the international level, brokering often involves epistemic communities, i.e. 
networks of intellectuals, academics, experts, and government advisers, as well as 
international non-governmental organizations. Epistemic communities develop 
new paradigms and transmit their programmatic implications, often deliberately 
couched in clever frames, to national decision makers as well as to the citizenry. 
Such an activity is sometimes referred to as ‘information politics’, something that 
World Bank President James Wolfensohn explicitly included into the professional 
mission of World Bank’s global poverty economists, by declaring the World Bank 
a ‘Knowledge Bank’ in 1996.115
3.8 limitAtioNS: ShiFtiNg SuBjeCtivitieS AND  
SuBjeCt poSitioNS
I approach my subject in this study using the theory and methods of ‘social con-
structivism’, characterised by an emphasis on language as a type of action that 
not only describes the world but also attributes meaning to and, at the same time, 
changes the social reality where we live.116 
‘Discourses’ are interpretative resources, that is, institutionalised modes of 
talking used by agents to attribute meaning to their own agent positions. Through 
their internal figures of speech, definitions and concepts, these institutionalised 
modes of talking actively influence how people see – and ‘frame’ – a problem, e.g. 
of poverty, and the related value assumptions and duties involved. For someone 
navigating several discourses like I do, the trick is to recognize the context, as well 
as the continuities and discontinuities in the conceptual logic of the narratives. 
Many discourses talk about the same real-life issues, although they often frame 
them by completely different concepts and heuristic constructs. 
Discourses also create preconditions for various ‘shifting subjectivities’ and 
‘subject positions’ available to individuals engaged in a process of self-definition. 
In other words, disagreements - or differences of emphasis - about the ideal poli-
cies, strategies, plans and project approaches for poverty reduction exist not only 
between governments, parties, groups (professional, ethnic, gender) and individ-
uals but also - and this is important - between the different subject positions - or 
identities - that one individual agent/actor may take in various situations. 
Writing a book like this is a long process, and during that process I have 
already had several rather different professional roles in relation to global – and 
Finnish - development co-operation and social policy. This ‘changing of hats’  has 
also to some extent shifted my subject position towards the topic of my research - 
114 Stone (1996, 2000). 
115 The Bank states that between 1997 and 2002 $283 million was spent on reorganising the Bank to be 
a knowledge institution.
116 Berger and Luckmann (1966, 1994), Filander (2000), p. 48-58, 169-173, 180, Heiskala (1994, 2000). 
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and the focus on my writing. During the years 1996-99, 2001-07 and 2009-10 at the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland117 and 2007-09 at the ILO-HQ in Geneva118 
my reading, thinking and writing was naturally rather ‘donor-headquarters-cen-
tred’. I had easy access - via the internet and through face-to-face contacts - to the 
latest wisdoms written by other Western researchers and poverty reduction plan-
ners at the World Bank, OECD-DAC, UNDP, ODI-London, IDS-Sussex, WIDER, 
UNRISD, ILO, UNCTAD, EURODAD, etc.119 
During my years among the ‘poor’ in the remote rural corner of Tanzania 
(1993-94 and 1999-2000) - with no access to internet, and almost ‘forgotten’ (that’s 
how I felt!) by my previous professional colleagues (busy people!), the research 
reports and policy documents and guidelines hotly debated between bureaucrats, 
politicians and researchers in Helsinki, London, Paris, Geneva and Washington, 
D.C.  provided - I am sad to say - little assistance to my day-to-day problems of 
the donor-recipient interface. 
Then again, in my small Finnish home town called Riihimäki, whose local 
governance I take part in, my thinking and writing has conventionally focused 
less on ‘development’ and more on the ‘social policies’ of a mature welfare state. 
This book is an outcome of all these, partly separate, partly overlapping subject 
positions of mine. But, the more globalized the world becomes, the more inter-
related all these ‘life-worlds’ of mine become. The need to articulate and to defend 
the value and role of the ‘social perspective’ and to argue in favour of a ‘socio-
ecolo-nomic’ balance appears equally important in Riihimäki, Tanzania and in 
all the networks and forums of global governance that I take part in.
My personal intellectual journey as a researcher, with 3-4 remarkably differ-
ent subject positions along the way, has also made me somewhat sceptical about 
those research reports whose authors tell - in the introductory chapter - what 
their hypothesis was when they started their research process, and who then 
spend the rest of their pages verifying that original hypothesis. My hypothesis 
- or hypotheses - have changed many times during the research process, partly 
due to my gradually deepening understanding of the subject I was researching, 
and partly due to the substantial changes in my life situation - and subject posi-
tion towards my topic of research. I would be surprised if this were not the case 
for many other young and middle-aged researchers, most of whom are marrying 
(some divorcing), expecting and delivering babies, raising children, moving their 
homes, jobs and offices, and subject positions towards their research topics during 
the course of their research process. However, such factors are seldom referred to 
117 In 1996-99 I was Secretary General of Finland’s Advisory Board for Relations with Developing 
Countries, the main interface of Parliamentary politicians and senior managers of the MFA-Finland. In 
2001-07 and 2009-10 I was Ministerial Adviser on Social Development, Global Social Policy and Social 
Dimension of Sustainable Development. See: formin.finland.fi.
118 At the ILO-Headquarters I worked as Research Manager for ISSA, the International Social Security 
Association. See: www.issa.int .
119 IDS-Sussex = Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in Brighton, UK. ODI 
= Overseas Development Institute, London. WIDER = World Institute for Development Economics 
Research in Helsinki. UNRISD = United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, Geneva. 
OECD-DAC = Development Assistance Committee of the Organisation for Economic Cooperation 
and Development, Paris. 
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in the research reports, as if they would have had no impact on the final results 
of the research - which I find hard to believe.120 
And it’s not only me that has changed: aAlso my target has been a mov-
ing one. The poverty economists at the World Bank – and the Bank itself - have 
changed over the years I have worked on this study. The overall thrust of this 
book would have been different – more optimistic perhaps - if I had completed 
it during Mr. Wolfensohn’s Presidency (1995-2005). If I had completed it during 
the WB-Presidency of the neoconservative Iraq-War architect Mr. Paul Wolfowitz 
(2005-2007) its tone would have been very negative. Now, as I am editing my 
manuscript for print during Mr. Robert Zoellick’s Presidency, a public statement 
of the World Bank President121 and a recent paper by the Bank’s Development 
Economics Senior Vice Presidency122 - written under the leadership of the World 
Bank’s new Chinese Chief Economist Justin Lin - are again giving me reasons 
for optimism. For a period of almost two decades I have been trying to form 
an informed opinion about the likelihood of positive pro-poor change in the 
World Bank and in global community of poverty economists. Unlike many criti-
cal scholars and global civil society opinion leaders who did not believe that the 
World Bank could be reformed,123 I decided to follow the Bank closely, with an 
open mind.
Also an institution can have several different - and shifting - subject posi-
tions.  This is a typical problem for bilateral donor agencies such as the Finnish 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs, who use development aid not only as an instrument 
of poverty reduction but also as an instrument of foreign policy, i.e. diplomacy: 
the positions taken by Finland in global trade policy negotiations at the WTO 
(where Finland wants to promote its identity as a rich, market-friendly open 
economy) are not always compatible with the pro-poor profile Finland takes in 
the UN-forums in support of global poverty eradication, reproductive health and 
Millennium Development Goals or other human rights –based goals of global 
governance. Full consistency between the subject positions, identities and profiles 
of the same actor in different situations would be called ‘policy coherence’. It is an 
ideal that for instance the Government of Finland and the European Commission 
have committed themselves to.124  But it is difficult to achieve, because it requires 
a full understanding of all the various processes and discourses in which one is 
a stakeholder.
 Also the World Bank has many overlapping and partially mutually incoher-
ent subject positions and identities. It is not a monolith but a micro-cosmos where 
several mutually conflicting development strategies and ideologies are represent-
ed, in constant competition with each other. Survival of the fittest is the rule of the 
120 What my wife and children will probably afterwards mainly remember of my research process is 
the endless packing, carrying and unpacking of huge boxes of books and papers that had to be moved 
from Finland to Tanzania and Switzerland - and back, and back and forth between IDS-Helsinki, the 
Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Helsinki and my home office in Riihimäki. 
121 Zoellick (2010).
122 World Bank (2010).
123 Teivainen (2002), Patomäki & al. (2002), Patomäki and Teivainen (2004).
124 See e.g. Ministry for Foreign Affairs (2004a,b, 2007), European Commission (2002b, 2009).
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game. But it would be wrong to call it a free competition of ideas: which ideas turn 
out to be the fittest depends very much on what the top-leadership, especially 
the President of the Bank, thinks. Like the US-Government, the World Bank can 
also be a very President-driven decision-making system. During President Jim 
Wolfensohn’s ten years at the helm of the World Bank a lot of serious rethinking 
and impressive organizational change took place in the World Bank – because 
President Wolfensohn wanted it, and could make it happen. 
A powerful President can change the World Bank surprisingly strongly. From 
a Nordic and European point of view the change was to the better during the 
Wolfensohn-era, to the worse during the Wolfowitz-era and again to the better 
during the Zoelleck-Era.125
The politics of poverty economics within the World Bank has remained invisible 
for outsiders for the bigger part of the Bank’s history, under the surface of the 
Bank’s tight disclosure policy. The main focus of this essay is on the one rare mo-
ment 1995-2005 when a combination of an information technology revolution and 
an exceptionally open-minded Bank President made the politics of poverty eco-
nomics visible to outsiders and revealed the manner how one particular school 
of thought in one social science, orthodox neoclassical economics, has been able 
to affect – and dominate over - other schools of economic thought and other so-
cial sciences, and thus, indirectly, also over global socio-economic policy making 
about poverty reduction.
3.9 limitAtioN: the politiCAl elemeNt iN All eCo-
NomiC theoRY
But it is not only the World Bank which is influenced by politics, so am I, and all 
other economic and social analysts. Let us remind ourselves of what the Swedish 
Nobel-economist Gunnar Myrdal had to say about economic theories:126 Myrdal 
argued that there is a political element always present in the development of 
economic theory. The implicit belief in the existence of a body of ‘scientific’ knowl-
edge acquired independently of all valuations (ideas) is naïve empiricism, Myrdal 
argued. Facts do not organize themselves into concepts and theories just by being 
looked at; indeed, there is an inescapable a priori element in all scientific work. A 
view is impossible except from a viewpoint. Questions must be asked before an-
swers can be given. The questions are an expression of our interest in the world, 
they are at bottom valuations. Valuations are thus necessarily involved already at 
the stage when we observe facts and carry on theoretical analysis, and not only at 
the stage when we draw political inferences from facts and valuations:
“A disinterested social science has never existed and can never come to exist – for logical reasons. 
Valuations are always implied in our search for truth…The valuations can be hidden, however, and the 
125 Mallaby (2004), Kagia (ed. 2005), Wolfensohn (2005).
126 Myrdal (1929/1953), p. vii-vii and Myrdal (1970), p. 25-26.
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researcher can remain un-lucid and undefined, this is what opens door to biases…The only means that 
logic places at our disposal to free ourselves from biases is the requisite of stating our value premises 
explicitly. The need to do this will be the more clearly felt the less naïve we are about how our ap-
proaches otherwise tend to become determined by the tradition of our science, by the influences from 
the society we are a part of, and, of course, by our own personality as determined by our individual 
history and experiences, and mental make-up, and our inclinations.”127
So, where do I stand? What are my value premises? Let me try to position myself 
in the landscapes of economic and social sciences and global citizenship during 
the early years of the 3rd Millennium: My personal point of departure is a grave 
concern about involuntary poverty by too many, on the one hand, and on the other 
hand about the un-sustainability (over the horizon of my children’s lifetime) of the 
economic growth model that the mainstream development economists have been 
prescribing as their single main recipe for poverty reduction among the poorest 
members of the human kind. I have a tormenting suspicion about how realistic 
the assumptions are about the pace and patterns of future growth, and the poli-
cies that are expected to deliver it, oriented as they are towards free competition 
of un-equals in limitless markets, and increased consumption of material goods 
in a world that is finite, after all. 
I am afraid that the societal and cultural reforms that will be needed to 
achieve a globally sustainable pattern of living in the rich West may be simply 
too demanding for some of the politically and militarily strongest societies of the 
world, especially the U.S. society,128 due to the enormous mistakes  made there 
by the previous generation of societal planners, who designed a private vehicle-
based settlement pattern and transportation system, which cannot be sustained 
without systematic exploitation of Third World resources (especially oil) and the 
global commons. As long as that model prevails in the USA (and some other 
OECD-countries), it provides an attractive (albeit unsustainable) daydream for 
too many materially deprived people of the world, who, too, want to taste from 
the apple tree of  the consumption-paradise. And it is hard to find morally sound 
arguments for convincing them not to aspire towards a realization of that day-
dream, however clearly we know the un-sustainability of that path.
On the other hand, as long as generations that have personally experienced 
the post 2nd World War period of growth are still in power in the rich West, in-
cluding Finland, it may not be possible to have any serious public debate about a 
future without material growth in the West.  It is nevertheless possible to ponder 
about what forms of capital have the most promising potential for growth. (See 
Figure 3).
We all know that physical capital can grow even only in a limited fashion at 
best. The limits of ecological capital cannot be stretched forever. But, we know 
of no limits to growth in human and social capital, which provides some hope: 
127 Myrdal (1970), p. 26.
128 For long, the USA used to be the strongest also economically, but before long China will have taken 
over.
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Many of the materially poor families are not so poor on social capital, because 
in situations of hardship they have often been forced to cope by investing into 
the social capital. Well-invested social capital has consequently accumulated into 
stocks that these societies and their people know how to use to live dignified 
human lives and to cushion shocks in the limited fields of physical and environ-
mental capital.
Figure 3. Sustainable Growth Potential of Selected Capital Types129
My own interest in public action and social capital lies primarily in the view that 
trust in norms fostering the ideals of equality and solidarity will make the inevi-
table adjustments easier for us all, and that the co-operation and networking can 
spur groundbreaking innovations globally, nationally and locally.
Finally, it’s nicer to be optimist than pessimist. Therefore, I do believe in the 
ability of people and societies to adjust in the pursuit of a good future differing 
from the current situation, if adjustment really becomes necessary. I also trust 
that the professional community of neo-classical mainstream economists will be 
able to do the rethinking required to break free from its excessive formalism and 
rationality assumptions and to become relevant again for the real daily challenges 
of less privileged majority of human kind.  Promising signs are already in the 
air. One particular phenomenon that has encouraged me greatly over the past ten 
years: The Post-Autistic Economics Movement. 
129 Seraggeldin (1996). Voipio (2000a,b) and Kajanoja and Simpura (2000a,b).
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3.10 the poSt-AutiStiC eCoNomiCS AND otheR 
ReFoRm movemeNtS WithiN the eCoNomiCS 
pRoFeSSioN 
An interesting and important process for the revival of economics was launched 
in June 2000 by a group of French economics students, under the banner ‘Post-
Autistic Economics Movement’.130 They published a petition on the web protest-
ing against: 
– Economics’ ‘uncontrolled use’ of mathematics as ‘an end in itself’, and the result-
ing ‘autistic science’, 
–The repressive domination of the neoclassical theory and derivative approaches 
in the curriculum, and
–The dogmatic teaching style, which leaves no place for critical and reflective 
thought.
Despite a counter-attack of the mainstream led by economics teachers and stu-
dents of the MIT in the USA, the Post-Autistic Economics Movement spread rap-
idly from France to Britain, the USA (including the Harvard University) and to 
over 100 countries of the world. 
Similar criticisms against – and positive alternatives to – neoclassical eco-
nomic theory have been and are being developed by a great number and va-
riety of other alternative schools of economic thought, including, for instance 
the ‘Evolutionary Political Economy Movement’, NetworkIDEAs (International 
Development Economics Associates), the Other Canon, Feminist Economics’ 
networks, Macroscan, Cambridge Realist Workshop as well as the ‘Rethinking 
Development Economics’ programme of the United Nations Research Institute 
for Social Development (UNRISD) – and many others.131
3.11 mY teNtAtive pRopoSitioNS
Before moving to the empirical case of my research - poverty reduction thinking 
within and outside the World Bank around the turn of the 3rd Millennium - let 
me still introduce here the nine tentative propositions  that began to emerge as I 
read more and contemplated on what I saw happening in global policy-making 
about poverty reduction.  My plan is to come back to these propositions in the 
concluding Chapter-7, to see how well they seemed to reflect the reality, based 
on my evidence.
130 Fullbrook (ed. 2003, ed. 2004)  See also:  Post-Autistics Economics in Websources.
131 See Alternative schools of economic thought in Websources. 
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3.11.1 Proposition-1: Ideas Are Important Economic Goods 
– But the Markets of Ideas Are Highly Asymmetric  
Ideas and their origins are well worth a study. As suggested by Meier (2001), “ideas 
are fundamental to the future progress of development”.132 Romer (1993) wrote “Ideas 
should be our central concern...(They) are extremely important economic goods.”133 
While it is admitted that participation of the poor themselves in the produc-
tion (and utilization) of ideas, knowledge and information is important, World 
Bank economists and other aid administrators have always been convinced that 
their efforts (in the northern research institutes and development agencies) are 
needed in order to reduce the poverty of the poor people in poor countries of the 
Global South. Again citing Romer: “In the earlier phases of the development process, 
reliance may have to be placed on the transmission of ideas.” 134 And Meier: “Nations 
are poor because their citizens do not have access to the ideas that are used in industrial 
nations to generate economic value.”135  
Romer put the simple point into a complicated, yet dexterous form:  “Ideas 
are the instructions that let us combine limited physical resources in arrangements that 
are ever more valuable”136 North recommended a “redirection of emphasis, that would 
entail, among other things, the incorporation of ideas and ideologies into our analysis”, 
as well as “modifying the notion and implications of rationality”.137 This sounds like a 
good goal for my study.
3.11.2 Proposition-2: Institutional Factors and Professional Identity 
Constrain the Effective Use of Ideas 
But why has it taken us so long to learn? And, have we really learned? Does 
the global community of poverty economists and development agencies have 
capacity to accumulate knowledge? Often, reading old books and documents, I 
have the feeling that, instead of progressing forward, we are moving in circles, 
re-inventing and forgetting the same old wheel over and over again. 
Recently, there has been a lot of interest in the subjects of aid effectiveness, 
management reform and organisational learning in development co-operation138 
- the debate itself being the result of a disillusionment about the achievements 
of development assistance in reducing poverty rapidly, and the consequent ‘aid 
fatigue’ among aid donors in the 1980s and 1990s. Aid agencies have become 
increasingly interested in reforming their own, and especially their poorer part-
ners’ organisations and their deeply institutionalized ways of working. ‘New 
132 Meier (2001), p. 1. 
133 Romer (1993b), p. 64. 
134 Meier (2001), p. 4. 
135 Romer (1993a), p. 543-73.
136 Romer (1993b), p. 64. 
137 North (1990), p. 135.
138 See e.g. Berg (2001), Carlsson (2001), Carlsson & al. (1994), Carlsson and Wohlgemuth (2001), DAC 
(2001), Edgren (2001), Forss & al. (1998), Grape (2001), King (n.d.), King (2001), King and McGrath 
(n.d.), Lintonen (2001), Mkandawire (2001), Wapenhaas (2001), Wieslander (2001). A range of studies 
was produced in the late 1980s and during the 1990s about aid effectiveness including well-known 
studies by Cassen et al. (1986), Mosley (1987), Bauer (1992), Berg (1993), Burnside and Dollar (1997), 
World Bank (1998) and Roland-Holst and Tarp (2002).
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wisdoms’ have been actively sought from the best-sellers of systems analysis, 
business management and new public management (NPM).139 
What has been the impact of these new wisdoms and management reforms? 
What seems to be the potential for cross-country transfer, emulation, harmonisa-
tion and coordination of ideas, policies and institutional arrangements?140 To what 
extent do institutional factors and professional identities constrain – or facilitate 
– the effective use of ideas in development?
3.11.3 Proposition-3: Not Only Material Interests (on the Left-Right 
Axis) But Also Professional Identities and Interests Determine 
How Agents Behave 
As Bøas and McNeill have shown, ideas are often used in multilateral institutions, 
knowingly or unknowingly, to promote the (material) interests or worldviews 
favoured by powerful states or interest groups. The process through which this 
happens is called framing, and its outcome is called hegemony. An effective frame 
is one which makes favoured ideas seem like common sense, and unfavoured 
ideas as unthinkable. Such processes cannot be explained in disregard of the 
distribution of power. 141
However, it’s not only about power: Gramsci understood hegemony as a struc-
ture of dominance which is sustained not merely by force, but by broadly based 
consent through the acceptance of an ideology and of institutions consistent with 
this ideology. The structures and actions of multilateral development institutions 
are determined by shared ideas to a larger degree than by shared material inter-
ests, and, equally importantly: the identities and interests of the actors within this 
system are constructed by social interaction around opposed and contested ideas, 
or competing interpretations of the same ideas. 
These contested ideas may – in some cases – be equal to competing ideologies, 
on the right-left axis. More often the competition takes place, however, between 
the perspectives represented by various professional and disciplinary groups: 
macro-economists vs. environmental scientists; economists vs. political scientists, 
sociologists and anthropologists; engineers vs. environmentalists, or macro-econ-
139 On ‘systems analysis’ and ‘learning organisation’, see e.g. Senge (1990), Senge et al. (1994), Kleiner 
(ed.1994). On ‘business management’, see e.g. Peters and Waterman (1982), Peters et al. (1984), Peters 
(1989, 1992), Kaplan and Norton (1996). On ‘new public management’, see e.g. Perry and Kraemer 
(1983), Osborne and Gaebler (1992), Pollitt (1993), Savoie (1994), Cochrane (1994), Temmes (1994), 
Farnham et al. (eds. 1996), Alam (1997), Clarke and Newman (1997) and Minogue et al. (1998). On 
‘reform of public institutions’, see e.g. European Commission (2000a), Lehtinen (2001), PSI (1997a,b,c), 
OEDC-PUMA (1999a,b,c, 2000, 2001), Peters (2000), Girishankar et al. (1999, 2000), Synnerstrom et al 
(2000), Parison et al. (2000), Turunen (2000), Wolf (2000), World Bank (2000), Hofman (2000), Manning 
et al (2000), Van Gelder (2000), Rinne (2000), Rockman et al (2000), Waghorne (2000), Therkildsen 
(2001). On ‘organisational culture’  see: e.g. Schein (1985). 
140 See e.g. Rose (1991) on ‘lesson drawing’, Bennet (1991) on ‘emulation’  and ‘harmonisation’, Haas 
(1992) on ‘policy learning’, Coleman (1994) on ‘policy convergence’ , Dolowitz and Marsh (1996) and 
Nedley (n.d.) on ‘policy transfer’ , World Bank (1997) on ‘renewing the Bank’s effectiveness to fight 
poverty’, Hobley (2000) on ‘transformation of organisations’, European Commission (2000b, paras 
29-39) on ‘coordination’, ‘complementarity’ and ‘coherence’, Gill and Maxwell (2001), Voipio (2001b) 
and OECD-DAC (2001b) on ‘co-ordination’  and ‘harmonisation’, Hoebink (2001) on ‘coherence’ and 
Dacosta et al. (2001) on ‘complementarity’. 
141 Bøas and McNeill (2004).
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omists vs. business-school micro-economists and labour economists. In the World 
Bank and the IMF most often the perspectives of the macro-economists prevail. 
This is a classic case of the ‘public choice theory’142: 
But even if the World  Bank, as an institution, may behave so as to maximize 
organizational self-interest, I do not think that the (self-)interest framework is the 
correct way to explain why the development economists of the World Bank (or 
any of my other admirably brilliant development economist colleagues, for that 
matter) do not themselves regard the near monopolistic position of neo-classical 
economists on the market of poverty reduction ideas as problematic.143 My read-
ing of Marshall, Myrdal and Easterly144 made me think – and that’s one of the 
hypotheses I wanted to test in this study – that we need to look more closely into 
the professional identities of development economists to understand why one 
professional group really seems to believe that the ideas of other development 
professionals are so irrelevant and insignificant and that their own ideas about 
poverty reduction so exhaustively superior compared to all other professional 
groups, that they see simply nothing wrong in their single-profession dominated 
institutional strategies of poverty reduction. 
142 James M. Buchanan (winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic Science 1986) and Gordon Tullock 
are credited with being the primary developers of the Public choice theory. Their book, Calculus of 
Consent (1962), is still considered the classic piece of this subject. It is the behaviour of public sector 
bureaucrats, which is at the heart of public choice theory. While they are supposed to work in the 
public interest, putting into practice the policies of government as efficiently and effectively as possible, 
public choice theorists see bureaucrats as self-interested utility-maximizers, motivated by such factors 
as “salary, prerequisites of the office, public reputation, power, patronage…and the ease of managing 
the bureau.” See: Niskanen (1973). For Downs (1967), broader (but still ‘selfish’) motivations such as 
“pride in performance, loyalty to a programme, department or government, and a wish to best serve 
their citizens” may also affect a bureaucrat’s behaviour. 
143 Graham Hancock (1989, Introduction) grossly exaggerated the public choice argument when he 
mercilessly attacked the selfishness of the ‘Lords of Poverty’, i.e. the non-poor poverty economists 
and other poverty professionals: “Garnered and justified in the name of the destitute and the vulnerable, 
aid’s main function in the past half-century has been to create and then entrench a powerful new class of rich 
and privileged people. In that notorious club of parasites and hangers-on made up of the United Nations, the 
World Bank, and the bilateral agencies, it is aid - and nothing else - that has provided hundreds of thousands 
of ‘jobs-for-the-boys’ and that has permitted record-breaking standards to be set in self-servicing behaviour, 
arrogance, paternalism, moral cowardice, and mendacity.” Peet & al (2003) use a more institutional interest-
framework to explain how the IMF, the World Bank and the WTO share the same ideas (ideology) as 
tools to promote the profit-maximizing interests of a small number of huge, undemocratic and largely 
unregulated transnational corporations. 
144 Myrdal (1970, p. 440) also repeated Albert Marshall’s criticism (1885) about the reluctance of 
conventional economists to give their backing to distributional reforms and about the fact that they 
“appeared cold” to the needs of the poor. World Bank’s leading growth economist Bill Easterly (2001, 
p.3) rejected Myrdal’s and Marshall’s accusations, claiming that the economists’ problem is not lack of 
motivation to help the poor: “As I pursue my career as a self-anointed expert on poor countries, the differences 
in the lives of the poor and the rich supply motivation. We experts don’t care about rising gross domestic product 
for its own sake. We care because it betters the lot of the poor and reduces the proportion of people who are poor. 
We care because richer people can eat more and buy more medicines for their babies.”
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3.11.4 Proposition-4: Interests Are Socially Constructed – Strong Or-
ganizations Can Change What Individuals, or even What States Want, 
i.e. the Ideas About State Interests 
What is even more astonishing, is that the shareholders of the World Bank, includ-
ing the governments of Finland and other rich and poor countries have allowed 
the World Bank economists to define poverty – de facto - in their narrow money-
metric way. Of course, political science scholars of the ‘realist’ tradition might 
argue that it is in the interests of some of the powerful shareholders to hide and 
silence the political struggles about global poverty, and to limit the global poverty 
debate into the closed and technical seminar rooms or journals of orthodox main-
stream economists. But why would governments of poor countries want the World 
Bank to use such a narrow poverty definition? And why don’t the rich country 
governments who domestically use a multi-dimensional concept of poverty – e.g. 
Finland – require that the Bank, too, should recruit multi-disciplinary profession-
als – not only economists - to analyze and to act on the multiple dimensions of 
poverty, vulnerability, powerlessness, etc. that keep the poor people of the poor 
countries poor? And why is it that the budget allocations from MFAF145 to finance 
World Bank’s research, piloting and other knowledge-intensive activities - i.e. the 
generation of new ideas – have grown much more rapidly than the willingness of 
the MFAF to finance similar knowledge-intensive idea-generation work by the 
United Nations’ development agencies (e.g. the UNDP, Unicef, ILO, WHO, Unctad, 
etc.) and UN research institutes (e.g. UNRISD, WIDER, IILS, UNDP’s International 
Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth, and Unicef’s Innocenti Research Centre)?
And finally, how is it possible that the social policy professionals and other 
professionals of care the world over accept their marginalized position in the global 
poverty policy-making processes? The core of their professional identity and mis-
sion is to reduce social injustices. They know that there is a lot of poverty, injustice, 
and inequality in the world. And they have the right kinds of knowledge and skills 
to contribute to solving those problems. Of course, the fact that the World Bank 
headquarters is located in Washington D.C. - physically and mentally far away from 
the Nordic countries - influences attitudes on both sides. But there is also something 
intangible that locks the social policy professionals out: That something is somehow 
related to the socially constructed ideas about the nature and causes of global pover-
ty and the language that should be used to analyze it. It is also related to the socially 
constructed identities about what it takes to be a good Global Poverty Professional. Is 
it only economists who can be good global poverty professionals? Who constructs 
these ideas and identities? How? Why? Is it on purpose or un-intentionally?146
 Very similar questions can be asked about the various professional groups’ 
roles in the decision-making about Finland’s contributions to global poverty re-
duction. Development cooperation is not a trivial issue in Finnish politics: The 
ODA-appropriations are one of the few votes in the Finnish government’ budget 
145 Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
146 The concept ‘social construction of reality’ was first coined by Berger and Luckmann (1966). Finnemore 
(1996 and 1997).
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that has been growing in absolute terms year after year since the dramatic col-
lapse during the serious recession of the early 1990s. Over 50 percent of Finnish 
members of parliament – including MPs belonging to the parties that are in the 
government - signed a petition in 2005 demanding more rapid increases to the 
ODA-budgets. The powerful national (Lutheran) church of Finland and a large 
number of NGOs gave their strong support to these demands. While the will-
ingness to pay (and probably also to make an impact on poverty) is so high, it is 
somewhat surprising that all these MPs, NGOs and other opinion-leaders have 
left the decision-making about the allocation and use of Finland’s ODA-budgets 
exclusively into the hands of career diplomats of the MFAF – who are by no means 
professionals of poverty reduction. How do the Finnish MPs and NGOs accept 
this situation? Do they assume that the career diplomats’ training and experience 
makes them somehow more competent in global poverty reduction than all other 
groups of Finnish professionals, e.g. the social policy professionals who have very 
effectively reduced poverty in Finland? And, why don’t these real professionals 
of care in other ministries and organizations resist this diplomats’ monopoly? 
Martha Finnemore, an American constructivist political scientist, has shown 
convincingly that large technocratic organizations (such as e.g. the World  Bank 
and the MFAF) have the skill and capacity to socialize political decision makers 
and the large public to accept new norms, values, and perceptions of interest. The con-
cept of development was intentionally redefined as poverty alleviation during Robert 
McNamara’s presidency in the World Bank (1968-81), and the reason for this was not 
only a moral concern but also a straightforward utilitarian interest in a bureaucratic 
aggrandizement of the role, budgets and organization of the World Bank.147 
The argument that Finnemore introduced – and which I now apply for 
the World Bank and the MFAF - is this: The World Bank can change what the 
Government of Finland – or of any other country - wants. Equally, the MFAF can 
change what the Finnish MPs know about global poverty, and what they want the 
Government of Finland to do about it.148 
This study seeks evidence of inter-linkages between interests, ideas, identities 
and institutions. In institutionalism we think that not only rationally calculable 
interests, but also ideas and identities guide and constrain the policy-making and 
decision-making arrangements in institutions. These arrangements, once institu-
tionalized, tend to be ‘sticky’, i.e. hard to change, even if studies, evaluations or 
other ideas would indicate that it would be rational to choose different – perhaps 
more efficient and effective - arrangements. Such obvious irrationality of human 
action in institutional contexts is a hard challenge for the orthodox neo-classical 
economics, the internal intellectual consistency of which rests on the assumption 
of rational profit-maximizing action by the individual Homo Oeconomicus.149
147 Finnemore (1996), p. 5.
148 Finnemore (1996), p. 5.
149  Throughout the history of economics there have been ‘heterodox’ thinkers, who have questioned 
the ‘Homo economicus’ assumption of the orthodoxy. But seldom have they been taken as seriously 
– and have they received as many Nobel Prizes - as now, during the very last years. See e.g. Ackerlof 
and Schiller (2009), Kahnemann (2002), Sen (1977. 2002). See also Simon (1978, 1986, 1987a,b).
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Of the three ‘schools’ of new institutional analysis, the rational choice insti-
tutionalists are the ones with a worldview quite close to that of the neo-classi-
cal economists. Because their models are grounded in the basic assumptions of 
micro-economics, rational institutionalists hold agents’ ‘preferences’ to be the 
primitives, the uncaused cause of the theory>. Given that all social structures 
and institutions are reducible to individual ‘utility calculi’, nothing a priori to the 
individual exists that another individual did not put there. Because of this, all 
social phenomena and outcomes must at base be intentional, and institutions can 
therefore only be seen as instrumental products used by individuals to maximize 
their respective utilities. Given these assumptions, rationalists’ theories predict a 
world in flux, replete with cycles, loops, multiple equilibria, and the like, where 
institutions are both formed and changed according to rapidly shifting contract 
curves and cost/benefit trade-offs.150
However, since the world around us seems to be much more stable than ration-
alists’ theories would predict, these theorists needed some mechanism to explain 
the apparent anomaly of stability. One main motivation for the rational choice 
scholars’ interest in institutions is that institutions are the factors that can explain 
why human action is sometimes irrational: Institutions impose constraints on 
the rationality of self-interested behaviour. For example, in the classic prisoner’s 
dilemma game theory exercise, when the rules (institutions) are changed, the 
prisoner’s choices (to defect, to cooperate, and so on) also change. Thus political 
and economic institutions are important for rational choice scholars interested in 
real-world politics because the institutions define (or at least constrain) the strate-
gies that political actors adopt in pursuit of their interests.151
Historical institutionalists find the strict rationality assumption of the neo-
classical and rational choice scholars overly confining.152 Historical institution-
alists want to go further. They argue that institutions play a much greater role 
in shaping politics, economics and history more generally, than suggested by a 
narrow rational choice model. First, for historical institutionalists, institutions are 
ontologically prior to the individuals who constitute them. This is pure common 
sense: A newborn baby girl does not start her life by speculating which kinds of 
institutions would maximize her self-interest in life. However, from the Day-1 of 
her life she is embedded in a dense network of institutions, formal and informal: 
maternal clinics by the municipal council; baptism (or equivalent) by the parish 
or other faith-based-community of which she becomes a member by the choice 
of her parents; the culture of the society that is either gender-equal or unequal 
largely determines her opportunities to develop and to use her full talents in the 
society. The individual (the baby girl) first inherits all this, and many, many other 
institutions from the previous generations, and only then – at some point in her 
life – can she try to make a contribution to intentionally change some of these 
institutions. It is not easy, but it is possible. 
150 Blyth (2002), 19. Thelen and Steimo (1992), p. 7.
151 See e.g. North (2005).
152 To be sure, many scholars who come from the rational choice tradition are also willing to relax the 
rationality assumption. See, for example, North (1990b, 2005).
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Secondly, in contrast to some rational choice analysts, historical institutional-
ists tend to see political actors not so much as perfectly informed, omnipotent 
and rational maximisers, but more as rule-abiding satisfiers153  The constant and 
repetitive quality of much organized life is explicable not simply by reference to 
individual maximizing actors but rather by the persistence of taken-for-granted 
practices and their reproduction in structures that are to some extent self-sus-
taining. In short, people don’t stop at every choice and think to themselves: “Now 
what will maximize my self-interest?” Instead, most of us, most of the time, follow 
socially defined rules, even when so doing may not be directly in our calculable 
self-interest.154
3.11.5 Proposition-5: Individuals, Organisations and Governments 
Are Motivated By a Complex Mix of Sometimes Conflicting 
Preferences
Most crucially, rational choice diverges from historical institutionalism on the 
issue of preference formation. Rational choice scholars assume – in the same way 
as utilitarian neo-classical economists do - that political and economic actors are 
rational and will act to maximize self-interest.  This is quite different from the 
historical institutionalists who take the question of how individuals and groups 
define their self-interest as problematical, arguing that not just the strategies but 
also the goals actors pursue are shaped by the institutional context.155
The idea of socially and politically constructed preferences echoes the writ-
ings of an earlier generation of institutionalists.   ‘Old institutionalists’ Thorstein 
Veblen and Karl Polanyi, among others, had argued that the individualistic, com-
petitive features of modern life must be seen as products of a specific institu-
tional set-up constructed in the advanced capitalist states: these institutions – i.e. 
bureaucratic state, capitalist market, Christian religion, democracy, and nuclear 
family – shape individual preferences, organizational interests and the repertoire 
of behaviours.156
Because each individual, organization and government manoeuvres in a 
dense matrix of institutions, they are each motivated by a complex mix of some-
times conflicting preferences. This makes the system dynamic. These potentially 
contradictory preferences make multiple logics available to individuals, organi-
zations and states.157 For instance, the Government of Finland can - as one of the 
‘progressive’ members of the UN - declare its full support to pro-poor global 
migration policies, and at the same time – as one of the relatively xenophobic EU 
member nations - support EU-legislation aimed at keeping the poor majority of 
the mankind outside the ‘Fortress Europe’. 
153 This idea has also been well articulated by Herbert Simon (1985), one of the leading scholars of the 
‘Organizational Institutionalism’, the third school of new institutional analysis.
154 DiMaggio and Powell (1991), p. 9, and Thelen and Steimo (1992), p. 8.
155 See e.g. Steinmo (1993). 
156 Veblen (1961), Polanyi (1944/1957). 
157 Friedland and Alford (1991), p. 232.
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By taking the goals, strategies, and preferences as something to be explained, 
historical institutionalists show that, unless something is known about the con-
text, broad assumptions about ‘self-interested behaviour’ are empty. The strate-
gic importance and weight of this argument could not be over-emphasized: It 
is enormous for anybody engaged in economic, social and political research. It 
is simply about the difference between asking the right questions or the wrong 
ones. It implies, that the most relevant methodological distinction and choice, for 
instance in poverty research, is not necessarily between survey-based and par-
ticipatory, nor even between quantitative and qualitative methods, but between 
approaches to data collection and analysis that are more and less contextual. 
But this is not a black-and-white distinction: the relationship between contextual 
and non-contextual methods is best seen as a continuum. In fact, historical in-
stitutionalists would have no trouble with the rational choice idea that political 
and economic actors are acting strategically to achieve their ends. But the point 
is that without a (spatially or historically) contextual approach it is hard for the 
researcher to know (or even guess) what the actors are trying to maximize, and 
why they emphasize certain goals and preferences in that situation over others.158 
Further, taking preference formation as problematical rather than as given, 
it then also follows that alliance formation is more than a lining up of groups 
with compatible (pre-existing and unambiguous) self-interests. Where groups 
have multiple, often conflicting interests, it is necessary to examine the political 
struggles and processes out of which particular coalitions are formed. This is un-
fortunately an area where the world pays a high price for the narrow economistic 
mono-disciplinarity of the poverty analytics of the World Bank: The analytic 
reports of the World Bank hardly ever have anything to say about coalitions, 
parties, trade unions and employers’ associations. Perhaps many economists are 
neither interested nor competent in analyzing coalitions and the like. In their pro-
fessional culture it is perfectly in order to extrapolate the interests and preferences 
of such coalitions and groups from the assumed interests of rational individuals. 
New ideas and identities can cause groups to rethink their interests. 
Consequently, the way in which various policies are framed or packaged can facili-
tate the formation of certain coalitions and hinder others.159 Leadership, ‘Zeitgeist’ 
(fashion) as well as new technological and social innovations160 can play impor-
tant roles in these processes. The historically and spatially context-specific analy-
sis of how these processes occur can be called Process Tracing.161 Process Tracing is 
a good name for the method of research used in this study.
158 Booth et al. (1997, 1999). Thelen and Steinmo (1992), p. 9.
159 One example of this is the way economic policies the main objective of which is to extend global 
markets have been ’packaged’ and sold by the World Bank to poor country governments, rich country 
aid agencies, civil society organizations, etc. under the title pro-growth, which has further been 
interpreted as being equivalent to pro-poor.  
160 Such as e.g. internet, email and cellphones that revolutionized the impact that anti-globalization 
demonstrators could have on the meetings of the top leaders on the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO 
at the very end of the 2nd Millennium. See e.g. Mallaby (2004), Maxwell (2001).
161 Bergholm and Saari (2010).
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3.11.6 Proposition-6: In Situations of ‘Knightian Uncertainty’ Ideas 
and Identities Rather Than Interests Determine How Agents Act
Since no-one really knows how to eradicate global poverty and how to make the 
future world sustainable for posterity, we all have to rely on ideas that make sense 
to us in this world that we grasp but partly. We are all in a situation of a Knightian 
uncertainty.162  Gamblers have it easier: they deal with risks, i.e. situations where 
they can assign mathematical probabilities to the randomness which they are 
faced with. Human life, however, is not a gamble. It is much more difficult. What 
makes it so difficult is that we have to deal with Knightian uncertainty, i.e. ran-
domness that cannot be expressed in terms of specific mathematical probabilities. 
Every day we have to make choices in situations where we are unsure as to what 
our interests are, let alone how best to act to realize them. 
Every day over 20 000 members of human kind die from poverty.163 – How 
should we react? It is not in the interest of anybody to let this happen, but this is 
a crisis too large for any one of us to solve alone. It requires collective action and 
institutional change. But what? And how? At what cost? Who has the right ideas 
and who has the right to define which ideas are right? 
“In uncertain situations agents must argue over, diagnose, proselytize, and impose on others their 
notion of what a crisis actually is, before collective action to resolve the uncertainty facing them can 
take any meaningful institutional form.”164 “The mobilization of perceptions of crisis…involves the 
formation and triumph of a simplifying ideology which must find and construct points of resonance 
with a multitude of individual experiences.”165 
In such an uncertain process, the set of available economic and social ideas with 
which to interpret the environment, reduce uncertainty, and make purposeful 
collective action possible becomes critically important for us. Our ideas also de-
termine the institutions we create and use. Ideas help to diagnose what has gone 
wrong, what is to be done and who might be for or against it (stakeholder analy-
sis). The nature of a crisis such as world poverty is not simply given by its effects, 
dislocations, or casualties, nor are the actions of agents in such a situation simply 
determined by their ‘given’ interests. Instead, the diagnosis of a situation as a 
‘crisis’ by a particular set of ideas is a construction that makes the uncertainty 
that agents perceive explicable, manageable, and indeed, actionable.166 
162 Frank H. Knight (1885-1972) was one of the most eclectic economists American economics has 
produced.  He was head of the Department of Economics at the University of Chicago from the 
1920s to the late 1940s. In his dissertation Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (1921) Knight made his famous 
distinction between “risk” (randomness with knowable probabilities) and “uncertainty” (randomness 
with unknowable probabilities). See Knight (1921), Blyth (2002, p. 8-10) and Knight in Websources.
163 United Nations (2005a). See also the constantly updated basic world statistics at: www.worldometers.
info
164 Blyth (2002), p. 9.  
165 Hay (1999), p. 321.
166 See e.g. Wolfensohn (1998).
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For rational choice institutionalists, such as Douglas C. North, uncertainty is 
the result of the complexity of the problems to be solved…and…incomplete infor-
mation between agents. Given these problems, the institutional framework, by 
structuríng human interaction, limits the  set of choices available to an actor 167 On 
the concept of uncertainty, North’s thinking comes very close to that of Herbert 
Simon, one of the most famous organizational institutionalists. Simon underlined 
the inherent limits on cognition – whether human, artificial or organizational – 
that preclude rational decision-making.
Time and information are not sufficiently abundant to allow individuals to 
calculate their preferences based on a full weighing of all alternatives and their 
consequences. Instead, a range of shortcuts of bounded rationality,168 such as e.g. 
reliance on standard operating procedures, routine,  imitation, reliance on preju-
dices, professional conventions and identities169, etc. allow individuals to make 
decisions. Thus, behaviour does not express preferences, but results instead from 
the various coping devices that individuals adopt in order to overcome their cogni-
tive limits. Not only are the same cognitive processes relevant for aggregating 
individual acts into organizational decisions, they are central to understanding 
any coordinated action of anarchic individuals.170
The application of rational choice theory in the sphere of firms and other 
organisations – e.g. in professional development agencies - is called ‘organisa-
tion theory’. Over time, this school’s critique of rationality became increasingly 
radical. Whereas the concept of bounded rationality introduced limits on choice 
procedures, the ‘garbage can model’ went further, suggesting that organizations 
tend to produce many ‘solutions’ which are discarded due to a lack of appropri-
ate problems. However, problems may eventually arise for which a search of the 
‘garbage can’ might yield fitting solutions.171 Another step was taken with the 
concept of ‘institutional scripts’ – actors retrospectively assigning a rationale to 
their actions from sets of pre-existing scenarios in order to understand what they 
have done.172
167 North (1990), p. 25. Blyth (2002), p. 30-34.
168 The term ‘bounded rationality’ was first proposed by Herbert Simon in 1957. Bounded rationality 
is a central theme in ‘behavioural economics’ (see Websources), which should not be confused with 
‘behaviouralism’. Bounded rationality is concerned with the ways in which the actual decision-making 
process influences decisions. See: Simon (1957, 1987b), March and Simon (1958), Julkunen (2003), p. 
27. Denzau and North (1993. p. 1) suggest, in a footnote, that ‘irrationality’ might be a better word for 
‘bounded rationality’. They argue that in order to understand decision making under conditions of 
uncertainty we must understand the relationship between the mental models that individuals construct 
to make sense out of the world around them, the ideologies that evolve from such constructions, and 
the institutions that develop in a society to order interpersonal relationships. 
169 It is interesting to monitor how young staff members in large technocratic organizations gradually 
learn to dress, think and talk the way World Bank economists  (or MFAF-diplomats) are expected to 
dress, think and talk.
170 Immergut (1996), p. 14-16. See also: Julkunen (2003), p. 27.
171 Solutions have a life of their own. They are distinct from problems, which they might be called on 
to solve. Solutions are answers (more or less actively) looking for a question. Participants may have 
ideas for solutions; they may be attracted to specific solutions and volunteer to play the advocate. 
Cohen et al. (1972).
172 Cohen and March (1974). See also: Immergut (1996), p. 15. 
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In sum, for both North and Simon, and their followers, uncertainty is a func-
tion of computational failings and complexity of the problems and communica-
tion that cause agents to devise institutions to cope with uncertainty by limiting 
the choice set available to them. However, something very important is missing 
in the models of both North and Simon: Uncertainty is not only a problem of 
complexity and computational failings. As we noted above: ‘Knightian uncer-
tainty’ is randomness that cannot be expressed in terms of specific mathematical 
probabilities. Uncertainty is much more than a probability distribution problem. 
Uncertain situations are qualitatively different from situations of risk, because in 
situations of risk, the probabilities can be assigned to possible outcomes but not 
in cases of uncertainty, because they are always unique.173
The point of making this distinction is to emphasize that situations of Knightian 
uncertainty – e.g. our world of poverty and unprecedented prosperity - are not the 
same as the situations of ‘uncertainty as complexity’, where agents are assumed 
to be sure of their interests, but unsure of how to realize them. Such theories re-
duce uncertainty to risk, but a theory based on Knightian uncertainty doesn’t. 
Because the world situation of today is in a high degree unique, we - the agents - 
can have no conception as to which possible outcomes are likely, and hence what 
our interests in this situation are. It would be wrong to define our interests either 
by assumption or by our ‘structural location’. Our interests can be defined only 
in terms of the ideas that we ourselves have about the causes of this uncertainty 
and about future outcomes we have reason to value. Without ideas as to how the 
world is put together, why poverty exists and how various policies could either 
reduce or increase poverty, it would be cognitively impossible for us (the agents) 
to act in the world in any meaningful sense. We would not know our interests or 
our optimal strategies.174
 A contrast with the natural world is useful here. Causes in the natural world 
may be highly complex, but our understandings of those causes have no impact 
on the outcomes we observe. For example, what we believe about the motions of 
the planets has no impact whatsoever upon those motions. In the socio-economic 
and political world, however, the problem is qualitatively different because the 
ideas the agents have about the impacts of their actions, and those of others, shape 
the outcomes. In contrast to rationalist or materialist theories, a socio-economic 
idea about e.g. poverty reduction, inequality reduction, or social protection, does 
not simply identify a given causal relationship in the economy for agents. Such 
ideas serve to restructure those causal relationships by altering the agents’ own 
beliefs about the interests of others, upon which the realization of the agents’ own 
ideationally derived interests depend. Whether an economic idea is deemed to 
be ‘true’ or not depends on how widely it is held. This is why strong economic 
organizations, such as the World Bank and the IMF, can sometimes influence 
entire economies by propagating theories (‘Truths’) about them.  
173 Knight (1921), p. 229, quoted in Blyth (2002), p. 31.
174 Sen (1999), Stiglitz et al (2009).
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In sum, the ideas held by agents are often more important in understand-
ing how they behave, than their structurally derived interests. Indeed, the ex-
planatory importance of ideas cannot be fully appreciated as long as the analyst 
maintains a separation of ideas and interests. Instead, we should see interests as 
being necessarily ideationally bound, and sometimes bound to identities. When re-
conceptualized in this way, ideas are indeed intimately related to interests but 
are not reducible to them.175 
This essay deals with the ideas of non-poor poverty economists and other 
non-poor poverty  professionals. Behind the global consensus on poverty reduc-
tion, we have found serious disagreements and bitter controversies. About what? 
And why? Can those disagreements be explained by analyzing the agents’ inter-
ests, and conflicts of interests?  What roles do ideational differences, or different 
identities play in these disagreements?
3.11.7 Proposition-7: Aid Implementation Should Not Be Left To 
Economists and Diplomats Alone
In 1995 the World Bank was an institution under siege. NGOs criticized its en-
vironmental and structural adjustment policies, poor country clients expressed 
dissatisfaction with the Bank’s business approach, and the major shareholders 
showed frustration at the Bank’s perceived inefficiency. Its 50-year celebrations 
in 1994 galvanized protest marches, crystallized in the 50 Years is Enough move-
ment. Over the next 10 years the World Bank changed significantly, becoming 
acknowledged once again, in many quarters, as the world’s leading development 
agency. How did this change happen?176 
As noted by Bill Clinton, Amartya Sen and Agnus Deaton in a World Bank 
publication evaluating the impacts of Jim Wolfensohn’s Presidency 1995-2005 – 
President Wolfensohn’s World Bank “focused consistently on its mission of poverty 
reduction” (Deaton). President Wolfensohn “paid more attention to poverty than any 
of his predecessors” (Sen). This “led to a revolution in how the Bank does business. He 
made poverty reduction the raison d’être of the Bank.” (Clinton).177 
I agree. During the Wolfensohn Era (1995-2005) the World Bank’s develop-
ment theory – as articulated in the Bank’s flagship publications such as the World 
Development Reports (WDRs178) - changed substantially, as we shall discuss in 
the chapters 3-4 of this essay. The World Bank no longer talked only about dams, 
bridges, privatization, trade liberalisation and downsizing government, as many 
felt it had done in the 1980s and 1990s. The Bank started to talk about a compre-
hensive and balanced development agenda including issues such as opportunities, 
security and empowerment179 – equally for all180. This was indeed revolutionary, 
as Bill Clinton noted. The Bank’s capacity to operationalise some aspects of this 
175 See Blyth (2002), p. 33-34.
176 Kagia (2005), p. 2., Rice (2005), p 76, Woods (2006). 
177 Deaton (2005), Sen (2005) and Clinton (2005).
178 Especially the WDRs of years 1997, 2000, 2004 and 2006.
179 World Bank (2001a). 
180 World Bank (2005b, and still later, in 2006). 
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broad, holistic agenda has been good (e.g. opportunities) but its capacity to op-
erationalise other aspects of it (e.g. empowerment) has been, and still is, severely 
limited, due not least to the strikingly unbalanced professional composition of the 
World Bank’s staff, and the near-monopoly of economists in all senior manage-
ment positions that influence the Bank’s organizational culture, staff incentives 
and staff identities about what it takes to be regarded - and promoted - as a good 
(World Bank) poverty professional. 
Such organizational biases tend to reproduce themselves efficiently, since the 
privileged (empowered) staff members (economists) have little incentive to raise 
the issue, although many of them surely recognize the problem. Thus – for rea-
sons of ‘guild interests’ - the Bank’s ‘rational’ economists tacitly accept a staff com-
position which is irrational (sub-optimal) if analyzed from the perspective of the 
World Bank’s overriding mission which is to reduce poverty along all its multiple 
dimensions. The Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (MFAF) suffers from a 
similar sub-optimality problem. There the privileged professional group – with 
monopoly power over all formal decision-making - consists of career diplomats. 
Unlike in the MFAs of other countries (e.g. the UK) or in the other Ministries in 
Finland, the entry into decision-making positions in the Finnish development 
policy administration has been effectively barred for non-diplomat poverty pro-
fessionals.
Many economists in the World Bank and many diplomats in the Finnish MFA 
do a great job as poverty reduction professionals. Yet, I seriously question the 
assumptions that a few months’ diplomatic training course in the Finnish MFA, 
or a university degree in economics – the way economics is taught in universities 
today181 – would give anyone better skills in analysing poverty, its causes and 
its solutions than almost any other social science degree. Poverty reduction is a 
multi-dimensional challenge, including major issues related not only to (a) oppor-
tunities, growth, distribution, and equality, but also related to (b) rights, power, 
empowerment, democracy, participation and governance, and to (c) vulnerability, 
security, respect, self-respect, gender and sustainability.
181 See e.g. Fullbrook (2003, ed.2004, ed.2007), Keen (2001), Chang (2003), Vartiainen (2004), Vihanto 
(2001).  See also: Post-Autistic Economics in Websources. As regards my own ‘love and hate’ relationship 
with economics, I have read economics and development economics literature probably more than 
many professional economists. I have a master’s degree in economic history and a subject studies 
degree with honors in environmental economics. However, already in the economics classes during 
my master’s studies I felt an instinctive aversion to the worldview and way of thinking of mainstream 
(neo-classical) economics. I realized that it was a politically important discipline and wanted to 
understand the economistic way of thinking better – but from the outside, without internalizing the 
economistic identity and worldview myself. My intense interest in the history of economic thought, 
sociology of economics, politics of poverty economics and development economics has been driving 
my research work throughout the 17 years that I have spent working on this essay. 
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3.11.8 Proposition-8: A ‘Rare Moment’ at the Millennium 
Turn Cracked the Illusion of Consent Among the Development Econo-
mists and Made the Controversies Known to Non-Economists
James Wolfensohn became President of the World Bank on 1 June, 1995, soon 
after the United Nations World Summit on Social Development in Copenhagen 
in March 1995. Mr. Wolfensohn’s second term as World Bank President ended 
on 31 May, 2005, shortly before the United Nations Summit that brought world 
leaders to New York to review the progress made in implementing the poverty 
reduction commitments made in Copenhagen and in the Millennium Summit of 
September-2000. 
The James Wolfensohn Presidency 1995-2005 can be characterized a ‘rare mo-
ment’182 when the politics of poverty economics in the World Bank became visible 
more clearly than ever before. The four factors that made the moment ‘rare’ will 
be just briefly mentioned here and discussed in more detail later in this essay: 
(a) a global disillusionment with structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s 
and 1990s; 
(b) a simultaneous emergence of a few brilliant and independent thinkers among 
world’s leading development economists; 
(c) the emergence of a new critical generation of economics students and teachers 
in some of Europe’s – and later America’s - leading universities (the Post-Autistic 
Economics Network, PAE183) ;
(d) a shift ‘from X-Files to Internet’, i.e. a drastic double change in (1) information 
technology and (2) the disclosure policies of the World Bank and other leading 
development institutions. 
Thus, while there was the emerging Millennium Consensus on poverty reduc-
tion, and there were the positive contributions by President Wolfensohn towards 
a widely shared consensus about a new, holistic, comprehensive and collaborative 
approach to poverty reduction184, the Wolfensohn Presidency period was also 
plagued by a whole range of serious controversies between:
(a) World Bank, IMF and WTO vs. the Global Civil Society movement;
(b) Economists vs. other social scientists
(c) Among economists.185 
182 On the concept of ‘rare moment’, see Julkunen and Vauhkonen (2005). It’s meaning comes close to 
the everyday concept of “ketchup bottle effect: For a long time, nothing comes out even if you try but 
then, at once, more than you can handle bursts onto your plate. We shall discuss, later in this essay, 
what factors created this ‘rare moment’ in the World Bank.
183 Discussions between post-autistic economists can be monitored in the Real-World Economics 
Review, at www.paecon.net.
184 See e.g. Kagia (ed. 2005), Mallaby (2004), Wolfensohn (2005).
185 See e.g. Kagia (ed. 2005), Kanbur (2001a, 2002a), Keen (2001), Chang (2003), Fullbrook (ed. 2003, ed. 
2004), Stiglitz (2000b, 2002, 2003).
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So, besides generating a number of historically important new approaches to 
poverty-focused development policy and cooperation, the Wolfensohn period 
(1995-2005) also revealed a number of serious limitations in the capacity of the 
dominant professional group of poverty reduction planners, the poverty econo-
mists, to deal with some of the key poverty problems identified. This essay ar-
gues that these limitations should not be taken lightly - which leads us to my last 
proposition:
3.11.9 Proposition-9: Professionals of Development and Care Should 
Be Aware of the Crisis Within the Economics Profession – and Not 
Take for Granted Routine Assumptions Based on Outdated Economics 
A re-reading of development economics is needed. But so is a serious rethinking 
of the mother science, economics, and a genuine search for a multi-disciplinary 
‘socio-ecolo-nomic’ balance.   A harmonious and balanced inter-disciplinary ap-
proach will not be possible without a serious and humble rethinking of the ideas, 
interests and identities of poverty economics. 
Some of the best brains of the economics – and accounting - profession had, 
indeed, already begun a genuine self-critical examination of the profession before 
the financial crisis of 2007-2010 struck the world and devastated the public image 
and self-confidence of the mainstream economists.186 The global depression has 
obviously been a humbling crisis also for the entire economics profession, and 
– from the point of view of professionals of care – it would be important now 
to avoid the temptations to become gleeful or to gloatand instead to seek to use 
the moment of rethinking in the economics profession as an opportunity for a 
renewal of constructive and fruitful multi-disciplinary interaction. 
Rethinking is never easy, however. It is most likely that poverty economists 
and other social scientists will continue to speak past each other. And that econo-
mists will continue dominating within the World Bank as much as diplomats will 
dominate in the MFA-Finland. And that the World Bank will continue dominat-
ing over UN-agencies and bilaterals.187 And that uppers will generally continue 
to dominate – and be criticized by - the lowers.188
Social policy professionals and other professionals of care can make a con-
structive move, by first trying to understand the worldviews of their economist 
(and diplomat) colleagues. It is not possible to understand how the World Bank 
acts, or why global poverty is portrayed to us the way it is done, without an idea 
186 See: Real-World Economics Review Blog (March 31, 2010) and Bezemer (2009).   
187 Under the leadership of Paul Wolfowich (2005-2007), the World Bank attracted criticism not only 
from those who object to the monopoly of economics but also from those who dislike the Bank because 
they consider it a tool of unipolar world domination by the US-Government. Before his nomination to 
the World Bank (by US-President Bush Jr.) Mr.Wolfowich had worked as National Security Adviser of 
President Bush Jr., and had gained dubious credentials as the main architect of the US-attack on Iraq. 
Mr. Wolfowich was forced to resign his post as World Bank President in 2007, due to a bad governance 
(favouritism) scandal. See e.g. Bond (2005), Doebler (2005) and Turki (2005). After Mr. Wolfowich, 
the World Bank has been led by Mr. Robert B. Zoellick, whose core vision is for the World Bank “to 
contribute to an inclusive and sustainable globalization – to overcome poverty, enhance growth with care for the 
environment, and to create individual opportunity and hope.”  See: Zoellick in Websources. 
188 The idea of ‘uppers’ and ‘lowers’ comes from Chambers (1997). 
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of how the economists think. Nor to understand Finnish development policy with 
no idea of what drives the diplomats’ choices. 
I am not expecting the World Bank economists to be ‘converted’ by this essay. 
But as a professional community the poverty economists will sooner or later con-
vert themselves. It is important for all professionals of care – in all development 
agencies and in all global social policy networks - to be aware that promising 
signs of change are ‘in the air’ among several networks of brilliant – more or less 
heterodox – economists and other serious thinkers within and outside the World 
Bank.
On September 29, 2010, as I was editing this book for print, Mr. Zoellick 
made a very interesting and encouraging public speech – titled “Democratizing 
Development Economics” - at the Georgetown University, just before the World 
Bank Annual Meetings 2010. In his speech Mr. Zoellick, a lawyer (i.e. a ‘non-
economic social scientist’) himself, asked whether development economics of 
today is addressing the most important problems facing developing countries or 
whether it has ‘lost its way’? The World Bank President called for a major rethink-
ing of development economics research at the World Bank. 189
“Even before the (2007-10 financial) crisis there was a questioning of prevailing para-
digms and a sense that development economics needed rethinking,” Mr. Zoellick said. 
“The crisis has only made that more compelling. Today, I will attempt to persuade you 
that economics, and in particular development economics, must broaden the scope of the 
questions it asks – thereby also becoming more relevant to today’s challenges. It must help 
policymakers facing complex, multi-faceted problems.”
As Mr. Zoellick said, he has been a policymaker throughout his professional 
career: “My principal interest has been policy. For me, this has evolved as a mixture of 
history, economics, economic history, finance, law, politics and government, and psychol-
ogy. The experience has underscored the complexity of our world. Practice has given me a 
certain skepticism of grand designs and a wariness of social engineering. I observed with 
concern when economics shifted away from political economy to ‘pure’ theory.”
In Mr. Zoellick’s view research economists often seem not to start with the key 
knowledge gaps facing development practitioners, but rather search for questions 
they can answer with the industry’s currently favorite tools. 
“We need humility in the face of complex problems that require observation, trials, 
testing - and honesty to acknowledge when well-intentioned, deeply-committed efforts still 
don’t work. We need to democratize and demystify development economics, recognizing 
that we do not have a monopoly on the answers,” the World Bank President declared. 
This essay of mine is an effort towards that same end.
Mr. Zoellick’s thinking was probably partly influenced by what he had ob-
served in the Bank himself. On a closer reading of his speech it becomes obvious 
that he was borrowing many of his arguments from a research paper drafted by 
the Development Economics Vice-Presidency of the World Bank (DEC), under 
the leadership of Mr. Justin Lin, Bank’s new Chief Economist and Senior Vice-
189 Zoellick (2010). 
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President.190  What makes this development particularly interesting in our rapidly 
changing world is the fact that Mr. Lin is a Chinese national. The impact of China 
in the globalizing world is, thus, not only felt through the huge role China plays 
in the global markets of trade, finance and investment, but also in the growing 
Chinese influence in the global markets for ideas. 
I’ll discuss Mr. Zoellick’s and Mr. Lin’s arguments in greater detail in the 
‘Conclusions’ chapter of my book. Whatever will be their impact in the World 
Bank, one conclusion I would wish the social policy professionals to draw is this: 
in the future there will be a growing demand not only for economic expertise 
but also for multi-disciplinary social (and environmental) policy expertise in: (a) 
rethinking ideas; (b) reinterpreting interests; (c) recreating identities; (d) rebuilding 
institutions and (e) re-establishing a balanced ‘socio-ecolo-nomic’ theory and policy.
190 World Bank (2010).
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4 From Conflicts to 
Consensus – Poverty 
Reduction at the 
Millennium
More than 8 million people around the world die each year because they are too 
poor to stay alive. Every morning our newspapers could report: “More than 20,000 
people perished yesterday of extreme poverty.”191 
In the words of Bono, famous rock-musician, the key question is this: “We can 
be the generation that no longer accepts that an accident of latitude determines whether a 
child lives of dies, but will we be that generation?” Future generations will know how 
we answered this key question.192
The new 3rd Millennium opened on a hopeful note. 147 heads of state and 
government assembled at the United Nations headquarters in New York in 
September 2000, chaired by President Tarja Halonen of Finland, and convinc-
ingly expressed a global determination to end poverty and other challenging 
and vexing problems inherited from the twentieth century.  For the occasion, the 
UN Millennium Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan presented the world 
with a remarkable document: We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the 
21st Century. That document became the basis for a yet more important global 
statement, The Millennium Declaration, adopted by 191 member governments of 
the United Nations.193 
The Millennium Declaration surveyed the issues of war and peace, health 
and disease, and wealth and poverty, and committed the leaders and nations of 
the world to a set of undertakings to improve the human condition. Specifically, 
it set forth a series of quantified and time-bound goals to reduce extreme pov-
erty, disease, and deprivation. Those goals were subsequently excerpted from the 
Millennium Declaration to become the eight Millennium Development Goals, or 
MDGs, approved by the UN General Assembly one year later, in September 2001 
(see Table 2 below).
191 Sachs (2005), p. 1.
192 Bono (2004).
193 United Nations Secretary General (2000), United Nations (2000a), Sachs (2005), p. 210-211. 
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Photo 1. Heads of State at the UN Millennium Summit, chaired by Ms. Tarja 
Halonen, President of Finland194
In the same year (2001) also both the World Bank and the Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) of the OECD published their own widely read Poverty 
Reduction Guidelines.195 Two points worth noting here are: (a) the unprecedented 
convergence and consensus between these Global Core institutions over the new 
poverty reduction strategy; (b) the non-insignificant differences between the new 
poverty reduction strategy compared with that advocated by the leading global 
mainstream development institutions during the previous two decades. 
Five years later, in September 2005, the governments of the world assembled 
again at the UN Headquarters in New York, to review progress and shortcom-
ings of the world in moving towards the MDGs, as well as to reconfirm their 
commitment to the ideas expressed in the Millennium Declaration and to achiev-
ing the MDGs in all regions of the world.196 Again, a similar meeting was held 
in September-2010 to review MDG-progress five years ahead of the target date 
2015.197
194 United Nations (2005c).
195 World Bank (2001a), and OECD-DAC (2001c).
196 United Nations (2005b). 
197 United Nations General Assembly (2010), United Nations Secretary General (2010).
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Table 2. Millennium Development Goals (MDG) as Presented by the UN Secretary 
General to the UN General Assembly in September 2001198
goals and targets progress monitoring indicators
Goal 1. Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger199
Target 1. Halve, between 1990 and 2015, 
the proportion of people whose income is 
less than one dollar a day.
1. Proportion of population below $ per day.
2. Poverty gap ratio (incidence x depth of 
poverty).
3. Share of poorest quintile in national con-
sumption.
4. Prevalence of underweight children (un-
der five years of age).
5. Proportion of population below minimum 
level of dietary energy consumption.
Target 2.
Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the propor-
tion of people who suffer from hunger.
Goal 2. Achieve universal primary education
Target 3.
Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, 
boys and girls alike, will be able to complete 
a full course of primary schooling.
6. Net enrolment ratio in primary education
7. Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who 
reach grade 5
8. Literacy rate of 15-24-year-olds
Goal 3. Promote gender equality and empower women
Target 4.
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and 
secondary education, preferably by 2005, 
and to all levels of education no later than 
2015.
9. Ratio of girls to boys in primary, second-
ary and tertiary education
10. Ratio of literate females to males of 
15-to-24-year-olds
11. Share of women in wage employment in 
the non-agricultural sector
12. Proportion of seats held by women in 
national parliament
Goal 4. Reduce child mortality
Target 5.
Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 
2015, 
the under-five mortality rate.
13. Under-five mortality rate
14. Infant mortality rate
15. Proportion of 1-year-old children immu-
nized against measles
Goal 5. Improve maternal health
Target 6.
Reduce by three quarters, between 1990 
and 2015, the maternal mortality ratio.
16. Maternal mortality ratio
17. Proportion of births attended by skilled 
health personnel
Goal 6. Combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases
Target 7.
Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse 
the spread of HIV/AIDS
18. HIV prevalence among 15-to-24-year-
old pregnant women
19. Contraceptive prevalence rate
20. Number of children orphaned by HIV/
AIDS
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Target 8.
Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse 
the incidence of malaria and other major 
diseases
21. Prevalence and death rates associated 
with malaria
22. Proportion of population in malaria risk 
areas using effective malaria prevention and 
treatment measures
23. Prevalence and death rates associated 
with tuberculosis
24. Proportion of tuberculosis cases detected 
and cured under directly observed treatment 
short course
Goal 7. Ensure environmental sustainability   
Target 9.
Integrate the principles of sustainable 
development into country policies and pro-
grammes and reverse the loss of environ-
mental resources
Note: The selection of indicators for goals 7 
and 8 is subject to further refinement
25. Proportion of land area covered by forest
26. Land area protected to maintain biologi-
cal diversity
27. GDP per unit of energy use (as proxy for 
energy efficiency)
Target 10.
Halve by 2015 the proportion of people 
without sustainable access to safe drinking 
water
28. Carbon dioxide emissions (per capita) 
[Plus two figures of global atmospheric pol-
lution: ozone depletion and the accumula-
tion of global warming gases]
29. Proportion of population with sustainable 
access to an improved water source
Target 11.
By 2020 to have achieved a significant 
improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers
30. Proportion of people with access to im-
proved sanitation
31. Proportion of people with access to 
secure tenure
[Urban/rural disaggregation of several of the 
above indicators may be relevant for moni-
toring improvement in the lives of slum
dwellers]
Goal 8. Develop a global partnership for development
Target 12.
Develop further an open, rule-based, 
predictable, non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system. Includes a commitment to 
good governance,
development, and poverty reduction — both 
nationally and internationally.
Note: The selection of indicators for goals 7 
and 8 is subject to  further refinement
[Some of the indicators listed below will be 
monitored separately for the least developed 
countries (LDCs), Africa, landlocked coun-
tries and small island developing States]
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Target 13.
Address the special needs of the least de-
veloped countries. Includes: tariff and quota 
free access for least developed countries’ 
exports; enhanced programme of debt relief 
for HIPCs200  and
cancellation of official bilateral debt; and 
more generous ODA for countries commit-
ted to poverty reduction
Official development assistance
32. Net ODA as percentage of OECD/DAC 
donors’ gross national product (targets of 
0.7% in total and 0.15% for LDCs)
33. Proportion of ODA to basic social ser-
vices (basic education, primary health care, 
nutrition, safe water and sanitation)
34. Proportion of ODA that is untied
35. Proportion of ODA for environment in 
small island developing States
36. Proportion of ODA for transport sector in 
landlocked countries
Target 14.
Address the special needs of landlocked 
countries and small island developing States 
(through the Programme of Action for the 
Sustainable Development of Small Island 
Developing States and the outcome of the 
twenty-second special session of the Gen-
eral Assembly)
Market access
37. Proportion of exports (by value and 
excluding arms) admitted free of duties and 
quotas
38. Average tariffs and quotas on agricul-
tural products and textiles and clothing
39. Domestic and export agricultural subsi-
dies in OECD countries
40. Proportion of ODA provided to help build 
trade capacity
Target 15.
Deal comprehensively with the debt 
problems of developing countries through 
national and international measures in order 
to make debt
sustainable in the long term
Debt sustainability
41. Proportion of official bilateral HIPC debt 
cancelled
42. Debt service as a percentage of exports 
of goods and services
43. Proportion of ODA provided as debt 
relief
44. Number of countries reaching HIPC deci-
sion and completion points
Target 16.
In cooperation with developing countries, 
develop and implement strategies for de-
cent and productive work for youth
Youth employment
45. Unemployment rate of 15-to-24-year-
olds
Target 17.
In cooperation with pharmaceutical compa-
nies, provide access to affordable essential 
drugs 
Access to essential drugs
46. Proportion of population with access to 
affordable essential drugs on a sustainable 
basis
Target 18.
In cooperation with the private sector, make 
available the benefits of new technologies, 
especially information and communications
ICT-access
47. Telephone lines per 1,000 people
48. Personal computers per 1,000 people
[Other indicators to be decided]
198
198  Later, in 2008 a third target was included to MDG-1.  The new MDG Target (1B) is: Achieve full and 
productive employment and decent work for all, including women and young people. The following 
four employment indicators were set to monitor progress toward the MDG Employment Target: 1.4 
Growth rate of labour productivity (GDP per person employed); 1.5 Employment-to-population ratio; 
1.6 Proportion of employed people living below the poverty line (working poor); 1.7 Proportion of 
own-account and contributing family workers in total employment (vulnerable employment rate).  In 
addition, another employment-related indicator falls also under MDG Goal 3, Promote gender equal-
ity and empower women. This is: 3.2 Share of women in wage employment in the non-agricultural 
sector.  For more, see: www.ilo.org/empelm/what/lang--en/WCMS_114244/index.htm.
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4.1 WhAt WAS NeW iN the milleNNium CoNSeNSuS 
oN poveRtY? 
The new global consensus on poverty reduction was qualitatively significantly 
different from that advocated by the mainstream poverty economists199 during 
the previous two decades. In my summary, the four main differences were:  
Context-specificity: A shift from a ‘one-size-fits-all’ mentality of analytic work to 
context-specificity in poverty assessments and in policy analysis. This means 
recognizing the uniqueness of each historical and spatial (global, national, local, 
household, individual) context. Essential here is the new seriousness with which 
the global development community was trying to respond to Robert Chambers’ 
question: “Whose reality counts?”200
Multi-dimensionality: A shift from a single-dimensional (money-metric) to a multi-
dimensional concept of poverty. The MDGs201 are an effort to operationalize this 
new conceptual framework, where poverty no longer can be measured merely by 
the income poverty measures such as GNP/capita and USD 1/day,   World Bank 
statistics and analyses have traditionally focused on. 
Coherence: A shift from each sector, ministry and UN-agency working separately 
‘in a silo’, to working for the same goals in each sector, e.g. through multi-secto-
ral inter-ministerial/inter-agency policies and programmes. Related to this is the 
recognition of the inter-linkages between the local, national, regional and global 
levels of governance, and the inter-linkages between material growth and environ-
mental destruction, and the subsequent imperative to ensure that our solutions to 
poverty are also environmentally sustainable, i.e. that there is coherence between 
our action agendas on poverty reduction and sustainable development.
Democratic principles: A shift from a dominance-based conditionality to democratic 
principles such as: human rights, participation, ownership, partnership, good gov-
ernance, co-ordination, harmonisation and alignment of external aid efforts to the 
national governance structures and implementation processes.202
This change of approach had certainly been ‘in the air’ in many circles in various 
parts of the world since the 1980s, and thousands if not millions of individuals 
had probably contributed towards that shift. It should not be unfair, however, to 
mention in this context the names of a few individual visionary poverty econo-
mists and other poverty professionals, who played an important role in articulat-
ing the broad global dissatisfaction with the old approach and in conceptualising 
the main elements of the Millennium Consensus on poverty reduction. At least 
names such as Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Frances Stewart, Richard Jolly, Mahbub 
199 Among the globally most influential poverty economists of the 1980s and 1990s were, e.g. Robert 
Cassen, Paul Collier, Angnus Deaton, Stanley Fisher, Anne Krugman, Lyn Squire, Lawrence Summers, 
and John Williamson.
200 See e.g. Chambers (1995, 1997).
201 The MDGs (= Millennium Development Goals). See e.g. Millennium indicators in Websources.
202 See e.g. Aid Harmonisation, and TASOET 2005 in Websources.
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ul Haq, Juan Somavia, Robert Chambers, James Wolfensohn, Joseph Stiglitz, Ravi 
Kanbur and Amartya Sen deserve to be mentioned here.  
4.2 CRiSiS iN the BANK – AND iN the eCoNomiCS 
pRoFeSSioN 
So, with the Millennium Consensus – was all well? No, unfortunately. All was not 
well. Something was seriously wrong: behind the conceptual convergence and 
strategic consensus within and among the UN, the World Bank and the OECD-
DAC, the thinkers and practitioners of different professional, national and ideo-
logical backgrounds were still attaching very different meanings to the common 
concepts and using remarkably different logics to link reality, theory and action. 
The game got rough: A few of the world’s brightest economic thinkers – Joseph 
Stiglitz, Ravi Kanbur and Bill Easterly - got kicked or harassed out from the World 
Bank, because they broke the rules of the mainstream economic orthodoxy. Their 
crime was that they had thought independently, used their own best judgment, 
and spoken out. The official World Bank tried its best – but failed miserably - to 
cover the disagreements and to maintain a facade of consensus and promising 
progress under the firm leadership of Washington-based neoliberal economists.
I soon started to realize that the crisis at the World Bank was only the tip of a 
much larger iceberg: a crisis of the mainstream neoliberal development economics, 
and perhaps even of the ‘mother science’, economics, as it is taught in the leading 
universities of the Western world. Since this crisis was not well known by social 
policy professionals and other professionals of care, and not even to most aid agen-
cy professionals, I found it necessary to explain its nature and causes in this essay. 
To understand the crisis and its roots, we have to take a short excursion into 
the history of the World Bank – and of economics:
4.3 KeYNeS AND the NeW Role oF the StAte iN 
mARKet eCoNomieS 
John Maynard Keynes’ (1883-1946) response to the tragedies caused by the Great 
Depression in the 1930s gained him a worldwide reputation as the founder of a 
new pragmatic school of economics that really helped governments solve huge 
problems of the national and international economy. Conventional neo-classical 
wisdom of the 1930s still held, against mounting evidence to the contrary, that 
time and nature would restore prosperity if government did not try to manipu-
late the economy. The mainstream economists’ arguments were strikingly similar 
to the ones used by orthodox ‘Washington Consensus’ economists half a century 
later in developing countries going through ‘Structural Adjustment Programmes’, 
imposed on them by the IMF and the World Bank: if all groups accepted the dis-
cipline of competitive adjustment, soon recovery, prosperity, and higher wages 
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would return. - Yet this remedy worked nowhere. New explanations and new 
policies were urgently needed.203 
The Democratic Party candidate Franklin D. Roosevelt had made promises 
of a ‘New Deal’ for the ‘forgotten man’ during the presidential elections of the 
USA in 1932. Opposed to the traditional American political philosophy of ‘lais-
sez-faire’, the New Deal generally embraced the idea of government-regulated 
economy aimed at achieving a balance among conflicting economic interests, and 
massive public works projects to promote a recovery. During and after the Great 
Depression, the idea of government intervention, whether in the form of taxation, 
industrial regulation, public works, social insurance, social welfare services, or 
deficit spending, came to assume a principal role in ensuring economic stability 
in most industrial nations with market economies.204 
In Europe, the main theorist and architect of the new government-reg-
ulated economy was John Maynard Keynes, a British economist.205  His 
‘The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money’, which appeared in 
1935-36, is a highly technical, even abstruse exposition of new ideas.206 The central 
message is readily translated into one major and two supporting propositions. The 
main idea is simple: in order to keep people employed, governments have to run 
deficits when the economy is slowing. The first supporting argument declared the 
existing theory of unemployment nonsense. In a depression, according to Keynes, 
there was no wage so low that it could eliminate unemployment. Accordingly, 
it was wicked to blame the unemployed for their plight. The second supporting 
proposition proposed an alternative explanation for the origins of unemployment 
and depression. This centred upon ‘aggregate demand’ - i.e., the total spending 
of consumers, business investors, and public agencies. When it was high, all was 
well. When aggregate demand was low, sales and jobs suffered. Keynes’ radical 
idea was that in such a situation the government should spend money they do not 
really have, i.e. ‘deficit finance’ the economy in order to keep the wheels rolling. 
The ‘General Theory’ thus provided a coherent theoretical rationale for a 
‘mixed economy of welfare’. As a liberal economist, Keynes believed in capitalism 
and favoured as much liberalism - and as little collectivism - as possible. However, 
he argued, the free play of market forces might reach perfect equilibrium, but 
at a cost of high unemployment and unnecessary social misery. The goal of full 
employment could only be achieved if the government intervened and stimulated 
both investment and aggregate demand by raising levels of public expenditure 
and playing a direct role in economic planning and management.207
203 Keynes (1936, 37), Skidelsky (2009), Cornia et al (1987).
204 See New Deal in Websources. 
205 Lekachman (2001).
206 Robert Reich, U.S. Government Secretary of Labour from 1993 to 1997, and today professor of 
economics and social policy at Brandeis, has characterized Keynes’ General Theory “a convoluted, badly 
organized and in places nearly incomprehensible tome.” Yet, that ‘convoluted, nearly incomprehensible 
tome’ – according to Reich’s assessment – “transformed the dismal science of economics into a revolutionary 
engine of social progress, and … saved capitalism from itself and surely kept latter-day Marxists at bay.” See: 
Reich (2000). 
207 Pinker (1998), p. 93. Reich (2000). 
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The General Theory fell among the economists of the day with a very Big 
Bang. Nothing for them was ever quite the same again. The practical implications 
of Keynes’ analysis extended beyond the world of theoretical economics to all 
the other applied social sciences, including social policy. Every attempt to find a 
‘middle way’ between the paradigms of unregulated laissez-faire and dirigiste 
central planning, as well as between the imperatives of competition and social 
justice still starts and ends with Keynes. Keynes was often invited to play a major 
advisory role in the making of British economic and social policies during the 
years of the Second World War and the post-war settlement.
Since Keynes was, himself, liberal in political outlook it is not surprising that 
his writings had a profound and lasting influence on the British Liberal Party. 
What is more remarkable is the extent to which some sections of the Conservative 
and Labour parties were subsequently won over to his views. For instance, in 1938 
Harold Macmillan208 who positioned himself at the left wing of the Conservative 
Party published a book titled ‘The Middle Way’ in which he set out a ‘compre-
hensive plan’ for national reconstruction and recovery. 
Compare this with the ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’ (CDF) pro-
posed in 1999 by Jim Wolfensohn209, President of the World Bank 1995-2005, as 
the basis of poverty reduction and development of the world’s poor countries. 
Macmillan acknowledged his intellectual debt to Keynes, and described his 
approach as a form of ‘planned capitalism’ that would ensure the survival of 
competitive markets. He called for the provision of major development grants in 
depressed areas, the introduction of a minimum wage policy and family allow-
ances, the extension of home ownership, direct governmental involvement in the 
fuel and transport industries and the establishment of a central planning council 
to oversee the implementation of economic and social policies.  Also many lead-
ing leftist economists like Joan Robinson, as well as John Hicks, Nicholas Kaldor 
and James Meade identified themselves as ‘Keynesians’. 210
4.4 the BiRth oF the WoRlD BANK AS AN 
‘ApolitiCAl’ gloBAl teChNoCRACY 
Keynes extended his influence also to what would nowadays be called ‘Global 
Governance’. He was the leader of the British delegation to the ‘Bretton Woods 
Conference’211 in 1944 where the IMF (International Monetary Fund) and the World 
Bank (International Bank for Reconstruction and Development) were founded.
208 Harold Macmillan (1894-1986) was a British conservative politician who held several ministerial 
posts in Winston Churchill’s World War II coalition government, and in all the subsequent British 
governments until 1957 when he was appointed Prime Minister (until 1963), and elected leader of the 
Conservative Party.
209 See Wolfensohn (1999). More about the CDF later in this essay.
210 Cornwall (2001) and Keen (2001), p. 202-211.
211 Rather than in humid Washington, the conference would take place in a scenic New England 
mountain resort, partly in deference to Lord Keynes’s preference for a cool meeting place that would 
not exacerbate his weak heart condition. 
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In the wake of the greatest economic collapse and most catastrophic war in 
history the representatives of the United Nations sought world peace, freedom, 
and security. Global economic growth integrating countries into a world market 
would be the means to achieve these goals. The Bretton Woods institutions, the 
World Bank and the IMF, would be the critical instruments. This was the shared 
vision of Bretton Woods.
The World Bank was very much a product of the ‘New Deal’ and ‘Keynesianism’, 
with their pioneering optimism about the ability of government and centralized 
planning to manage economic forces and cycles. It was conceived, negotiated, and 
promoted by economists and financial technicians as an institution that, along 
with the IMF, would operate on an ‘apolitical’, unbiased basis where only econom-
ic considerations would be relevant. It was the first, and remains the pre-eminent, 
global technocracy. Little thought was given to the political and moral risks as-
sociated with such an enterprise, though the literature of modernity from Max 
Weber onward is replete with warnings of the human consequences of bureau-
cratic rationality divorced from democratic political and social accountability.212
The voting power of the World Bank Executive Directors (EDs) is roughly pro-
portional to the amount of money contributed to the Bank by the member govern-
ments the EDs represent. The U.S. vote originally counted for 36 percent; by 2004 
it was down to 16.39 percent. Japan had second largest contributions and voting 
power in 2004 with its 9.87 percent of votes. Next came Germany (4.49), France 
(4.30) and United Kingdom (4.30). The Executive Director representing a voting 
group consisting of all the Nordic and Baltic states had a total of 3.34 percent 
of the votes.213 The 30 countries of the OECD controlled almost two-thirds, and 
the G8-countries almost half the votes. Just two Executive Directors represented 
the over 50 states of sub-Saharan Africa on the World Bank Board, wielding just 
above 5 percent of the total votes between them.214
The Fund and the Bank were housed in a new building in Washington, origi-
nally intended for State Department, at 1818 H Street - a five minute walk from the 
White House. These quarters became the ‘Global Headquarters’ of poverty reduc-
tion planning for the following (at least) 60 years. Most of the staff of the World 
Bank were to be economists from the U.S.A. or the UK. When the other members 
states started to demand that also their nationals should be recruited to the staffs 
of the two institutions, the Bank and the IMF responded by headhunting econom-
ics students of other nationalities at the ten leading U.S. and UK universities. As 
a result, gradually, the staff ‘diversity’ was increased so that, e.g. by 1998 of the 
total of 9 262 staff members of the World Bank, 51 percent were women, and 53 
percent were developing country nationals. However, if you look more carefully 
into the backgrounds of the staff, the image of intellectual diversity vanishes: still 
212 Rich (1994), p. 63. 
213 These figures represent the voting power in the World Bank ‘proper’, i.e. the IBRD. On questions 
relating to the World Bank ‘window’ for the low-income countries (the IDA), the voting shares of 
Executive Directors are slightly different: USA: 14.28%, Japan: 10.90%, Germany: 7.00%, the UK: 5.06%, 
France: 4.32%, and the Nordic-Baltic voting group: 4.94%. See: World Bank Voting Power in Websources.
214 Rich (1994), p. 58. 
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most of the staff of the World Bank Headquarters have received their academic 
education in one of the ten mainstream economics departments of the U.S.A. or 
the UK. The intellectual climate is therefore still rather monolithic, and independ-
ent thinkers have a hard time in the Bank, both among the junior as well as senior 
staff. In the years just before and after the turn of the Millennium the number 
of ‘dissidents’ ousted from the Bank, also from influential senior positions, was 
remarkably high.215
4.5 DevelopmeNt AiD – expoRtiNg the goSpel oF 
‘Big iS BeAutiFul’ pRojeCt plANNiNg 
In Western literature one often finds a false dichotomy between the ‘socialist’ idea 
of planning and the ‘capitalist’ trust in the spontaneously equilibrium-creating 
market-forces. The belief in and dedication to ‘comprehensive planning’ has been 
great among many Western planners, as well. 
During Roosevelt’s New Deal, the arm of the Federal Government reached also 
into the area of electric power. The purpose of the ‘Tennessee Valley Authority’ 
(TVA), established in 1933, was to reduce poverty in a seven-state area by supplying 
cheap electricity, preventing floods, improving navigation, and producing nitrates. 
The TVA was nothing less than the first modern, large-scale effort in the world to 
plan and finance ‘integrated regional development’.216 As such the TVA became the 
‘cradle’ of the international professional community of ‘project planners’. 
By the 1960s the TVA had directly inspired gigantic river-basin development 
schemes in Brazil, Colombia, Mexico, Ghana, India, Philippines, etc.217 When 
the first World Bank missions arrived in these countries, local social scientists 
did not know what the World Bank technocrats meant by the word ‘project’, nor 
were they conversant with the new techniques of planning used by the Bank 
advisers (such as ‘surveys’ and ‘statistical analyses’). As planning experts were 
not available nationally, the World Bank offered to send experts from the U.S.A. 
as consultants to help developing country governments establish the necessary 
national planning organs and to train the first generation national development 
planners. One of the first World Bank consultants was Albert O. Hirschman, a 
German-born American economist, one of the first classics of a new profession 
of ‘development economists’.218 
215 World Bank (1998c), p. 109. For instance the former Chief Economist of the World Bank, Joseph 
Stiglitz, the Lead Author of the World Development Report 2000, Ravi Kanbur, the Bank’s leading 
Gender Adviser, Caroline Moser, and the Bank’s senior environmental economist Herman Daly, 
all leading global authorities of their fields, have been forced to leave their positions in the Bank, 
due to their ‘unorthodox’ opinions, which have contradicted the ‘Official Truths’ of either the U.S. 
Government and/or mainstream neoclassical economics.
216 Or ‘watershed development’, to be precise. Maxwell and Conway (2000), p. 8, Rich (1994), p. 231.
217 These include the Damodar Valley Corporation in India, the Akosombo Dam in Ghana, the São 
Francisco Valley Commission in Brazil, and the Cauca Valley Corporation in Colombia. See e.g. Rich 
(1994), p. 233, Hamilton (1969), p. 86-109, Sanders (1991), p. 8, Easterly (2001), 25-28, Escobar (1995), 
p. 38, 88, Maxwell and Conway (2000), p. 8.
218 Hirschman (1984), p. 88-94.
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4.6 DevelopiNg CouNtRieS - eCoNomiC plANNeR’S 
pARADiSe 
As noted by Gunnar Myrdal, an economist himself, in 1970: 
“We economists have this slightly paranoid but socially useful bent of mind: We 
naturally accept the responsibility for taking a broad view of an entire country, and 
indeed the whole world. Place any economist in the capital city of an underdevel-
oped country and give him the necessary assistance and he will in no time make 
a PLAN. In this regard we are unique among the social scientists. No sociologist, 
psychologist, or anthropologist would ever think on trying to do such a thing.”219
The wartime mobilization of resources in the USA had demonstrated what could 
be achieved once a nation was given an overriding national objective and a sense 
of priorities. So too had the Marshall Plan stimulated ‘national planning’ of the 
post-war recovery programs in Europe. To finance these programs, European na-
tions had been asked to calculate the requirements for external resources through 
loans and grants based on the shortfall between national needs and the domestic 
resources available to fill these needs. 
The overall approach to poverty reduction taken by this new profession of 
development economists was to plan economic growth and poverty reduction 
through investment projects, resorting to foreign financing when possible or 
necessary. This goal required the ‘rationalization’ of the productive apparatus, 
according to the methods developed in industrial nations.220 
4.7 liNeAR pRogReSS AND CYCliCAl evolutioN iN 
the WoRlD BANK’S poveRtY ReDuCtioN StRAtegieS 
FoR the 1970S, 1980S, 1990S, AND 2000S 
The World Development Reports 1980, 1990, and 2000 constitute an interesting 
sequence of decade-by-decade stock-taking of the World Bank’s overarching ob-
jective and central mission - poverty reduction. The WB strategic thinking on 
poverty reduction in the 1970s is reflected in publications such as ‘The Assault 
on World Poverty’,221 ‘Redistribution with Growth’222 and ‘The Design of Rural 
Development’,223 which all were widely-read and influential in development aid 
circles all around the world in the mid and late 1970s. 
In retrospect, it seems to me that the World Bank’s official thinking about 
poverty reduction has moved in cycles, rather than progressed in a linear manner. 
There is a linear trend towards increasingly multi-dimensional view of poverty 
219 Myrdal (1970), p. 20.
220 Escobar (1995), p. 88-89.
221 World Bank (1975a).
222 Chenery et al. (1974).
223 Lele (1975, 1979).
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from the WDR-1980, through WDR-1990, to the strategic approach advocated by 
the World Development Report 2000. Surprisingly, however, the framework of 
poverty reduction as presented in the World Bank’s publications of the 1970s, 
contains many of the important dimensions and insights that readers of the WDR-
2000 praised as new and important. In a comparative reading of the ‘Official 
Truths’ of the Bank from the past four decades, the 15-year period between 1982-
1997, the period of ‘Structural Adjustment’ and the ‘Washington Consensus’ 
emerges as a rupture in the logical development of thinking and understanding. 
Many authors in the South as well as North have called the 1980s and 1990s a ‘lost 
decade’ for the poor people and countries of the world.224 Below, and also later 
in this essay, we shall try to analyse what possibly could have been the factors 
and reasons that caused this discontinuity in the evolution of poverty reduction 
thinking in the World Bank, and consequently also in many other parts of the 
broader global development community. 
4.8 WoRlD BANK’S AppRoACh to poveRtY 
ReDuCtioN iN the 1970S 
The famous 1973 ‘Nairobi speech’225 of the World Bank’s President Robert 
McNamara identified poverty as the World Bank’s ‘arch enemy’ and set out the 
Bank’s new agenda for the 1970s. Bank lending was supposed to continue to grow 
at a phenomenal rate of 14 percent a year, and an increasing proportion of loans 
would be targeted to alleviate what McNamara called ‘absolute poverty’, i.e. a 
condition he had defined as affecting 40 percent of the total population in de-
veloping countries (700 million people) who, left behind by economic growth, 
“remained trapped in conditions of deprivation which fall below any rational definition 
of human decency.”226
McNamara’s basic philosophy was summarized by himself in his foreword to 
the Bank’s flagship publication of the 1970s, ‘The Assault on Poverty’:227 “The basic 
problem of poverty and growth in the developing world can be stated very simply. The 
growth is not equitably reaching the poor. And the poor are not significantly contributing 
to growth. Development strategies therefore, need to be reshaped in order to help the poor 
become more productive.”
McNamara knew that by far the largest number of poor lived in the rural areas 
of the developing world. Rural poverty was reflected in poor nutrition, inadequate 
shelter and low health standards. These, in turn, affected the productivity of the 
rural poor and their quality of life. What was required, McNamara concluded, 
were production improvements, and mutually reinforcing programs of better 
nutrition, preventive health, improved water supply, basic sanitation and practi-
224 E.g. Wignaraja (1997) and Easterly (2000).
225 The ‘Nairobi speech’ was McNamara’s address to the World Bank Annual Meeting that was 
exceptionally held in Nairobi in 1973. McNamara (1973). 
226 McNamara (1973), cited in Rich (1994), p. 83.
227 McNamara (1975), p. v-vi.
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cal education…Agricultural credit was a key element in helping the poor become 
more productive. But traditionally the flow of credit to small farmers had been 
inadequate, both because they lacked sufficient collateral and because of the high 
administrative costs of small loans. The World Bank was experimenting with new 
methods to help governments overcome these obstacles. McNamara confirmed 
that the Bank would support realistic land reforms because they were consistent 
with the development objectives of increased agricultural production, more eq-
uitable distribution of income and expanded employment. Such programs were, 
however, difficult to carry out, McNamara regretted, for they affected the power 
base of the traditional elite groups in the developing society. The Bank would, 
however, support such programs in order to increase agricultural output and to 
improve the lives of the rural poor.
Most critical of all, McNamara emphasized, the Bank would support new 
rural institutions and organizations that would devote more attention to improv-
ing the productivity and potential of the poor than to protecting the power of 
the privileged.228
4.8.1 Redistribution With Growth
The book  ‘Redistribution with Growth’229 was a joint effort of the World Bank 
and the IDS-Sussex230 in 1974. The basic argument of the publication was that the 
extra income (surplus) earned through economic growth should be redirected 
to the poor instead of redistributing the existing assets. Through ‘incremental 
redistribution’, as output expanded, an increasing share of the increase in output 
would accrue to the low-end poverty groups. Redistribution would thus occur 
without reducing anybody’s existing income or assets.231 This amounts to a strat-
egy of raising the growth rate of the incomes of the poor, while the upper end of 
the income scale would not grow so rapidly. 
World Bank Vice-President (and Chief Economist) Hollis Chenery introduced 
the book by stating: “It is now clear that more than a decade of rapid growth in under-
developed countries has been of little or no benefit to perhaps a third of their population. 
Although the average per capita income of the Third World has increased by 50 per cent 
since 1960, this growth has been very unequally distributed among countries, regions 
within countries, and socio-economic groups.”232
The book’s diagnosis had several policy implications for channelling the bene-
fits of growth to certain targeted poverty groups – the small farmers and landless 
228 Rich (1994), p. 83-84. Thinking about McNamara’s recent past – as the U.S. Secretary of Defense in 
charge of the mass killings of Vietnamese soldiers and civilians by the U.S. Army during the Vietnam 
war, it is confusing to read the ecclesiastical concluding words of McNamara’s Nairobi speech: “All of 
the great religions of the world teach the value of each human life. In a way that was never true in the past, we 
now have the power to create a decent life for all men and women. Should we not make the moral precept our 
guide to action? The extremes of poverty and deprivation are simply no longer acceptable…It is development’s 
task to deal with them.”
229 Chenery et al. (1974).
230 IDS-Sussex = Institute of Development Studies at the Sussex University in Brighton, UK.
231 This was the same philosophy as that recommended for Finland by Pekka Kuusi in 1961. See Kuusi 
(1961).
232 Chenery (1974), p. xiii. See also Meier (1984), p. 160-161.
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labourers in the rural areas and the unemployed, ‘working poor’, and underem-
ployed in the urban informal sector. Conventional policies had prevented these 
poverty groups from sharing equitably in a general increase in output because 
of their lack of physical and human capital and lack of access to public services, 
information, and markets.233
A welfare index that combined growth and distribution considerations was 
suggested to be used to evaluate the effects of proposed development programmes. 
Such an index would give a higher weight to the growth of incomes of the poorer 
than the wealthy groups. Unlike the conventional measures of growth in income 
that attach the same weight to a dollar of extra income for a rich person as for a 
poor one, the advocates of ‘redistribution with growth’ suggested that measures 
should give to the growth of incomes of the lowest 40 per cent of the population 
three times the weight that is given to the growth of incomes of the top 20 per 
cent, and twice the weight given to income growth of the middle 40 per cent of 
the population. This redistribution would increase the investment resources avail-
able to the poor, improving the quality of work in the rural and urban informal 
sectors, and redirecting public investment. There would be a special emphasis on 
agriculture and rural development as they were conceived as the major concern 
of poverty-oriented planning. Moreover, policies would be devoted to making the 
informal sector more productive by removing discrimination against this sector 
and improving its access to public services, credit, information, and markets.
Based on statements and writings of its President and Vice-President we can 
summarize the World Bank’s official approach to poverty reduction in the 1970s 
into the following illustration (Figure 4).
233 Meier (1984), p. 161.
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4.8.2  The Basic Needs Approach – the Road Not Taken in the 1980s 
The bold commitments made by Robert McNamara and Chenery’s ‘Redistribution 
with Growth’ programme focused the international donors’ attention to the day-
to-day realities of life. The poor and marginalized people were found to be less 
interested in achieving phenomenal economic growth figures, or in becoming 
really rich. All they were dreaming of was to be able to take even small gradual 
steps towards a safer tomorrow for their children and themselves. This eye-open-
ing realization led to the ‘Basic Needs Approach’, first introduced in the World 
Employment Conference of the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 1976, 
and later effectively popularised by the World Bank publication ‘First Things First 
- Meeting Basic Human Needs in Developing Countries’, published in 1981.234 
These reports proposed that each country should adopt a basic needs ap-
proach, aimed at achieving a certain specified minimum standard of living for 
each citizen by the end of the century. Many economists – identifying themselves 
as ‘trustees of the poor’ – sympathised with the idea of securing core needs (edu-
cation, health, nutrition, water supply and sanitation, and shelter) for all. This 
was in line with arguments of productive labour utilization, redistribution with 
growth, and mitigation of absolute poverty. It was concrete, and politically easier 
to sell than income or asset redistribution.235
But the basic needs approach was a road that the World Bank never took. 
Those, who today advocate for ‘Social Protection Floors for All’ would do wisely 
to analyse why this was the case.236 Much as the economists – as trustees of the 
poor – were interested in the elimination of poverty…, as ‘guardians of rational-
ity’ they disliked the basic needs approach.237 
Why? Firstly, the multi-dimensional basic needs approach was difficult for the 
average mainstream economist to handle with the tools he or she had learned at 
the university. The basic needs approach had no underlying conceptual model 
that would have allowed the economist to draw inferences deductively. Nor was 
the approach quantitative. The average economist thus had no guide in exercising 
his logic of choice. How should he weigh a 10 per cent increase in literacy and 
complete freedom from malaria as against a 70 per cent increase in literacy and 
no health improvement? How was he to assess the fulfilment of basic material 
234 Streeten et al. (1981). Interestingly, the authors of the ‘First Things First’ are the same people (Mahbub 
ul-Haq, Paul Streeten, and Frances Stewart), who have since the late 1980s effectively challenged the 
World Bank’s overly economistic, non-people-centred structural adjustment approach, and continued 
developing, under the UN-agencies (Unicef and UNDP), the ‘human development approach’, as a 
better alternative.
235 As Gerald Meier, a historian of economic thought has reminded, economists initially identified 
themselves as ‘trustees for the poor’. The business of economics was from the outset ‘social betterment’. 
The economist’s primary goal was the elimination of poverty. Even Adam Smith believed that “No 
society can surely be flourishing and happy, of which the greater part of the members are poor and miserable”’ 
Economists were searching the way to the ‘progressive state’ in which the condition of the labouring 
poor would steadily improve. In the mid-nineteenth century, however, economists adopted a static 
state of mind that focused merely on the conditions of efficiency in allocating a given amount of scarce 
resources among alternative uses. Static resource allocation became the subject matter of neoclassical 
economics – and the economist became, in the words of Nobel laureate Kenneth Arrow, ‘the guardian 
of rationality’. Arrow (1974), p. 16. 
236 See Social Protection Floor(s) in Websources.
237 Meier (1984) p. 4.
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needs, but at the cost of non-material needs, such as participation and political 
rights as in China? Those who advocated the basic needs approach argued – 
contrary to an emphasis on market forces by the ‘guardians of rationality’ – that 
economic growth did not spread its benefits widely and speedily through market 
forces. Instead of relying on market forces, they advocated for a big role for the 
government in the administrative allocation of particular resources to particular 
groups of people. As Paul Streeten contended, since supplies responded to market 
incentives only slowly or even perversely: “…it is not sufficient to channel purchasing 
power into the hands of the poor, through employment creation, productivity-raising meas-
ures, improvements in access to productive factors for the self-employed, and appropriate 
policies for relative prices. The structure of production and supply, and the institutional 
arrangements must also be such that they respond speedily to the demand generated by a 
basic needs approach.”238
This sounded a bit ‘socialist’ to the average economist239 who feared that this 
approach would invite an excessive degree of government intervention without 
sufficient rational guidance. Instead, the average economist instinctively felt that a 
more efficient approach to the fulfilment of basic needs might still be through in-
come growth, provided that market forces would be strengthened and allowed to 
operate. Increasing productivity, raising then demand for labour, increasing public 
investment as income rise, and raising the purchasing power of the poor – these 
would be the forces needed to fulfil basic needs, the average economist argued.240
In other words, economic growth was considered a vitally necessary but not 
sufficient factor of poverty reduction. But human development, too - education 
and training, better health and nutrition, social support and fertility reduction 
– was shown to be important not only in alleviating poverty directly, but also in 
increasing the incomes of the poor, and GNP growth as well.  The vital message 
of the World Bank President Robert S. McNamara in his Foreword to the WDR-
1980 was: “...Some steps we all have long known to be morally right - primary education, 
for example - make good economic sense as well.”241
One of the greatest ironies of – and surprising turns in – the history of the 
World Bank (and the international aid community at large) is that several wis-
doms of the Bank’s multi-dimensional poverty reduction strategy of the 1970s were 
almost completely forgotten and marginalized during the next two decades (1980s 
and 1990s). The poverty reduction strategy of the World Bank in the 1970s was 
multi-dimensional, in fact clearly a relative of the Bank’s and the OECD-DAC’s 
poverty reduction strategies for the Third Millenium. 1980s brought the Bank’s 
poverty reduction thinking ‘back to square one’.
238 Streeten et al. (1981), p. 31.
239 Remember, we are talking here of Western, mostly Anglo-American economists (or at least 
economists educated in Anglo-American universities), and remember, too, that we are talking about 
a time period in which the socialist challenge of the Soviet Union and other central planning economies 
was still strong, and in which,  therefore, the thinking of the Anglo-American ‘guardians of rationality’ 
cannot be satisfactorily explained without paying at least some attention to their ideological aversion 
against ‘socialist’ Big Government interventions.
240 Meier (1984), p. 165.
241 Ranis (2004), McNamara (1980), p. iii.
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 We unfortunately do not have the counterfactual, but one can only wonder 
what would be the state of world poverty – and poverty reduction thinking - 
today, if the rupture of the early 1980s would not have taken place, and if the 
intellectual community of pro-poor poverty reduction planners could have con-
tinued their work uninterruptedly for the period of 20-30 years since the times 
of McNamara, Chenery, Streeten & al. 
The reasons for this discontinuity cannot be found merely by looking into 
what was happening in the poor countries – the underlying causes were related 
to the global oil and debt crises, as well as to the structural imbalances in the 
national economies of the USA and the UK, and to the phenomenal political rise 
to a global hegemonic position of the neo-liberal ideology of the ‘New Right’ (i.e. 
Thatcherism’242 and ‘Reaganomics’243) in Britain and in the USA, respectively, and 
consequently also in the international financial institutions. 
4.9 the WoRlD BANK AppRoACh to poveRtY 
ReDuCtioN iN the 1980S 
The ‘World Development Report 1980’244 (WDR-1980) was published at a time 
of difficulty and uncertainty for the world economy - for the rich as well as for 
most of the poor countries – caused by the two oil-crises of the 1970s, which were 
242 When the British Conservative party won a decisive victory in the 1979 general elections Margaret 
Thatcher (born 1925) became Prime Minister. A woman of formidable will in the face of doubt, 
her political philosophy took the moniker ‘Thatcherism’. Along with her great ally and friend, US 
President Ronald Reagan, Thatcher made the 1980s into a decade of conservatism and anti-communist 
sentiment. She completely abandoned the previous Keynesian economic policies and adopted, 
instead, an extreme mode of monetarist policy making. Upon entering office she advocated measures 
that would limit government control, such as giving individuals greater independence from the 
state, ending government interference in the economy, and reducing public expenditures. Although 
her conservative philosophy met with approval, during her first two terms unemployment nearly 
tripled, the number of poor people increased, and bankruptcies resulted from her efforts to curb 
inflation. Thatcher became known as the ‘Iron Lady’ because of her strict control over her cabinet and 
the country’s economic policies. During her third term Thatcher continued the ‘Thatcher revolution’ 
by returning education, health care, and housing to private control. For more on Thatcher and 
‘Thatcherism’, see Thatcher in Websources. 
243 Ronald W. Reagan (born 1911) took office as President of the United States on January 20, 1981, as 
the oldest man ever to assume the presidency of the USA. Reagan supported a ’New Right’ agenda 
that promised tax cuts, deregulation of the economy, increased military spending, a halt to runaway 
inflation, and reduced spending for social welfare programs. This agenda promised to reverse the 
active role of government in American life that had begun with President Franklin Roosevelt’s ’New 
Deal’ programs in the 1930s. Reagan succeeded in promoting the concept of ’less government’ and 
significantly reduced the rate of social spending on welfare programmes while stopping inflation 
cold by 1984. But his refusal to raise taxes or to scale back on huge expenditures for defence produced 
a soaring deficit. During Reagan’s term in office (until 1989), the overall national debt of the USA 
tripled. Reagan’s presidency reaffirmed the traditional American values of individualism and restored 
the public’s sense of patriotism. He embodied the essential markings of the American character - its 
sense of optimism and self-assurance. Reagan’s foreign policy greatly facilitated the historic reforms 
that ultimately ended the Cold War with the Soviet Union. But the consequences of his economic 
programmes left the nation burdened with an out-of-control deficit and an unequal distribution of 
wealth that greatly favoured the very rich. For more on Reagan and ‘Reaganomics’, see Reagan in 
Websources. 
244 World Bank (1980).  The WDR-1980 was prepared by a team led by Paul Isenman. Isenman has 
later served for many years as one of the  coordinators of the OECD-DAC poverty reduction network 
(POVNET). See: World Bank (1980), p. iv.
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an outcome of a cartel of a few developing countries producing oil. World Bank 
economists believed that the only way for the non-oil-producing poor countries 
to cope in the post-oil crises world was to adjust their economies to external pay-
ments imbalances, higher energy prices and slower growth in world trade. It was 
forecasted that these adjustment measures would necessarily slow the growth of 
the poor country economies for at least the first few years of the 1980s.
Since the outlook for growth was not promising, the Bank urged that more 
generosity and initiative in the provision of concessional aid by richer countries 
was needed. The threat of further cartel behaviour and other supply restrictions 
by the commodity-producing poor countries had sensitised the industrial coun-
tries’ ears to the poorer countries’ demands in international negotiations. In order 
to avoid the poor countries’ claims for radical global reforms such as the proposed 
‘New International Economic Order’ (NIEO)245, the rich countries made promises 
about providing capital and technical knowledge and about opening their own 
markets to developing-country exports. The Bank, in 1980 still under the leader-
ship of political and intellectual leaders of the ‘Redistribution with Growth’ era 
of the 1970s – President Robert McNamara and Chief Economist Hollis Chenery 
- pointed out that successful adjustment should not unduly sacrifice either the 
current living standards of the poor people or the measures needed to reduce 
poverty in the future. 
While there was increasing recognition that growth does not obviate the need 
for human development and other steps to reduce poverty, the WDR-1980 stressed 
that the converse was true as well – direct steps to reduce poverty do not obviate 
the need for growth. The direct attack on poverty, if it was ultimately to be suc-
cessful, had to be combined with measures to ensure that the economies of the 
developing countries continued to expand. Unless the oil-importing developing 
countries could fund their large projected balance-of-payments deficits, output 
and growth would be seriously affected. The domestic policies would also be 
crucial: the more efficiently they used their imports, their investments, and their 
energy supplies, and the more they increased their savings and investment, the 
faster their growth and poverty reduction would be. 
Because the Western industrialized countries were importing about 65 per-
cent of developing country exports, the WDR-1980 suggested that rich countries’ 
growth rates and trade policies largely determined how much the developing 
countries could export. Also, because they accounted for more than half of world’s 
energy consumption, it was the rich countries’ energy conservation efforts (or 
lack of them) that would have the biggest impact on international energy avail-
ability, and prices. Also, most of the foreign capital that the developing countries 
would need would have to come through the industrial world’s banks or directly 
from its aid programmes. The WDR-1980, therefore, underlined that the active 
support of the richer nations was required to assist the process of development 
and poverty reduction in the poor countries, through the provision of capital and 
245 The NIEO-Declaration was adopted by the UN General Assembly in April 1974. See e.g. Voipio 
(1993), p. 267.
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technical knowledge and through the opening of their markets to developing 
country exports. There was a risk that the domestic economic problems of the 
richer countries would cause them to give inadequate attention to the immense 
problems of the developing world, and to the hardships that narrow or short-
sighted policies – in energy, trade and financial assistance – could inflict.246
The WDR-1980 was optimistic about the capacity of human development in-
vestments to improve the lives of the poor. The past three decades (1950-1980) 
had seen impressive achievements: Average incomes had doubled. Average life 
expectancy in the developing world had increased from 42 to 54 years. Literacy 
among adults had risen from about 30 to more than 50 percent. There had been 
a significant closing of the gap between industrialized and developing countries 
in life expectancy, literacy and primary school enrolment. But there was still a 
long way to go.247 
Incomes of the poorest groups could be raised by investments into employ-
ment creation, land reform and schooling, especially for girls. Better education, 
health and nutrition would be important ends in themselves, but they could also 
help the poor people to help themselves – to raise incomes and to reduce fertility. 
Human development alone could not overcome absolute poverty; but it would be 
an essential complement to other steps to raise the productivity and incomes of 
the poor. The planners’ difficult task would therefore be to choose at the margin 
between human development and growth-oriented activities. The economic pay-
off to human development would ease the tradeoffs between growth and poverty 
reduction. But it would not eliminate them, which meant that policy decisions 
would be affected by the relative emphasis attached to increasing growth, rais-
ing the incomes of the poor and attacking the non-income aspects of poverty (e.g. 
malnutrition, frequent child death, disease and ignorance). 
And whatever the balance of objectives, the difficulty of quantifying costs 
and benefits would compound the problems of deciding how large the human 
development budget should be, and how it should be divided among education, 
health, nutrition and family planning, as well as within each of these areas. The 
WDR-1980 recommended that the way in which these dilemmas are resolved 
would have to vary according to the circumstances of each country (‘country-
specificity’). The low-income countries of Africa and Asia, for example, would 
perforce have to put strong emphasis on economic returns, not forgetting, how-
ever, that the most valuable resource any country has is its people, the means and 
the end of economic advance.248
246 McNamara (1980), p. iii and World Bank (1980), p. 1. 
247 World Bank (1980), p. 1.
248 World Bank (1980), p. 98.
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Figure 5. World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy 1980
As we can see, many of the aspects of the Millennium Consensus on Poverty 
Reduction were already in place in the World Bank’s strategy for poverty reduc-
tion as it was presented in the World Development Report 1980: a balance be-
tween policies promoting growth and human development, country-specificity, 
and a (weak) demand for a policy coherence in the rich countries policies. August 
18, 1982, however changed much, and made the World Bank forget much of the 
wisdoms authored by Paul Isenman & co. into the WDR-1980.249 The challenge of 
global poverty reduction was abruptly ‘framed’ differently.
4.10 StRuCtuRAl ADjuStmeNt – CoNDitioNAl loANS 
On August 18, 1982, Mexico announced that it could no longer service its external 
debt to international commercial banks. With this announcement began the debt 
crisis for Latin America and Africa as new commercial lending was abruptly cut off. 
To avert a growth collapse, the World Bank economists thought they had a good 
solution: to make aid and lending to developing countries conditional on their 
making policy reforms. This move implied a rapid ‘re-framing’ of the the global 
poverty reduction challenge: instead of aid financing investment for development 
and poverty reduction, it was now aid financing policy reform towards what be-
came known as the ‘Washington Consensus’, a standard list of policy measures 
that the World Bank economists assumed to be ‘good for poverty reduction’.250 
Previously World Bank loans had been for projects and carried conditions 
only about those projects. But in the 1980s, the World Bank began to make gen-
eral loans that carried conditions on economic policies to countries in crisis. The 
adjustment lending251 would meet the debt crisis by inducing the recipients to 
249 Paul Isenman later played an important role in the DAC-POVNET Secretariat during the process 
when the POVNET discussed and negotiated the joint DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines, including 
the strong commitment to the multi-dimensional concept of poverty. See Figure 1 in Chapter-1 above. 
See also: OECD-DAC (2001c). 
250 Find the list below in the section 4.11. 
251 Most of the readers will be familiar with the SAP-period, and for those who aren’t, a broad literature exists 
about the pros and cons of the SAP-experience: E.g. Cornia et al. (1987), Wagao (1990), Haggard and Kaufman 
(eds. 1992), Williamson (1993, 2000), Bello et al. (1994), Danaher (ed. 1994), Msambichaka et al (eds.1995), Engberg-
Pedersen et al. (1996), Jayarajaah et al (1996), Harvey (ed. 1996), Abugre and Alexander (1998), Alexander (1998), 
Stiglitz (1998a), Dollar and Svensson (2000), Srinivasan (2000), Easterly (2001b), Teivainen (2002), UNDP (1990-
1997), World Bank (1980, 1983, 1990, 1991, 1992b, 1992c, 1993, 1996, 1996b, 1996c, 1996d, 1996e, 1997a, 1998a, 
2000, 2000b, 2000d, 2000e, 20001f, World Development Movement (2000).
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adjust their policies to promote growth, while providing needed money in the 
absence of commercial lending. The IMF had always had conditions on its loans, 
but after 1982 it expanded the number and lengthened the maturity of the loans 
it was making. Also bilateral donors and official creditors (like export promotion 
agencies) now also made their grants and loans more conditional by coordinating 
their lending with the IMF and World Bank.252
Between 1980 and 1989, the World Bank and the IMF gave an average of six 
adjustment loans to each country in Sub-Saharan Africa, and almost as many 
to the countries of Latin America, Asia, Eastern Europe, North Africa and the 
Middle East. A similar strategy would be tried again in the 1990s during the 
second Mexican debt crisis of 1994-1995 and then again two years later, after the 
East Asia crisis of 1997-98. The operations were successful for everyone except the 
patient. There was much lending, little adjustment, little growth and little poverty 
reduction in the 1980s and 1990s. As the World Bank President Barber B. Conable 
noted in his ‘Foreword’ to the ‘World Development Report of 1990’253 (WDR-1990): 
“...for the poor in the poor countries the 1980s was a lost decade”.
4.11 moRe humAN FACeS FoR StRuCtuRAl
ADjuStmeNt 
The report ‘Structural Adjustment with a Human Face’, written by UN-researchers 
Giovanni Andrea Cornia, Richard Jolly and Frances Stewart,254 and widely dis-
seminated by Unicef in 1987, made the ‘human face’ argument widely known 
- and supported - around the world.255 This was an effort to ‘re-frame’ the global 
poverty reduction challenge again in a more human-centred and less economistic 
way than the ‘Washington Consensus’ had done. 
As argued by Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (CJS), the human consequences of 
adjustment should not be accepted as an inevitable and unfortunate by-product 
– but treated as an essential concern. The protection of minimum levels of nu-
tritional status and other basic human needs could be monitored and made as 
much a part of the objectives of adjustment as the balance of payments, inflation 
and economic growth. Cornia, Jolly and Stewart proposed a broader approach to 
adjustment, ‘adjustment with a human face’, which would involve three things: 
1. A clear commitment in the goals of adjustment policy to protect the 
minimum nutrition levels of children and other specially vulnerable 
groups;         
2. The implementation of a broader approach to the adjustment, comprising: 
252 Easterly (2001), p. 101-102.
253 Conable (1990), p. iii.
254 Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987). 
255 Richard Jolly, then Deputy Executive Director of Unicef had actually introduced the arguments 
already in 1985 in an article he wrote to the ‘Development: Seeds of change’ magazine of the Society 
for International Development (SID). Jolly (1985). Reprinted in Harcourt (1997), p. 97-105.
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(a) Actions to maintain a minimum floor for nutrition and other basic 
human needs;
(b) Restructuring within the productive sectors – agriculture, service, 
industry – to rely more upon the small-scale, informal sector 
producers and to ensure their greater access to credit and  internal 
markets to stimulate growth in their incomes; 
(c) Restructuring within health, education and other social sectors, to 
restore momentum and ensure maximum coverage and benefits 
from reduced resources. 
(d) More international support for adjustment, with longer-term 
commitments, and a ceiling on outflows of debt interest and 
amortization payments. 
3.  A system for monitoring poverty and human well-being during 
adjustment.256 
To miss out the human dimension of adjustment was not only a human tragedy. 
It was also an economic error of the most fundamental sort, CJS argued. To fail 
to protect young children at the critical stages of their growth and development 
was to wreak lasting damage on a whole generation, the results of which might 
well have effects on economic development and welfare for decades ahead.257 
Moreover, in the short run, it was plainly absurd to imagine that economic dyna-
mism could be fully restored when an important fraction of a country’s workers 
remained malnourished – or remained, as among small-holder peasants in many 
African countries at the time - with too few basic goods to buy to provide incen-
tives for the extra effort. 
CJS emphasized that a people-focused adjustment would also require ‘em-
powerment’– a shift to self-reliance, decentralization, small-scale production and 
community action.258 Special concern should be given for women in the adjust-
ment process, because women engaged in household and informal sector activi-
ties were making a disproportionately large contribution to the economic welfare 
of the poorer sections of the population, although their many important activities 
were underestimated, or not counted at all, in the conventional economic statis-
tics.
Retrospectively, bearing in mind the categorization of policy ideas into ‘pro-
grammes’, ‘paradigms’, ‘frames’ and ‘public sentiments’ as presented in Table 1. 
and Figure 2.,  we can understand that the structural adjustment drive was moti-
vated not only by the World Bank and IMF economists’ objective analysis about 
what would be best for the poor countries and their poor people, but also by a 
deliberate ideologically motivated effort to re-frame the idea of ‘aid-for-poverty-
reduction’ into an instrument for promoting the paradigm of pro-market/anti-gov-
ernment neo-liberalism and the political programme for privatisation, deregula-
256 Jolly (1985). Reprinted in Harcourt (1997), p. 99. 
257 Compare this with the WDR-2006, i.e. World Bank (2005b), p. 16-19.
258 Compare this with the WDR-2000, i.e. World Bank (2001a). 
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tion and liberalization aimed at extending the ‘free global markets’ (Thatcherism/
Reaganism) to as many countries of the world as possible. The public sentiment in 
the Anglo-American countries and decision-making circles in the early 1980s was 
that the smaller the governments would be in the various countries of the world, 
the better it would be for the transnational corporations - a large proportion of 
which were owned by Anglo-American interests. 
By the turn of the new Millennium this ‘minimalist state ideal’ had, however, 
become discredited, even by the official wisdom of the World Bank: As convinc-
ingly shown by Joseph Stiglitz in the World Bank’s World Development Report 
1997, even in a pure market economy system… 
“…development requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, en-
couraging and complementing the activities of private businesses and individuals.”259   
4.12 the WoRlD BANK AppRoACh to poveRtY 
ReDuCtioN iN the 1990S 
The world economy as a whole enjoyed some moderate growth in the closing 
years of the 1980s. But the auspicious picture was not uniform. The industrial 
countries and the South-East Asian ‘Tiger Economies’ had seen favourable devel-
opments in growth, trade and investment (and poverty reduction). But in most 
countries of Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa real per capita incomes, living 
standards and investment had slipped. In 1985 more than one billion people, or 
almost one-third of the total population of the developing world, were reported 
as “living on incomes of less than one US-dollar per day”, a ‘money-metric’ criterion 
that the World Bank had adopted as the single most important measure of its 
‘mono-dimensional’ conception of poverty. 
In 1990 the World Bank economists projected for the 1990s buoyant growth 
of about 3 percent a year in the industrial countries and about 5.1 (on average) in 
the developing world - compared with the 4.3 percent achieved by developing 
countries in the 1980s. In the thinking of the World Bank leadership, improve-
ments in what they again called ‘quality of life’ depended on the rapid pace of 
growth, and the economists’ forecasts promised good prospects for improving 
the quality of life, except in Sub-Saharan Africa where rapid population growth 
was expected to offset the beneficial effects of economic growth. In East Asia and 
South Asia the World Development Report (WDR) 1990 promised dramatic falls 
in the number of poor, and improvements in social indicators. Even in Africa, 
adequate provision for the social sectors was expected to allow a rapid reduc-
tion in child mortality and a reversal of the decline in primary school enrolment 
experienced during the 1980s.260
259 World Bank (1997a), p. iii. 
260 Conable (1990), p. iii-iv.
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Figure 6. World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy 1990
The World Bank leadership was confident in 1990 that “the key measures for com-
bating poverty are known”, and “the resources to support such an effort are there to be 
mobilized.”261 The two key strategies proposed by the WDR-1990 and used by the 
World Bank during the 1990s were (a) labour-intensive (or broad-based) economic 
growth and (b) basic services (education, health, etc.), whereas the third (half) di-
mension, (c) safety nets and transfers - i.e. how to manage the livelihood risks of 
those poor people and nations who would fail to benefit from the ‘opportunities’ 
provided by the growth - was to receive only scant attention by the World Bank 
and most other international donors during the 1990s. 
In contrast, at the very end of 1990s social protection/security issues took a 
centre stage in the international discourse on poverty reduction, not least due to 
the East Asian financial crisis in 1997, which caused a substantial surge in the re-
gion’s poverty rate after several decades of falling poverty trends. Learning from 
mistakes of the 1990s, an increasing number of World Bank poverty experts262 
closer to the Millennium Turn started to recommend that: 
“strengthening the existing and setting up new safety nets and social policies - before a crisis 
hits - should be seen as a priority investment for long term development.”263 
In retrospect, the 1990s – at least the first half of it – was another ‘lost decade’ for the 
World Bank, as evidenced, for instance, by a study of the World Bank’s leading growth 
researcher, William Easterly, titled: “The Lost Decades: Explaining Developing Country Stag-
nation 1980-1998”.264 The main weaknesses in the World Bank economists’ approach to 
poverty were the following two:
261 Conable (1990), p. iv.
262 E.g. Martin Ravallion, Giovanna Prennushi and Francisco Ferreira.
263 Ferreira, Prennushi and Ravallion (1999). See also Prennushi et al. (n.d.) and Prennushi and Browne 
(2000).
264 Easterly (2000) See also: Easterly (2001a,b).
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(a) a stubborn insistence on an ideologically biased ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
standard economic policy prescription ‘package’ (Washington Consen-
sus) to all poor countries, irrespective of their context-specific develop-
ment experiences and constraints. 
(b) Failure by the poverty economists of the World Bank to take seriously 
and to operationalize the non-money metric and difficult-to-quantify 
dimensions of the multi-dimensional poverty challenge.
The term ‘Washington Consensus’ had been coined by John Williamson in 1990.265 A dec-
ade later, in 1999266 Williamson noted that the phrase was often being used in a sense 
significantly different to that which he had intended, as ‘a synonym for neo-liberalism’ or 
for what George Soros267 had called ‘market fundamentalism’.” 
Indeed, as the global resistance against the neo-liberal structural adjustment pro-
grammes had grown wider and stronger all over the world, its opponents had started to 
use Washington Consensus as a general slogan to describe the whole package of policy 
prescriptions imposed on poorer country governments by the U.S. Government and its 
‘lackeys’ – the World Bank and the IMF. This package was seen to be motivated by an 
Anglo-American monetarist free market ideology embracing the most extreme version 
of ‘Laissez-faire Reagonomics’ with opinions such as: “Let’s bash the state – the markets will 
resolve everything”, or “Liberalize as much as you can, privatise as fast as you can, and be tough in 
monetary and fiscal matters”, that did not serve well to solve the context-specific problems 
of poor countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia.268 
In 1999 Williamson pointed out that his original 1990-paper had not been an ideologi-
cally motivated normative prescription. His objective had only been “to describe the lowest 
common denominator of policy advice being addressed by the Washington institutions – not to all 
poor governments of the world, but especially - to Latin American countries as of 1989.”  The 10 
propositions of the ‘Washington Consensus’ – as summarized by Williamson in 1999, 
were:
1. Fiscal discipline;
2. A redirection of public expenditure priorities towards fields with high economic 
returns and the potential to improve income distribution, such as primary health 
care, primary education, and infrastructure;
3. Tax reform (to lower marginal tax rates and broaden the tax base);
4. Interest rate liberalization;
5. A competitive exchange rate;
6. Trade liberalization;
7. Liberalization of foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows;
8. Privatization;
9. Deregulation (in the sense of abolishing barriers to entry and exit);
10. Secure property rights.
265 Williamson (1990). 
266 Williamson (2000), p. 257. Kolodko (1998). 
267 Soros (1998).
268 Williamson (2000).
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4.13 iNNovAtive AlteRNAtive thiNKiNg 
- CoNtext-SpeCiFiCitY
Since the mid-1980 the use of the so called ‘participatory methods’ of develop-
ment planning became increasingly popular, first in NGO-projects, and later also 
in projects funded by bilateral government agencies, UN-agencies and devel-
opment banks such as the World Bank. An important lesson that many poverty 
professionals learned through their involvement in participatory projects was the 
enormous diversity and context-specificity of life situations and development con-
straints and opportunities that poor people have to cope with in various parts of 
the world, and even in the various villages of the same country, region or district. 
This learning experience led to a phenomenon Professor Robert Chambers has 
called ‘ABC’. The acronym stands for ‘attitude and behaviour change’. The ABC 
influenced relatively broad groups of poverty economists and other poverty pro-
fessionals during the 1980s and 1990s, and led to a new increasingly balanced and 
self-critical stance towards the quality and relevance of the knowledge that the 
non-poor poverty professionals have been able to acquire with their conventional 
‘scientific’ skills and methods, and a positive attitude and interest towards the 
‘anthropological otherness’ and the corrective and complementary knowledge 
that poor people themselves possess.269
The ABC has also been strongly advocated over the years by a large number 
of poor people and poor people’s organizations who have felt uncomfortable in 
their role as ‘targets’ of the well-meaning but hopelessly ‘top-down’ interventions 
of the poverty economists and other aid professionals. Professor Chambers – a 
brilliant writer as he is - and a number of Southern and Global NGOs have over 
the past two decades provided a lot of inspiration to a global community of ‘par-
ticipatory practitioners’ of ‘participatory rural appraisals’ (PRA), ‘participatory 
action research’ (PAR), ‘participatory learning and action’ (PLA) and, more re-
cently, ‘participatory poverty assessments’ (PPA) and ‘Poverty and Social Impact 
Assessments’ (PSIA).
Professor Chambers has not saved his critical words about the poverty econ-
omists and other non-poor poverty professionals, but to the credit of the pov-
erty professionals it must be added, that Chambers’ messages have not gone to 
deaf ears. In 1994 when the UNDP270 invited a group of 55 poverty professionals 
to help UNDP prepare for the World Summit for Social Development (‘Social 
Summit’) in Copenhagen in March-1995, by writing short articles into a book on 
‘Empoverishment’,271 Chambers’ article was placed first into the very beginning 
of the book. The article was titled: “Whose Reality Counts?” The reality of those 
few at the centres of power? Or the reality of the many poor at the periphery?272 
The root problem is that professionals and poor people seek, experience, and 
269 Chambers (1974, 1983, 1993, 1994a,b,c,d, 1995, 1997). See also: Swantz (1984), Gould (ed. 1991), 
Laitinen, Voipio and Grönqvist (1995), Laitinen (2001). See also Participatory methods in Websources. 
270 UNDP = United Nations Development Programme.
271 Kirdar and Silk (eds. 1995). 
272 Chambers (1995), p. 1. See also Chambers (1997).
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construct different realities, Chambers explained. The view from on high seeks 
and sees sameness and simplifying stereotypes. The question is whether concepts 
and measures that are universal, standardized, measurable, and generated by 
and designed for conditions in the urban industrial North can be universally ap-
plied in the more rural and agricultural South, and whether they fit or distort the 
diverse and complex realities of the poor.273 
Chambers had borrowed part of his conceptual tools from Amartya Sen, who 
could justifiably be today considered the leading poverty researcher of the world. 
One of Sen’s important contributions to international ‘poverty science’ is the fol-
lowing notion, which has bridged the deep and difficult gulf between the concepts 
of ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ poverty: 
“Poverty is an absolute notion in the space of capabilities but very often 
it will take a relative form in the space of commodities.” 
- Amartya Sen274
As Sen writes, there are certain capabilities, such as being well nourished, or being 
able to live a long good life, or the capability remarked upon by Adam Smith, to 
appear in public without shame – which are absolute.275 If they are desirable at 
all, they are desirable for all. It is the resources or commodities that are needed to 
realise them, and not they themselves, which will vary through time and across 
space. For Sen, what is important at the end of the day is not the form of com-
modity possessions, but the substantive freedoms – the capabilities – “to choose a 
life one has reason to value”.276
Sen himself attributes277 this idea to two great thinkers of the past, Aristotle278 
and Adam Smith.279 At the very beginning of his Nicomachean Ethics280 Aristotle 
noted: “Wealth is evidently not the good we are seeking; for it is merely useful for the 
sake of something else.” 
Writing in 1776, Adam Smith put the issue thus: 
“By necessaries I understand not only the commodities which are indispensably neces-
sary for the support of life, but whatever the customs of the country renders it indecent for 
creditable people, even the lowest order to be without. A linen shirt, for example, is, strictly 
speaking, not a necessary of life. The Greeks and Romans lived, I suppose, very comfortably 
though they had no linen. But in the present times, through the greater part of Europe, a 
273 Chambers (1995), p. 7 and Chambers (1997), p. 162.
274 Sen (1983, 1984, 1987 and 1999). See also: Malaska and Voipio (1997). 
275 Smith (1776), vol.2. book 5, chapter 2. 
276 Sen (1999), p. 74, Sen (2002), p. 10.
277 Sen (1999), p. 14, 73-74.
278 Of the two great philosophers of ancient Greece, Plato (427-347 BCE) and Aristotle (384-322 BCE), 
the latter was the one who relied on observation. Aristotle was Plato’s ‘most intelligent’ pupil, who was 
to become the author of a philosophical and scientific system that through the centuries became the 
support and vehicle for both medieval Christian and Islamic scholastic thought: until the end of the 
17th century, Western culture was Aristotelian. And, even after the intellectual revolutions of centuries 
to follow, Aristotelian concepts and ideas remained embedded in Western thinking.
279 For more on Smith, see Adam Smith in the Websources.
280 Aristotle (revised edition 1980), book 1, section 5, p. 7.
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creditable day-labourer would be ashamed to appear in public without a linen shirt, the 
want of which would be supposed to denote that disgraceful degree of poverty which, it is 
presumed, nobody can well fall into without extremely bad conduct. Custom, in the same 
manner, has rendered leather shoes a necessary of life in England. The poorest creditable 
person of either sex would be ashamed to appear in public without them.”281 
Aristotle’s, Smith’s and Sen’s notion of commodities and capabilities has impor-
tant implications to the way we define ‘basic needs’, one of the key concepts of 
much of poverty-oriented development assistance, and of welfare economics.282 
If it is accepted that the concern is basically not with the commodities people 
possess, but with the ‘kinds of lives’ people can lead, then this must suggest that 
the ‘basic needs’ should be defined in line with capabilities. Then the so-called 
‘basic’ needs in the form of commodity requirements are instrumentally (rather 
than intrinsically) important and may vary greatly with various physiological, 
social, cultural and other contingent features. In other words, the focus has to be 
on the freedoms generated by commodities, rather than on the commodities seen 
on their own. The main issue is thus the “substantial freedom to choose the kind of life 
that one wants to lead”.283 
How do the northern aid donor agencies handle this administratively? Tax-
payers and politicians may expect the donors to focus on the most basic ones 
among the many basic needs. But how do the donors know what kinds of lives 
the poor people live – or would want to live - in those hundreds of localities 
in the dozens of countries where each donor works. Chambers had an answer, 
which was less flattering for the poverty economists and other poverty profes-
sionals of the aid agencies:
 
“In assessing how people live in a ‘poor’ community of a ‘poor’ country, and what do-
nors’ aid could do, professionals’ realities are often universal, reductionistic, standardized 
and stable. Those of economists dominate, expressed in poverty thinking concerned with 
income-poverty and employment thinking concerned with jobs.”284 
‘Poverty’ is used in two main senses, Chambers claimed. In the first common 
usage, it is a blanket word referring to the whole spectrum of deprivation and 
suffering; In the second, it has a narrow technical definition for purposes of easi-
ness of measurement and comparison. In professional discourse, the technical 
definition colonizes the common usage. “Income-poverty starts as a proxy or corre-
late for other deprivations but then subsumes them. It is then but a short step to treating 
what has not been measured as not real”. It then becomes the reductionism of normal 
economics, not the experience of the poor that defines poverty.285 – This leads us 
to the challenge of ‘multi-dimensional poverty’.
281 Smith (1776), vol.2. book 5, chapter 2.
282 Streeten et al’s First Things First (1981) is one of the classics on basic needs. 
283 Sen (1999), p. 74. 
284 Chambers (1992, 1995, 1997). See also Malaska and Voipio (1997). 
285 Chambers (1995), p. 3-4.
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4.14 iNNovAtive AlteRNAtive thiNKiNg 
- multi-DimeNSioNAlitY 
The World Bank’s authoritative annual flagship publications, the World Develop-
ment Reports (WDRs) have since their inception in 1978 ranked countries accord-
ing to their per capital gross domestic product (GDP). However, the relationship 
between per capita GDP and human well-being is weak. The critical factor for 
human well-being is ‘income distribution’. 
Chambers went on to say that many aspects of good life (e.g. friendship, love, 
self-sacrifice, laughter, music, health, and creativity) are not counted when deter-
mining GDP, but many aspects of a lower-quality life (e.g. insurance claims, se-
curity guards, fossil fuel consumption, and deforestation) are computed in GDP. 
Very different perspectives have been given by UNICEF’s annual State of the 
World’s Children report, which ranks countries according to their mortality sta-
tistics for those under age five years of age, or by the ‘Physical Quality of Life 
Index’ (PQLI), which combines in a single scale life expectancy at age one year, 
adult literacy, and infant mortality, or by the Human Development Index (HDI) of 
the UNDP’s annual Human Development Report, which combines per capita 
GDP, life expectancy at birth, and literacy.286
We often think about ‘primitive poor societies’ and ‘complex modern socie-
ties’. Contrary to this common (mis)conception, Chambers has claimed that it is 
the poor who actually live in complex, diverse and dynamic local realities unlike 
us who live in highly standardized and predictable (post-) modern industrialized 
societies, whose diversities seem to be withering away as globalisation and inte-
gration (are said to) force societies to harmonise every aspect of life.287 
Chambers claimed that for the poor in the poorest countries, income-poverty, 
though important, was only one aspect of deprivation. Participatory appraisals288 
had confirmed many other dimensions and criteria of disadvantage, ill-being and 
well-being as people experience them. In recent years these lessons learned by 
engaging the poor themselves in poverty assessments had encouraged a growing 
number of donor agencies to enrich their conceptions of poverty by such dimen-
sions as social inferiority, isolation, physical weakness, vulnerability, seasonal 
deprivation, powerlessness and humiliation. 
Chambers visualized these insights into a simple but very useful triangle 
model of sustainable livelihoods. (See Figure 7 below.) ‘Sustainable living’, or 
‘sustainable livelihoods’ is an objective on which most poor people and profes-
sionals – in any society at any time – can agree. In its simplest sense a livelihood 
is a means of gaining a living. Chambers’ working definition of sustainable liveli-
hoods was as follows: 
286 Chambers (1995), p. 6. See also UNDP (1990), p. 104-108. For leading development economists’ most 
recent efforts to further develop the methodologies of HDI and other multi-dimensional quality-of-life 
indices, see Quality-of-life indices in Websources.
287 See Chambers (1995), p. 7, and Chambers (1997), p. 162.
288 See e.g. Chambers (1995), p. 8, Mukherjee (1992), p. 21-26. Norton et al. (1994), Norton et al. (2001), 
Narayan (1997), Narayan and Prichett (1997), Narayan et al. (2000a, 2000b), Narayan and Petesch 
(2002), Ehrhart et al. (2003). See also Participatory methods in Websources. 
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“A livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of liv-
ing. Assets comprise stores, resources, claims and access. A livelihood is sustainable if it 
can cope with and recover from stress and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and 
assets, and provide sustainable livelihood opportunities for the next generation; and con-
tribute net benefits to other livelihoods at the local and global levels, in the short and long 
term.”289
Figure 7.  Triangle Model of Sustainable Livelihoods: the Poor as ‘Portfolio 
Managers’ 
In Chambers’ framework, the ‘livelihood capabilities’ comprise the skills, physi-
cal and mental energies and experiences required for a living.290 ‘Stores and re-
sources’ are tangible assets commanded by a household. Stores include e.g. food 
stocks, stores of value such as gold, jewellery and woven textiles, and cash sav-
ings in banks of thrift and credit schemes. Resources include, for instance, land, 
water, trees, and livestock; and farm equipment, tools, and domestic utensils. 
Assets are often both stores and resources, as with livestock, trees and savings. 
‘Claims and access’ are intangible assets of a household. Claims are demands and 
appeals that can be made for material, moral or other practical support or access. 
The support may take many forms, such a food, implements, loans, gift, or work. 
Claims are often made at times of stress or shock, or when other contingencies 
arise. Claims may be made on individuals or agencies, on relatives, neighbours, 
289 Chambers (1992). 
290 There is a small difference between the ways Sen and Chambers use the term ‘capability’ . For 
Chambers ‘capability’ is one of the three building blocks of ‘living’ (‘livelihood’). If Sen would use 
Chambers’ framework, he would probably write ‘capability’ into the oval in the centre (instead of 
‘living’). Stores and resources as well as claims and accesses would be building blocks of (Sen’s) 
‘capability’. Sen might prefere to use e.g. ‘capacities’ as the name of the third (top) building block 
(skills and health, etc.). 
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patrons, chiefs, social groups or communities, or on NGOs, the government or 
the international community, including programmes for poverty alleviation. 
They are based on combinations of rights, precedent, social convention, moral 
obligation and power. Access is the opportunity in practice to use a resource, 
store or service or to obtain information, material, technology, employment, food 
or income. 
Out of the ‘portfolio’ of tangible and intangible assets available to them peo-
ple construct and contrive a ‘livelihood’ (‘living’), using physical labour, skills, 
knowledge, and creativity. Skills and knowledge may be acquired within the 
household, passed on from generation to generation as indigenous technical 
knowledge, or through apprenticeship, or more formally through education or 
extension services, or through experiment and innovation.291
In conclusion: Sen’s and Chambers’ thinking frameworks underline the im-
portance of respecting the enormous diversity of human life situations. If what 
really counts is our substantial freedom to choose the kind of life we have reason 
to value (as Sen says) and if the potential combinations available to us for con-
structing our portfolios of tangible and intangible assets and personal livelihood 
capabilities are as many as Chambers indicates, this then means that ‘blue-print 
planning’292 by outsider-professionals (economists as well as non-economists) be-
comes difficult in poverty reduction planning. If  Sen and Chambers are correct, 
and I believe they are, then poverty reduction must, by definition, be participa-
tory and empowering, so that the poor people themselves will be in a position 
to contrive the best combination of their numerous different livelihood capabili-
ties, stores, resources, claims and things they can have access to. The dimension 
between advocating standard recipes and sensitivity to difference in diversity is 
a useful criterion that can be used in comparing and categorizing various pov-
erty economists and other poverty professionals, as well as donor agencies and 
their aid interventions. Those who believe in diversity, like myself, trust that it 
is a good concept for describing not only the ways and means to get out from 
poverty, but also the plenitude of different realities in a world beyond poverty.293 
But how could the world community work together, if everyone has a different 
‘future beyond poverty’ in mind?
291 Chambers (1992, 1995). Voipio (1998c, 2002). 
292 The term ‘blue-print planning’ refers to the kind of planning that architects do: They draw a 
complete plan of a house – the task of the construction workers then is simply to follow the plan to the 
smallest detail. In this way, if the blue-print plan is good enough the end result will be a good house. 
The point here is that poverty reduction planning does not work this way, no matter how incredibly 
competent the NPPEs and other NPPPs are.
293 See Malaska and Voipio (1997) and Voipio (1998c), p. 14. 
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4.15 At the uN: the uNiteD NAtioNS’ ‘gloBAl 
AgeNDA’ AND the moNitoRiNg oF iNteRNAtioNAl 
goAlS 
In the course of the 1990s, a series of major World Conferences294 organised by the 
United Nations (UN) introduced into the international debate several concerns 
that affect both the industrialized and the developing countries. The UN Confer-
ences created a value base for managing the globalization process. As a result, 
189 states committed themselves to furthering the ‘Global Agenda’,295 a list of 
concerns which are essential to the safety of people everywhere and to socially, 
environmentally and economically sustainable development. In the UN ‘Millen-
nium Declaration’296 the leaders of practically all states of the world reaffirmed 
their commitment to the Global Agenda, including the ‘Millennium Develop-
ment Goals’ (MDG).297 
Of the UN-Conferences of the 1990s the World Summit for Social Develop-
ment (WSSD)298 in Copenhagen in 1995 was in retrospect the one that made the 
greatest impact on the Millennium poverty reduction agenda. In the Copenha-
gen Social Summit 186 states agreed to unite their efforts to “eradicate poverty, as 
an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind.”299 The other two 
major pillars of the Social Summit Agenda were the promotion of full employ-
ment and social integration. 
Most of the elements that we have on the action agenda of the global Mil-
lennium Consensus on poverty reduction were already there in Copenhagen 
1995, but the number of people understanding the multi-dimensional agenda 
was smaller then than today. One of the visionaries was Juan Somavia.300 As 
Somavia wrote just before Copenhagen, the World Summit for Social Develop-
ment offered a unique opportunity for governments and people: Whereas past 
UN meetings had focused on a single issue in all of its complex dimensions – for 
example, the environment, population, education, or human rights – the Social 
Summit aimed to integrate the contemporary problems of poverty, unemploy-
294 The major UN-Conferences during the 1990s were:  The World Summit for Children, 1990 New York; 
The UN Conference on Environment and Development, 1992 Rio; The World Conference on Human 
Rights,1993 Vienna; The International Conference on Population and Development,1994 Cairo; The 
World Summit for Social Development, 1995 Copenhagen; The Fourth UN World Conference on 
Women, 1995 Beijing; The UN Conference on Human Settlements (HABITAT II),1996 Istanbul; The 
World Food Summit,1996 Rome;  The Millennium Summit, 2000 New York. For more information and 
for links to the various UN-Conferences’ web-pages, see UN-Conferences in Websources. 
295 See e.g. Tan (1997). 
296 United Nations (2000). See Millennium Declaration in Websources.
297 United Nations (2001), p. 56-58. See Millennium indicators in Websources. .
298 Or ‘Social Summit’, or ‘Copenhagen Summit’. See Social Summit in Websources. .
299 Copenhagen Declaration (1995), p. 10. See Copenhagen Declaration in Websources, and in Box 
3.1. below. This slogan (“to eradicate poverty, as an ethical, social, political and economic imperative 
of humankind”), as well as the whole Social Summit was the brainchild of Juan Somavia,  the then 
Permanent Representative of Chile to the United Nations, and the Chairman of the Social Summit. 
Somavia acted as President of the UN Security Council in 1996-97. Currently Somavia serves as 
Executive Director of the International Labour Organisation (ILO). See: Somavia (1995), p. 483, and 
see also Somavia in Websources.
300 See Somavia in Websources.
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ment, and social integration.301 For us, who live in the post-September 11, 2001 
world, it is now easier than in 1995 to understand how right Somavia was in his 
analysis of the global strategic situation: 
“Heretofore, nations and people were fundamentally separated by the ideological, political, 
and attendant economic dichotomies of the Cold War. With its passing, one great chasm – 
between East and West – was closed…Today the sources of conflict in the world are multi-
polar and multi-causal... Some were camouflaged in the Cold War years and have only now 
surged to the fore; others, as old-age as the conflict between the haves and the have-nots, or 
between extremists and relativists, have re-emerged with a vengeance.”
I also participated in the Social Summit, as an observer member of the Finnish del-
egation. I was then at the very early stages of my research process, collecting ideas 
and perspectives. Something in Somavia’s words struck me already then. Now, re-
reading his pre-Copenhagen texts years later, I know better what it was.  Already 
in 1995, Somavia was able to write something that I could now write as one of the 
core lessons that I have learned during my lengthy process of research (and action): 
“The challenge (is) putting economics at the service of the needs of human beings…break-
ing with the past characterization of economics as a dry, dismal science, divorced from 
human experience and lived out among widget makers in the splendid isolation of graphs 
and derivations. It is about understanding the fundamental links between economic growth 
and social development – namely that the two are interdependent and promote each other. 
Broad-based sustainable economic growth is a prerequisite for social development, while so-
cial development is a necessary foundation for equitable and sustained economic expansion. 
To that end, patterns of growth are as important as rates of growth.”302
Somavia is among  the poverty professionals303 who have left their big mark also 
on the poverty reduction action agenda of international development coopera-
tion. In 1995 he wrote: 
“Obviously, one does not wish poverty away – no matter how rich or poor the region, 
country, or community. Yet by beginning with a commitment to eliminate the most ex-
treme forms of poverty, on a date to be set by each country and in a manner carried out 
in accordance with the policy priorities in those countries (notably, with the assurance of 
the international community to support countries, as necessary, and the commitment of 
those nations to steward their resources effectively)…people will have a concrete benchmark 
against which to measure their leaders’ political commitment to bettering the quality of hu-
man life and progress.”304 
301 Somavia (1995), p. 480. President Wolfensohn of the World Bank was quick to operationalize this 
integrated approach to development problems into his “Comprehensive Development Framework” (CDF) 
–initiative in January 1997.
302 Somavia (1995), p. 481-482.
303 NPPP = Non-poor poverty professional. Somavia is lawyer by education.
304 Somavia (1995), p. 482-483.
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In line with this vision of Somavia (and many others), the international devel-
opment co-operation community has since Copenhagen committed itself jointly 
to concrete numerical time-bound goals and targets (MDGs) aiming at reducing 
and eliminating multi-dimensional poverty with ever-greater determination and 
professionalism.305
In the Copenhagen Social Summit the Heads of State committed themselves 
to the following ten commitments: 
1.    to create an economic, political, social, cultural and legal environment that will enable 
people to achieve social development.
2.    to eradicate poverty in the world, through decisive national actions and internation-
al cooperation, as an ethical, social, political and economic imperative of humankind. 
3.    to promote the goal of full employment as a basic priority of economic and social poli-
cies, and to enabling all men and women to attain secure and sustainable livelihoods 
through freely chosen productive employment and work.
4.    to promote social integration by fostering societies that are stable, safe and just and 
based on the promotion of all human rights, and on non-discrimination, tolerance, 
respect for diversity, equality of opportunity, solidarity, security and participation of 
all people, including disadvantaged and vulnerable groups and persons.
5.  to promote full respect for human dignity and to achieving equality and equity between 
women and men, and to recognizing and enhancing the participation and leadership 
roles of women in political, civil, economic, social and cultural life and in development.
6.   to promote and attain the goals of universal and equitable access to quality edu-
cation, the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and the access 
of all to primary health care, making particular efforts to rectify inequalities relating 
to social conditions and without distinction as to race, national origin, gender, age or 
disability; respecting and  promoting our common and particular cultures; striving to 
strengthen the role of culture in development; preserving the essential bases of people-
centred sustainable development and contributing to the full development of human 
resources and to social development. The purpose of these activities is to eradicate pov-
erty, promote full and productive employment and foster social integration.                                               
7.   to accelerate the economic, social and human resource development of Africa and the 
least developed countries.
8.   to ensure that when structural adjustment programmes are agreed to, they include 
social development goals, in particular eradicating poverty, promoting full and 
productive employment and enhancing social integration.
9.   to increase significantly and/or utilize more efficiently the resources allocated to 
social development in order to achieve the goals of the Summit through national 
action and regional and international cooperation.
10.  to an improved and strengthened framework for international, regional and sub-region-
al cooperation for social development, in a spirit of partnership, through the United 
Nations and other multilateral institutions.
Text box 1. The Copenhagen Declaration306 
305 The level of determination and professionalism of the intergovernmental development community 
(i.e. the non-poor poverty professionals, NPPPs) is, of course, daily and weekly questioned by critics. 
Nevertheless, looking at it as a participant observer from inside the NPPP-community, the poverty-
focus has been at historical heights between Copenhagen Social Summit (March-1995), Millennium 
Summit  (September-2000), and the MDG-Review Major Event (September-2005).
306 Copenhagen Declaration (1995), p. 9-24. See: Copenhagen Declaration in Websources. 
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The Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD307 was instru-
mental in the process where the intergovernmental community has set itself clear 
quantitative and time-bound targets for poverty reduction, and agreed on indica-
tors to be used in the monitoring of progress towards the targets. Rapidly after 
the Copenhagen Social Summit, the bilateral aid donor community in 1995-95 
drafted, negotiated and agreed on a joint development cooperation strategy for 
the 21st century. The joint strategy, widely known by its name “Shaping the 21s 
Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation”308 (‘S21’ in short), for-
mulated the key Copenhagen commitments into a list of ‘International Develop-
ment Goals’ (IDGs)309, that were to be later (in 2000) adopted almost word-by-
word, with minor amendments, by the whole world community at the UN Mil-
lennium Summit, with a new name: ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs)310.
Table 3. International Development Goals (IDG) as agreed in OECD-DAC in 1996311
goAl DeFiNitioN
economic Well-being
REDUCING EXTREME 
POVERTY
The proportion of people living in extreme poverty in develop-
ing countries should be reduced by at least one-half by 2015.
Social development
UNIVERSAL PRIMARY 
EDUCATION
There should be universal primary education in all countries by 
2015.
GENDER 
EQUALITY
Progress towards gender equality and the empowerment of 
women should be demonstrated by eliminating gender disparity 
in primary and secondary education by 2005.
INFANT AND 
CHILD MORTALITY
The death rates for infants and children under the age of five 
years should be reduced in each developing country by two-
thirds the 1990 level by 2015.
MATERNAL 
MORTALITY
The rate of maternal mortality should be reduced by three-
fourths between 1990 and 2015. 
REPRODUCTIVE 
HEALTH
Access should be available through the primary health-care 
system to reproductive health services for all individuals of ap-
propriate ages, no later than the year 2015.
environmental 
sustainability & 
regeneration
ENVIRONMENT There should be a current national strategy for sustainable de-
velopment, in the process of implementation, in every country 
by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of envi-
ronmental resources are effectively reversed at both global and 
national levels by 2015.
307 OECD = Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development.
308 OECD-DAC (1996). 
309 OECD-DAC (1996), p. 2. See Table 3 below. 
310 United Nations (2000), p. 5. United Nations (2001), p. 56-58. See Table 2 above.
311 More information about the international development goals (IDGs) and their monitoring can be 
found at the OECD-DAC Indicators website. See DAC-Indicators in Websources.
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The UN Millennium Summit in September 2000 agreed on a broader set of 
goals including (in addition to those of development and poverty reduction) 
commitments in the areas of peace, security and disarmament; environmental 
protection; human rights, democracy and good governance; protection of the 
vulnerable; meeting the special needs of Africa and strengthening the United 
Nations as the key forum and instrument for pursuing all of these global goals. 
The Millennium Summit adopted the list of IDGs developed in the DAC, but 
added into the list a few new goals, such as: hunger reduction, access to safe 
drinking water, reversing the spread of HIV/AIDS, special assistance to children 
orphaned by HIV/AIDS, slum improvement, development of a pro-poor global 
trading and financial system, commitment to good governance, addressing the 
special needs of least developed countries as well as those of the landlocked and 
small island states, comprehensive measures to solve the debt problems of devel-
oping countries, strategies for youth employment, availability of essential drugs, 
partnerships with the private sector and civil society for poverty reduction. 
The Millennium Declaration commitments were then edited by the UN-Sec-
retariat into a new list of 8 ‘Millennium Development Goals’ (MDGs), 18 ‘Targets’ 
and 48 related ‘Progress Monitoring Indicators’  that were presented to the global 
community in the Secretary General’s report to the UN General Assembly in 
September 2001 (See Table 3. above). 
As Chambers’ Triangle Model (Figure 7 above) shows, sustainable liveli-
hoods are multi-dimensional. Monetary income is naturally one of – but only 
one of many – sources of livelihoods. Reduction of income poverty (halving the 
proportion of people with income less than one dollar day) is therefore natu-
rally one of the Millennium Development Goals. But the noteworthy fact is that 
lack of incomes and low consumption are today considered only one among the 
many dimensions of poverty. The MDGs reflect the contemporary conceptual 
consensus about the multi-dimensionality of poverty. Sustainable poverty reduc-
tion, therefore, requires progress along all the MDGs.
 
4.16 the oRigiNS oF the multi-DimeNSioNAl 
CoNCept oF poveRtY – the iNStRumeNtAl Role 
plAYeD BY the uNDp AND AmARtYA SeN 
The early, and most active advocate of the multi-dimensional approach to pov-
erty in the global development discourse of the 1990s was no doubt the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP). In year 1990 the UNDP published 
the first ‘Human Development Report’312 the format of which deliberately imi-
tated that of the World Bank’s authoritative flagship report ‘World Development 
Report’ (WDR).  While the WDR contains ranking lists of the world’s nations 
in terms of their GNP/capita (PPP)313 achievements, the Human Development 
312 UNDP (1990). 
313 Gross National Product in purchasing power parity terms. 
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Reports (HDRs), which the UNDP has ever since published annually314 have, in-
stead, introduced a variety of wider criteria of human development and poverty 
(including longevity/life expectancy, educational achievements, gender equality 
and political rights), and ranked the world’s nations in terms of their achieve-
ments in facilitating multi-dimensional human development for their citizens 
(Human Development Index HDI, Human Poverty Index HPI, Gender-disaggre-
gated Development Index GDI, Gender Empowerment Measure GEM, etc.). 
The founder and chief architect of the UNDP’s HDR-approach was Mahbub 
ul Haq315, a renowned Pakistani and international poverty economist. Interest-
ingly, a closer investigation reveals that one of the main sources of Haq’s intellec-
tual and political inspiration - and his main academic adviser316 in the process of 
introducing the people-centred HDR-approach - was nobody else but Amartya 
Sen. It was Sen’s 1973 book ‘On Economic Inequality’ and his 1976 paper ‘Poverty: 
An Ordinal Approach to Measurement’317 that had broadened the informational 
basis of interpersonal welfare comparisons.318 Sen’s work thereby provided a way 
into conceptualizing and operationalizing value judgments on distributional is-
sues, and by doing so acted as an antidote to a natural instinct among economists 
to avoid distributional questions.319 
314 UNDP (1991-2004).
315 Mahbub ul-Haq (1934-1998) of Pakistan studied economics together with Amartya Sen at the Trinity 
College in Cambridge, UK. During his professional career Haq served in many distinguished policy 
positions, including Finance and Planning Minister of Pakistan (1982-8), Director of the Policy Planning 
Department in the World Bank (1970-82), and Special Adviser to UNDP Administrator. In addition 
to the Human Development Reports of the UNDP, which Haq was the chief editor for between 1990-
1996, Haq’s major publications include The Strategy of Economic Planning (1963), The Poverty Curtain 
(1976), and Reflections on Human Development (1995). See also Ul-Hag in Websources.
316 The UNDP HDR-1990 drafting team were advised by the following expert members of the Panel 
of Consultants: Gustav Ranis, Amartya K. Sen, Frances Stewart, Keith Griffin, Maghnad Desai, Aziz 
Khan, Paul Streeten, Shlomo Angel, Petro Garau and Mahesh Patel. In 1997, when Richard Jolly had 
taken over the role of Principal Coordinator of the Human Development Report from Mahbub ul-
Haq, his HDR-1997 staff team was managed by Sakiko Fukuda-Parr. Amartya K. Sen continued even 
then as a member of the Panel of Consultants. See also: Emmerij et al. (2001), p. 139-140, and Jolly et 
al. (2004), p. 291-292 and 321.
317 And Tony Atkinson’s classic 1970 paper ‘On the Measurement of Inequality’. The appearance of 
these papers in the 1970’s sparked a huge discussion on how exactly to incorporate distributional 
value judgments. In the measurement of poverty, the culmination of this process was undoubtedly 
the famous paper by James Foster, Joel Greer and Erik Thorbecke in 1984, ‘A Class of Decomposable 
Poverty Measures’.  This measure, which has been called the ‘Cornell measure’ of poverty, has now 
become the workhorse of applied work on poverty the world over. This work is going on, and some 
of the leading brains behind this work gathered in Helsinki, Finland, in May 2003, in a WIDER 
conference on ‘Inequality, Poverty and Human Well-Being’. See: especially Kanbur (2003a), Foster 
(2003), Thorbecke (2003) and Osberg (2003).  See Inequality and welfare measurement in Websources. 
318 Compared to the utilitarian fundamentalism of Robbins, Arrow, Nozick and Rawls. 
319 As Ravi Kanbur (2002a, 2003a) explains, the British economics professor Lionel Robbins (1898-
1984) seems to have played a key role in ‘misleading’ the global community of English-speaking 
economists into an unnecessarily individualistic and positivistic direction, away from ethical questions 
of distribution and fairness. See also Robbins in Websources.
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Figure 8. The Ranking of World’s Countries According to the HDI and GNP320
The late Mahbub ul Haq was far-sighted enough to use this new theoretical open-
ing: he introduced the Human Development Index (HDI), which is a weighted 
sum of three components - income, literacy and life expectancy.321 The way Amar-
tya Sen tells the story is that he had told Mahbub that the conceptual foundations 
of such a measure were very weak (sure enough, within weeks of the measure 
coming out many economists attacked it on these grounds). But Mahbub had 
responded to Sen that such a measure that would attract countries to compare 
their ratings with their neighbours would raise issues of health and education 
on par with income in a way that nothing else could. As Sen has acknowledged, 
Mahbub ul Haq was right. The annual publication of the HDI is now an eagerly 
awaited event and invariably leads to debates within a country through compari-
son with ‘competitor’ countries (US versus Canada, India versus Pakistan, Ghana 
versus Cote d’Ivoire, Finland versus Sweden, etc). Its benefits in terms of raising 
awareness at the highest policy levels have been incalculable, and it has been an 
integral part of the policy debates.322
320 UNDP (1990), cover and inner cover.
321 The HDI is a composite measure based on three indicators: (a) Longevity (as measured by life 
expectancy at birth); (b) Educational achievement (as measured by a combination of adult literacy and 
the combined gross primary, secondary and tertiary enrolment ratio); and (c) Access to resources for a 
decent standard of living (measured by real GDP per capita, in PPP$), with an adjustment factor. The 
HDI ranks countries from 1 to 175. In 2001 Norway was number one, followed by Iceland and Sweden. 
USA ranked 7th, UK 13th and Finland 14th. Tanzania was 160th (or 16th from the bottom). Using the 
Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM), the five Nordic countries took the five top positions (Finland 
was 5th). Using the Human Poverty Index, Finland ranked 3rd best. UK dropped to position 15 and 
USA to 17. Tanzania, a country that still scored last but one among all nations in the GDP per capita 
(PPP) statistics, left 35 countries behind in the Human Poverty Index rankings. See: UNDP(2003) and 
Human Development Report in Websources.
322 Kanbur (2002a, 2003a).
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As Sen has argued convincingly in his academic writings,323 the growth of 
GNP or of individual incomes can, of course, be very important as ‘means’ to 
expanding the freedoms enjoyed by the members of the society. But freedoms 
depend also on other determinants as well, such as social and economic arrange-
ments (for example, facilities for education and health care) as well as political 
and civil rights (for example, the liberty to participate in public discussion and 
scrutiny). Besides, as Sen has shown, high incomes per head cannot guarantee 
the freedom of individuals to live long and live well. For example, the citizens 
of Gabon, South Africa, Namibia or Brazil may be much richer in terms of per 
capital GNP than the citizens of Sri Lanka or China or the state of Kerala in India, 
but the latter have very substantially higher life expectancies than do the former. 
Also the African Americans, though much richer than people in the third world, 
have an absolutely lower chance of reaching mature ages than do people of many 
third world societies.324
Sen’s radically new proposition is that the political and social freedoms (that 
is, for instance, the liberty of political participation or the opportunity to receive 
basic education or health care or social security) are not only conducive to devel-
opment (as growth of incomes or GNP), as many economists before him have re-
alized. In light of Sen’s more foundational view of ‘development as freedom’, this 
way of posing the question tends to miss the important understanding that these 
substantive freedoms belong to the constituent components of (multi-dimension-
al) development and poverty reduction. Their relevance for development does 
not have to be freshly established through their indirect contribution to the 
growth of GNP or to the promotion of industrialization. Substantive freedoms 
are not only among the principal means of development, but also – essentially – 
the primary ends of development.325
The substantive freedoms include elementary capabilities like being able to 
avoid such deprivations as starvation, under-nourishment, escapable morbidity 
and premature mortality, as well as the freedoms that are associated with being 
literate and numerate, enjoying political participation and uncensored speech 
and so on. In the constitutive perspective, poverty reduction involves expansion 
of these and other basic freedoms. In this view, “poverty reduction is identical to 
development, i.e. the process of expanding human freedoms”. In the light of the founda-
tional view of development as freedom, even a very rich person who is prevent-
ed from speaking freely, or from participating in public debates and decisions, 
is poor, in the sense of being deprived of something she has reason to value. The 
process of poverty reduction, or development, when judged by the enhancement 
of human freedom, has to include the removal of this person’s deprivation.326
This fundamental point – the intrinsic importance of human freedom as the 
pre-eminent objective of development - is distinct from the instrumental argu-
ment that these freedoms and rights may also be – and in fact are - very effective 
323 Well synthesized in Sen (1999), p. 3.
324 Sen (1999), p. 5-6.
325 Sen (1999), p. 5, 10. 
326 Sen (1999), p. 36-37. 
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in contributing to economic progress. The effectiveness of freedom as an instru-
ment lies in the fact that different kinds of freedom interrelate with one another, 
and freedom of one type may greatly help in advancing freedom of other types. 
Sen suggests five distinct types of freedom that may be particularly worth em-
phasizing in this instrumental perspective. This is by no means an exhaustive 
list, Sen says, but it is interesting to note that his list is almost identical with 
the list adopted by the OECD-DAC Poverty Reduction Network (POVNET) as 
the basic conceptual framework of multi-dimensional poverty reduction in the 
DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines.327 Sen suggests the following five types of 
freedom, that are (also) instrumentally (i.e. not only intrinsically) important for 
poverty reduction: (1) political freedoms, (2) economic facilities, (3) social oppor-
tunities, (4) transparency guarantees and (5) protective security. 
(1)   Political freedoms and civil rights in Sen’s usage328 refer to the opportunities that 
people have to determine who should govern and on what principles, and also 
include the possibility to scrutinize and criticize authorities, to have freedom of 
political expression and an uncensored press, to enjoy the freedom to choose 
between different political parties, and so on.
(2)   Economic facilities refer to the opportunities that individuals respectively enjoy 
to utilize economic resources for the purposes of consumption, or production, 
or exchange. The economic entitlements that a person has will depend on the 
resources owned or available for use as well as on conditions of exchange, such 
as relative prices and the working of the markets. It should be obvious that dis-
tributional considerations are important, in addition to aggregative ones. The 
availability and access to finance can also be a crucial influence on the economic 
entitlements that economic agents are practically able to secure. 
(3)   Social opportunities refer to the arrangements that society makes for education, 
health care and so on, which influence the individual’s substantive freedom to 
live better. These facilities are important not only for the conduct of private lives 
(such as living a healthy life and avoiding preventable morbidity and premature 
mortality), but also for more effective participation in economic and political 
activities. For example, illiteracy can be a major barrier to participation in eco-
nomic activities that require production according to specification or demand 
strict quality control (as globalized trade increasingly does). Similarly, political 
participation may be hindered by the inability to read newspapers or to com-
municate in writing with others involved in political activities.    
         
 
327 See Figure 9 below. Sen (1999), p. 37-38. OECD-DAC (2001c), p. 39.  The 5 dimensions of the poverty/
poverty reduction framework of the OECD-DAC POVNET are: (1) political, (2) economic, (3) human, 
(4) socio-cultural and (5) protective. In addition, the DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines identifies 
two major ‘cross-cutting issues’, (6) gender and (7) environment, that are relevant for each of the five 
dimensions of poverty/poverty reduction. 
328 Sen (1999), p. 38-40.
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(4)   Transparency guarantees329 deal with the need for openness that people can expect: 
the freedom to deal with one another on the basis of a presumption of trust, 
disclosure and lucidity: that people can expect to get what they are offered and 
what they expect. Transparency guarantees have a clear instrumental role in pre-
venting corruption, financial irresponsibility and underhand dealings. 
(5)   Protective security: Finally, no matter how well an economic system operates, some 
people can be typically on the verge of vulnerability and can actually succumb to 
great deprivation as a result of material changes that adversely affect their lives. 
Protective security is needed to provide a social safety net330 for preventing the 
affected population from being reduced to abject misery, and in some cases even 
starvation and death. The domain of protective security includes fixed institu-
tional arrangements such as e.g. unemployment benefits, and statutory insur-
ances and income supplements to the indigent as well as ad hoc arrangements 
such as famine relief or emergency public employment to generate income for 
destitute.
All the leading development institutions of the world today conceive poverty as 
a multi-dimensional problem that can be best addressed through comprehensive 
and balanced approaches focusing on a variety of policy areas simultaneously. 
In what follows we shall look into the ways how the members of the OECD-De-
velopment Assistance Committee (DAC) today apply the conceptual framework 
of multi-dimensional poverty in their joint poverty reduction guidelines. For the 
ease of reading, the OECD-POVNET conceptual framework of multi-dimension-
al poverty, already once presented as  Figure 1, is reprinted here as Figure 9.331 
329 This is missing from the DAC-POVNET’s Guidelines, which include also a ‘socio-cultural’ dimension 
of poverty, plus gender and environment as cross-cutting themes. OECD-DAC (2001c). 
330 Social policy experts from Finland often emphasize that safety nets are not enough: Vulnerable 
people (and all people are sometimes vulnerable) need social ‘springboards’ – or ‘trampolines’ -  that 
help them bounce soon after a shock occurs back onto their feet as active producers and citizens.
331 OECD-DAC (2001c). 
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Figure 9. The Multi-Dimensional Framework of Poverty as Presented in the OECD-
DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines 2001332
4.17 povNet oF the oeCD-DAC 
The DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines is an outcome of a three-year process (1998-2001) 
of commissioned research,333 negotiation and consensus-building in the framework of the 
OECD-DAC334 Network on Poverty Reduction (POVNET), the members of which are civil 
servants from the governmental aid agencies of the rich industrialised countries335 The 
leading multilateral development institutions such as the IMF, the World Bank, UNDP 
and Unicef also take part in the POVNET meetings.
According to the consensus view of the donor agencies, as documented in the DAC 
Poverty Guidelines, the concept of poverty includes different dimensions of deprivation. 
In general, poverty means the inability of men or women to meet economic, social and 
332 OECD-DAC (2001c), p. 39.
333 The DAC “Scoping Study of Donor Poverty Reduction Policies and Practices” (OECD-DAC 
1999a), was conducted by a large team of researchers from leading European and North-American 
development research institutes, coordinated by Aidan Cox of the Overseas Development Institute 
(ODI) of London. I was part of the team, conducting the country case studies on Finland, Tanzania 
and Nepal, and participating in the editing of the Synthesis report. See: Voipio (1998a), Voipio and 
Hoebink (1999), Gsänger and Voipio (2000), Cox, Healey and Voipio (1999) and Cox, Healey, Hoebink 
and Voipio (2000).
334 ‘OECD’ stands for the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, which is an 
influential ‘think-tank’ and cooperation forum of the rich industrialised country governments. ‘DAC’ 
stands for the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD. 
335 I have represented the Government of Finland in the POVNET since 2001.
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other standards of well-being. The multi-dimensionality of poverty is based solidly on 
research that includes major participatory studies of what poor people mean by pover-
ty.336 It covers measures of ‘absolute poverty’ such as child and infant mortality rates, and 
‘relative poverty’, as defined by the differing standards of poverty and well-being in each 
society.337 An adequate concept of poverty should encompass the causal links between 
the core dimensions of poverty and the central importance of gender and environmental-
ly sustainable development, as the DAC-framework in Figure 9 does. The five dimensions 
and two cross-cutting factors of poverty and poverty reduction efforts are characterised 
in the DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines338 as follows: 
Economic capabilities mean the ability to earn an income, to consume and to have 
assets, which are all key to food security, material well-being and social status. 
These aspects are often raised by poor people in participatory poverty assessments 
(PPAs)339, along with secure access to productive financial and physical resources: 
land, implements and animals, forests and fishing waters, credit and decent em-
ployment.
Human capabilities are based on health, education, nutrition, clean water and shelter. 
These are core elements of well-being as well as crucial means to improving liveli-
hoods. Disease and illiteracy are barriers to productive work, and thus to economic 
and other capabilities for poverty reduction. Reading and writing facilitate com-
munication with others, which is crucial in social, economic and political participa-
tion. Education, especially for girls, is considered the single most effective means 
for defeating poverty and some of its major causal factors, for example illness – in 
particular AIDS – and excessive fertility.
Political capabilities include human rights, voice and sufficient influence over public 
policies and political priorities. Deprivation of basic political freedoms or human 
rights is a major aspect of poverty. This includes arbitrary, unjust and even violent 
action by the police or other public authorities that is a serious concern of poor peo-
ple. Powerlessness aggravates other dimensions of poverty. The politically weak 
have neither the voice in policy reforms nor secure access to resources required to 
rise out of poverty.
Socio-cultural capabilities concern the ability to participate as a valued member of 
a community. They refer to social status, dignity and other cultural conditions 
for belonging to a society - capabilities highly valued by the poor themselves. 
Participatory poverty assessments indicate that geographic and social isolation is 
the main meaning of poverty for people in many local societies; other dimensions 
are seen as contributing factors.
336 E.g. Mukherjee (1992), Narayan (1997), Narayan and Pritchett (1997), Narayan et al. (2000a, b), 
Narayan and Petesch (2002). See also OECD-DAC (1999a).
337 OECD-DAC (2001c), p. 37-38. 
338 OECD-DAC (2001c), p. 38-40.
339 On PPAs, see: Norton et al. (2001). For an example of a concrete PPA-process in a poor country 
(Tanzania), see Ehrhart et al (2003).
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Protective (social risk management)340 capabilities enable people to withstand economic 
and external shocks. Thus, they are important for preventing poverty. Insecurity 
and vulnerability are crucial dimensions of poverty with strong links to all other 
dimensions. Poor people indicate that hunger and food insecurity are core con-
cerns along with other risks like illness, crime, war and destitution. To a large 
extent, poverty is experienced intermittently in response to seasonal variations and 
external shocks – natural disasters, economic crises and violent conflicts. Dynamic 
concepts are needed because people move in and out of poverty. Today’s poor are 
only partly the same people as yesterday’s or tomorrow’s. Some are chronically 
poor341 or inherit their poverty; others are in temporary or transient poverty.
Still, looking at the conceptual framework of the DAC Poverty Reduction 
Guidelines (Figure 9) above, the links indicated by arrows are significant. Each 
box represents an important dimension of poverty, which affects – and is affected 
by – all the others. Household members may consume little and be vulnerable 
partly because they lack assets, often because of inadequate income, poor health 
and education, or because they lose their few productive assets as a result of 
shocks. Lack of human rights and political freedoms indicates a risk of violent 
conflict shocks. Vulnerability and social exclusion hamper human and political 
capabilities, reducing incomes and assets, and so on. The fact that different di-
mensions of poverty are tightly interrelated, while still distinct and imperfectly 
correlated, is a major reason for a multidimensional concept.342
Gender equality and environmental sustainability are international development 
goals in their own right. But they are also key to reducing poverty across its vari-
ous dimensions. Gender inequality concerns all dimensions of poverty, because 
poverty is not gender-neutral.343 Cultures often involve deep-rooted prejudices 
and discrimination against women. Processes causing poverty affect men and 
women in different ways and degrees. Female poverty is more prevalent and typi-
cally more severe than male poverty. Women and girls in poor households get 
less than their fair share of private consumption and public services. They suffer 
violence by men on a large scale. They are more likely to be illiterate as well as 
politically and socially excluded in their communities. Hence, women ’s abilities 
to overcome poverty are generally different from those of men.344
340 The concept of ‘Social Risk Management’ was first developed and coined by Holzmann and 
Jorgensen (1999), and through their active contributions, included in the conceptual framework of the 
World Bank’s new approach to poverty reduction in the 3rd Millennium. See: World Bank (2001c). The 
emphasis of weakness, insecurity, vulnerability as essential dimentions and characteristics of poverty 
– and the centrality of ‘risk-reduction’, ‘risk-mitigation’ and ‘risk-coping’ in the livelihood strategies 
of the poor - have emerged from the participatory rural appraisals (PRA) and participatory poverty 
assessments (PPA) during the 1980s and 1990s. See e.g. Chambers (1995), p. 9-10, and Chambers 
(1997), p. 170-172. 
341 See e.g. Chronic Poverty Research Centre (2004). See also: Chronic Poverty in Websources.
342 OECD-DAC (2001c), p. 39.
343 See DAC Guidelines and Source Book for gender equality (OECD-DAC 1998a and b, respectively). 
See also: Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland (2003) and Gender in Websources.
344 These few paragraphs on gender and environment in the DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines are 
an outcome of hard negotiations and editing, which leaves little scope for me here to shorten the text 
further. These paragraphs are citations from OECD-DAC (2001c), p. 40.
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Women play a crucial role in the livelihoods and basic human capabilities of 
poor households. By providing for their children, they reduce the risk of poverty 
in the next generation. But women in general have less access than men to assets 
that provide security and opportunity. Such constraints on women’s productive 
potential reduce household incomes and aggregate economic growth. Gender 
inequality is therefore a major cause of female and of overall poverty. Gender-
related ‘time poverty’ refers to the lack of time for all the tasks imposed on wom-
en, for rest and for economic, social and political activities. It is an important 
additional burden that in many societies is due to structural gender inequality – a 
disparity that has different meanings for women and men.
Environment and poverty are linked in many ways. Environmental degrada-
tion, in both rural and urban areas, affects poor people the most. Conversely, it is 
also a result of poverty. Sustainable development and poverty reduction require 
maintaining the integrity of natural ecosystems and preserving their life-sup-
porting functions. Critical factors linking environment and poverty include se-
curity of access to the natural resources on which many poor households depend, 
and environmental health risks that particularly affect women and children.
In rural areas, land degradation, deforestation and declining fish stocks are 
serious threats to the livelihood and health of poor people, along with pollution 
of water and indoor air. Yet, the rural poor often lack alternatives to unsustainable 
use of fragile land for subsistence agriculture, livestock ranging and woodcutting, 
thus aggravating soil loss. The increasing scarcity of good land and clean water 
can fuel social and political instability and local, national and regional conflict, 
unless the competing needs of different users can be peacefully and equitably 
reconciled. 
Poor people in both rural and urban areas are highly vulnerable to devastat-
ing natural disasters such as droughts, floods, typhoons/hurricanes and rising 
sea levels that threaten entire populations in small islands and low-lying coastal 
areas, especially in poor countries. The incidence and severity of these may be 
aggravated by global climate change, which is expected to accelerate. Economic 
growth in developing as well as rich industrialised countries – while useful for 
poverty reduction – generates increased emissions of greenhouse gases that affect 
global climate change.345
345 See the DAC guidelines on disaster mitigation (OECD-DAC 1994). 
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4.18 WoRlD BANK: CoNtext-SpeCiFiCitY, 
multi-DimeNSioNAlitY, CoheReNCe AND 
DemoCRAtiC pRiNCipleS – pReSSuReS mouNtiNg 
oN the WoRlD BANK 
The official attitude of the World Bank towards the multi-dimensional, context-
specific and people-centred HDR-approach remained luke-warm during the first 
half of the 1990s. Only after the Social Summit (in March 1995), and after the 
entry into office of the Bank’s new President, James Wolfensohn (in June 1995), 
did the World Bank  start to show genuine interest in the multi-dimensional con-
ception of poverty. 
The international discussion about the ‘human face’ and ‘social dimensions’ of 
adjustment and development - facilitated initially by Unicef and since 1990 by the 
annual Human Development Reports (HDR) of the UNDP - was instrumental in 
changing the thinking among the World Bank economists. Probably the strong-
est winds of change blew, however, from the streets of Washington D.C., Seattle, 
Stockholm, Prague, Genoa, etc., as well as from the ‘world-wide web’  (internet) 
- where rapidly expanding coalitions of grassroots, women’s, solidarity, faith-
based, youth, labour and development organizations were protesting and de-
manding a profound transformation of what they conceived as an un-just global 
economic order and of its main harbingers, the Washington-based international 
financial institutions, the World Bank and the IMF. 346
The global resistance against the mono-dimensional neo-liberal adjustment 
agenda of the 1980s and 1990s was fuelled by the intuitively convincing intellec-
tual arguments provided by the UN agencies as well as by the increasingly active 
role of international pro-poor development and environmental NGOs, such as 
e.g. Oxfam International, Development Gap, Action Aid, Save the Children Fund, 
Catholic Relief Services, Friends of the Earth, Environmental Defence Fund, and 
many others. Also entirely new networks and coalitions (e.g. Eurodad, ATTAC, 
PGA, Jubilee-2000, etc.) were created through e-mail and internet-based network-
ing, and at selected strategic occasions – especially during well-covered media 
events such as the annual meetings of the World Bank, the IMF, and the WTO, 
and the G7/G8-summits - this ‘army of internet-warriors’, or the ‘Global Civil 
Society’ was able to link up with global media to generate  unforeseen publicity 
for their critical arguments against the unjust and unsustainable realities of the 
world. This way they also managed to create substantial pressures on the World 
Bank, the IMF - and also on the World Trade Organization, WTO.347 
346 See also the World Bank’s own evaluation of the ‘Social Dimensions of Adjustment 1980-93’, 
published by the Bank’s own evaluation department in 1996. World Bank (1996d). Jolly (1985). 
Reprinted in Harcourt (1997). Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987). UNDP (1990-2005).
347 Maxwell (2001) is a witty, compelling account of how one – obviously pro-poor – non-poor poverty 
economist (and probably several others) experienced the paradox between his self-identity as a 
relatively radical ‘trustee of the poor’ on the one hand, and as an object of angry slogans by street 
demonstrators, on the other hand – not knowing whether his son was one among the many in the 
angry mob, or not.
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4.19 WolFeNSohN, WoRlD BANK AND the 
multi-DimeNSioNAl AppRoACh to poveRtY 
When James D. Wolfensohn348 entered office as President of the World Bank on July 
1, 1995, only three months after the Copenhagen Social Summit, one of his first acts 
was to proclaim his intention to fundamentally change the institution. And indeed, 
even critics of the Bank admit now, in retrospect, that during his decade in office 
Wolfensohn has followed astonishingly loyally the normative priorities set by the 
world’s nations at the UN Social and Millennium Summits. He has also showed re-
markable managerial skills in making a highly constructive contribution towards 
the emergence of the Global Millennium Consensus on Poverty Reduction. 
The World Bank’s attitude towards the kind of multi-dimensional and people-
centred approach that the Social Summit Declaration represented, had been luke-
warm, at best, during the first half of the 1990s. It was only after the Social Summit 
and Wolfensohn’s entry as President, that the World Bank started to show interest 
in the multi-dimensional conception of poverty. 
One of the turning points for the Bank was Wolfensohn’s decision to invite 
Amartya Sen to give five Presidential Fellow Lectures (in the fall of 1996) to the 
senior staff of the World Bank on “Development as Freedom”. (A book by the 
same name based on the lectures he gave at the World Bank was published by Sen 
in 1999. 349) Another important boost was the nomination of another to-be Nobel 
Laureate in economics, Professor Joseph Stiglitz, to the post of Chief Economist in 
the Bank. That happened in February 1997.350  The third major effort Wolfensohn 
initiated (in 1997) was the “Strategic Compact”, a Bank-internal ‘structural adjust-
ment programme’. According to Wolfensohn, the Strategic Compact was meant to 
be “a plan for fundamental reform and renewal of the World Bank to make it more effective 
in achieving its basic mission of reducing poverty.”351 By implementing the Strategic 
Compact, the World Bank was supposed to deliver better products and services 
to its clients, and to reaffirm its position as the premier global development insti-
tution – a respected leader and partner in the business of catalysing knowledge 
and financial resources in the fight against poverty.352
348 James D. Wolfensohn is the World Bank Group’s ninth president since the Bank’s establishment 
in 1946. Wolfensohn was born in Australia 1933, but has become a naturalized US citizen.  Prior to 
joining the World Bank, Mr. Wolfensohn was an international investment banker on Wall Street in 
New York, leading his own investment firm that advised major US and international corporations. 
Wolfensohn has been an exceptionally active president of the Bank, and an effective transmitter of 
visionary thinkers’ (e.g. Amartya Sen’s and Joseph Stiglitz’s) ideas into development management. 
Since becoming president on June 1, 1995, Wolfensohn has travelled to more than 120 countries to 
gain first-hand experience of the challenges facing the World Bank and its 183 member countries, and 
taking the initiative in forming a variety of new strategic partnerships between the World Bank and 
the governments, the private sector, civil society, religious and women’s groups, regional development 
banks and the UN. In November 1999 Wolfensohn became only the second President of the World Bank 
since Robert McNamara in the 1960s (more about McNamara later in this book) to be re-appointed for 
a second term. See e.g. World Bank (2002a), Schifferes (2000), Mallaby (2004), Kagia (ed. 2005), and 
Wolfensohn (2005).  
349 Sen (1999). Plus one follow-up lecture in November 1997. See Sen (1999), p. xiii.
350 For more, see Stiglitz in Websources.
351 World Bank (1997d), p. 1. See also: Mallaby (2004), 162-170, 213, 245, 291, 378-379, and Kesu (1997). 
352 World Bank (1997b), p. i. 
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4.20   50 YeARS iS eNough – ReFoRm impoSeD oN the 
WoRlD BANK FRom the StReetS AND FRom the top 
On the other hand, Wolfensohn hardly had any other choice than to initiate a fun-
damental reform in the World Bank’s way of doing business. In 1994 during the 
50th anniversary of the founding of the World Bank (and the IMF) at the Bretton 
Woods Conference of 1944, the Bank (and the Fund) had become the target of in-
tensive and aggressive criticism by leading pro-poor US-based and international 
development NGOs, who joined forces in a “50-Years-Is-Enough” -campaign. That 
was a coalition of over 200 grassroots, women’s, solidarity, faith-based, policy, 
social and economic justice, youth, labour and development organizations who 
identified themselves as being dedicated to “the profound transformation of the 
un-just international economic order, and its institutional pillars, the World Bank, 
the IMF and the World Trade Organization (WTO)”. Through education and ac-
tion, the Network is committed to “transforming the international financial institu-
tions’ policies and practices, to ending the outside imposition of neo-liberal economic pro-
grams, and to making the development process democratic and accountable.”353
Above all, the Network called for the full participation of affected women and 
men in all aspects of World Bank and IMF projects, policies and programs. En-
couraged by the UN-agencies’ convincing arguments and evidence that ‘Structur-
al Adjustment with a Human Face’354 was possible, they demanded that the Bank’s 
agenda of imposing Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) on the poor country 
governments should be reconciled with the popular agenda of poverty reduction 
(the stated purpose of the Bank) and participation. This required, they believed, 
far-reaching changes in the lending policies, internal processes and structures of 
the World Bank and the IMF. Only with these reforms implemented would these 
institutions be able to play a positive role in support of equitable and sustainable 
development, the 50-Years-Is-Enough campaigners argued.355 
4.21 ShAReholDeR vieWS ARe impoRtANt FoR A BANK 
What really forced President Wolfensohn and his staff to take the criticism of the 
anti-SAP campaigners356 seriously was the fact that the critical views were widely 
shared by the opinion-leaders in the World Bank’s shareholding donor govern-
ments. This was revealed by an extensive qualitative ‘Reputation Study’ conduct-
ed by the Bank in the autumn of 1994. Significantly, the 1994 study revealed that 
the majority of respondents – primarily governmental, non-governmental and 
353 See Fifty-Years-is-Enough in Websources.. The Movement celebrated the 60th anniversary of the World 
Bank and the IMF in 2004 by using a slogan: “60 Years of Destruction – World Bank/IMF – Time to Retire!”. 
See also Mallaby (2004), p. 61-65, 82-87, 119, 162, 194, 211, 261-264, 272, 343, 379.
354 Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987). 
355 Alexander (1998), p. 20, Jolly (1985), Cornia, Jolly and Stewart (1987), and UNDP (1990-2002).
356 SAP = Structural Adjustment Programme
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private sector opinion leaders of western industrialised nations357 - were highly 
sceptical of and resistant to a strong role for publicly funded development insti-
tutions in general – and the World Bank in particular – in the global economy. 
The research had suggested that the World Bank was speaking a different 
language from its key constituents around the world – in terms of the context 
for and most effective approaches to international development, as well as about 
the Bank’s own appropriate role and way of working in order to address foreign 
assistance needs. Above all, many respondents, especially in Europe, had cau-
tioned that the end of the Cold War had resulted in a conspicuous dominance of 
the United States in the world economy, along with the ideological dominance 
of an elite group of Washington-based policy-makers overemphasizing market 
liberalization as the key factor in international development. In the 1994 study, 
respondents had identified poverty reduction as the Bank’s basic mission, but 
generally speaking, the Bank had not been perceived by the respondents as a 
credible or effective institution for tackling poverty.358 
4.22 WhAt WAS So WRoNg With the WoRlD BANK – 
AND WhAt CoulD WolFeNSohN Do ABout it? 
The NGO movements criticizing the Bank had gained momentum already in the 
mid-1980s, when the Bank had started to provide policy-based structural adjust-
ment loans to complement the policies imposed on indebted governments by 
the IMF. Countries in financial trouble or in need of loans for developmental 
purposes had to ‘adjust’ and ‘restructure’, often severely cutting down govern-
ment spending and subsidies; liberalizing trade and finance; privatise publicly 
owned companies, and taking steps towards ‘good governance’, as defined by 
the Washington-based neoliberal advisers.359 
The NGOs believed that the main rationale for these policies was to secure the 
interest of the international creditors. Yet, the debt problem persisted and even 
got worse after decades of ‘adjustment’ and ‘reconstruction’. The socio-economic 
systems of the affected countries were transformed, and the NGOs were particu-
larly critical about the way that the most lucrative elements of the national means 
of production were ending up in the hands of transnational corporations as a 
result of the externally imposed privatisation programmes.360 
357 I was one of the interviewees.
358 See A.R.C. (1998). Even many staff members within the World Bank were gradually getting more 
and more doubtful, sceptical and/or cynical about the credibility of the ‘Official Truths’ of development 
economics, structural adjustment, as well as of the World Bank and the IMF. “One more such victory 
and we are lost” was the way William Easterly, the Bank’s leading growth researcher characterized the 
structural adjustment loans. See Easterly (2001), p. 44 and 101-102.
359 Mahbub ul Haq had advocated the concept ‘humane governance’ in response to his criticism towards 
the concept ‘good governance’,  which had – in ul Haq’s view - failed to match the radicalism of the 
notion of ‘human development’. Humane governance would include the notions of good political, 
economic and civic governance. See: Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre (1999). See also: 
Emmerij et al. (2001), p. 196.
360 Patomäki, Teivainen and Rönkkö (2002), 51-52.
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The environmental movement had, however, generally been far more suc-
cessful than the development movement in shifting the policies and practices of 
the World Bank and other major development banks. The environmental NGOs 
had been protesting against the large, environmentally and socially hazardous 
dams and other investment projects financed by the World Bank.361  In 1993 a few 
large shareholders of the World Bank joined forces with international NGOs con-
vincing the World Bank Board of Executive Directors to adopt a new information 
disclosure policy (to replace the old highly secretive principles), and to establish 
an ‘Inspection Panel’ to investigate allegations of Bank non-compliance with its 
policies by directly affected groups. These reforms had strengthened the sense 
of public accountability within the Bank.362
Until the early 1990s, multilateral debt was widely seen by many policy mak-
ers and the management of the international financial institutions as untoucha-
ble. Debt relief, if any, was limited to commercial bank and bilateral official debt. 
Decisive factors in changing this perception included: academic work, analysis 
by the Non-Aligned Movement, receptive Northern governments, and interna-
tionally active NGO-networks. 
In 1992, EURODAD (the European Network on Debt and Development),363 with 
membership in 15 European countries, Oxfam International,364 which is a partner-
ship of 10 NGOs with the same name around the world that fund development, 
relief, and advocacy in 70 countries, and other NGOs began systematic advocacy 
for comprehensive debt relief, and mobilized their membership to that end. They 
worked to achieve widespread acknowledgement of the seriousness of the multi-
lateral component of the overall debt problem and then to seek solutions, putting 
pressure on e.g. the G-7 governments, the management of international financial 
institutions, including their Boards and the major financial media. NGO advocacy 
positions in the area of debt were based on the following perceptions and beliefs:
•	  For many poor countries, debt burdens were too large relative to export incomes, 
national budgets and social expenditures, and constituted a barrier to poverty 
reduction.
•	  Debt service more than offset new resource flows because debt service payments 
had to be made in convertible foreign exchange, whereas aid was often tied to 
projects and procurements in the donor country.
•	  The burden of austerity was often borne disproportionately by the poorest, vul-
nerable groups who had no voice in shaping policy.
•	  Austerity programmes sometimes resulted in cuts in essential services while 
leaving ‘non-productive’ expenditures (e.g. the military) untouched.
•	  All creditors should take responsibility for debt reduction, including the World 
Bank and the IMF.
361 E.g. in cases such as Polonoroeste (Brazil) and the Sardar Sardovar project (India), it had been found 
that the Bank-funded operations were not complying with the Bank’s own policies. See e.g. Mallaby 
(2004), p. 261-285, Abugre and Alexander (1998), p. 116-118. 
362 See Rich (1994, 1997), Abugre and Alexander (1998), p. 116.
363 See Eurodad in Websources. 
364 See Oxfam in Websources. 
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•	  The basic model of development and poverty reduction was flawed to the extent 
that it put a higher priority on servicing foreign debt than on meeting basic needs 
and rights of populations and protecting the environment.365
4.23 the hipC DeBt RelieF iNitiAtive 
The advocacy by the NGOs (which was also increasingly supported by sever-
al sympathizing governments from the South as well as the North) culminat-
ed in the HIPC-Initiative launched jointly by the Presidents of the World Bank 
(Wolfensohn) and the IMF (Michael Camdessus), and approved by the Boards of 
the two institutions, in September 1996. The ‘HIPC’ stands for “Highly Indebted 
Poor Countries”, and the principal objective of the initiative was to bring the poor-
est countries’ debt burdens to sustainable levels, subject to satisfactory policy 
performance, so as to ensure that adjustment and reform efforts are not put at 
risk by continued high debt and debt service burdens.366 
The HIPC Initiative could be read as a sign that also the orthodoxy of the G7/
G8 countries and the Bretton Woods institutions was admitting that an important 
part of the debt was unpayable and that this threatened to destroy the basis for 
any economic recovery and poverty reduction. The HIPC was the first ever debt 
initiative that was both comprehensive and concerted and aimed at exiting from 
the endless rescheduling process by targeting the goal of debt sustainability.367 
However, critics said that even this was ‘too little too late’. The framework of 
the HIPC I, initiated in 1997, had many flaws that Eurodad and the other interna-
tional NGOs felt had to be corrected: the extended timeframe, criteria for compli-
ance, over-optimistic assumptions on aid and exports, and deficient thresholds 
and indicators. The framework for assessing debt sustainability was inadequate 
and incomplete. The ranges were too high for the criteria employed – namely the 
ratios of the net present value (NPV) of debt to exports (200 to 250 per cent); annu-
al debt service to exports (20 to 25 per cent); and the annual fiscal burden of debt 
(fiscal revenue/debt of 280 per cent). For these criteria, NGOs recommended ratios 
of 150, 14 and 200 per cent respectively. In addition, the NGOs advocated the in-
clusion of a ‘vulnerability analysis’, a measurement of poverty or social develop-
ment of the country’s people, as an element of the debt sustainability assessment. 
What the NGOs witnessed was, however, that the creditors, instead, took what 
was intended to be a debt sustainability indicator as additional conditionality on 
the indebted government. Donors now claimed that the HIPCs needed to perform 
adequately not only with respect to structural and macro-economic criteria, but 
also with respect to social development and poverty reduction goals.368 
365 Abugre and Alexander (1998), p. 119.
366 World Bank (1999b), p. 1. Mallaby (2004), p. 105-115, 248-252, Wolfensohn (2005), p. 100-101, 208-212, 
312-321,  Abugre and Alexander (1998), p. 118.
367 Patomäki, Teivainen and Rönkkö (2002), p. 52. Abugre and Alexander (1998), p. 119.
368 Abugre and Lexander (1998), p. 119, Peet (2003), p. 93-100.
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At the Cologne G8 Summit of 1999 the major creditor countries called for a 
new approach, now called ‘Enhanced HIPC’ or ‘HIPC-II’.369 Critics again com-
mented, however, that this appeared to contain more of the same rather than a 
qualitatively different, new approach.370 
While the World Bank’s Operations Evaluation Department (OED)371 in 2003 
assessed the HIPC to have been “a major innovation in development finance that 
had given a fresh start to the world’s poorest countries, Eurodad still claimed that 
the ‘HIPC-bottle’ was’“half-empty’.372 The main problem in Eurodad’s view was 
that the HIPC-II Initiative did not go far enough in changing the poverty situa-
tion of HIPCs. The reason was that the HIPC-II did not take into consideration 
the resources these countries needed for poverty-reducing expenditures and for 
spurring growth: 
“The acknowledgement that debt sustainability should not only be judged on whether or not 
a country has the financial resources to service its debt, but also on the pressure that high 
levels of debt service can exert on other essential public expenditures such as health, educa-
tion, or environmental conservation, represents an important progress towards adopting 
a more comprehensive approach to debt problems… On the ground however, little change 
has been observed and debt sustainability is, in most cases - including the HIPC initiative, 
still being assessed according to narrow macro-economic criteria… It is perfectly possible, 
and indeed is currently the case, for a country or region to have a ‘sustainable debt’ (and 
significant debt servicing) according to [IMF’s macroeconomic criteria], while millions of 
people within the country are dying of hunger or disease.” 373
4.24 the StRAtegiC CompACt 
Back to April 1997: The Bank’s President Jim Wolfensohn portrayed the Strategic 
Compact as an agreement “…between the Bank and its shareholders: to invest now 
in order to deliver a fundamentally improved World Bank in the future – quicker, less 
bureaucratic, able to respond continuously to changing client demands (improved prod-
ucts) and global development opportunities, and more effective in achieving its main mis-
sion: reducing poverty.”374 Funded by a $250 million increase in the administrative 
budget over the three years reform period, after which the budget was supposed 
to return to 1997 levels.375 
369 Federal Ministry of Finance (of Germany) et al. (1999). Wolfensohn (2005), p. 326.
370 Eberlei and Unmuessig (1999), Patomäki, Teivainen and Rönkkö (2002), p. 52.
371 OED = Operations Evaluation Department. See HIPC in Websources. 
372 See See HIPC in Websources. 
373 Eurodad (2002). See also: Eurodad (2001).
374 World Bank (1997b), p. 1, Wolfensohn (2005), p. 85-86.
375 The budget included $100-$150 million earmarked for staff separations. It was assume, with little 
definitive planning that the sustainability of the Compact would be funded by savings generated from 
reduced overhead and simplified business procedures. See: World Bank (1997b), Annex 3.3. See also: 
Mallaby (2004), p. 162-170, Weaver and Leiteritz (2002), p. 15. 
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In explaining the rationale of the Strategic Compact to the Executive Board 
of the Bank, Wolfensohn mentioned the surging private capital flows to the de-
veloping countries and the declining support for official development aid. But he 
also mentioned the new broader development paradigm – with greater emphasis 
on local capacity and social, environmental and governance dimensions of de-
velopment. Wolfensohn also mentioned the powerful technological revolution 
that was facilitating access to knowledge - as a crucial factor for development 
and as a factor that had profound effects on how all organizations (including 
the World Bank) could do business: to be more competitive, faster, flatter in their 
structure, more networked and eager to partner, and more learning-oriented, 
with knowledge recognized as a key driver of effectiveness. World Bank had 
failed to keep up with these trends. As a result:
•	  Close to one third of Bank-supported projects had unsatisfactory outcomes (ac-
cording to the Bank’s own evaluations, the most influential of which had been 
the so called ‘Wapenhaas Report’ in 1992376);
•	  Demand for the Banks loan products was flat – with the Bank’s incomes on a 
declining path;
•	   Lack of professional expertise in the Bank in key areas (e.g. social and financial 
sectors);
•	  Clients (developing country governments) were complaining about the Bank’s 
slowness and standardized approach, with the effect that many potential part-
ners of the Bank had turned into its critics – culminating during the Bank’s 50th 
Anniversary – or perceived as competitors. 377 
Under the Strategic Compact, Wolfensohn proposed, a concerted effort would be 
made to renew the Bank in four mutually related priority areas: 
1)  Refuelling current business activity: moving away from ‘blueprint’ lending to more 
country-specific lending and advisory services, decentralizing Bank’s resources, 
staff and decision-making authority to ‘the front-line’ (i.e. to Bank’s country-
offices in the poor countries), as well as meeting the Bank’s commitments un-
der the HIPC initiative, etc.      
 
376 The report of the ‘Portfolio Management Task Force’, commissioned by then President Lewis 
Preston, and headed by the respected long-time senior manager of the Bank, Willi Wapenhaas, had 
uncovered shocking statistics with respect to the declining effectiveness of the Bank’s portfolio of 
past programmes and projects. Specifically, the report had found that the number of projects judged 
‘unsatisfactory at completion’ had increased from 15 % of the sample evaluated in 1981 to 30.5 in 
1989 and 37.5% in 1991. In a critical departure from previous portfolio evaluations, the Wapenhaas 
Report had looked past external factors such as poor macroeconomic policies and the volatility of 
oil prices and focused on the Bank-internal features undermining the organization’s realization of 
overall development objectives. At issue were such issues as the Bank’s over-reliance on universal, 
abstract development knowledge and ‘blueprint project models’. At the heart was the condemnation 
of the Bank’s organizational culture, specifically defined by the authors as a deeply embedded set of 
‘perverse incentive structures’ that created a ‘loan approval culture’ and ‘disbursement imperative. 
See e.g. Weaver and Leiteritz (2002), p. 12-13.
377 World Bank (1997b), p. ii. 
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2)  Refocusing the development agenda promised greater attention and investment in 
staff capacities in new or previously neglected sectors of multi-dimensional pov-
erty reduction, such as social and environmental sustainability, good governance 
and the role of the private sector. As a result, four new thematic networks were 
established between research, policy and operational units, centred on the areas 
of Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (ESSD), Human De-
velopment (HD), Finance and Private Sector Infrastructure (FPSI), and Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Managemenet (PREM). 
3)  Retooling the Bank’s knowledge base: Access to lessons learned and best practice was 
known to be an essential element of participatory democracy and key to devel-
opment effectiveness – and yet, the Bank’s knowledge was not readily available 
to those who needed it – inside or outside the Bank.378 To address this problem, 
Wolfensohn promised to turn the World Bank into a ‘Knowledge Bank’ by build-
ing “a world-class knowledge management system across the institution: to collect, syn-
thesize and disseminate knowledge, and make it more readily accessible to staff, clients 
and partners.”379
4)  Revamping institutional capabilities: The last pillar of the Strategic Compact was 
an ambitious architectural reform under a complex matrix management system 
meant to strengthen the Bank’s bureaucratic ability to address the first three re-
form components in a coherent manner. It focused first on integrating internal in-
formation systems to promote intra-organizational communication and second 
on realigning human resources toward new development agendas through staff 
turnover. It also promised to improve the weak areas of portfolio management, 
supervision, monitoring and evaluation. The implicit objective of this last initia-
tive was to address and disrupt the underlying ideologies, norms and routines that 
constituted the destructive culture of the ‘old’ Bank and create new incentive struc-
tures for the ‘new’ Bank.380
Although the terms ‘context-specificity’, ‘multi-dimensionality’, ‘coherence’ 
and ‘democratic principles’ were not explicitly used in the text of the Strategic 
Compact, it is easy to see that these ideas were as important pillars in the World 
Bank’s new approach to poverty-focused development work, as they were in the 
poverty reduction agendas of the UN and the OECD-DAC. 
On March 28, 1997, the Executive Board of the World Bank approved 
Wolfensohn’s request for authority to proceed with the implementation of the 
Strategic Compact, albeit at a revised (slower than originally planned) pace, at a 
total additional costs of $250 million over a four year period 1998-2001.381
The Strategic Compact has, in retrospect, been a vastly interesting process – 
and relatively successful, I would say. The official Bank proclaims that it has been 
378 In fact, most of the World Bank’s documents had over the years been treated as classified, and much 
of Bank’s analysis was not accessible to the other international development organisations, or even to 
the governments of those countries whom they concerned.
379 World Bank (1997b), p. 1, Wolfensohn (2005), p. 85-86.
380 World Bank (1997b), p. iii-iv. Weaver and Leiteritz (2002), p. 15-16.
381 World Bank (1997e), p. 1.
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a tremendous success. If you talk to Wolfensohn’s critics within the World Bank 
(there are many), the Strategic Compact ranks among his worst abominations.382 
An internal review conducted at the end of the reform process383 indicated a 
remarkable improvement in the quality of project design and implementation 
planning, with QAG384 evaluations showing a jump in ratings of project ‘quality-
at-entry’ from 78 % ‘satisfactory’ or better in 1996 to 89% in 1999. Likewise, OED385 
data on the outcome of existing project in 1999 indicated 77 % with satisfactory 
or higher ratings (up from 65% in 1993), with an even larger improvement in the 
quality of the Bank’s analytic and advisory work.386 Most importantly, the internal 
review found signs of a ‘new organisational culture’.
Already in the spring of 1998, just over a year after the launching of the 
Strategic Compact, the Bank’s external credibility had improved dramatically. 
The World Bank commissioned a follow-up study to the ‘Reputation Study’ con-
ducted in 1994. Like the previous one, also the 1998 study was an integrated, 
multi-country research study to examine the attitudes and perceptions about the 
Bank among the opinion leaders in the Bank’s primary constituencies in many 
(9) of its donor countries plus in the United Nations and the European Union.387 
The first, and perhaps most striking, difference between the 1998 study and 
the 1994 research was the degree to which the intellectual landscape had changed 
within a period of just four years, from an atmosphere of general scepticism 
toward public-sector-driven international development in general – and the role 
of the World Bank in particular – to a much more open, complex and inclusive 
approach to foreign assistance. The majority of the 1998 respondents had per-
ceived a movement away from the traditionally divergent mono-dimensional 
approaches to international development (i.e. a strict allegiance to either an es-
sentially public-sector or private-sector model) and toward the emergence of a 
much broader understanding of development (to include both an appreciation of 
the social, cultural and political dimensions of global and local economies), along 
with a complex, multi-sector approach to addressing global economic problems. 
Specifically, in contrast to the 1994 research, continental European respondents 
now demonstrated a much greater acceptance of the role of a strong private sec-
tor role in international development, while the majority of U.S., U.K. and private 
sector respondents had swung away from their exclusive confidence in the effec-
tiveness of the private sector to address global economic needs. Respondents in 
the latter group now recognized an important role for the state and other public-
sector institutions in international development.388
382 Mallaby (2004), p. 162.
383 Worldbank (2001d). See Strategic Compact in Websources. 
384 QAG = Bank’s internal Quality Assurance Group.
385 OED = the Bank’s internal Operations Evaluation Department. See: Operations Evaluation 
Department (2001). About the OED, See also:  Grasso, Wasty and Weaving  (eds.2003).
386 In the official jargon of the World Bank analytic and advisory work is called “non-lending economic 
and sector work”. See: Weaver and Leiteritz (2002), p. 17.
387 A.R.C. (1998). I was again one of the Finnish respondents.
388 A.R.C. (1998), p. 7-8.
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The World Bank’s World Development Report (WDR) 1997,389 which had had 
a special focus on ‘the role of state’ in development, had probably been instru-
mental in facilitating this shift in the latter group’s attitudes and opinions. It 
represented an almost 180-degree turnaround in the World Bank’s attitudes to-
wards the public sector’s role in development. Before 1997, during the ‘structural 
adjustment era’ of the 1980s and early 1990s, the Bank had been a strong advocate 
of the ‘minimalist approach to the  state’. The WDR-1997, however, explained why 
this extreme view was at odds with the evidence of the world’s development suc-
cess stories. The Foreword to the report, written for the Bank’s President James 
D. Wolfensohn by the Bank’s then new Chief Economist, the later Nobel Laureate 
Joseph Stiglitz emphasized that… 
“…development requires an effective state, one that plays a catalytic, facilitating role, en-
couraging and complementing the activities of private business and individuals…Good gov-
ernment is not a luxury, but a vital necessity. Without an effective state, sustainable develop-
ment, both economic and social, is impossible.”390 
Virtually all donor country respondents to the 1998 study reported that the Bank 
had significantly improved since the 1994 study. The Bank was now perceived 
as an institution driven by change. “James Wolfensohn is the best thing to happen to 
the Bank and millions of poor people around the world in a long time”, was the strong 
opinion of a Canadian respondent, and many respondents, in fact, made similar 
remarks: “One of the biggest positive changes is the new president’s focus on commu-
nications. He is the master of communications – great at thinking on his feet”, was a 
comment made by a United Nations representative.
Figure 10.  The World Bank – From a Marginal to a Mainstream Role 1994-1998391
389 World Bank (1997a).
390 World Bank (1997a), p. iii.
391 A.R.C. (1998), p. 8.
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In 1998 the issue was thus no longer whether or not the Bank should play an 
important role in international development, but the degree to which the tra-
ditional, economically driven model for development should continue to drive 
the Bank’s overall mission priorities and objectives. Using factor analysis, the 
researchers of the 1998 study identified a cluster of World Bank’s core mission 
priorities, which were consistently interrelated in the minds of the majority of 
respondents. 
Respondents from all regions and sectors consistently named poverty allevia-
tion as the primary mission priority of the Bank. In addition, the named priority 
goals also included sustainable development, seeking out partnerships (with poor 
country governments and with other donors) and post-conflict resolution. In 
combination, these core priorities were seen by the donor country opinion lead-
ers as important contributors to the Bank’s primary mission of poverty reduc-
tion. Additional Bank emphases – such as crisis management and private-sector 
development – fell far behind the core priorities and were largely perceived as 
contributing to the continuing overall confusion regarding the Bank’s primary 
commitments and appropriate role in international development. In short, the 
1998 research indicated that while respondents were open to complexity in their 
understanding of the Bank – “a multi-dimensional approach is at the heart of the new-
ly emerging model for international development”, as the researchers concluded – the 
respondents were not prepared to accept for the Bank disparate, non-integrated 
priorities which would duplicate the services of other development institutions 
and which would not conspicuously drive the Bank’s overall goal of poverty 
reduction.
4.25 A top-ClASS ghoSt WRiteR 
- NoBel-eCoNomiSt StiglitZ At the WoRlD BANK 
In February 1997 when President Jim Wolfensohn invited him to join the World 
Bank as Chief Economist, Joseph Stiglitz was already “one of the giant figures in 
economics of the last 50 years.”392 He had also become an enormously influential 
player in the making and evaluation of economic policy. He had served – first as a 
member and later as chairman with cabinet rank – in President Clinton’s Council 
of Economic Advisers.  Since the 1970s Stiglitz had been publishing on differ-
ent aspects economic development in a relatively independent and unorthodox 
392 As praised by a press release of the Columbia University. Professor Stiglitz had made seminal and 
fundamental contributions to every sub-field of economic theory – microeconomics, macroeconomics, 
industrial organization, international economics, labour economics, financial economics, and 
development economics. Professor Stiglitz had published more than 300 papers in the premier 
journals of the field, as well as a dozen books in a 35-year career. During his career, he had been a 
professor at Yale University, where he had been tenured at the unusually young age of 27, as well as 
Princeton, Oxford, and Stanford. He had become a Fellow of the Econometric Society at the age of 29 
and was a member of the National Academy of Science. Professor Stiglitz was also the recipient of the 
prestigious John Bates Clark Medal, awarded every two years to the American economist under the 
age of 40 who has made the most significant contributions to the subject. Stiglitz (2002), Chang (ed. 
2001). For more, see Stiglitz in Websources. 
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manner. Stiglitz grounds his analyses on a set of – what he (and I, too) believes 
to be more realistic – assumptions than economists usually do.393 In particular, 
he has promoted incorporation of time, imperfect information, the problems of 
moral hazard and adverse selection, and the costs of acquiring information, to 
economic theory. 
Two years in Kenya at the age of 26-28 years (in 1969-1971) had turned Stiglitz, 
a talented mathematically oriented American economist into an enthusiastic 
poverty economist: 
“Some of my most important theoretical work had been inspired by what I saw there. I 
knew the challenges facing Kenya were difficult, but I hoped that it might be possible to do 
something to improve the lives of the billions of people there and in the rest of the world who 
live in extreme poverty. Economics may seem like a dry, esoteric subject but, in fact, good 
economic policies have the power to change the lives of these poor people. I believe govern-
ments need to – and can – adopt policies that help countries grow but that also ensure that 
growth is shared more equitably.”394 
Stiglitz, too - like Sen – believed that poverty reduction is a multi-dimensional 
challenge. In his own words: 
“I had certain objectives in mind when I came to the World Bank. One of them was to 
change the thinking, both with respect to the objectives – broadening them from just growth 
to this more broad-based democratic and equitable sustainable development.”395 
Another objective Stiglitz had had in mind was to bring about a change in eco-
nomics. In his view the standard answers given by the ‘Washington Consensus’ (the 
hegemonic view among mainstream development economists during the 1980s 
and early 1990s) were either partial answers or actually wrong. “For example, hy-
per-inflation is a problem, but there is very little benefit of pushing inflation down below 
ten per cent, and if the cost is higher unemployment and social distress, then the cost is 
not worth the benefit”, Stiglitz explained in an interview in March 2000.396 
Particularly relevant for the next part of our story is Stiglitz’s third objective, 
which was to change the process of the development dialogue: 
393 However, as Patomäki, Teivainen and Rönkkö (2002, p. 73) rightly note, Stiglitz – unrealistically 
- continues to assume closed systems. He also bases his methodology on the so called ‘Ockham’s 
razor’ (on the positivist myth of simplicity), and is tied to a set of restrictive deductive-analytical 
possibilities. But it is nonetheless important that he argues that “the pseudo-scientific ‘as if –methodology’ 
by Friedman has been pushed too far”, referring to the conservative American ‘monetarist’ and ‘laissez-
faire’ economist Milton Friedman – meaning that assumptions have to be tested and realistic. See 
Stiglitz (1992), p. 276, 298. On Friedman, see e.g. Tomassin (n.d.), Herndon (1996). An interesting 
comparison with Stiglitz’s criticisms of economics is the much more thoroughly realist methodological 
criticism of economics by Lawson (1997). 
394 Stiglitz (2002), p. xi. See also: Stiglitz in Websources.
395 Stiglitz in an interview by the German D+C Development and Cooperation magazine in March 2000. 
See Stiglitz interview in Websources. On the other hand, in his Nobel autobiography Stiglitz writes 
about the time he joined the World Bank: “I had no strong agenda, other than doing what I could to promote 
the development of these countries, in ways which did as much as possible to eliminate poverty.” 
396 See: Stiglitz interview in Websources. See also Stiglitz (1998a) and Ambrose (1999). 
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“There was still the colonial mentality of the developed countries who were telling the rest 
of the countries what to do. This was just out of tune with where we ought to be. It was not 
the way people should treat each other and not the way you get effective development…Per-
sonally, I strongly believe in democratic processes and open debate. I also have very strong 
views about the role of the economist, which is not to tell governments what to do but to lay 
out the consequences of various courses of action and allow the country to make the deci-
sion. The old view was a very paternalistic one. It assumed that countries are not capable 
of taking decisions, that we have to decide, between us, what is the right thing for them.”397
4.26 the CompReheNSive DevelopmeNt FRAmeWoRK 
The message from the Bank’s shareholders was clear in the 1998 ‘Reputation 
Study’, and President Wolfensohn read it carefully. His response was the “Com-
prehensive Development Framework” (CDF) initiative.398 Wolfensohn first intro-
duced this approach in October 1998 in his speech to the World Bank/IMF annual 
meeting, which was held in the wake of the South-East Asian and Russian finan-
cial crises of 1997-98. In his speech, which was titled “The Other Crisis”,399 Wolfen-
sohn reminded his economist and banker colleagues, who were concerned about 
the potential effects that the financial crisis might have on the global financial 
architecture, that there was another crisis out there among the poor and newly im-
poverished communities of the world. (Over 20 million East Asians were estimat-
ed to have fallen back into poverty during 1997-1998 due to the financial turmoil.) 
“Today, while we talk of financial crisis – 17 million Indonesians have fallen back into pov-
erty, and across the region a million children will now not return to school. Today, while 
we talk of financial crisis – an estimated 40 percent of the Russian population now lives 
in poverty. Today, while we talk of financial crisis – across the world, 1.3 billion people 
live on less than $1 a day; 3 billion live on under $2 a day; 1.3 billion have no access to 
clean water; 3 billion have no access to sanitation…We must address this human pain. We 
must go beyond financial stabilization. We must address the issues of long-term equitable 
growth…We must focus on the institutional and structural changes needed for recovery 
and sustainable development. We must focus on the social issues.” 400
“…Financial plans alone are not sufficient…We have learned that when we ask govern-
ments to take the painful steps to put their economies in order we can create enormous 
tension. It is people not governments that feel pain…When we redress budget imbalances, 
we must recognize that programs to keep children in school may be lost, that programs to 
ensure health care for the poorest may be lost, that small and medium enterprises, which 
provide income to their owners and employment to many, may be starved of credit, and 
fail…We have learned, Mr. Chairman, that there is a need for balance. We must consider 
397 See Stiglitz interview in Websources.
398 Wolfensohn (1999). See also Comprehensive Development Framework CDF in Websources. 
399 Wolfensohn (1998). Wolfensohn (2005), p. 109-120. See also Wolfensohn – The Other Crisis in 
Websources.
400 Wolfensohn (1998), p. 2. Wolfensohn (2005), p. 110-112.
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the financial, the institutional, and the social, together. We must learn to have a debate 
where mathematics will not dominate humanity, where the need for often drastic change 
can be balanced with protecting the interests of the poor. Only then will we arrive at solu-
tions that are sustainable.”
Wolfensohn admitted that the notion that development involves a balanced eco-
nomic and social program was not revolutionary. “But the fact remains that it is not 
the approach that we in the international community have been taking”, Wolfensohn con-
fessed.401 Wolfensohn was right: this kind of thinking, indeed, was not new: it had 
been advocated in the past by many poverty economists and other poverty profes-
sionals in many parts of the world, e.g. Condorcet in France, List in Germany, Snell-
man and Kuusi in Finland, British Fabians, Nyerere in Tanzania, Myrdal for Sweden, 
USA, India and the rest of the world, and Sen, ul Haq, Somavia, Cornia, Jolly and 
Stewart at the UN-level, for the whole world. Just to name a few. There have been 
others. Wolfensohn’s ghost writer Stiglitz, however, knew that this was not exactly 
the way of thinking the mainstream economists were used to. He added, therefore:
“Too often we have focused too much on the economics, without a sufficient understanding 
of the social, the political, the environmental, and the cultural aspects of society…We have 
not thought adequately about the overall structure that is required in a country to allow it 
to develop in an integrated fashion into the type of economy that is chosen by its people and 
its leadership. We have not thought sufficiently about the vulnerabilities - those parts of an 
economy that can bring all the building blocks tumbling down. Or about sustainability - 
what it takes to make social and economic transformation last. Without that, we may build 
a new international financial architecture. But it will be a house built on sand.”402 
A new development framework – a Comprehensive Development Framework 
(CDF) - was needed, Wolfensohn suggested in his speech in October 1998. A 
framework with five pillars: 
(1) good governance;                                                                                                                          
(2) regulatory and institutional fundamentals of a workable market economy
(a legal and tax system, property rights, competition policies, an effi-
cient judiciary, a transparent financial system and internationally 
recognized accountancy and auditing standards);
(3) policies for inclusion: education for all (especially women and girls), 
health care, social protection for the unemployed, elderly, and people 
with disabilities, early childhood development, mother-and-child clinics,                          
(4) public services and infrastructure necessary for communication 
as well as urban and agricultural development, and                                                                                                            
(5) environmental and human sustainability, including water, energy and 
food security.403
401 Wolfensohn (1998), p. 6. Wolfensohn (2005), p. 115.
402 Wolfensohn (1998), p. 6-7. Wolfensohn (2005), p. 115.
403 Wolfensohn (1998), p. 7-8. Wolfensohn (2005), p. 116.
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The essential point in Wolfensohn’s CDF-proposal was the idea that the com-
prehensive development framework would be an overarching, holistic approach 
for a 10-20 year timeframe, agreed with – and owned by - the government concerned 
which would allow all development partners, i.e. the UN-system, the develop-
ment banks and the bilateral aid donors, to work together to meet the shared goals 
of poverty reduction and environmental sustainability.404 What are the basic struc-
tural, social, and human prerequisites that should balance the macro-economic 
considerations? Wolfensohn suggested a list of 14 essential elements of a CDF:
Table 4. The 14 Essential Elements of a Comprehensive Development Framework405
A. Structural Requirements
(1) Good and clean gov-
ernment
•	 Capacity building; 
•	 An open legislative and transparent regulatory system; 
•	 Properly trained and remunerated officials; 
•	 Leadership and officials committed to clean government.
(2) An effective legal and 
justice system
•	 Protection of human and property rights; 
•	 A comprehensive framework of laws and systems for prop-
erty, contract, labour, bankruptcy, commercial codes and 
personal rights 
•	 Well-functioning, impartial and honest judicial and legal 
system
(3) A well-organized 
and supervised financial 
system
•	 A well organised, trained, audited, supervised and interna-
tionally accepted system for banks, financial institutions and 
capital markets; 
(4) A social safety net 
and social programs
•	 Provision for the elderly, the disadvantaged and disabled, 
for children, the unemployed, and for those affected by 
natural disasters, war, or economic disasters. Special pro-
grammes for the indigenous peoples.
•	 By government-provided programmes, or by informal ar-
rangements, familial or tribal support
•	 Employment opportunities and the terms of employment 
are crucial. So is balance in macro-economy.                                         
B. human Requirements
(5) Education and 
knowledge institutions
•	 Universal primary education for girls and boys
•	 An open and competitive system of secondary and tertiary 
education.
•	 Construction of schools, modern curricula, real needs of the 
local market, teacher training.
•	 Adult education, literacy and lifelong learning: especially for 
women and girls. Indigenous people.
•	 Pre-school education
•	 Science, technology and knowledge transfer.
404 Wolfensohn (1999), p. 3-4.
405 Matrix developed by the author, on the basis of Wolfensohn (1999), p. 4-8.
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(6) Health and 
population issues
•	 Mother-and-child health care, family health care, family 
planning. 
•	 Communal and local services. Specialized services on 
regional or national basis.
•	 TB, malaria and AIDS
C. physical Requirements
(7) Water and sewerage •	 Distribution, delivery, finding and saving water
•	 Sewerage, pollution and health
•	 Regional aspects of water
(8) Energy •	 Wood and fossil fuels – health/breathing problems
•	 Time savings for women
•	 Environmental impacts
(9) Roads, transportation 
and telecommunications
•	 Adequate roads system makes trade and services, incl. 
health possible
•	 Trunk roads, rail and air transport: key to growth and link to 
regional and international markets
•	 Telecommunications for trade, information and education: 
telephone, e-mail, computers, radios
(10) Sustainable 
development, 
environment and cultural 
issues
•	 Pollution can kill people and economic activities
•	 Forest, aquifer, water, air and biodiversity protection
•	 Cultural preservation: historic sites, artefacts, books, but 
also the spoken word and the arts.
•	 Culture is not a luxury. It can be justified for tourism, industry 
and employment, but also in preserving and enhancing 
national pride and spirit.
D. Specific strategies Requirements
(11) Rural strategy •	 Most of the poor live in rural areas
•	 Not only new crops and agricultural extension. Also 
needed are: provision of non-monopolistic trading, 
micro-credit, storage and transportation outlets.
•	 Technical assistance to farmers and processors
•	 Integrated action, but without complex comprehensive 
state planning
(12) Urban strategy •	 Special and unique problems of mega-cities require 
appropriate action in urban planning
(13) Private sector 
strategy
•	 Private sector (domestic and foreign), as the engine of 
growth, requires structural policies, incl. trade policy, 
tax policies, competition and regulatory policy, and 
corporate governance
•	 Conditions must be created for a climate of investor 
confidence – with appropriate laws, transparent 
regulations, and predictable taxes. “Rules of the game” 
must be clear, incl. property rights, fair and equitable 
labour practices. 
•	 Provision of credit, guarantees, sources of project 
funding.
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(11) Rural strategy •	 Most of the poor live in rural areas
•	 Not only new crops and agricultural extension. Also 
needed are: provision of non-monopolistic trading, 
micro-credit, storage and transportation outlets.
•	 Technical assistance to farmers and processors
•	 Integrated action, but without complex comprehensive 
state planning
(14) Special national 
considerations
•	 Included to provide flexibility for special considerations 
depending on the country or the region
•	 E.g. in Bolivia: An Anti-Cocaine Production Strategy
Note that in Box 10 of Table 4 Wolfensohn is talking about “the National Spirit”, 
pretty much in the same way as e.g. Herder, Hegel and Snellman did 150 years 
ago. ‘The Spirit’ (‘Geist’) of the Time and of the Nation is an idea that originat-
ed from German thinkers such as Kant, Herder and Hegel. The reason I take it 
up here is that the idea of the national ‘Geist’ is in my view one of the seriously 
neglected and underestimated factors in mainstream economic explanations of 
development and poverty reduction. Patriotism and nationalism have definitely 
led to unfortunate fundamentalism and extremism in some few cases, but much 
more often – I would claim – in the history of nations, they have been important 
positive motivational factors in the successful poverty reduction efforts of many 
countries of the world. The broadly shared feeling of the national spirit played a 
fundamentally important part, for instance, in the emergence and growth of the 
Finnish national liberation, independence and nation-building movement. Reduc-
tion of the poverty of the masses was considered both a means and an important 
intrinsic goal of that movement. 
Wolfensohn made the CDF into a ‘framework’, i.e. a matrix, by including an-
other axis where he identified all the main ‘players’ in the society, e.g.: (a) Gov-
ernment: national (incl. Parliament), provincial, local, (b) Donors: multi- and bi-
lateral, incl. financial institututions, (c) Private Sector, (d) Civil Society. The CDF 
was not intended to be a rigid scheme designed in Washington, and imposed 
on a country from outside without adaptation to local conditions. In order to 
show this Wolfensohn included in his draft proposal a country-specific CDF for 
Bolivia, where the headings of the matrix fields had been changed to suit better 
the Bolivian reality. The principle was nevertheless the same: a comprehensive 
picture of a country’s situation and main players in one glance. 
The basic elements of the CDF were not new. What was new was their joint 
articulation as a framework to guide development assistance. At a closer look, the 
distinguishing features of the Comprehensive Development Framework were 
the following: 
•	 Development concerns are ‘structural’ and ‘social’. A development strategy, 
therefore, has to incorporate not only the dimensions of short-term economic ad-
justment but also a holistic long-term vision on governance and human and so-
cial dimensions.       
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•	 Policy reform and institutional development cannot be imported or imposed. 
‘Ownership’ is key. The country has to be in the ‘driver’s seat’406 in formulating 
and implementing its development strategy. Because a country is more than its 
government, a country-led strategy has to involve all the ‘stakeholders’, includ-
ing the private sector and civil society.407
•	 Successful development requires ‘partnerships’ among government, local com-
munities, the private sector, civil society, and development agencies. Donors and 
multilateral institutions are only part of the development assistance community, 
and they should concentrate on their areas of comparative advantage in partner-
ship with the country.            
•	 Development activities must be guided and judged by ‘results’, i.e. by progress 
on the bottom line of poverty reduction and sustainable growth rather than pro-
gress on investment (as in the planning era of development in the 1960s and 
1970s) or on compliance with market-driven policy conditionality (as in the 
structural adjustment era in the 1980s and early 1990s).408 
From the points of view of the UN, the DAC, most development NGOs and most 
social scientists, Wolfensohn’s CDF proposal was a great victory. At last the World 
Bank, the world’s strongest development policy trend-setter and an institution 
with ten thousand economists seemed to understand that development cannot be 
measured and assessed in terms of dollars only. Instead, one must have a grasp of 
the inter-relationships of physical and non-physical - and country-specific – fac-
tors, and different institutions and people in order to realize how development 
- i.e. change to the better - can be achieved as a result of a balance of these many 
different factors. 
The link to the main narrative of my essay is this: The CDF was the World 
Bank’s version of the intellectual shift of the poverty reduction agenda towards: 
(a) context-specificity, (b) multi-dimensionality, (c) coherence, (d) democratic princi-
ples. Wolfensohn’s CDF meant great progress in the ideational realm. Unfortunately, 
in the institutional and identity-related realms, the World Bank’s poverty economists 
have since then had non-insignificant problems in operationalizing the CDF-ideas.
406 When talking about the need of country ‘ownership’, Wolfensohn indeed used this metaphor 
(“Countries must be in the driver’s seat”) that had been previously used by the Nordic governments 
and Gerry Helleiner in 1995, 1996 and 1997 when talking about the new development partnership 
they were proposing to be established between the Government of Tanzania and its Nordic donors. 
In Voipio and Hoebink (1999) I commented that the literary meaning of this metaphor was probably 
rather inappropriate to be used in reference to sustainable poverty reduction of poor countries such as 
Tanzania or Bolivia, who could hardly afford to, and should - for ecological reasons - probably not be 
encouraged to think that getting into the driver’s seat (of a private motorized 4WD vehicle) would be 
an appropriate goal of the poverty reduction efforts. I suggested that for most of the poor Tanzanians, 
to get access to the reins of an ox-cart would probably be (ecologically, economically and historically) 
a more realistic target. To say so without sounding arrogant, of course, requires an additional sentence 
or two: We in the rich world also have to be prepared to conceive – and to build - a future without 
complete reliance on private vehicle usage. This requires systematic investments into the development 
of attractive and competitive public transport systems, in the rich as well as the poorer societies. See 
Voipio and Hoebink (1999), p. 45. See also: Agreed notes, Nordic-Tanzania (1996) and Helleiner (1995, 
1997). See also Helleiner (2000, 2001). 
407 This dimension was largely absent from the government-led strategies of the 1950s and 1960s. 
408 See e.g. Maxwell and Conway (2000), p.vii; Hanna and Agarwala (2000), p. 9.
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In some ways Wolfensohn’s Comprehensive Development Framework was 
also worrisome: It raised the question: “Why did we have to wait for Jim Wolfen-
sohn (and Joseph Stiglitz)?” Hadn’t any of the World Bank’s ten thousand econo-
mists ever before understood the concepts that Wolfensohn now presented as a 
‘new dimension’? I would imagine that undergraduate courses in sociology or 
economic and social history might have provided a sufficient base for this ’dis-
covery’. Why aren’t development agencies learning? Why did the World Bank 
do things ‘wrong’ for 50 years before Jim Wolfensohn came along and said how 
things could be done ‘right’?  
4.27 pRSp – opeRAtioNAliZiNg the hipC-
iNitiAtive, the S21, AND the CDF 
The operational expression of the new thinking that informed the Comprehen-
sive Development Framework (CDF) – and that was also in line with the bilateral 
donors’ new joint aid strategy (‘S21’)409 - was to be called the “Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper Approach”, or “PRSP-Approach”, in short. The PRSP-approach was, 
in essence, a response to the criticisms410 about conditionality: Instead of impos-
ing conditionality on poor country governments from the outside, conditionality 
– or better still: ‘performance orientation’ and ‘budget discipline’ – had better be 
based on a national consensus strategy that the Government, Parliament, enter-
prises, trade unions and other citizens of the poor countries would identify and 
feel as their ‘own’.411  
At the Joint Annual Meeting of the World Bank and the International Mon-
etary Fund (IMF) held in September 1999,412 it was decided that each low-income 
developing country would be requested to prepare a national ‘Poverty Reduc-
tion Strategy Paper’ (PRSP), which would serve as means to obtaining informa-
tion needed for decisions concerning application of the HIPC debt relief initia-
tive and World Bank loans.413 
The PRSP was to be a three-year socio-economic development strategy that 
focuses on poverty reduction. It is prepared by the national government, with 
the participation of a variety of domestic and international development part-
ners, in line with the participatory principles underpinning the CDF-approach. 
‘Country ownership’ is thus a key principle in the PRSP-approach, although 
409 OECD-DAC (1996).
410 E.g. Killick et al. (1998). See also: Killick (2004). 
411 The Finnish government – rather successfully – based its comprehensive package of economic 
and social policies in the 1970s on a similar national consensus-building process (‘Korpilampi’), 
with broad participation from all sectors of the government, together with the opposition parties, 
labour unions, the employers’ representatives and key groups of the civil society. See: Saari (2010).
412 The PRSP-approach was officially approved by the Boards of the IMF and the World Bank in 
December 1999.
413 IDA loans, to be specific. (IDA = International Development Association, i.e. the “soft loan window” 
of the World Bank that provides concessional credits to low-income countries.) See: JICA (2001), p. iv.
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many civil society observers414 have felt that this principle has been seriously 
undermined by the requirement that the PRSPs have to be approved by the 
boards of the IMF and the World Bank in Washington D.C. This rule is related 
to the original role of the PRSPs, which were initially needed as documents 
that the IMF and the Bank could use to justify the cancellation of debts owed 
to them by the HIPCs.415 
When a PRSP is presented by a government to the Executive Boards of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, it has to be accompanied by 
an assessment of that strategy by Bank and Fund staff. The ‘Joint Staff Assess-
ment’ (JSA) makes an overall assessment for the Boards as to whether or not 
the strategy presented in the PRSP constitutes a sound basis for concessional 
assistance from the Fund and the Bank. A positive assessment does not neces-
sarily indicate that the staff members agree with all of the analysis, targets, or 
public actions set forth in the PRSP, or consider that the PRSP represents the 
best possible strategy for the country. Rather, it indicates that the staff consid-
ers that the strategy provides a credible framework within which the Bank and 
the Fund can design their programmes of concessional assistance, including 
debt relief.416
According to the ‘official’ World Bank guidance417 a PRSP was expected to be: 
•	  country-driven and owned, based on broad based participatory processes for for-
mulation, implementation and outcome-based progress monitoring;
•	  results-oriented, focusing on outcomes that would benefit the poor;
•	  comprehensive in scope, recognizing the multidimensional nature of the causes of 
poverty and measures to attack it;
•	  partnership-oriented, providing a basis for the active, coordinated participation of 
development partners (bilateral, multilateral, non-governmental) in supporting 
country strategies;
•	  long-term: Based on a medium and long term perspective for poverty reduction, 
recognizing that sustained poverty reduction cannot be achieved overnight.
All countries receiving HIPC debt relief, and all countries in which an IMF ‘Pov-
erty Reduction and Growth Facility’ (PRGF)418 is in place or programmed, need 
414 See e.g. Pan-African Declaration (2001), Action Aid (2002), Catholic Relief Services (2001), 
EURODAD (2001b), ICFTU (2001), JDRAD (2000), Jubilee South (2001), North-South Coalition/IBIS 
(2001), Oxfam (2001), Uganda National NGO Forum (2002), World Confederation of Labor WCL 
(2002), World Development Movement (2000, 2001), World Vision (2000). 
415 HIPC = Highly Indebted Poor Country. 
416 The World Bank and the IMF have tried – in vain - to explain that officially a PRSP does not 
need to be “approved” by the World Bank and the IMF. The role of the IMF/World Bank ‘Joint Staff 
Assesment’ (JSA) of the PRSPs is only to assess “whether the PRSP forms a credible basis for the Bank’s and 
the Fund’s lending programmes” in the country concerned. In reality, this is ‘whitewashing’, since every 
poor country government very well knows that practically all foreign ODA-funding to support the 
implementation of their PRSP is conditional on the PRSP getting an ‘approval’ from the Washington-
based financial institutions, i.e. the IMF and the World Bank.
417 I.e. the ‘Draft PRSP-Sourcebook’. See: Klugman (2001), p. 3. World Bank (2001h/Overview). 
418 PRGF = Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility is the new name for the IMF’s credit package, i.e. 
what used to be called ‘Economic and Structural Adjustment Fund’ (ESAF) during the era of Structural 
Adjustment Programmes.
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to have Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers endorsed by the Boards of the Bank 
and Fund. The same expectation applies to all ‘IDA countries’, i.e. 81 low-income 
countries that are eligible for soft loans from the World Bank’s International De-
velopment Association (IDA). 
It was expected by the Bank and the IMF that the PRSP would be prepared 
through broad-based consultations on priorities and problems…
•	  within government (various ministries, parliament, and local governments); 
•	  with other national stakeholders, such as e.g. civil society groups, women’s 
groups, ethnic minorities, policy research institutes and academics, private sec-
tor, trade unions, and representatives of the different regions of the country;
•	  with bilateral and multilateral external development partners;
•	  with the poor people and their representatives.419   
The challenge to produce a national PRSP was relatively much easier for those 
countries – e.g. Tanzania and Uganda – that had already between the Copenhagen 
Social Summit and the PRSP-Initiative received support from the UNDP for pre-
paring their national ‘National Poverty Eradication Strategies’ (NPESs).420 While 
many countries had to start the drafting of their PRSPs from the scratch, for in-
stance for Tanzania and Uganda it was primarily an editing challenge. 
It was recognized by the Bank and the Fund that the preparation of country-
owned, participatory PRSPs could take up to two years. In order not to delay 
progress in providing concessional assistance or HIPC debt relief, countries were 
given an opportunity to prepare ‘Interim PRSPs’ (I-PRSPs). I-PRSPs were expect-
ed, at a minimum, to include a statement or commitment to poverty reduction, 
an outline of the nature of the poverty problem in the country and of the existing 
government strategies to tackle it, and a timeline and a process plan for prepar-
ing a ‘Full PRSP’, together with a tentative three year policy matrix and macro-
economic framework.421
While the shift to country-ownership was expected to allow substantially 
more leeway for the poor country governments in terms of policy design and 
choices than ever before, five basic elements of a full PRSP were required by the 
Bank and the Fund. These have since constituted the standard elements – and 
Table of Contents – of PRSPs in almost all IDA-eligible countries: 
1. an assessment of poverty and its key determinants in the country;
2. setting targets for poverty reduction;
3. prioritising public actions for poverty reduction;
4. establishing systematic monitoring of poverty trends, and evaluating the im-
pact of government programmes and policies; and
5. a description of the main aspects of the participatory process of designing 
and implementing the PRSP.422
419 Klugman (2001), p. 6. World Bank (2001h/Overview). 
420 See e.g. Voipio and Hoebink (1999). 
421 Klugman (2001), p. 3. World Bank (2001h/Overview). 
422 Klugman (2001), p. 3-4. World Bank (2001h/Overview). 
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It was considered important by the Bretton Woods institutions that the PRSP 
would build on and provide consistency with other current government docu-
ments that set forth national or sectoral development plans and/or budgets. Based 
on the PRSP, the developing country was expected to prepare a ‘Medium Term 
Expenditure Framework’ (MTEF), i.e. a medium-term government fiscal plan.423
Most bilateral and multilateral donors (including Finland) have since then 
indicated their approval of the PRSP principles, and have increasingly sought 
to coordinate their own activities and procedures with it. Once the PRSP is 
prepared by the developing country with the participation of its development 
partners, it is used to clarify the comparative advantages of the donor agencies 
involved and to propose how they should support the developing country con-
cerned in its poverty reduction efforts. 
4.28 DeSigN oF the WoRlD BANK’S ‘OFFICIAL TRUTH’ 
ABout poveRtY ReDuCtioN 
 
One of the real cases where Chief Economist Stiglitz felt he could change the 
process of the development dialogue was the drafting of the World Bank’s next 
‘Official Truth about Poverty Reduction’ i.e. the World Development Report 2000, 
which was to have a special focus on poverty reduction.  Within the World Bank 
there had been a tradition to publish once in every ten years a special volume 
of the Bank’s ‘flagship’ publication, World Development Report (WDR), which 
would contain the ‘politically correct’ approach to reducing poverty for the next 
decade or so. The changes in the ‘Global Official Wisdom on Poverty Reduction’ 
are well documented in the World Development Reports (WDRs) 1980, 1990 and 
2000.424 
Previously the World Development Reports had been written by dedicated 
teams of experts, primarily from within the World Bank, sometimes supported 
by some leading Anglo-American academic economists working closely with the 
World Bank. In the case of WDR-2000 on ‘Attacking Poverty’ Stiglitz wanted not 
only its contents but also the process of report preparation to reflect the principles 
he valued: democracy, openness and participation. Stiglitz recruited Professor Ravi 
Kanbur, a widely respected economist, famous inequality researcher, and for-
mer World Bank senior official,425 to head the drafting team,426 and agreed with 
423 JICA (2001), p. 1. 
424 World Bank (1980, 1990, 2001a).
425 Ravi Kanbur, a UK citizen and professor of economics at Cornell University, was a World Bank 
staff member from 1989 to 1997, serving successively (and successfully) as Adviser, Senior Adviser, 
Resident Representative in Ghana, Chief Economist for Africa, and Principal Adviser to the Chief 
Economist. For more about Kanbur, see Kanbur in Websources.
426 The other members of the WDR-2000 team were Nora Lustig, Monica Das Gupta, Christian 
Grootaert, Victoria Kwakwa, Christina Malmberg Calvo, Kevin Morrison, Alice Sindzingre, Michael 
Woolcock and Zainal Yusof. The work was carried under the general direction of Jozef Ritzen and 
Joseph E. Stiglitz and, in the final stages, Nicholas Stern. Amartya Sen is acknowledged as one of the 
persons who advised the team. World Bank (2001a), p. vii. For a well-informed, but critical insider’s 
view, see Sindzingre (2004).
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Kanbur that the drafting process of the WDR-2000 would be used as a vehicle 
for broadly participatory dialogues with the World Bank’s external constituencies 
all around the world, as well as a focal point of dialogue within the Bank itself. 
Building on the encouragement of Stiglitz and the Bank’s President Wolfensohn, 
the WDR-2001/1 team headed by Kanbur adopted a philosophy and stance of 
open and continuous consultation, aimed at making the drafting process as par-
ticipatory as possible.
The first draft outline of the report was posted on the World Bank’s internet 
page and interested persons from all over the world were invited to comment 
and contribute their views to the process.427 The Drafting Team held numerous 
consultations with various categories of experts in various countries of the world, 
and commissioned the largest ever participatory study of poor people’s views 
on poverty.  The ‘Voices of the Poor´ study428 that was conducted as background 
of the WDR-2000 asked more than 60.000 men and women living in poverty in 
60 countries to analyze and share their ideas of well-being (a good experience of 
life) and ‘ill-being’ (a bad experience of life). Well-being was variously described 
as happiness, harmony, peace, freedom from anxiety, and peace of mind. People 
described ill-being as lack of material things, as bad experiences, and as bad feel-
ings about oneself. Although the nature of ill-being and poverty varied among 
locations and people – something that policy responses must take into account 
– there was a striking commonality across countries. Alongside the material, 
physical (health-related) well-being featured prominently in the characterization 
of poverty. And the two meld together when lack of food leads to ill health – or 
when ill health leads to an inability to earn income. Security of income was also 
closely tied to health. But insecurity extended beyond ill health. Crime and vio-
lence were often mentioned by poor people, as well as insecurity of rainfall. For 
many poor people, well-being meant the freedom of choice and action and the 
power to control one’s life. As an old woman said: 
“To be well means to see your grand-children happy and well dressed and to know that your 
children have settled down: to be able to give them food and money whenever they come to 
see you, and not to ask them for help and money.”429
427 Of course, this opportunity was available only to those who had access to the internet. 
428 The ‘Voices of the Poor’ –study in fact consisted of three large, inter-connected research efforts, 
each reported in a separate book: (a) The first book, ‘Can Anyone Hear Us?’ (Narayan et al. 2000a) 
gathered the voices of over 40.000 poor women and men in 50 countries from the World Bank’s 
‘participatory poverty assessments’ conducted during the 1990s. (b) The second book, ‘Crying Out for 
Change’ (Narayan et al. 2000b) drew comparable material from a new set of 23 participatory country 
studies. The final book, ‘From Many Lands’ (Narayan and Petesch 2002), offered regional patterns 
and country case studies. All the three studies were coordinated by Deepa Narayan, the principal 
social development specialist for the World Bank’s Poverty Group.  For more on the ‘Voices of the 
Poor’ –study, see section 6.5. of this book.
429 Narayan et al. (2000a and 2000b). Also cited in World Bank (2001a), p. 16. 
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5 From Consensus to 
Conflicts – The World Bank 
and Poverty Economics
5.1 empoWeRmeNt, SeCuRitY, oppoRtuNitY AND 
iNteRNAtioNAl ACtioN 
In contrast to the World Bank’s previous predominantly ‘money-metric’, growth-
centred poverty reduction strategies,430 the ‘Human Development Reports’431 pub-
lished by the UNDP annually in the 1990s had been instrumental in facilitating a 
global consensus on the multi-dimensionality of poverty - and standard of living. 
As the ‘Voices of the Poor’ -study and other participatory field work among the 
poor had taught, in discussing poverty and inequality, alongside the standard 
measures based on the levels of income, consumption, health and education, had 
to be put other measures which reflect such dimensions as vulnerability and risk, 
powerlessness, crime and violence, social exclusion/inclusion, and other factors high-
lighted by the poor themselves as being important. Hence the need to go below 
the levels of the national economy and the household to investigate the conditions 
facing the various geographical areas and social segments of the population, and 
the various individuals within the household, respectively.432 
Recent trends in the evolution of trade, technology, and political systems had 
also created great opportunities for improvements in welfare around the world. 
The challenge emerging for the first decade of the next Millennium was defined 
in 1998 by Professor Ravi Kanbur, the original director of the World Bank team 
preparing the Bank’s World Development Report 2000’ on the theme of ‘Attacking 
Poverty ’ as follows: 
“The key issue for the early part of the next century is how to bridge this gap between 
opportunity and risk.” 433
This realization was the ’loom’ upon which Kanbur started to weave the 
Bank’s first ‘Official Truth about Poverty” of the 3rd Millennium. According to 
Kanbur, the challenge for policy makers was the design and implementation of 
430 See: World Bank (1980, 1990). 
431 UNDP (1990-1999). See also: Chambers (1995, 1997).
432 World Bank (1998d), p.1.
433 World Bank (1998d), p.2. See also Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999, p.44)
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institutions, mechanisms and policies ‘coherently’ at various levels to harness 
the potential for poverty reduction, by setting a long term course which would 
access global and local opportunity but allow broad sharing of the gains from 
development, while managing the short term risks of inequality, vulnerability, 
marginalization and social dissolution. 
The early drafts of the WDR-2000 published by Kanbur’s team in 1999434 intro-
duced a new ‘best practice’ approach that suggested a global attack on poverty 
on three fronts: 
(i)    ensuring empowerment of the poor by increasing their voice and partici-
  pation in decision making, and managing the growth of inequalities; 
(ii)   providing security against shocks at the individual and national levels, 
  and for those left behind by rapid change; 
(iii)  creating opportunity for the poor by putting in place the conditions for 
  sustainable economic expansion, to provide the material basis for po-      
  verty reduction. 
Figure 11. The World Bank Poverty Reduction Strategy, Draft 1999
In addition, the World Bank outline for WDR-2000 suggested a fourth front - 
‘International Action’ (Global Governance)  - where action would also be needed 
to achieve the objectives set for poverty reduction.  This was remarkable: always 
before the World Bank poverty economists’ analysis of the poverty problems 
had been confined to individual poor ‘nation states’, or (national) ‘economies’.435 
Now the Bank suggested that also international mechanisms were needed to ex-
pand ‘market access’ in rich countries for poor countries’ goods and services, as 
well as to protect the poor countries and people from the volatility of the global 
forces of trade and capital flows. ‘Pro-poorness’ along the international dimen-
sion would also require provision of international debt relief, ensuring ‘a voice’ 
for poor countries and poor people in global negotiation forums, and provision of 
434 World Bank (1998d, 1999c).
435 The ‘economistic’ language of economists has its own term, ‘an economy’ for the unit that all other 
people call ‘a society’ or ‘a country’. 
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‘international public goods’ (IPGs)436 that benefit poor people, such as for instance 
better global control of communicable diseases (e.g. vaccinations) or research to 
raise yields in tropical agriculture, as well as increasing efficiency in the utilisa-
tion of international aid resources.437
5.2 poWeRleSSNeSS, pARtiCipAtioN AND ‘voiCe’
The drafting team of the WDR-2000 took a ‘Sen’ian’ or ‘Chambers’ian’438 (partici-
patory and anthropologically sensitive) look at the realities of life of poor people. 
For many poor people, well-being means the freedom of choice and action and 
the power to control one’s life. Those materially deprived often feel acutely their 
lack of ‘voice’, power, and independence. Threats of physical force or arbitrary 
bureaucratic power make it difficult for the poor to engage in public affairs, to 
make their interests known, and to have them taken into account. This helpless-
ness subjects them to rudeness, humiliation, shame, inhumane treatment, and 
exploitation at the hands of the institutions of state and society. Poor people hun-
ger for institutions that are fair, polite, honest, listening, trustworthy, and neither 
corrupt nor corrupting. 
Social norms and barriers can also contribute to voicelessness and powerless-
ness. While local cultures have intrinsic value, they can sometimes be inimical 
to reducing human deprivation. In many agrarian societies poor people’s lack of 
assets and income-earning opportunities ties them to rich land-owners in patron-
client relationships. Pervasive in almost all societies is inequality between men 
and women. Poor women are discriminated against in the household and in land, 
labour, and credit markets. Lack of savings and assets precludes a more inde-
pendent role for women in decision-making in the household and the community. 
This both causes poverty and undercuts development – for women’s agency is a 
powerful source of human gains, especially for children. Discrimination based 
on ethnicity, religious beliefs, social status, and race has similar effects. 
The genuine and serious attention given by the drafting team of the WDR-
2000 to the real life experiences, voices and views of poor people in various parts 
436 A key characteristic of public goods is the difficulty of restricting people from consuming them 
without paying, i.e. ‘free-riding’, once those goods have been produced. This characteristic means 
that if production of public goods were left to the market, there would be an under-supply unless 
the government stepped in to produce the goods or to provide incentives (such as subsidies) for their 
production. National governments have long intervened in this way, providing such national public 
goods as defence, infrastructure, law and order, and rules and standards. The problem is more complex 
for international public goods, because there is no world government to help spur the production of 
these goods – countries therefore must decide to cooperate to produce them. For instance malaria, 
tuberculosis and AIDS cause 5 million deaths a year – about 9 per cent of all deaths in the world, and 
most of them in the poor countries – but the international pharmaceutical companies have not had 
sufficient incentives to produce affordable vaccinations and curative drugs for these killer diseases, 
because they judge that the purchasing power of the poor people in poor countries would be too 
low for the companies to make profits over the costs of research and development work required to 
produce those vaccines or drugs. See: World Bank (2001a), p. 181-183.
437 For an interesting discussion on the ‘international dimension’ of pro-poor public action, see: World 
Bank (2001a), p. 179-204.
438 Referring to Amartya Sen and Robert Chambers.
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of the world led them to suggest that ‘empowerment’ should be conceived as the 
Number One pillar of the poverty reduction strategies of the 3rd Millennium. 
Empowerment means enhancing the power and capacity of poor people to influ-
ence the state institutions that affect their lives, by strengthening their participa-
tion in political processes and local decision-making. And it means removing 
the barriers – political, legal, social and cultural – that work against particular 
groups and building the assets of poor people to enable them to engage effec-
tively in markets.439 
Kanbur referred to the ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’ (CDF) as an 
approach that emphasized a wide range of closely interconnected issues that have 
to be addressed in any country simultaneously to achieve significant progress 
in poverty reduction and development. The CDF also emphasized the partner-
ships necessary between the government, the private sector, civil society and the 
international community. Its philosophy was one of the primacy of local context-
specific realities and conditions in arriving at a strategy and in formulating and 
undertaking specific interventions. Broad based local ownership of the strategy was 
key to success in this perspective. 
5.3 the ChAlleNgeS oF iNeQuAlitieS, RiSKS AND 
SuStAiNABle expANSioN 
But a question still remained: How was one to compare different proposals and 
different ‘comprehensive’ packages for poverty reduction within a country? What 
analysis needs to be conducted to compare two different approaches proposed for 
a country? And how should one diagnose the country’s situation without falling 
into the usual ‘sector-by-sector-assessment-trap’? Kanbur’s proposal was that for 
any package, the following three key questions have to be asked: 
1. First, what does this package do for addressing economic, social and institution-
al inequalities which hurt not only the poor but overall development and growth? 
2. Second, what does this package do to address issues of risk and vulnerability at the 
micro and at the macro level? 
3. Third, what does it do for sustainable human development and economic expan-
sion in the medium term, an expansion in which the poor participate fully? 
Packages which score high on all three areas should go forward for further con-
sideration.440 Kanbur then went on to ask himself the rhetorical question whether 
the Empowerment, Security, Opportunity -trilogy (emerging as it was from the three 
above mentioned key questions) would simply be a ‘rearrangement of furniture’ 
relative to the past perspectives. What would the Bank be doing differently, as a 
result of WDR-2000?  Kanbur had interesting visions in September 1999:
439 World Bank (2001a), p. 16, 35-36, 39. 
440 World Bank (1999e), p.23-25.
156
•	 A much clearer and sharper view on the role of inequalities - of assets, across 
gender, across ethnic groups, etc. - impeding poverty reduction and growth, and 
policies to address these.
•	 A clear stance on, and providing support for, making institutions of the state (lo-
cal and national) pro-poor and accountable to the poor.
•	 Support for capacity building for organisations of the poor, which are member-
ship based and which work to ensure that the ‘voice’ of the poor is heard in the 
formulation and implementation of policies and interventions.
•	 A strong recognition of the importance of risk and vulnerability in the lives of 
the poor, and the encouragement of analysis that clarifies further the nature and 
magnitude of the impacts of risk and vulnerability on poverty, efficiency and 
growth.
•	 Development of a ‘modular’ approach to security, with different interventions 
- community, market and state - to address different issues and sections of the 
population.
•	 An enhanced appreciation of the extent to which macro shocks - financial, natu-
ral disasters, etc. - are part of the reality of developing nations circumstances, 
and support for developing national and international responses to these. 
•	 On economic policy reform (trade and capital account liberalization, financial 
markets liberalisation, privatisation, etc.) a clear recognition that universal pre-
scriptions are unlikely to succeed, that local realities matter, and that the success 
of liberalization in reducing poverty is contingent upon institution building. 
•	 On sectoral strategies, for example in education and health, a recognition of 
strong cross-sectoral linkages and cross-cutting impacts on empowerment, secu-
rity and opportunity, as well as the central importance of holding service deliv-
ery accountable to the poor.
•	 A strong stance on the impact of global forces and global externalities on poor 
nations and the poor in poor nations, ensuring that the ‘voice’ of the poor nations 
are heard in discussions of global arrangements, and support for the provision of 
global public goods which benefit the poorest.
•	 A clear recognition that development assistance only succeeds when it supports 
broad based consensus on poverty reduction, and gears the Bank’s own interven-
tions along these lines.441
441 World Bank (1999e), p.25-27.
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5.4 A moDulAR AppRoACh to ‘SOCIAL RISK 
MANAGEMENT’ AND ‘LIVELIHOOD SECURITY’
The recently established ‘Social Protection’ department of the World Bank, under 
the leadership of Robert Holzmann and Steen Jorgensen, provided some of the 
most refreshing and innovative new theoretical insights to the drafting process 
of the WDR-2000. Working in parallel with Kanbur’s WDR-team, and in construc-
tive consultation with European (including Finnish442) experts of social policy, 
Holzmann and Jorgensen443 developed what they called a “modular approach to 
social protection”, which I consider one of the most important innovations of the 
Bank’s new poverty reduction strategy. It has since then been largely adapted by 
both the OECD-DAC Poverty Reduction Guidelines444 as well as by UN Secretary 
General’s ‘Roadmap’ for implementing the Millennium Declaration.445 
In the definition of Holzmann and Jorgensen, social protection (SP) consists 
of public interventions to assist individuals, households and communities better 
manage their livelihood risks. Specifically, SP seeks to: 
•	 Reduce the vulnerability of low-income households, with regard to consump-
tion and access to basic services;
•	 Allow for better consumption smoothing over the lifecycle for all households 
and, consequently, for more equal welfare distribution of households;
•	 Enhance equity particularly with regard to the exposure to shocks and the effects 
of shocks;
•	 Contribute to solidarity, social cohesion and social stability of a country;446
Public interventions for more effective risk management can be: 
442 The Government of Finland facilitated an international experts’ meeting on the social dimensions 
of sustainable development in October 1998 in Finland. That was the first international event where 
Robert Holzmann introduced the draft conceptual underpinnings of the Bank’s new Social Protection 
strategy. I also had the opportunity to participate in that highly interesting expert meeting. Holzmann 
received a general support and a whole range of constructive criticisms and comments to his draft 
from the Finnish and other international social policy professionals (SPPs) – and a comparison 
between Holzmann’s first draft and the final version in the WDR-2000 indicates that the comments 
received from Finnish SPPs strengthened the Bank’s conceptual framework. See: Wiman (1999) and 
Wiman and Partonen (1999).
443 My understanding is that a non-insignificant factor in the emergence of the Bank’s new strategic 
approach to social protection was that, being both Europeans, Holzmann (an Austrian) and Jorgensen 
(a Dane) had gained personal experiences of European comprehensive social policy thinking. Unlike 
in the ideologically biased (pro-market, anti-government) intellectual atmosphere of the USA, in 
most countries of Europe, ‘social policy’ has a broadly acknowledged and respected role in both the 
academic and policy-making spheres, as an essential part of good governance, economic policy and 
social science.
444 OECD-DAC (2000c), p. 48. 
445 United Nations (2001), p. 41.
446 Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999), p. 49.
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(a) indirect, such as fostering the capacities of households to reduce the variability 
of income, improving saving capacities and risk-sharing, or facilitating the op-
erations of market institutions such as banks, insurance companies and pension 
funds, or 
(b) direct, such as providing transfers, subsidizing assets or goods, implementing 
public works programmes, or mandating old-age income insurance.
Conventionally, social protection has often been defined as a collection of meas-
ures that includes: (1) social assistance, (2) social investment and development 
funds, (3) labour market interventions, and (4) pensions and other insurance-type 
programmes. However, all too often, Holzmann and Jorgensen argued, we end 
up operating within the four cylinders and not looking at cross-cutting issues or 
we do not analyse the social protection system as a whole. This is what the Bank’s 
new social protection strategy set to do, by suggesting a typology for types of 
risk, strategies, instruments and institutions involved in risk management. Their 
typology447 had four main categories: 448 
I. The type of risk incurred, with three main distinctions: 
•	 Catastrophic vs. non-catastrophic shocks
•	 Idiosyncratic shocks449 vs. covariant shocks450
•	 Single vs. repeated shocks.
II. The type of strategies to address these shocks with three main distinctions and 
sub-categories:
•	 Risk reduction strategies451
•	 Risk mitigating strategies,452 including:
	Portfolio diversification453 
	 Insurance454
	Hedging455
•	 Risk coping strategies456 
III. The type of instruments by the formality of arrangements, with three main dis-
tinctions:
•	 Informal/personal arrangements457
447 Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999), p. 54. See also: World Bank (2001), p. 136.
448 Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999), p. 50, 53.
449 I.e. risks affecting an individual or household.
450 I.e. risks affecting groups of households or communities (meso-level), or risks affecting whole 
regions or nations (macro-level).
451 Introduced ‘ex-ante’ in order to increase the level of expected income and/or reduce the variance, 
e.g. moving to safer area and/or professions.
452 Introduced ‘ex-ante’ in order to reduce the income variance with occasional costs for the expected 
income.
453 I.e. having multiple assets with different risk characteristics. Compare this with the triangle model 
of poor people as ‘portfolio managers’ by Robert Chambers, in Figure 5 above, and in Chambers (1992, 
1995). See also Voipio (1998c, 2002).
454 I.e. pooled risk coverage through payment of insurance premium.
455 I.e. risk exchange.
456 Introduced ‘ex-post’, i.e. once the risk has occurred. E.g. dis-saving/borrowing, charity, means-
tested transfers, universal social assistance and public works (e.g. food-for-work).
457 Such as marriage, mutual community support, and real assets such as cattle, estate and gold.
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•	 Formal/market based arrangements458
•	 Formal/publicly mandated or provided arrangements459
IV. The type of institutions/actors in social risk management.
•	 Individuals/households
•	 Communities
•	 NGOs
•	 Market institutions (e.g. banks and insurance companies)
•	 Government.
Risk pooling is an effective strategy for managing risks. The distinction by level 
(micro, meso, macro) is critical, however. A risk that affects an entire village, for 
example, cannot be insured solely within the village. It requires pooling with 
areas not subject to the risk. In practice, many shocks have both idiosyncratic and 
covariant parts. A matrix arises (Table 5.). 
Table 5.  The Main Sources of Risk Facing Poor People460 
type of risk
iDioSYNCRAtiC CovARiANt
i.e. risks affecting 
an individual or 
household (micro)
Risks affecting groups 
of households or 
communities (meso)
Risks affecting 
regions or nations
(macro)
Natural E.g. lightning, 
drowning, snakes, 
vermin
Rainfall, landslide, 
volcanic eruption
Earthquake, flood, 
drought, high winds
health Illness, injury, disability, 
old age, death
Epidemic Pandemic, 
e.g. HIV/AIDS
Social Crime, domestic 
violence
Terrorism, gang activity Civil strife, war, 
social upheaval
economic Unemployment, resettlement, harvest failure Growth collapse, 
hyper-inflation, 
balance of payments 
crisis, financial 
crisis, currency 
crisis, technology 
shocks, terms 
of trade shocks, 
transition costs of 
economic reforms.
Changes in food 
prices
political Harassment, repression Riots Political default on 
social programmes, 
coup d’état
environmental Poisoning Pollution, deforestation, 
nuclear disaster
Deforestation, 
nuclear disaster
458 Such as financial assets and insurance contracts.
459 Such as rules and regulations, social insurance, transfers, and public works.
460 Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999).
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The potential risk management strategies were grouped above into (b) actions 
in anticipation of a shock (risk reduction and risk mitigation) and  (b) actions in 
response to a shock (coping measures). Risk reduction aims at reducing the prob-
ability of a shock or negative fluctuation. Individuals or households can some-
times take such action themselves (digging wells, setting up mosquito nets). But 
to reduce most risks effectively, action is also needed at the meso or macro level. 
The risk of flooding can be reduced if the community builds a dike or the govern-
ment builds a dam. Sound economic and environmental policies, education and 
training, and other measures can also reduce a wide variety of risks. 
Risk mitigation aims at reducing the negative impact of shocks. Households 
mitigate risk through diversification (acquiring assets whose returns are not per-
fectly correlated) and insurance. Common diversification strategies are planting 
different crops on plots in different locations, combining farm and non-farm 
income, and combining wage income and income from household enterprises. 
Households can take most of these actions on their own – though group or gov-
ernment action (e.g. agricultural extension, infrastructure, saving facilities) can 
sometimes facilitate risk mitigation. Insurance can also take place through self-
insurance (e.g. by saving, or by planting exceptionally drought or pest resistant 
crops), or via informal community insurance, or via formal insurance.
Coping strategies aim to relieve the impact of a shock after it occurs. Actions 
by individuals include drawing down savings or selling assets, borrowing, and 
calling on support networks. Actions by government may include, e.g. activat-
ing the transfers or workfare mechanisms that constitute the social safety net. If 
these measures prove insufficient, households may need to reduce consumption 
or increase their labour supply. Many of these coping responses force a high long-
term cost on households for a short-term benefit (e.g. selling of one’s land to get 
money for food, or drawing the children – often girls – from school to assist in 
raising incomes for the family during a crisis.)461
Since poor people cannot fully manage their livelihood risks alone, the WDR-
2000 concludes462 that the government’s poverty reduction strategy needs to sup-
port the efforts of the poor to manage risk – reducing and mitigating risk and 
coping with shocks. The WDR-2000 suggests that such a strategy should include 
formal and informal mechanisms, provided by both the public and the private 
sector. In principle and excluding cost considerations, the best approach would 
be to reduce the risk of harmful shocks. Next would be risk mitigation to reduce 
the possible impact of a shock. Coping would be a residual approach to address 
the failures of the first two.463
461 Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999), p. 56-62. World Bank (2001a), p. 141-142. See also: Dercon (ed. 
2004), Dercon and Sabates-Wheeler (2004), Sabates-Wheeler and Haddad (2005).
462 World Bank (2001a), p. 146-159.
463 As the WDR-2000 notes in an endnote, this priority ranking reflects a concern for preventing the 
hardship and deprivation that frequently result from shocks, especially for the poor. It does not imply 
that all risk should be eliminated, because – the WDR-2000 says – this would have strong, undesirable 
incentive effects. In the extreme, the absence of all risk would lead to an incentive to undertake no 
activity at all – the essence of the moral hazard problem.
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 In practice, different direct and opportunity costs may well change the rank-
ing of options. For instance, a comparative study in India found that, at the mar-
gin, public work programmes benefited the poorest quintile the most, while credit 
programme benefited the second and third poorest quintiles the most. In any 
case, the WDR-2000 concluded, the balance needs to shift from policies for coping 
to those for reducing and mitigating risk. This means ensuring that social safety 
nets such as public works/workfare programmes, targeted human development 
programmes, and social funds are in place on a permanent basis and can be scaled up 
when a shock occurs. It also means providing better access to credit and financial 
assets, facilitating income diversification, managing labour market risk better 
(especially child labour), and providing health insurance. Such actions would 
allow poor people to pursue higher-risk, higher-return activities that could pull 
them out of poverty.
The essence of the idea of a ‘modular approach’ to social protection advocated 
by the WDR-2000 is that “not every country needs to set up a comprehensive social 
safety net. But each does need to construct a modular system of programmes based on its 
own patterns of risk and to cultivate a suitable mix of providers (public and private) and 
administrative arrangements.”464
5.5 CoNtRoveRSieS iN the CoNSultAtioNS 
As reported by Ravi Kanbur in Mid-1999 in his report to the World Bank Chief 
Economist465, there seemed to be five ’Big Issues’ that had raised controversies in 
the consultations: 
5.5.1 Growth 
Economists, typically, had felt that ‘growth’ had been underemphasized and given 
too much of a back seat in the First Cut Outline of the WDR. On the other hand, 
non-economists had felt that ‘growth’ was lurking in the background and was 
still ‘excessively’ the basis of the strategy. Environmentalists, in particular, had 
stressed that it was not clear whether economic growth could be environmentally 
sustainable globally, even if the Bank designed policies to attain ‘win-win’ at the 
national level. 
5.5.2 Empowerment 
Non-economists had felt that the discussion was too ‘wishy washy’ and did not 
face up to power and interests. It’s all very well to have women participate in 
design of projects, but national level policy-making is still in the hands of a (often 
international) male elite. Economists had felt that there was a great deal of overlap 
464 World Bank (2001a), p. 147. For more about World Bank’s conceptual frameworks and practical 
approaches for social protection, see Social Protection / World Bank in Websources. The International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) is another intellectual leader in developing approaches for pro-poor social 
protection in the world’s poorest countries. See Social Protection / ILO in Websources. 
465 I.e. to Joseph Stiglitz. See World Bank (1999e), p. 27.
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between empowerment and opportunity, since they (and others) typically think 
of education and health as ‘empowering’  the poor. 
5.5.3 International Action 
The Draft Outline treated the international dimensions in a separate section. 
There was concern that this would make ‘international’ an add-on - instead it 
should suffuse throughout the report, and be particularly present in the first 
section of the report, on ‘causes’ of poverty. Linking to empowerment, the role of 
international capital and international institutions in perpetuating poverty had 
been strongly emphasized by NGOs. Linked to this there had been a call for an 
evaluation of the Bank’s own role and the impact of its own policy advice. Not 
everyone in the World Bank was so keen on this,  however.
5.5.4 Policy Instruments and Recommendations 
There had been a general concern that specific policy instruments and specific 
policy recommendations had not come through the Draft Outline. What would 
the World Bank and the rest of the donor community do differently in education 
or in health, for example? Kanbur believed that this related to the fact that the 
Drafting Team had not taken a sectoral slice at the problem - which would more 
naturally lead into policy specifics.
5.5.5 Neglected or Under-Empahasized Areas 
There had been a number of areas that had not to be given sufficient emphasis, if 
was felt. Among these were: fertility and population, environment, gender and 
civil conflict. 
These had been the main issues, or criticisms, but generally - in Kanbur’s view- 
there had been a broad support for the ‘Empowerment, Security, Opportunity’ 
-metaphor, for the emphasis given in the Draft Outline to risk and vulnerability, 
and for the fact that the World Bank Drafting Team was going beyond a conven-
tional economic discourse (but with disquiet among economists about what the 
World Bank experts would be able to say in the non-economic arena.466)
5.6 the CeNSoRShip SCANDAl 
But, strong ideological and identity-related factors influence the way donor agencies 
talk about poverty. This was the case also with the drafting process of the World 
Bank’s newest ‘Official Truth about Poverty Reduction’. 
In May 2000 Ravi Kanbur, the lead author of the forthcoming WDR-2000 ten-
dered his resignation. He sent a letter to senior World Bank management ex-
pressing his concerns about what he saw as “unreasonable pressure” to tone down 
WDR’s sections on globalization. ‘Reliable Washington sources’ indicated that 
Lawrence Summers, the US Treasury Secretary in the Clinton Administration 
466 This turned out to be a sharp-sighted observation, as we shall see shortly.
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had announced that he personally wanted to rewrite some sections of the WDR, 
a publication that was likely to be extremely prominent in future discussions on 
international issues and in guiding aid interventions.467
Note that this was not a conflict between anti-globalization activists and 
mainstream policy-makers. Nor was it a disagreement between economists and 
non-economists, nor between World Bank ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. Both Kanbur 
and Summers are highly respected mainstream economists and World Bank in-
siders. Kanbur, a UK citizen and professor of economics at Cornell University, 
was a World Bank staff member from 1989 to 1997, serving successively (and suc-
cessfully) as Adviser, Senior Adviser, Resident Representative in Ghana, Chief 
Economist for Africa, and Principal Adviser to the Chief Economist. The Chief 
Economist whom he was advising then was - Lawrence Summers - a former 
Harvard professor of economics, whom President Clinton had made Treasury 
Secretary (Minister of Finance) of his cabinet. This is remarkable: When the World 
Bank had in Spring 1998 searched for a leader for the team that was to write the 
Bank’s next ‘Official Truth’ about an issue that is at the absolute core of the Bank’s 
mission, they had came to the conclusion that of all economists of the world Ravi 
Kanbur was the most competent, reliable and appropriate person for the task. For 
such a decision, green light must have been sought – and received – also from 
the US-Government
At the time Kanbur had accepted the invitation he had made a public state-
ment on process integrity. In a letter to the Bretton Woods Project468 on 17 July 1998 
Kanbur had stated: 
“I want to let you know my own personal philosophy and perspective as we go into the 
processes leading up to the Poverty WDR. First and foremost, I want to stress that I would 
stand behind any Report that I put my name to, and would not submit to any substantive 
editing I did not agree with.”469 
The problem was that this was exactly what Summers expected Kanbur to do 
(forgetting that he no longer was Kanbur’s boss). Why all this?
Two fundamental issues were ‘wrong’ in Kanbur’s draft – and thus had to 
be ‘corrected’ – in view of the mainstream neo-liberal neoclassical economists, a 
school of thought to which Summers belongs: (a) ‘Growth’, and (b) ‘Trade Openness’. 
Kanbur’s first draft was not ‘anti-growth’, but its ‘mistake’ in Summers’ view 
was that it did not include the kind of ‘Song of Praise’ for economic growth and 
467 Mallaby (2004), p. 268-269, Bretton Woods Project (2000a,b,c). 
468 The Bretton Woods Project (BWP)  is an independent initiative by a group of British non-
governmental organisations (NGOs). It works with an extensive network of over 7000 non-
governmental organisations, policy-makers, journalists, researchers and parliamentarians worldwide 
to press for increased transparency and civil society participation in World Bank and IMF policies 
and interventions. Through highly professional briefings, reports and the bimonthly digest Bretton 
Woods Update, it monitors projects, policy reforms and the overall management of the Bretton Woods 
institutions with special emphasis on environmental and social concerns. See Bretton Woods Project in 
Websources.
469 Bretton Woods Project (2000a, b, c). 
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the free trade ideology as World Bank documents are normally expected to do. 
It simply discussed and analysed neutrally the (frustratingly modest) poverty 
reducing impacts of the past two decades of growth-, liberalization- and export-
oriented  structural adjustment programmes. That the poverty-reducing record 
of the structural adjustment policies had indeed been weaker than expected was 
not Kanbur’s private thinking but a conclusion made by many other economists 
and social scientists both inside and outside the World Bank - including the head 
of Bank’s own Growth Research Unit, William Easterly, who found470 that in 1980-
1998, during the ‘Structural Adjustment Decades’, the median per capita income 
growth in developing countries had been 0.9 per cent, as compared to 2.5. per cent 
in 1960-79. That this stagnation seemed to represent a disappointing outcome to 
the movement towards the neo-liberal ‘Washington Consensus’ was a research 
outcome that Easterly was allowed to discuss in the internal discussion among 
World Bank poverty economists. (At that time it was not yet common to paste all 
World Bank research reports onto the internet.) But to tell it openly to the whole 
world in a World Bank flagship publication, as Kanbur intended to do, was unac-
ceptable for Summers, who himself had been one of the main architects of the 
neo-liberal Washington Consensus policies.
5.7 the WAShiNgtoN CoNSeNSuS AND ANotheR 
DiSmiSSAl SCANDAl471 
Kanbur pointed out in July 1999 that Williamson’s original ‘Washington Consensus’ 
propositions had not been nearly as bad as the critics had made them sound. Many 
critics would be surprised, Kanbur pointed out, to discover that item number two 
in Williamson’s original formulation had been ‘redistributive reallocation of public 
expenditure’, a proposal that was also on the agendas of the pro-poor critics of struc-
tural adjustment programmes. Kanbur, however, also had his own reservations 
about the pro-poor benefits of the original policy package: Kanbur wanted to take 
more seriously the fact that local realities really matter and that a broad universal 
consensus package was bound to be problematic if applied across the board. On 
some issues, like trade liberalization, Kanbur was more sceptical than Williamson.
But the main problem – and justification for the criticisms - was not what the 
‘Washington Consensus’ had said but what it had done (or not done).  Why, for in-
stance, had the least progress been made in implementing the above said second 
policy, pro-poor redirection of the public expenditure policies? The poor peo-
ple, poor country governments and the international civil society that saw only 
the outcomes rather than Williamson’s original paper, were correct in critically 
concluding that the Washington Consensus did not, in its real-life implemented 
version, contain the item number two.472
470 Easterly (2000, 2001). 
471 See: Williamson (1990, 1993, 2000), World Bank (2001a), p. 63., Stiglitz (1998), p. 1., Srinivasan (2000), 
Kanbur (1999).
472 Kanbur (1999). 
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Kanbur himself had been in charge of operationalizing the Washington 
Consensus as the Bank’s Resident Representative in Ghana and as Chief 
Economist of the Bank’s Africa Region. He explained, retrospectively, the politi-
cally or ideologically biased ‘mindset’ and ‘negotiation stance’ of the World Bank 
and IMF staff as follows: 
“There is no question in my mind that in the 1980s, and to a certain extent well into the 
1990s, many saw the main task as being storming the citadel of statist development strate-
gies. In this mindset, nuances were beside the point – intellectual curiosities, which paled 
in comparison to the benefits of rapid and deep movements away from the former paradigm. 
They suspected, perhaps rightly, that those on the other side, were hell bent on preserv-
ing the status quo. In this setting, a negotiating stance, rather than a dialogue based on 
mutual comprehension, was appropriate. So the negotiators from Washington always took 
a more purist stance, a more extreme stance than even their own intellectual framework 
permitted…’Give them an inch of nuance, and they’ll take a mile of status quo’, seemed to 
be the mindset and the stance. ‘If you want 28 enterprises privatised, start by asking for 56’, 
seemed to be the opening gambit.’473
In other words, what Kanbur was saying in 2000 was that it was the Bretton 
Woods institutions’ negotiating ploy to demand more in the way of liberalizing 
reforms than they really expected – or felt advisable - to achieve. This obviously 
was a tactic that led citizens in the poor countries to identify these institutions 
with something closer to market fundamentalism than the institutions even re-
ally believed in.
Officially Kanbur “resigned”, but of course, in reality he was forced to re-
sign. What makes the case even more shocking, is that when the US-Treasurer 
Lawrence Summers pressurized Kanbur,  Kanbur no longer had the World Bank 
Chief Economist Joseph Stiglitz there to support him. Stiglitz himself had been 
forced to resign already 6 months earlier, in November 1999. A Washington D.C. 
based rumour has it that prior to the end of James D. Wolfensohn’s first term as 
World Bank’s President the US-Government (Treasury Secretary Larry Summers 
again) had left Wolfensohn with two options only: either Wolfensohn or Stiglitz 
– one of the two had to leave the Bank. Stiglitz and Wolfensohn had then jointly 
(according to the rumour) decided that it is better that Wolfensohn stays and 
Stiglitz is replaced by a relatively like-minded development economist, Nicholas 
Stern. Stiglitz’s own version of the story474 is that US-Treasury (headed by that 
time by Larry Summers)… 
“had put enormous pressure on the World Bank to silence my criticisms of the policies 
which they and the IMF had pushed, and though the President of the World Bank agreed 
with the stances I took on most of the issues, he was, I think, less comfortable about open 
473 Kanbur (2000a, 2001a). This expression ‘those on the other side’, reflects the negotiating stance of the 
staff of the Washington institutions, and refers, probably, to the poor country governments and to the 
international NGOs criticizing the structural adjustment programmes. 
474 Presented in his Nobel-autobiography in 2001. See Stiglitz  in Websources. 
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discourse of these issues. I had come to the World Bank under an agreement that I would 
be more than a corporate spokesperson, that I could speak out on the relevant issues, in 
a responsible way…Under Treasury pressure it was impossible to maintain this kind of 
independence…”.
The root cause for Stiglitz’s dismissal (or ‘voluntary resignation’, as it was offi-
cially called) was his criticism against the policies pursued by the IMF and the 
U.S. Treasury Department in East Asia and in Russia during the global economic 
crisis of 1997-98 At the time of the serious street demonstrations against the IMF, 
the World Bank and the WTO in Seattle (in December 1999) and in Washington 
D.C. (in April 2000), Stiglitz publicly endorsed475 the demonstrators’ criticism ac-
cording to which the IMF was ‘”arrogant, not listening to the developing countries, 
secretive and insulated from democratic accountability”. And besides, the soon-to-be 
Nobel laureate in economics said, the IMF and the U.S. Treasury Department 
were applying completely out-of-date and out-of-tune-with-reality macroeco-
nomic models to analyse the East Asian and Russian crises. In 1997 Stiglitz had 
voiced concerns about the potential political and social turmoil that the IMF’s 
excessively contractionary monetary and fiscal programs – based on bad econom-
ics, in Stiglitz’s view - could lead to in East Asia. Stiglitz also expressed the view 
that the IMF and the U.S. Treasury had - by paying insufficient attention to the 
institutional infrastructure that would allow a market economy to flourish, and 
by easing the flow of capital in and out of Russia - laid the groundwork for the 
oligarchs’ plundering of public property in Russia.476
In 1997 the IMF imposed fiscal austerity measures (balanced budgets) and 
tighter monetary policies on Thailand and other East Asian countries. Austerity, 
the Fund’s leaders said, would restore confidence in the East Asian economies. 
“All the IMF was asking of the countries was to have a balanced budget”, IMF’s first 
deputy managing director Stanley Fisher wrote in the Financial Times.477 Already 
at this stage Stiglitz had thought that this was a mistake. For one thing, Stiglitz 
reminded, not for sixty years – since Herbert Hoover’s times - had respectable 
economists believed that an economy going into a recession should have a bal-
anced budget.  But the IMF and U.S. Treasury economists did not want to listen 
to these serious arguments of the World Bank Chief Economist, although the 
World Bank was contributing literally billions of dollars to the East Asia rescue 
packages. 
And besides, Stiglitz continued his criticism, unlike the Latin American na-
tions to whom ‘Washington Consensus’ had recommended austerity measures, 
the East Asian countries were already running budget surpluses. In Thailand, 
the government was running such large surpluses that it was actually starving 
the economy of much-needed investments in education and infrastructure, both 
essential to economic growth and poverty reduction. And the East Asian nations 
475 Stiglitz (2000b). See also: Stiglitz (2000a, 2002) and Mallaby (2004), p. 193-195.
476 Stiglitz (1998b, 2002). 
477 Fischer (1997). Cited in Stiglitz (2002), p. 105-106.
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already had tight monetary policies, as well: inflation was low and falling. (E.g. in 
South Korea it stood at a very respectable four per cent.) Stiglitz had tried to con-
vince the IMF-leaders that East Asia’s problem was not imprudent government, 
as in Latin America; East-Asias’s problem was an imprudent private sector – all 
those bankers and borrowers, for instance, who had gambled on the real estate 
bubble. Under such circumstances, Stiglitz had feared, IMF’s austerity measures 
would not revive the economies of East Asia – but would instead plunge them 
into recession or even depression. High interest rates might devastate highly in-
debted East Asian firms, causing more bankruptcies and defaults and creating 
unemployment, poverty and misery. And this is exactly what happened. “Quite 
frankly, a student who turned in the IMF’s answer to the test question – ‘What should 
be the fiscal stance of Thailand, facing an economic downturn?’ – would have gotten an 
F”, said Stiglitz who has taught economics at Oxford, MIT, Stanford, Yale and 
Princeton (and explained this, in his frustration, by that the IMF-staff frequently 
consist of “third-rank students from first-rate universities.”) 
By January 1998, things had gotten so bad that the World Bank’s vice presi-
dent for East Asia, Jean Michel Severino, invoked the dreaded r-word (‘recession’) 
and d-word (‘depression’) in describing the economic calamity in Asia. Lawrence 
Summers, the deputy treasury secretary then, railed against Severino for making 
things seem worse than they were, “but what other way was there to describe what was 
happening”, Stiglitz wondered afterwards. Output in some of the affected Asian 
countries had fallen 16 per cent or more. Half the businesses in Indonesia were in 
virtual bankruptcy or close to it, and, as a result, the country could not even take 
advantage of the export opportunities that the lower exchange rates provided. 
Unemployment soared, increasing as much as tenfold, and real wages plummeted 
– in countries with basically no safety nets. Poverty came back into the societies 
where the ‘East-Asian miracle’478 had wiped it out during the few previous three 
decades. In South Korea, urban poverty almost tripled, with almost a quarter of 
the population falling back into poverty. In Indonesia, poverty doubled. Not only 
was the IMF not restoring economic confidence in East Asia, it was undermining 
the region’s social fabric. 479 
478 On the ‘East-Asian Miracle’, see: World Bank (1993).
479 Stiglitz (1998b, 2002, p. 97, 112). 
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But neither Lawrens Summers480 and Robert Rubin481 of the US Treasury 
nor Stanley Fischer482 and Michel Camdessus483 of the IMF wanted to think that 
their policies had been misguided. They stuck to their positions, in spite of what 
Stiglitz viewed as overwhelming evidence of their failure. When the IMF finally 
decided to support lower interest rates and reversed its support for fiscal contrac-
tion in East Asia, it said it was not due to the public pressures created by Stiglitz’s 
open opposition but because ‘the time was right’. More or less the same thing 
happened with Russia, where Stiglitz had strongly criticized the IMF’s ‘shock 
therapy’, privatisation and corporate governance policies that had led to declines 
in GDP and serious increases in poverty. 
Stiglitz has, of course, tried to understand why Summers’, Rubin’s, Fisher’s 
and Camdessus’s economics led them to so different policy conclusions than 
Stiglitz’s economics (of imperfect information). They are all famous mainstream 
economists, anyway. Stiglitz’s retrospective conclusion is simple: 
“The IMF is pursuing not just the objectives set out in its original mandate, of enhancing 
global stability and ensuring that there are funds for countries facing a threat of recession to 
pursue expansionary policies. It is also pursuing the interests of the financial community. 
This means that the IMF has objectives that are often in conflict with each other.”484
480 Lawrence H. Summers was vice president of development economics and chief economist of the 
World Bank from 1991 to 1993. During that period he became famous for his internal World Bank 
memo that was then leaked and caused a scandal among the global environmental community. In 
the memo Summers had proposed that ‘dirty industries’, i.e. hazardous production plants should be 
moved to Africa and other LDCs (least developed countries), because (a) Africa was – in Summers’ 
opinion - “vastly under-polluted”, and (b) if some people had to die or become sick due to health hazards 
of production, “the costs of foregone earnings would be lower in the poor countries than in the rich countries”. 
In other words Summers’ argument was that the value of human life was lower – according to his logic 
– in the poor than in the rich countries. See Summers in Whirledbank in Websources. In 1993 Summers 
was named as Undersecretary of the US-Treasury for international affairs. In 1995 he was promoted 
to the number-two position of the Treasury, just under Secretary Robert Rubin. On July 2, 1999, Mr. 
Summers was confirmed by US Senate as secretary of the treasury (Minister of Finance). According 
to his biography, Summers “worked internationally to reform the international financial architecture and the 
International Monetary Fund, to secure debt relief for the world’s poorest countries, and to combat international 
money laundering. He took office as 27th president of Harvard University on July 1, 2001, but had to 
resign in 2006 due to a scandal that he created by his public speech in 2005 where he suggested that 
the under-representation of women in science and engineering could be due to a “different availability 
of aptitude at the high end,” and less to patterns of discrimination and socialization. Surprisingly, In 2008, 
President Barack Obama surprisingly invited Mr. Summers to chair his National Council of Economic 
Advisers. Mr. Summers did not stay in that job for long, however, since in September 2010 he declared 
publicly his intention to resign from that position at the end of year 2010. Economic media explained 
his resignation was caused by his disappointment not having been elected as Chairman of the US 
Federal Reserve, when President Obama gave a second term to Ben Bernanke.
481 Robert Rubin is today Director and Chairman of the Executive Committee at the Citigroup, one of 
the world’s largest private banking businesses. He was US Secretary of Treasury (Minister of Finance) 
from January 1995 to 2 Jul, 1999. See Rubin in Websources.
482 Stanley Fischer was first deputy managing director of the IMF from 1994 to 2001 and special advisor 
to the managing director until January 2002. Prior to his tenure at the IMF, Fischer had served as 
vice president of development economics and chief economist at the World Bank. From IMF Fischer 
was promoted to his current position as President of Citigroup International and Vice Chairman of 
Citigroup, Inc. Fischer was born in Zambia in 1943. See Fischer in Websources. 
483 Michel Camdessus, a French national, was IMF’s Managing Director January 1987-February 2000. 
See Camdessus in Websources.
484 Stiglitz (2002), p. 206-208.
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This tension is all the greater because this conflict cannot be brought out into 
the open: if the second objective – of pursuing the interests of the US financial 
community – were publicly acknowledged, international support for that institu-
tion might weaken, Stiglitz believes. His reasoning here is also methodologically 
interesting – and familiar to us from the Propositions 4 and 5 in the theoretical 
Chapter-3 of this book. Nobel Laureate Stiglitz writes:
 
“IMF never formally set out to put the interests of the financial community over the sta-
bility of the global economy or the welfare of the poor countries they were supposed to be 
helping. We cannot talk meaningfully about the motivations and intentions of any institu-
tion, only of those who constitute and govern it. Even then, we often cannot ascertain true 
motivations – there may be a gap between what they say are their intentions and their true 
motivations. As social scientists, we can, however, attempt to describe the behaviour of an 
institution in terms of what it appears to be doing. Looking at the IMF as if it were pursu-
ing the interests of the financial community provides a way of making sense of what might 
otherwise seem to be contradictory and intellectually incoherent behaviours.” 
The IMF’s behaviour should come as no surprise: many of IMF’s key personnel 
have come from the US-financial community (and this holds true for the World 
Bank, as well.) Many of the IMF’s (and the Bank’s) key personnel are very familiar 
with the perspectives and ideology of the financial community. Having served 
these interests well in the IFIs485, many of them have left to well-paying jobs in 
the US-financial business. Stan Fischer, the deputy MD who played a major role 
in the East Asian and Russian episodes, went (in January 2002) directly from 
the IMF to become a vice chairman of the Citigroup, the vast financial firm that 
includes Citibank. A chairman of Citigroup Executive Committee was Robert 
Rubin, who, as Secretary of US-Treasury, had had a central role in the IMF polices 
that Stiglitz had criticized. Stiglitz, in 2002, could not help but to ask a rhetorical 
question: Was Stan Fischer being richly rewarded for having faithfully executed 
what he was told to do?
5.8 the DilemmA the oRthoDoxY FACeD: 
hoW to ‘RepAiR the DAmAge DoNe’? 
Having ousted Stiglitz from the Chief Economist’s office (November-1999486) and 
Kanbur from the WDR-team (May-2000), Summers and other representatives of 
the ‘neo-liberal orthodoxy’ of Washington D.C. had to try to ‘repair the damage 
done’ by Kanbur’s exceptionally open and consultative process: Something had to 
be done to bring back the two fundamental articles of faith (i.e. the ‘pro-poorness’ 
of trade openness and economic growth) into the prime place in the newest ‘Official 
Truth’ of the World Bank on poverty reduction.  Kanbur’s draft had had a bal-
485 IFI = International Financial Institution.
486 Stiglitz finally left the Bank in January 2000. 
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anced discussion about them in Part-III of the book, but Summers wanted them 
to be in the beginning of Part-I, where they had been in the previous ‘Official 
Truths’ 10 and 20 years ago. 
David Dollar and Aart Kraay were the ‘fire-fighters’ whom Summers & co gave 
the task to generate ‘research evidence’ in support of the ‘poverty-friendliness’ of 
the liberalization and growth oriented ‘Washington Consensus’ policy packages 
prescribed by the Bank and the IMF on developing country governments. Dollar 
and Kraay switched on their computers and ran cross-country regressions on the 
World Bank data sets as long as they got what they were looking for: ‘statistical 
evidence’ just enough to produce – and to widely disseminate – two ‘academic’ 
papers: one titled ‘”Growth is Good for the Poor”,487 and another one titled “Trade, 
Growth and Poverty”, 488 showing that also trade openness was pro-poor. The first 
paper stated:
“Income of the poor rises one-for-one with overall growth. This general relationship be-
tween income of the bottom fifth of the population and per capita GDP holds in a sample of 
80 countries covering four decades. Although there is a fair amount of variation around this 
general relationship, a number of popular views about the poverty-growth relationship are 
not true. The effect of growth on income of the poor is no different in poor countries than 
in rich ones. Incomes of the poor do not fall more than proportionately during economic 
crises.”
In the midst of the embarrassing dismissal scandals, this was the only piece of 
evidence Summers & co. could find or generate to prove their point, but the point 
had to be included in the WDR-2000: and so it was.489 And thereafter it was of 
course drummed around the world by the powerful public information machin-
ery of the World Bank Communications Department – and by widely read like-
minded press such as e.g. The Economist490, as one of the main messages of the 
WDR-2000, and as a proof that the critics of IMF/World Bank policies were “fun-
damentally misguided or worse”.491 No wonder that Kanbur did not want to associate 
himself with that. Why? What was wrong with Dollar’s and Kraay’s findings?
487 Dollar and Kraay (2000). 
488 Dollar and Kraay (2001). 
489 World Bank (2001a), p. 47. 
490 The Economist, May 27. 2000. See also, e.g. the Daily Telegraph (London), June 9, 2000, p. 35.
491 Martin Wolf in Financial Times, April 12, 2000, p. 23. Wolf’s article was titled: “Kicking Down 
Growth’s Ladder: Protesters Against the World Bank and the IMF are in Effect Seeking to Deny the Poor the 
Benefits of a Liberal World Economy.”
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5.9 CRoSS-CouNtRY RegReSSioN ANAlYSeS 
– gRiND the mill loNg eNough AND You Will 
get ANY ReSult You NeeD 
Many knew that something was wrong, but in the ‘brotherhood’ of neoclassical 
economists few were initially willing to speak out (for fear of risking their career 
prospects in the development agencies or in the academic departments of econom-
ics, where the neoclassical growth-centered, pro-market doctrine prevails): As so 
often before, the first balance-seeking voices came from within the UN-agencies, 
and this time in a quite shocking and embarrassing manner: UN-researchers 
Jan Vandermoortele and Enrique Delamonica published a commentary in June 
2000, which demonstrated that the far-reaching  – and politically extremely im-
portant – conclusions of the paper by Dollar and Kraay were not proven by the 
analytic method used. They did not say that Dollar and Kraay forged their results, 
but they meant it. They also showed why the statistical results of Dollar-Kraay’s 
cross-country regressions do not form any solid basis for the rather sweeping 
conclusions made by the paper and by the press headlines written on its basis. 
Vandermoortele and Delamonica performed a test: They replaced Dollar-
Kraay’s two number sets with two sets of random numbers that had approximately 
the same range as the original numbers. Then they commanded their computers 
to make exactly the same mathematical operations and correlation analyses to 
their numbers as Dollar and Kraay had made to theirs. The result was amazing: 
The random number sets correlated with each other roughly as much as Dollar 
& Kraay’s original 370 observations of per capita income growth and bottom 
quintile income shares, covering 80 countries. The difference between the ran-
dom figures and the so called ‘statistical proof’ of Dollar and Kraay was so small 
that it was not statistically significant. So, is growth always good for the poor? 
Vandermoortele and Delamonica concluded: “We do not know, but we do know that 
the authors of the paper are incorrectly claiming they found the answer.”492
Dollar and Kraay’s paper has since then been heavily criticized by many oth-
ers, and from other standpoints, as well.493 For the first, the observed correlation 
comes from periods – or ‘episodes’ - when the GDP of the countries of the sample 
had grown at least 2% per year. During periods of slower growth – which Dollar-
Kraay completely ignored, and which have been common during the globalisa-
tion era – there was hardly any correlation between the income of the poor and 
the GDP. From Dollar and Kraay’s data one can find 35 episodes where the income 
of the poor actually fell when per capita income rose.494 
For the second, the quality and reliability of Dollar-Kraay data has been criti-
cized. It is the poorest quintile whose income data are for many reasons the most 
unreliable. From the number set of Dollar & Kraay one can find many periods 
during which the increase or decrease in the income of the poor are so large that 
492 Vandeermoortele and Delamonica (2000).
493 See e.g. Weisbrot, Baker, Naiman and Neta (2001), Douthwaite (2000), Tammilehto (2003), p. 16-19. 
494 Weisbrot, Baker, Naiman, Neta (2001), p. 8., Tammilehto (2003), p. 16-19.
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they almost certainly are due to measurement errors. On the other hand, there 
may also be systematic errors in the data. Those countries and periods where the 
poor fared really badly are most likely missing from the data because when the 
resources of a very poor country have been too few to reach the poor, it is likely 
that there have been no resources to conduct surveys, either. 
A third systematic error may arise from the fact that the Dollar-Kraay study 
does not take into account how during bad times the number of people in a 
household often rises, when e.g. young adults do not move away from (or when 
they move back to) their parents’ homes, and the elderly people increasingly move 
to their children’s place because of poverty. Thus inspite of a recorded rise in 
incomes per household, the incomes per capita may, in fact, have fallen. 
For the fourth, it is also controversial if the increase in monetary income of 
the poor measures the decrease in poverty.495 
For the fifth, the results are in contradiction with many other studies that 
show that especially in poor countries and especially after year 1980 both 
the economy and inequality have grown side by side.496 Further, according to 
Easterly’s study,497 the structural adjustment loans had decreased substantially 
the connection between growth and the incomes of the poor. One is then left 
to wonder, what ‘policies’ Dollar and Kraay referred to when they wrote about 
‘policy-induced growth’. At least their World Bank colleague William Easterly, 
the head of the Bank’s growth research unit, found “no evidence for a direct effect of 
structural adjustment on growth”. Instead, he found that the poor population groups 
had benefited less from the output expansion (growth) in those countries which 
had received many adjustment loans from the Bretton Woods institutions (and 
probably had also followed satisfactorily the policy packages prescribed by the 
Washington-based advisers) than in countries with few adjustment loans (and 
probably weaker loyalty to the Washington-based policy advice.)
5.10 the eluSive QueSt FoR gRoWth  
So, after Stiglitz, Kanbur and Vandermoortele & Delamonica,498 now Bill Easterly 
was the problem for the orthodoxy of mainstream economists in Washington 
D.C. He ‘failed’ to find the evidence he was expected to, and worse: he declared it 
publicly! Having spent 16 (structural adjustment) years (1985-2001) in the World 
Bank’s growth research department Easterly wrote and published a book by the 
495 Douthwaite (2000) and Weisbrot, Baker, Naiman, Neta (2001). See also: Bourguignon (2004), p. 3.
496 See e.g. UNCTAD (1997), Cornia (2001). 
497 Easterly (2002b).
498 The orthodoxy could not threaten Vandermoortele and Delamonica, because they were employees 
of the UNDP and Unicef, respectively. Jan Vandemoortele is a Belgian national who holds a Ph.D. in 
Development Economics. He later joined UNDP as Principal Adviser and Group Leader on Social 
Development. Since 1995, he worked with UNICEF where he headed Policy Analysis.  Between 1991-
94, he served with UNDP as Senior Economist in Malawi/Zambia as well as with the Regional Bureau 
for Africa in New York. Prior to that, he worked for 12 years for the ILO, mostly in Africa. Enrique 
Delamonica works for Unicef, and is attached also to the New York University.
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name: “The Elusive Quest for Growth – Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures 
in the Tropics”. The book was highly critical, but officially that was not a prob-
lem, because Easterly had asked for an official permission from the World Bank 
leadership for publishing it. Yet, he made one mistake: He wrote an article to the 
Financial Times (4 July, 2001) about his book, having not asked for a permission 
for that from his superiors in the World Bank. In the article Easterly argued that 
aid financing, including US$1 trillion (£685 billion) in World Bank and IMF loans 
had failed to achieve their targets of poverty alleviation.499 Showing admirable 
determination, the Washington-based orthodoxy latched onto this opportunity: 
As a result, Easterly was fired.
Dollar and Kraay were again ordered to provide evidence in support of the 
conventional Washington Consensus wisdom according to which “openness to 
foreign trade benefits the poor” to the same extent that it benefits the whole economy. 
And so they did. In addition they found out that avoidance of high inflation in fact 
is ‘super pro-poor’:  that is, high inflation is more harmful to the income of the poor 
than to GDP overall. In contrast they found no evidence that formal democratic 
institutions or public spending on health and education have systematic effects 
on incomes of the poor.500
Dani Rodrick, professor of international political economy at Harvard 
University immediately bashed Dollar and Kraay’s arguments: Rodrick explained 
that Dollar and Kraay had selected their sample countries unacceptably arbitrarily. 
They had combined policy measures (tariff averages) with an outcome (import/
GDP) measure, which is conceptually inappropriate. They had also deliberately 
biased their results by using different base years for calculating changes in tariffs 
and trade volumes. They had – for some reason – excluded one country that should 
have been on their list of ‘globalizers’. Inclusion of that country, Columbia, would 
have weakened Dollar and Kraay’s results. On the other hand, they had included 
in their list 6 countries (out of 18) that did not fit the stated criteria. Rodrick then 
went on to perform the same tests as Dollar and Kraay, but without making those 
arbitrary choices that had biased Dollar and Kraay’s selection of the country sam-
ples, and – alas – Rodrick got results that provided “no support” to Dollar and 
Kraay’s hypothesis that ‘globalizers’ had done significantly better economically 
than other nations. Rodrick then asked what we could learn from regression stud-
ies such as Dollar and Kraay’s, where trade/GDP is used as regressor. Rodrick’s 
answer was: “Essentially nothing, unless we assume the result we are testing for.” This 
is, because trade and incomes are both endogenous (outcome variables).501 
499 Easterly (2002). See also Easterly in Websources. 
500 Dollar and Kraay first presented their arguments in a paper presented at the conference on “Poverty 
and the International Economy,” sponsored by Globkom (Parliamentary Commission fo r Swedish 
Policy on Global Development) and the World Bank, October 20-21, 2000, Stockholm, Sweden. A 
slightly revised version of the paper is available at Dollar and Kraay _ Trade openness in Websources.  See 
also Dollar and Kraay’s article in Finance and Development, IMF’s quarterly magazine (2001), and Kevin 
Watkins’s critical counter-argument, also on the pages of IMF’s Finance and Development. 
501 See Rodrick in Websources.  
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The bottom line of Rodrick’s comment was that: (a) The analysis in Dollar and 
Kraay’s paper was extremely misleading, (b) There was no evidence that rapid/
deep trade liberalizers were doing any better than other countries (and some 
evidence to the contrary), (c) The cross-country evidence was consistent with 
the hypothesis that the quality of institutions was the driving force behind both 
trade and incomes; (d) Dollar and Kraay’s claims regarding the beneficial effects 
of trade liberalization on poverty “have to be seen as statements based on faith rather 
than evidence.”
Ravi Kanbur had been at pains trying to stress that policy-makers should 
not base their decisions on general formulae such as the Washington Consensus 
‘package’ and on flawed methodologies such as cross-country regressions502 
based on questionable and incommensurable statistical data from various coun-
tries, but that they should instead examine the country-specific, detailed, disag-
gregated impacts of various policy choices on different population groups of each 
individual country.503 
5.11 the NAtuRe oF DiSAgReemeNtS 
Ravi Kanbur has understandably been often asked to explain, retrospective-
ly, what actually were the root causes of disagreements between himself and 
Summers (and the rest of the ‘neoliberal orthodoxy’ in Washington D.C.). Upon a 
request by the Swedish Parliamentary Commission on Globalisation (‘Globkom’) 
Kanbur wrote a paper on “Economic Policy, Distribution and Poverty: The Nature of 
Disagreement”, plus a shortened version of the same for the WIDER.504  Kanbur’s 
message is not surprising for the critics of the World Bank and the IMF in various 
civil society organisations, but his words are clearly targeted at his fellow poverty 
economists  who may have problems understanding why the Governors of the 
World Bank and the IMF – organisations whose self-stated mission is to do good, 
i.e. to reduce poverty – could only meet under police protection, under siege by 
protestors who believe that the policies the IMF and the Bank harm the poor and 
espouse benefit only the rich and powerful.505
The street demonstrations that accompanied global summits around the 
Millennium Turn can be easily but mistakenly dismissed as being unrepresentative. 
But, as Kanbur reminds his economist colleagues (on the basis of his exposure to 
502 Nobel-economist Joseph Stiglitz calls the cross-country regressions “a flawed methodology”. See 
Stiglitz (2001),p. 3.
503 Encouragingly, also Nicholas Stern, who followed Joseph Stiglitz as World Bank Chief Economist 
– in his key note speech at the World Bank’s Annual Bank Conference on Development Economics 
for Europe (ABCDE-Europe) in 2002 - made a plea for a methodological shift from statistical cross-
country regressions to micro-level studies based on country-specific evidence. Source: Castren Tuukka, 
personal communication. 
504 Kanbur (2000, 2001).‘WIDER’ is ‘World Institute for Development Economics Research’, a UN-
University research institute based in Helsinki, Finland.
505 Kanbur (2000, 2001), p. 3. For an example of the – sometimes rather innovative, I should say - 
language and action used by the ‘internet-guerillas’ in their fight against the World Bank , the IMF 
and the WTO, see Anti World Bank internet-guerillas in Websources.  
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the diversity of views expressed during the WDR-consultations), the street demon-
strations are only the tip of a whole iceberg of disagreement that includes vigorous 
debate in the leading newspapers, passionate involvement of faith based organisa-
tions, and the genteel cut and thrust of academic discourse.506 “The real question is 
why”, Kanbur asks “why are there such deep disagreements on key aspects of economic 
policy despite seeming consensus about priority of poverty reduction among objectives?”
Kanbur argues that the reasons lie deep in the perspective and frameworks 
of analysis adopted by different groups. To simplify matters (and, as he says, “in 
full recognition of the fine texture of differences and individual views”) he considers 
two groups: A and B, characterized as the ‘Finance Ministry’ and ‘Civil Society’ 
tendencies.
In Group A, labelled ‘Finance Ministry’ would obviously be some who worked 
in finance ministries in the North, and in the South. It would include primarily 
economists and other economic analysts, economic policy managers and opera-
tional managers in the international financial institutions, IFIs. A key constituent 
would be the financial press, particularly in the North507 but also in the South. 
Finally, one would include many, though not all, academic economists trained 
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition. Group A types tend to believe that the cause of 
poverty reduction is best served by rapid adjustment to fiscal imbalances, rapid 
adjustment to lower inflation and external deficits and the use of high interest 
rates to achieve these ends, internal and external financial sector liberalization, 
deregulation of capital controls, deep and rapid privatisation of state owned en-
terprises and, perhaps the strongest unifying factor in this group – a rapid and 
major opening up of an economy to trade and foreign direct investment.508 
On each of these issues, Group B types tend to lean the other way. The Group 
B could be labelled ‘Civil Society’. This group would obviously include analysts 
and advocates in the full range of advocacy and operational NGO’s. There would 
also be people who worked in some of the UN specialized agencies, in aid minis-
tries in the North and social sector ministries in the South. Amongst academics, 
non-economists would tend to fall into this group. Among my readers, I would 
assume most of the social policy professionals and other professionals of care to 
intuitively position themselves closer to the Group B than Group A.509
Before exploring the disagreements between these groups, Kanbur records what 
he had during the WDR-consultations experienced as growing areas of agreement 
and consensus: e.g. such areas as international public goods, the importance of edu-
cation and health, the key role of institutions, plus the recognition that both the 
markets as well as the state can fail. However, these growing areas of agreement 
throw into sharp relief the remaining deep disagreements on economic policy, 
distribution and poverty. Much of the reason lies, Kanbur analysed, in three key 
features characterizing assessments of economic policy, distribution and poverty: 
(a) Aggregation; (b) Time Horizon, and (c) Market Power.
506 For high quality Bretton Woods –critical analyses, see World Bank critical NGOs in Websources.  
507 E.g. The Economist, and the Financial Times.
508 Kanbur (2000, 2001), p.3-4. 
509 SPP = Social Policy Professional, POC = Professional of Care.
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5.11.1 Aggregation 
First, Group A tends to view the consequences of economic policy in much more 
aggregative terms than does Group B. The ‘Treasury economists’, in their typical 
way of focusing on the ‘national economy’, often fail to see the ‘society’ and its 
various sub-categories. When talking poverty, they focus on national measures 
of poverty. It happens quite regularly, Kanbur points out however, that improve-
ments in national level statistics hide a worsening for large sections of the popula-
tion. This was the case, for example, in the Chiapas region in Mexico in the early 
1990s. Just looking at the national income/expenditure statistics (which improved) 
could not have predicted the rebellion that was to come from Chiapas. And for a 
local official or an NGO working with the increasingly poor indigenous peoples 
in Chiapas, it is cold comfort to be told, “but national poverty has gone down.” A 
similar story can be told about gender based disaggregation, and other groupings 
based on ethnicity and race. 
The income/expenditure statistics, for instance, fail to capture the value of pub-
lic services. So, it is quite possible for public services to worsen considerably and 
yet for this effect to not show up in the income-expenditure based measures of 
poverty incidence. If the bus service that takes a woman from her village to her 
sister’s village is cancelled, it will not show up in these measures. If the health 
post in the slum runs out of drugs, it will not show up. If the primary school text 
books disappear, or if the teacher does not turn up to teach, it will not show up. 
But those with ground level operations and personnel will pick these up. And 
to them, as well as to the poor, the claim that poverty has gone down will ring 
hollow. None of this is to say that it is not useful to calculate nationally repre-
sentative, household survey based, income-expenditure poverty measures. It is 
simply to say that focusing on them solely misses out on disaggregated detail 
which others can help to fill in, and which influences the perceptions and as-
sessments of these others.510
Still another frequently appreciated disconnect relates to aggregation: The 
work horse poverty concept of Group A analysts is the incidence of poverty - 
the percentage of the total population below some poverty line, say one dol-
lar per person per day. This is the concept the poverty economists instinctively 
go for, Kanbur admits. For example, the first among the several Millennium 
Development Goals, broadly accepted by donor agencies, is to halve by 2015 the 
incidence of income poverty (incomes below $1/day). But analysts and especially 
advocates and operational types in Group B instinctively think of the absolute 
numbers of poor as the criterion. The potential for disconnect should be clear. 
In Ghana, for example, while the incidence of poverty was falling at around one 
percentage point per year between 1987 to 1991, the total population was growing 
at almost twice that rate, with the result that the absolute number of poor, even us-
ing the standard income-expenditure based measure, grew sizably. Think again 
of the local NGO with ground level operations. If the number of people turning 
up to soup kitchens, the number of homeless indigents who have to be provided 
510 Kanbur (2000, 2001), p. 7.
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shelters, the number of street children, increases, then those who work in these 
organizations can, quite rightly from their perspective, argue that poverty has 
gone up. That the incidence of poverty has fallen is of little relevance to them, 
and to be told repeatedly and insistently that poverty has fallen is bound to lead 
to difficulties in communication and dialogue.511 
5.11.2 Time Horizons 
Second, Group B’s major concerns are with the consequences over a time horizon 
which is both much shorter and much longer than the ‘medium term’ horizon 
(five to seven years) which the economists in the Group A typically adopt. For 
those who work with the daily realities of poor people’s lives, and for the poor 
themselves, short run survival trumps medium term benefits every time, if the 
family is actually at the edge of survival. Many in Group A now accept this and 
support safety nets in general terms. However, they would nevertheless want to 
press ahead with economic reforms even if safety nets were not immediately in 
place, anticipating the medium term benefits. Over the long term of fifty to a hun-
dred years, many in Group B fear the environmental consequences of unchecked 
economic growth.512 The poverty economists of Group A, while agreeing that 
specific ‘corrections’ are called for, are essentially ‘techno-optimists’ (Kanbur’s 
term) pointing to history to argue that predicted environmental disasters have 
not actually come to pass. 
Group B members fear that the mainstream economists and policy makers 
only recognize those momentous environmental catastrophes that make news 
in the CNN (such as: Chernobyl, Harrisburg, Bhopal, El Niño, Hurrican Mitch, 
etc). Group B members emphasize that most of the environmental catastrophes 
have been slow processes, that have already irreversibly destroyed the livelihood 
potential of present and future generations of people and other creatures, e.g. 
the global climatic change; ozone depletion; accumulation of nuclear wastes that 
nobody knows how to de-activate but the next ten thousand generations will have 
to live with; the deforestation of the Amazonas and many other rainforests of 
the world; the contamination of Ogoni-land by oil companies; the creation of an 
absolutely unsustainable model of fossile-fuel-dependent human settlements and 
transportation systems in the USA and other societies, and the highly destructive 
impact that this ‘one-man-one-car’ role model has on the poorer societies who try 
to ‘develop’ to reach to that ‘American Dream’. 
511 Kanbur (2000, 2001), p. 9.
512 In reality, serious environmental destruction has resulted from ‘successful’ economic growth policies, 
for instance in South East Asia, even over much shorter time periods. The past 15 years of fast economic 
growth, without decent environmental regulation, have resulted in dramatic air pollution in South 
East Asia. Economics still lacks the methods to measure the balance of individual ‘utility gains’ and 
‘losses’  in a situation where the increasingly enriched people in the cities of South East Asia no longer 
can walk or ride their bikes – or motor-bikes – on the streets without wearing a breathing mask. 
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5.11.3 Market Structure and Power 
As Kanbur says, undoubtedly the most potent difference in perspectives centres 
about structure and power. The implicit framework of Group A poverty econo-
mists in thinking through the consequences of economic policy on distribution 
and poverty is the abstract economics textbook model of a competitive market 
structure of a large number of small agents interacting without market power 
over each other. The instinctive picture that Group B has of market structure is 
one riddled with market power wielded by agents in the large and in the small. 
This is true whether they are talking about the power of big corporations in the 
market place or in negotiating with governments, or of the power of the local 
moneylender in determining usurious rates of interest in the village economy. 
They see the formulation and implementation of economic policy as being in-
fluenced by real agents with market power, and they see policy feeding through 
to real life consequences through a market structure, which is not genuinely 
competitive.513
The immediate response of the Group A poverty economists to the suggestion 
that openness in trade, for example, might hurt the poor in poor countries is to (im-
plicitly or explicitly) invoke the basic text book theorems of trade theory. Opening 
up an economy to trade will - in theory - benefit the more abundant factor because 
this factor will be relatively cheap and opening up will increase demand for this 
factor overall. Since unskilled labour is the factor abundant in poor countries, 
opening up is supposed to benefit unskilled labour and hence the poor. Leaving 
aside the fact that this is a theory of medium term equilibrium, and thus subject 
to the disagreements discussed in the previous section, it is also a theory based 
on competitive product and factor markets. In particular, if local product and 
factor markets are segmented, because of poor infrastructure or because of the 
local monopoly power of middlemen and moneylenders, the simple theory will 
not go through quite so simply, Kanbur notes. 
Another example is capital mobility. Leaving to one side the question of port-
folio capital, where Group A has itself moved to a more cautious stance since 
the financial crises of the late 1990s, there is the issue of mobility of invest-
ment capital. A very strong belief in Group B that Kanbur had come across in 
the WDR-2000 consultations was that increased mobility of investment capital 
makes workers in both receiving and sending countries worse off. Such a view 
is derided by Group A analysts as being incoherent - “How can you say that when 
capital leaves the US it hurts US workers, and when it gets to Mexico it hurts Mexican 
workers as well?!” 
Of course in a theoretical framework with perfectly competitive markets (a 
situation that exists nowhere in the real world), it is indeed incoherent to suggest 
that increased capital mobility makes workers worse off everywhere. At most it 
will make workers in only one country worse off. Moreover, since with mobil-
ity capital will move to the highest return, this is more efficient so the gainers 
could – in theory - more than afford to compensate the loser, if such a mecha-
513 Kanbur (2000, 2001), p. 11. 
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nism existed. But such compensation mechanisms exist nowhere outside the 
imaginable theoretical world of neoclassical economics.514 Social safety nets and 
development assistance are the closest – but very imperfect – real-world proxies. 
Besides, neither the goods, services, capital nor (especially) the labour markets 
are perfectly competitive. None of the poverty economists in Group A seem to 
advocate the full liberalisation of migration controls for poor country citizens 
willing to take our rich country jobs. Rather, increasingly mobile capital and im-
mobile labour bargain in each country over wages and employment. The deregu-
lation of capital mobility has increased the bargaining power of capital relative to 
immobile labour, making workers in both countries worse off relative to capital. 
This is how the Group B sees it, but the Group A replies that ‘theoretically’ things 
should not be so, and the cycle of non-dialogue goes on. But thinking through the 
distributional consequences of economic policies when market structures are not 
competitive, in the small or in the large, will be needed before the framework of 
Group A can be made to speak to the concerns of Group B.515
5.12 gRoWth  – AS AN iNCReASe iN emploYmeNt, 
pRoDuCtivitY, pRoDuCtioN AND iNComeS, oR AS 
A StANDARD ‘mARKet-FRieNDlY’ poliCY pACKAge 
The word ‘growth’ had been one of the most immediately divisive words in the 
WDR-consultations facilitated by Kanbur and his team. The poverty economists 
of Group A had accused Group B of being ‘anti-growth’, and Group B had charac-
terized Group A as being victims of a ‘growth-mania’. In Kanbur’s view, this disa-
greement was an unfortunate misunderstanding, caused by the two completely 
different connotations given to the word ‘growth’. In some situations, the word 
‘growth’ is used in its common sense meaning of ‘an increase in real national 
production and per capita income’, but in other situations it is used as a proxy of 
a particular economic and social policy package. This package is ‘growth oriented 
policies’ as seen by the poverty economists of Group A and ‘economic policies 
which hurt the poor’, as seen by Group B.
Very few in Group B would in fact argue that the disastrous impact on poverty 
of the East Asia crisis had nothing to do with the collapse of per capita income 
there (i.e. negative growth). In general, the disagreements between A and B are 
not about economic growth in its common sense meaning – nobody (or almost 
nobody) is against an increase in per capita income. The real disputes are about 
the distribution of this growth, its costs, including its long run consequences for the 
514 Mainstream economic theory normally uses the utilitarian principle of ‘Pareto improvement’ to 
explain away this dilemma. The solution at the level of ‘cost benefit analyses’ is – in theory – the 
‘compensation principle’, i.e. to use distributionally sensitive weights to evaluate the gains and losses 
of a project or a policy. Most often than not the pragmatic solution is, however, to simply ignore 
distributional considerations and simply to calculate the aggregate gains of the project or policy. 
Kanbur thus prefers to call the ‘compensation principle’ by the name ‘compensation in principle’. Kanbur 
(2002b).
515 Kanbur (2000, 2001), p. 12.
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environment and the social fabric, and about which kinds of policy packages actu-
ally get you equitable and sustainable economic growth. 
The tendency among some poverty economists in Group A (Kanbur does not 
mention Dollar and Kraay by name) to try to show the strong correlation between 
poverty reduction and increases in per capita income (a correlation which few 
would doubt), and then to criticize those in Group B as being ‘anti-growth’ is 
unfortunate, Kanbur writes. The disagreements are not about the correlation,516 
but about the policy packages.
Given these deep differences, the way forward should go through mutual un-
derstanding and comprehension, Kanbur believes. Unfortunately, many on both 
sides are adopting the stance of negotiation rather than dialogue. 517  Kanbur’s focus 
is mainly on the attitudes and strategies of Group A, his professional poverty 
economist colleagues: Especially since the street riots organised by the various 
anti-globalisation movements in Seattle at the occasion of the WTO-Summit, a 
“line in the sand – this far, not further” –mentality seems to have gripped influential 
elements of Group A – in the International Financial Institutions (IFIs), in the 
WTO, in the G7 Treasuries, in the financial press, and among some in the aca-
demia. “Give them an inch of nuance and they’ll take a mile of protection”, seems to be 
the mindset. This is unfortunate, Kanbur deplores: “Trying to understand legitimate 
alternative views on economic policy, being open and nuanced in messages rather than 
closed and hard, is not only good analytics, it is good politics as well.” 518 - History is 
clearly not at an end.
516 Although there are serious disagreements about the methodologies used by Dollar and Kraay, as 
we have seen above.
517 Raj Patel, a left-wing intellectual from the USA (and definitely a member of ‘Group B’), comments 
Kanbur’s constructive suggestions with sympathy, but also with criticism. Patel, who in fact had 
studied under Kanbur, and who commends him as “one of the nicest and smartest people I’ve ever met”, 
disputes Kanbur’s claims about “a great deal of agreement between bankers and their critics” and about 
the chances of “a mutually acceptable compromise through dialogue”. Patel gives four reasons for his 
doubts: (1) Kanbur exaggerates the extent of consensus because of selection bias: During the WDR-
consultations Kanbur had been in contact only with those ‘co-opted’ NGOs who are ideologically 
prepared to work with the Bank. That selection, in Patel’s view, is not representative of the wider 
world of social movements and NGOs. (2) ‘Political preferences’ (Kanbur’s wording) are signs of 
stubborn convictions, and therefore far less reconcilable than Kanbur seems to assume. (3) Bankers 
talk softly and carry big sticks: Central bankers, in Patel’s view have a great deal of power, and strong 
ideologies. The dialogue between them and the millions of grassroots critics is an undemocratic, 
unaccountable and (hence) illegitimate dialogue. The views of the peasant farmers in Karnataka and 
landless peasants in Brazil count for little in that dialogue, although they number millions. (4) History 
doesn’t dialogue: Kanbur in his paper contrasts confrontation – “a sign of irrational, frustrated rage” – 
with dialogue – “a symptom of equanimity, reasonableness, preparedness to compromise”. Yet, Patel claims, 
confrontation is much more important than Kanbur allows. It has always been through confrontation 
that certain politics become possible. Dialogue happens after the fact. In Patel’s view Kanbur mistakes 
policy change as the consequence of dialogue, rather than as a cause of it. See Raj Patel in Websources. 
518 Kanbur (2000, 2001), p. 15-16.
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5.13 AFteR All the SCANDAlS – WhAt BeCAme 
oF the WoRlD BANK’S StRAtegY FoR poveRtY 
ReDuCtioN iN the 3RD milleNNium ? 
At Ravi Kanbur’s request, two NGOs – the Bretton Woods Project and New 
Policy Institute – had run a moderated e-mail conference to discuss the first 
draft text of the WDR-2000 that had been disseminated in January 2000 through 
the World Bank’s web-page – for the first time ever. The electronic conference 
had attracted 1,523 participants from over 80 countries. Many respondents had 
felt that the draft WDR 2000 reflected real progress compared to its predecessors, 
with an increased examination of the non-income dimensions of poverty and 
recognition of insecurity, voicelessness and powerlessness. It had moved be-
yond national average figures on poverty incidence to examine the many factors 
that influence poverty outcomes for vulnerable population groups. A number 
of contributors had, however, urged the WDR to be bolder in its conclusions, 
particularly on the ‘political obstacles’ to implementing pro-poor policies, and 
the need for a ‘rights-based approach’ to press Northern countries to do more on 
trade and environmental degradation. In his 19 May, 2000, response to the e-mail 
conference, Ravi Kanbur had said that his team was looking to strengthen their 
lines on some of these issues, in particular to…”revise the concluding recommenda-
tions to bring global actions to center stage”. 
Alex Wilks, Coordinator of the Bretton Woods Project, commented in June-
2000, soon after Kanbur had announced his resignation: 
“The resignation of the lead author of this flagship Bank report confirms our view that 
the World Bank is unable to accept dissenting views, whether from insiders or outsiders. 
Coming soon after Joe Stiglitz departed as Chief Economist this is a major blow for an in-
stitution trying to position itself as a ‘Knowledge Bank’ and a ‘Listening Bank’.519 It raises 
questions of who really calls the shots at the Bank and what evidence or opinions about the 
impacts of globalisation they are trying to suppress.”520
Reading the WDR-2000 retrospectively – after these ‘political obstacles’ – it ap-
pears, however, that Larry Summers and his ‘orthodox neoliberal partners’ inter-
vened too late in the process to be able to change the major thrust of the World 
Bank’s Poverty Reduction Strategy for the first decade of the 3rd Millennium: The 
major change, compared to Kanbur’s first draft (See Figure 11 above), was that 
in the final version (See Figure 12 below), the ‘opportunity pillar’ comes first, 
519 Here Wilks refers to a public statement made by James D. Wolfensohn, the President of the World 
Bank, in the internet-based ‘Development Forum – Speaker’s Corner’ of the Bank, where Wolfensohn 
admitted that even if the Bank were to become a ‘Knowledge Bank’ (which was his aim), the Bank 
could not know everything, and the knowledge that would help the Bank’s clients in a specific case 
might be knowledge that the Bank staff themselves do not have. Therefore, Wolfensohn urged, the 
Bank staff will need to learn to listen, to learn from its clients, from other development agencies, from 
NGOs with extensive field experience, as well as from the Bank’s partners in the private sector. See 
World Bank – Listening Bank in Websources. See also Mallaby (2004).
520 Bretton Woods Project (2000a). 
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leaving ‘empowerment’ and ‘security’ behind, although the (final) text explicitly 
states that “there is no hierarchy of importance” (between these three elements). And 
further the final published version said:
“The elements are deeply complementary. Each part of the strategy affects underlying 
causes of poverty addressed by the other two. For example, promoting opportunity through 
assets and market access increases the independence of poor people and thus empowers them 
by strengthening their bargaining position relative to state and society. It also enhances 
security, since an adequate stock of assets is a buffer against adverse shocks. 
Similarly, strengthening democratic institutions and empowering women and disadvan-
taged ethnic and racial groups – say, by eliminating legal discrimination against them 
– expand the economic opportunities for the poor and socially excluded. Strengthening or-
ganizations of poor people can help to ensure service delivery and policy choices responsive 
to the needs of poor people and can reduce corruption and arbitrariness in state actions as 
well. And if poor people do more in monitoring and controlling the local delivery of social 
services, public spending is more likely to help them during crises. 
Finally, helping poor people cope with shocks and manage risks puts them in a better posi-
tion to take advantage of emerging market opportunities. That is why this report advo-
cates a comprehensive approach to attacking poverty.” 521
This is clearly Ravi Kanbur’s text, based on the holistic ‘Comprehensive 
Development Framework’ thinking, by Jim Wolfensohn and Joseph Stiglitz. 
Where the ‘firefighters’ of the neoliberal mainstream position, David Dollar and 
Aart Kraay, managed to leave their mark in the final version of the WDR-2000, 
was in the contents of the ‘Opportunity’ chapters of the report where they force-
fully imposed the ‘Orthodox Truth’ about the unconditional blessings of eco-
nomic growth and open markets.
The ‘opportunities’ Kanbur and his team had wanted to discuss (according to 
their ‘Approach and Outline on WDR 2000’522  from September 1999) were the op-
portunities “in which the poor people participate fully”523, whereas Summers, Dollar 
and Kraay imposed on the final version a standard neo-liberal discussion about 
‘overall growth’, the opportunities of non-poor private investors and the benefits of 
export orientation and opening the capital account.524 
Kanbur had wanted to “investigate the requirements for sustainable economic 
expansion and human development in which the poor participate fully”, and he had 
concluded that “private sector and market oriented activity indeed is a key factor in 
increasing income earning opportunities for the poor”. In some cases such activity 
521 World Bank (2001a), p. 7. See also p. vi and p. 40.
522 World Bank (1999e), p. 20.
523 Compare this with the definition of “pro-poor growth” of the OECD POVNET Guideline on Pro-
Poor Growth six year later: “Pro-Poor Growth is growth that (also) poor people participate in, contribute 
to and benefit from.” See: Section 6.12 of this book. 
524 World Bank (20001a), p. 8
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requires liberalization of state controls that hold the poor back. In other cases – ac-
cording to Kanbur’s draft – it requires state intervention to encourage pro-poor 
market responses. 
OPPOrtUNitY EMPOWErMENt sECUritY iNtErNAtiONAL 
ACtiONs
-	Pro-Poor	Growth -	Responsive	Public		
Administration
-	Social	Risk	
Management…
-	Market	Access	in	Rich	
Countries
-	Inequality	and	
Redistribution
-	Rule	of	Law
-	Household	
Responses -	Reducing	Global	
Volatility
-	Markets
-	Decentralization -	Policy	Responses
-	Pro-Poor	International	
Public	Goods
-	Assets -	Eliminating	Gender	
Discrimination
-	Reducing	
Vulnerability	to… -	Voice	for	the	Poor	in	
Global	Forums
-	Governance	and	
Accountability -	Social	Fragmentation	
and	Conflict
-	Economic	Crises -	Making	Aid	Effective	in	
Reducing	Poverty
-	Building	Social			
		Capital
-	Natural	disasters
-	Relieving	the	Debt	
Burden
Figure 12. The Multi-Dimensional Framework of Poverty as Presented in the World 
Bank’s World Development Report 2000. Final version 2001.
For Kanbur, the key was to build up the assets of the poor and to increase the rate 
of return to these assets (e.g. land, physical capital and human capital, such as 
education, health and family planning, as well as public goods such as infrastruc-
ture or environmental assets.) Within the overall framework of an asset-based 
approach to increasing income opportunities for the poor, Kanbur had wanted to 
investigate issues such as land, credit, infrastructure, education, health, environ-
ment and rural/urban strategies. His focus was on the interconnections between 
these, and the links not only to  ‘opportunity’ but also to ‘empowerment’ and 
‘security’. Kanbur’s focus was on the political economy of these strategies, and on 
implementation in such a way that the poor really do benefit from policies and 
interventions.525
The tone of the ‘opportunities’ chapter of the WDR-2000 turned out rather 
different in the hands of the neoliberal fire-fighters, after Kanbur’s resignation: 
The priorities for them were “encouraging effective private investment”, “expanding 
into international markets” and “infrastructure and knowledge”.  Kanbur’s headlines 
“building the assets of poor people” and “addressing asset inequalities across gender, 
ethnic, racial, and social divides” were, however, not completely erased, but were 
preceded by the ‘more important’ issues such as “reducing risk for private investors”, 
“expanding access to Internet technology”, “organizing export fairs”, “training in modern 
525 World Bank (1999e), p. 20.
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business practices”, “deregulation and complementary institutional reform”, “opening 
trade and capital accounts – preferably through fast liberalization”526
The point of view, the style and even the vocabulary are so different in the 
texts written after Kanbur’s ousting, compared to the ones written by Kanbur, 
that a reader can rather easily recognize the ‘add-ons’ – and ignore them, if she/he 
likes to. Save for the imposed sections, the WDR-2000 is still in my view one of the 
most interesting and encouraging texts ever published by the World Bank. On the 
other hand, it is fair to say that most of the points that were ‘new’ to the Bank in 
year 2001, had already been discussed by the UNDP in its Human Development 
Reports, especially the ones from years 1990 and 1997.527
The final, published version of the World Bank’s World Development Report 
2000528 proposes a strategy for attacking poverty in four ways: promoting op-
portunity, facilitating empowerment, enhancing security, and through international 
action. (See Figure 12 above):
5.14 the eSSeNtiAl meSSAgeS oF WDR-2000 
In my reading, the essential messages of the World Development Report 2000 are 
the following: 
1. Equality is good for growth;
2. Redistribution is good for efficiency;
3. Gender equality is an essential element of poverty reduction. Active measures 
are required at least in the following areas:529
(a) The political sphere: representation, input to policy and project design, 
legal rights, civic education; political gender quotas; gender budget-
ing;
(b) The economic sphere: access to property (incl. land), non-discrimina-
tion in the labour market; gender-focused job-training;
(c) The household sphere: in marriage, dicorce and inheritance   
(d) The social sphere: reproductive rights and services, out-of-home child 
care, time-saving infrastructure (water, power, transportation);
(e) The protective sphere: gender-aware public works, safety nets, control 
of domestic violence, survivors’s benefits and old-age security;
4. Helping poor people manage risk is an essential part of poverty reduction;
526 World Bank (2001a), p. 8.
527 UNDP (1990, 1997). As we already discussed earlier in this book, the 1997 Human Development 
Report was based on the kind of multi-dimensional concept of poverty that the economics professor 
and Nobel Laureate Amartya Sen (one of UNDP’s academic advisers) has advocated over the past 20 
years. The HDR–1997 focused on the following six priorities for action to eradicate poverty:               (1) 
Empowerment and participation; (2) Gender equality; (3) Pro-poor growth (‘pro-poor’ defined as: full 
employment, lesser inequality, LDC priority, rural priority); (4) Pro-poor globalization; (5) Pro-poor state 
policies and markets; (6) Debt relief, aid and market access to rich country markets.
528 World Bank (2001b). See also WDR-2000 in Websources.
529 This point 3 is partly based on another World Bank publication ‘Engendering Development’, World 
Bank (2001i). 
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5. Risk management should focus on risk reduction and mitigation, rather than 
only on coping (i.e. safety nets, as suggested by WDR-1990);
6. Typical livelihood risks of the poor are: illness, injury, crime, domestic violence, 
old age, harvest failure, fluctuations in food prices and demand for labour;
7. Typical responses by the poor are: diversification of sources of income, using 
savings, networks of mutual support, child labour, migration, selling assets, re-
ducing consumption;
8. Market-based insurance does not serve the poor well – the state has a special role 
in providing or regulating insurance and safety nets for the poor;
9. Public works are an effective approach to social protection for the poor at times 
of crisis;
10. Social protection programmes should be in place on a permanent basis so that 
they can be scaled up when a shock occurs;
11. Allowing the rich and middle-class to participate in risk management pro-
grammes and showing that insurance is less costly than other poverty reduction 
efforts can boost political support for publicly funded mechanisms;
12. Public risk mitigation will succeed only if poor people have a channel for dia-
logue with government on issues of risk and vulnerability;
13. Poverty reduction starts with ‘Livelihood Security’, i.e.
(a) Knowing that the family will have enough to eat tomorrow;
(b) Knowing that if we get sick, we shall get care;
(c) Trusting that nobody is going to steal my land, cattle, tools;
(d) Trusting that contracts hold in business;
(e) Daring to take risk, invest, and use one’s ‘enterprising spirit’
(f) Realizing the benefits of networking;
(g) Learning to understand – and to use, and to defend – civic rights, rule 
of law and democracy (= self-empowerment)
14. The bottom line is, that security requires:
(a) An effective, developmental state with recognized citizens’ rights;530
(b) A democratic and participatory local government;
(c) Social capital at the community, national and global levels
5.15 ALUTA CONTINUA – mixeD CommitmeNt 
oF the BANK to the WDR-2000     
In retrospect, the ‘Official Truth about Poverty Reduction’, as presented in the 
World Bank’s World Development Report 2000 represented remarkable concep-
tual progress. It converged, conceptually, well with the ‘Official Truths’ of the 
United Nations (UN) and of the OECD-DAC, and  gave evidence of the existence 
of a Millennium Consensus among (several of) the world’s most competent poverty 
economists working for the leading intergovernmental organisations. 
530 ‘Rights’ as an explicit concept and as a strategy was probably the most serious missing element in 
the WDR-2000.
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Yet, conceptual progress alone does not make a difference in the lives of poor 
people, unless the new conceptual frames are also broadly internalised among 
the aid agency staff and put into practice in the day-to-day planning, financing, 
management and monitoring operations of the grant and credit-giving develop-
ment agencies. As we learned already in Chapter-3 (Proposition-2) the degree of 
operationalization depends on the will and capacity of the leadership and staff as 
well as on the malleability of the organizational culture. 
In the case of the World Bank, the key messages of the WDR-2000 served the 
needs of the Bank’s top leadership and external communications extremely well, 
but encountered substantial resistance internally among a large proportion of 
the nearly 10.000 economists of the Bank, most of them of the ‘orthodox’ neoclas-
sical variety. Yet, ‘aluta continua’ – the fight goes on: There are also several bril-
liant champions supporting – and fighting for - the broader and more heterodox 
agenda of Kanbur & co. within the World Bank.531 
A major setback to the new four-pillar (empowerment – security – opportu-
nity – international action) approach to poverty reduction came in January-2001 
when the Bank’s new Chief Economist Nicolas Stern532 introduced what he called 
the Bank’s ‘Strategic Framework Paper’533, which partly undermined the multi-di-
mensional WDR-2000 approach to poverty, and slipped the Bank back into another 
over-simplified two-pronged approach for poverty reduction, consisting – again - 
of only two pillars: (a) ‘Investment Climate’, and (b) ‘Investments in poor people’. 
Figure 13. Strategic Framework Paper (2001), and OD 1.00 (2003) 
This was, in fact, nothing but the WDR-1980 approach, only with some new word-
ings in the headlines. Stern’s interpretation had been that his two-pronged ap-
proach ‘followed logically’ from the WDR-2000. My interpretation is different: 
Remember what Finnemore534 had written about the capacity of international 
organisations (IOs) such as the World Bank - and influential professional com-
531 In my capacity as Adviser of Finland’s Ministry for Foreign Affairs I have had an excellent 
opportunity to engage in close dialogue with – and to monitor the attitudes towards the WDR-2000 
agenda – of a fairly broad selection of World Bank staff.
532 Nicholas H. Stern was the World Bank Chief Economist from July 2000 to October 2003, when he 
joined the UK government as Second Permanent Secretary and Managing Director, Budget and Public 
Finances, and Head of the Government Economic Service. 
533 World Bank (2001c). 
534 Finnemore (1996). 
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munities, such as orthodox economists - to socialize the governments and execu-
tive boards to define priorities in a way that serves the institutional and status 
interests of the IO – or the professional community – concerned. With its primary 
focus on concepts such as investments and incentives Stern’s conceptual framework 
rolled the ball back onto territory that the 10.000 economists of the World Bank 
were familiar and comfortable with, away from the ‘alien lands’ of empowerment 
and other sociological concepts, introduced by Kanbur & co., that the orthodox 
economists clearly were uncomfortable with. 
The battle between these two approaches has ever since been going on – un-
decided – within the World Bank. During Stern’s tenure as Chief Economist, a 
process was started to revise the Bank’s old ‘Operational Directive (OD) 4.15 on 
Poverty Reduction’ (which was based on the conceptual framework of the WDR-
1990). The new draft ‘Operational Policy (OP) 1.00 on Poverty Reduction’ was 
posted on the Bank’s website,535 for public comments. It was written in line with 
Stern’s 2-pronged framework (investment climate + investments in poor people). 
However, as soon as Stern left the Bank, and Francois Bourguignon536 – anoth-
er famous inequality researcher and congenial soul with Ravi Kanbur – took over 
the position as Chief Economist, the process of developing the new OP 1.00 was 
frozen indeterminately. Instead, while a decision had been made (during Stern’s 
tenure) to dedicate the World Development Report 2005 to the theme ‘Investment 
Climate’537 (based on a research programme managed by David Dollar in the 
Bank’s research department, DEC538), Bourguignon’s countervailing impact was 
felt in the decision to dedicate the immediately next World Development Report, 
WDR-2006 to Bourguignon’s (and Kanbur’s) favourite theme, ‘Equity’.539  
Again, unlike the draft OP 1.00 (written for internal use by the World Bank 
staff, mainly economists) the World Bank Annual ‘Progress Report on Fight 
Against Poverty 2004’ (written for external audience) gives a strong impression 
that the World Bank still stands firmly and unconditionally behind the WDR-
2000 multi-pillar approach to poverty based on the three broad imperatives: (a) 
Promoting opportunity for poor people; (b) Facilitating poor people’s empower-
ment; and (c) Enhancing poor people’s security. In contrast with the earlier Annual 
Reports that dealt with World Bank’s work alone, the 2004 report discusses (in 
535 See World Bank Draft OP 1.00 on Poverty Reduction in Websources.
536 Francois Bourguignon is a French national, and internationally recognized as one of the intellectual 
leaders in the economics of public policy, inequality, economic growth, income distribution and 
development. Bourguignon was previously Director of the Bank’s Development Research Group, and 
managing editor of the World Bank Economic Review. Before joining the World Bank Bourguignon was 
Professor of Economics at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales in Paris (since 1985), and 
also a member of the Council of Economic Advisors to the French Prime Minister. Bourguignon has 
authored or edited several books, including his most recent, The Impact of Economic Policies on Poverty 
and Income Distribution – Evaluation Techniques and Tools (edited with Luiz Pereira da Silva). See: econ.
worldbank.org/staff/fbourguignon/  and www1.worldbank.org/publications/pdfs/ 15491frontmat.pdf 
.
537 See: econ.worldbank.org/wdr/wdr2005/text-35620/ .
538 Despite the Bank’s official commitment to a multi-dimensional (i.e. multi-disciplinary) approach to 
poverty, the Bank’s research department has insisted on sticking to its old name ‘DEC’, referring to 
‘Development economics’ (only).
539 See e.g. www.worldbank.org/poverty/inequal/ .
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line with the spirit of Wolfensohn’s Comprehensive Development Framework, 
CDF, “how the World Bank Group works with others to help countries move towards the 
vision of poverty reduction embodied in the Millennium Development Goals.”540
5.16 people-CeNtReD DevelopmeNt AND humAN 
RightS oR CoRpoRAtioN-CeNtReD DevelopmeNt 
AND pRopeRtY RightS? 
According to the Bank’s own judgment in 2004: 
“We now know how to use development assistance more effectively, and yet the level of 
aid has never been lower. In the longer-term, as developing countries deepen their policy 
reforms and improve their capacity to absorb new aid, a doubling of current aid levels from 
$56 billion a year could be productively used to further accelerate progress toward the Mil-
lennium Development Goals.”541
Unfortunately, my conclusion was that this was not true: Money is not the main 
problem in development aid. The main problem is that we do not know. Or more 
precisely: that we do not have a consensus, not even among the economists of the 
World Bank, not to speak of a consensus between them and the non-economist 
poverty professionals or between the non-poor and the poor people of the world. 
While the UN-agencies, most international NGOs, most European govern-
ments and many others systematically emphasize ‘people-centred development’, 
the central claim of the Bank’s flagship publication, WDR-2005, was: “Putting 
firms and entrepreneurs at the centre of development”. While human rights are 
the ultimate cornerstone for the former, the WDR-2005 (on Investment Climate) 
was silent about human rights and instead underlined the urgent need to protect 
property rights. So whose rights are then, after all, primary: those of human be-
ings or those of capital? At the same time, however, within the same institution, 
the World Bank, several brilliant minds, including the authors of the next WDR, 
WDR-2006 (on ‘Equality’) were struggling with the dilemma how to argue for 
the need to reduce inequalities of all kinds at all levels, but without mentioning 
540 See: www.worldbank.org/poverty/progress/index.htm .
541 World Bank (2004f). 
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the ‘prohibited’ concept ‘human rights’.542  They had solved the dilemma by talk-
ing about ‘two fundamental inequalities’: (a) Inequality of opportunities, and (b) 
Inequality of recognition (i.e. meaning ‘inequality of rights’.)543 
Another group of brilliant poverty professionals within the Bank, the Social 
Development Department544, had innovated and tested545 a broad range of ap-
proaches, methods and tools that the Bank could use to promote human rights 
in its client countries. Also they tried to avoid the direct use of the concept 
‘human rights’, and instead talked about ‘empowerment’ and other concepts 
from the WDR 2000 poverty reduction framework, e.g. ‘social accountability’, 
‘rule of law’, ‘participation’, ‘conflict prevention’, ‘indigenous rights’, etc. They 
had also taken enormous efforts to formulate a strategy for World Bank’s work 
towards building of good societies (i.e. social development), to balance the con-
ventional efforts of the Bank’s economists to build good economies (i.e. economic 
development).546 
But again in this case, the truth was, that the main opponents of this dedi-
cated group of poverty professionals were not somewhere outside but inside the 
World Bank. Although they work innovatively and tirelessly to turn into tangible 
real action the conceptual insights (especially about empowerment) of the Bank’s 
542 The World Bank’s Articles of Agreement (‘Constitution’) state that, in all its decisions, “only economic 
considerations shall be relevant.” Many people within (and outside) the Bank believe that this restriction 
prevents the Bank from dealing with the issue of human rights or any other ‘political’ issues. To be sure, 
it does fall outside the Bank’s mandate to intervene in party-political disagreements of its member 
states. However, as everyone well knows, all World Bank loan conditions are unavoidably always 
political, too, not least because they often determine the realisation or non-realisation of human rights. 
It is naïve to assume that Bank could stay neutral on political issues, and they never even pretend to 
when what’s at stake are ‘property rights’. Why would ‘human rights’ be different, or less relevant? 
Some influential members of the Bank’s Executive Board (e.g. China, India, Chile, the USA) have, 
however, sometimes tried to avoid uncomfortable discussions within the Bank Board by reminding 
the Bank’s management that the Articles of Agreement prohibit discussion about human rights. In 
1998, at the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Bank 
published a booklet titled: “Development and Human Rights: The Role of the World Bank” (see: www.
worldbank.org/html/extdr/rights/hrtext.pdf ). At that time the Bank argued, wrongly in my view, 
that “because lending decisions are based on the quality of the project, and the effectiveness of the programs in 
reducing poverty”, the Bank “has been able to escape the costly ideological considerations” (such as human 
rights), “which have little to do with relieving the burden of poverty.” In my view this is wrong: Involuntary 
poverty is a violation against human rights, and all forms of human rights violations may contribute 
to impoverishment. Interestingly, in May 2004 President Wolfensohn told, in front of a small group 
of invited guests at a  Greenpeace-sponsored forum, that he was going to press for the World Bank to 
include human rights issues in its future lending criteria. “The institution has up till now refused to deal 
with its activities in a rights-based approach”, said Mr. Wolfensohn. “If I talk about a rights-based approach, 
I get letters (from board members) saying I have exceeded my authority because we are a financial institution”, 
he said. Mr Wolfensohn would not say when he wants to bring his plan forward but admitted he was 
nervous about opening up the discussion. “I want to bring this to the board and win. I don’t want to bring 
it up and lose.” See: www.eireview.org/doc/UKIndependent16may.doc
543 “Whereby different groups in society are accorded different treatment by institutions in that society, by virtue 
of racial, ethnic, gender or other group-based characteristics. Intermediate inequalities – which help shape the 
fundamental ones and which are often more easily measurable – include income (or consumption) inequality, 
inequality in the distributions of health and educational outcomes, inequality in asset ownership, and inequality 
in political power.” World Bank (2004b).
544 See: lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.nsf/60ByDocName/SocialDevelopment .
545 Much of this work has been funded by the Norwegian-Finnish funded Trust Fund for Environmentally 
and Socially Sustainable Development (TFESSD). See: lnweb18.worldbank.org/ESSD/sdvext.
nsf/08ByDocName/ ActivitiesSocialDevelopmentWindow .
546 See: World Bank (2003a, 2004a).
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Flagship WDR-2000, they are at best ‘tolerated’ by the great majority of the Bank’s 
economists.547 
The same could be unfortunately said about the Social Protection Group of 
the World Bank548 – and of the World Bank Institute549, who have taken highly 
innovative and dedicated efforts to operationalise the insights of another major 
pillar - ‘security’ - of the WDR-2000 conceptual framework, for instance at the na-
tional level in African countries, in the contexts of the national PRSP-processes.550 
The World Bank is not a monolith. There are the ‘good guys’ and there are the 
‘bad guys’, and - as everywhere else - most are something in-between. Therefore, 
my mind is doubtful: I do want to recognize, learn from and share with others 
– also with my readers here – some of the best fruits of the promising work by 
some of the best poverty professionals in the World Bank. And to point out where 
I see weaknesses. While doing so I would, however, not want to create unfounded 
optimism – or pessimism – about the World Bank among those who keep less con-
tact with it than I do: Old conventions and professional routines die hard. For an 
organisation of thousands of – mainly neo-classical – economists it is hard to get 
away from the excessive reliance on quantitative money-metric thinking, where 
success is measured in terms of GDP-growth, inflation trends, foreign reserves, 
etc. – and personal professional success in terms of the numbers of loan contracts 
prepared and processed all the way through to Board approval. For the World 
Bank is a bank, after all.
In what follows, I shall describe and analyse two key practical methods that 
the World Bank poverty economists use to assess the poverty impacts of devel-
opment projects and programmes (PSIA) and the overall quality of developing 
country policies (CPIA). To understand the ideas behind these acronyms551 takes 
one a long distance towards understanding World Bank’s thinking and action on 
poverty reduction. The latter, CPIA, is particularly important, because it is the 
tool that the World Bank uses for judging the amounts of development credits 
and grants that it allocates to each developing country. 
5.17 poveRtY AND SoCiAl impACt ANAlYSiS (pSiA) 
In the World Bank’s terminology “Poverty and Social Impact Analysis” (PSIA) refers 
to an analysis of the distributional impacts of policy reforms on the well-being 
or welfare of different stakeholder groups, with particular focus on the poor and 
vulnerable individuals, areas and population groups. In so doing, it also addresses 
issues of sustainability and risks to policy reform that come with social impacts 
547 The poverty professionals of the Social Development Department are mainly – but not exclusively 
– non-economist social scientists.
548 Although they are almost exclusively economists – but perhaps not ‘orthodox’ enough, in the view 
of some. See: www1.worldbank.org/sp/ 
549 www.worldbank.org/wbi/socialprotection/ 
550 www.worldbank.org/wbi/socialriskmanagement/srmafrica.html . Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland has been the main sponsor of this work, together with France and UK. 
551 PSIA = Poverty and Social Impact Assessment; CPIA = Country Policy and Institutional Assessment; 
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of policy changes. The World Bank published a ‘PSIA User’s Guide’552 in 2002, and 
invited partners’ comments and contributions towards improving it. The methods 
introduced in the 2002 PSIA-Sourcebook were largely quantitative methods used 
by economists. In year 2005 a parallel Guidebook on qualitative (more sociological, 
anthropological, political studies, etc.) ‘Tools for Institutional, Political and Social 
Assessment’ (TIPS) was published jointly by the World Bank and the British aid 
agency DFID.553
The PSIA-Guidelines bring us back to the multi-dimensionality of poverty, 
and its implications to the – by necessity multi-disciplinary - work of the poverty 
professionals: Poverty and Social Impact Analysis is supposed to focus on the 
“distributional impact of policy change – particularly on the poor and vulnerable popu-
lations groups and areas.” In contrast to the adjustment reforms of the 1980s and 
1990s, in the PRS-era the policy debate has focused mainly on public expenditure 
reforms (especially in health, education, water and sanitation, and roads and in-
frastructure); institutional reforms to improve governance (e.g. decentralization, 
civil service reform, tax reform); and specific structural reforms (e.g. trade reform, 
privatisation, financial sector reform, and agriculture sector reform).554
Depending on country circumstances, social groups may be defined in terms of 
income classes (or categories, e.g. ‘deciles’, or ‘quintiles’), gender, ethnicity, age, geo-
graphic location, livelihoods, etc.  PSIA is concerned about distributional impacts for 
two reasons. First, the welfare impact of policy on target groups such as the poor, 
or women, is the ultimate objective of policy change. Second, understanding the 
distributional impacts of policy, even among non-target groups, is important for 
the effectiveness of a policy and its ultimate sustainability. Policy changes - even if 
welfare improving - almost invariably result in losers, at least in the short-run. While 
losers may not necessarily be poor, reduction in their welfare may not be acceptable 
for social welfare or political economy reasons and may significantly affect the im-
plementation and sustainability of reform. The examples given in the Bank’s PSIA-
Guide are situations where, for instance, “trade liberalization is ‘derailed’ by business 
and union interests who fear the impact of competition on protected labour and commodity 
markets.” Similarly, “reforms could also be ‘derailed’ by interests within the public sector.” 
These examples indicate an unnecessary bias in the attitudes of the authors of 
the Bank’s first – quantitative/economistic - PSIA-Guide:  Who are they to judge 
that the opinions of the national business, labour or public sector representa-
tives necessarily ‘de-rail’ a reform? If the World Bank is serious about national 
ownership and broad-based participation they should welcome situations where the 
national stakeholders take an active interest and responsibility of the national 
reform programme. Perhaps in some cases they may thus manage to ‘re-rail’ a 
552 World Bank (2002c). See also PSIA in Websources. 
553 World Bank and DFID (2005). 
554 For example, 44% of the 9 full PRSPs completed by March 2002 had called for changes in tariff rates; 
44% had planned the privatisation of utilities; 33% had planned pension reforms of the public sector; 
44% had called for civil service reform; 89% had fiscal decentralization on the agenda; 56% had called 
for reform of agricultural legislation; 33% had planned to raise VAT and other consumption taxes; 
22% had plans on liberalizing interests rates; and 44% had called for changing fiscal deficit targets 
(vis -à-vis the previous IMF program or Policy Framework Paper (PFP). See: World Bank (2002c), p. 6
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nationally owned policy process that the Washington-based advisors may have 
tried to ‘de-rail’ by insisting on their theoretically elegant but contextually more 
ignorant ideas.   – Nevertheless, the PSIA-Guide authors are correct with their 
point that a PSIA ought to identify and analyse the impact of policy also on other 
stakeholders, beyond the poor, who are affected by or can influence reforms.555 
The first (quantitative) PSIA-Guide suggests that policy or institutional reform 
can be expected to have an impact on poor households and other stakeholders 
through five main transmission channels: (a) employment and wages; (b) prices; 
(c) access; (d) assets; and (e) transfers and taxes.556  
5.18 hoW to ANAlYSe poveRtY AND SoCiAl impACt? 
Although there is no template methodology to analysing the poverty and social 
impacts of policy, a good PSIA is often designed by using some of the following 
elements, depending on country circumstances: (i) asking the right questions; (ii) 
identifying stakeholders; (iii) understanding impact transmission channels; (iv) 
assessing institutions; (v) gathering data and information; (vi) analysing impacts; 
(vii) contemplating design and compensatory schemes; (viii) assessing risks; (ix) 
setting-up monitoring and evaluation systems; and (x) fostering policy debate and 
feeding back for policy adjustment.557 
The first step in analysing policy impacts is to identify the prioritised devel-
opment objectives. While poverty reduction may be an overarching objective, 
poor countries may well have multiple priorities in reaching that objective, and 
measures to address all of them are not necessarily compatible. For example, a 
country’s priorities may include fiscal discipline, full employment and improved 
educational and health standards of its people. Tightening budgets may improve 
macroeconomic stability while slowing growth and reducing employment in the 
short term. While inflation hurts the poor, so too does joblessness. In a country-
level PSIA558, it is important to identify which reforms have been prioritised in the 
PRSP. The prioritisation has to be country-specific because it depends on factors 
such as the likely size and uncertainty of the poverty and social impacts of each 
individual reform, the degree of controversy of the reform issue, and the time 
sensitivity of the reform.
Stakeholder analysis identifies people, groups and organizations that are im-
portant to take into account when conducting PSIA.  It addresses those people 
555 World Bank (2002c), p. 7.
556 World Bank (2002c), p. 8-9.
557 World Bank (2002c), p. 11. It is useful to realize that PSIA is conceptually a close relative of several 
other impact assessment methodologies, developed in different contexts, by experts of various 
professions, e.g.: (a) Strategic Environmental Assessment (See SEA in Websources.) (b) Human Impact 
Assessment (See HUIA in Websources.) 
558 The World Bank’s Social Development Department is using funding from a Norwegian-Finnish 
funded Trust Fund on Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (See TFESSD in 
Websources. ) to develop and field-test methods that could be used in country-level PSIAs (Integrative 
Country Social Assessments, ICSAs).  See Integrative Country Social Assessments in Websources. 
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who are affected by policy, as well as those who affect policy. Identifying and 
disaggregating the first type – intended beneficiaries and those who suffer ad-
verse impacts - is central to the analysis of poverty and social impact of policy. 
The second type - organized groups such as trade unions, business associations 
or NGOs - may become sources of support or opposition to policies. To the extent 
that stakeholder analysis helps focus subsequent research on specific sets of ac-
tors, it increases the relevance of more complex analysis of poverty and social 
impacts while reducing time and cost. 
Ownership assessment helps reveal sources of potential resistance to or distortion 
of policy choices. It examines government’s willingness to undertake and stick 
with reform over time. Weak ownership can lead governments to abandon reforms 
mid-term or produce distorted policies. The basic output of an ownership assess-
ment is an estimate of the location and extent of pressure that government will 
experience in adopting a policy reform. Factors that may polarize existing social 
tensions and affect ownership can be analysed by looking at the political economy 
and social diversity (e.g.. ethnic, religious, linguistic, gender, and age) of a country. 
Having identified potential stakeholders, laying out a priori the channels (e.g. 
employment, prices, access, assets and transfers & taxes) by which the analyst 
expects a particular policy change to impact various stakeholder groups is an 
important step to the PSIA-process. Also, given that ‘feedback effects’ may be 
time differentiated, so will net impacts on various stakeholders. An important 
example is that of policies aimed at improving the efficiency of the economy, 
which by virtue of changing the status quo may have certain distributional effects 
in the short-term, but, by aiming to foster increases in productivity and growth 
may – if successful - have a positive net welfare improvement for most people 
over the longer term. 
Institutions affect the impact that policy has on poverty and welfare among 
different groups. But institutions are also often the object of policy reform. Indeed 
privatisation, civil service reform, decentralization, and public expenditure man-
agement reform are examples of institutional reforms that change the incentives 
and rules that govern public and private organizations. Two key areas of focus 
when assessing institutions are (i) the analysis of market structure and (ii) the 
analysis of organisations. Identifying the context-specific market structure (e.g. 
monopoly, monopsony, oligopoly, perfectly competitive, etc.) and its determinants 
(e.g. natural monopoly, restrictions to entry, collusion, etc.) is crucial to understand 
the enabling conditions that would need to be created for market reform to lead 
to improvements in performance and better outcomes for the poor. Enterprise (or 
trader) surveys can be useful for understanding the market constraints as well as 
de jure and de facto barriers to entry and transactions costs. Quantitative or quali-
tative household surveys can also get at who and where services are bought, and 
at what price. ‘Service Delivery Surveys’ (SDS), and ‘Citizens’ Report Cards’559 
can be applied to the analysis of the effectiveness of public or private providers 
of goods and services.
559 See PSIA in Websources.
194
Organizational mapping and institutional assessment are tools that can be used 
to judge the likely poverty impacts of reforms that involve a change in govern-
ment responsibility, or cooperation among government agencies. Static mapping 
maps out the relations among the implementing agencies and identifies those 
expected to support or obstruct the reform. Process mapping identifies the flow 
of decision-making, information and resources within and among public sector 
organizations, and the organizational norms that cannot be easily gleaned from 
official documents or diagrams. This helps create an understanding of the incen-
tives that affect behaviour and of the constraints to effective policy implementa-
tion. Institutional assessment evaluates the effectiveness of the relevant institutions, 
from performance incentives to their capacity to implement policy. It addresses 
key issues such as: (i) roles; (ii) knowledge and access to information; (iii) incentive 
structures; (iv) receptivity to policy change; (v) capacity; (vi) resources or financial 
clout; (vii) scope to adapt to the new reform agenda. 
The analytic tools used by World Bank staff in poverty and social impact as-
sessments are summarized in a table format below (Table 6).
Table 6. Typology of Tools for Poverty and Social Impact Analysis (PSIA)560 
tool What it does? Reforms
A. Measuring Impact – Social Tools
Social impact
Assessment (SiA)
(a) using qualitative
techniques only
*Qualitative SIA is usually a 
complement to other analytical 
work; it identifies perceptions, 
preferences, coping behaviour, 
and attributes that determine
impacts, and pre-conditions 
for affected persons to benefit 
from policy reforms
*Any type of policy reform
(b) SIA with mixed
(qualitative and 
quantitative) methods
* Assesses how individuals 
and diverse social groups 
are impacted  differentially 
by reforms and are likely to 
respond to opportunities and 
constraints based on their 
assets and capabilities.
* Any type of policy change; 
quantitative SIA has 
comparative advantage for 
reforms with low feedback 
effects.
participatory
poverty
Assessment (ppA)
*PPAs and beneficiary 
assessments (BA) use 
participatory techniques to 
include poor people’s views in 
the analysis of poverty and the 
formulation of policies.
*More useful for 
simultaneous, multiple 
reforms or for reforms with 
high feedback effects. 
*BA is more useful for 
examining direct impacts of 
reforms with low feedback 
effects.
560 Adapted (simplified and edited) from World Bank (2002c), p. 52-55.
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Social Capital
Assessment
tool (SoCAt)
*Estimates likely changes in 
productive behaviour after 
policy change based on an 
assessment of levels of social 
capita
* Particularly relevant to 
agricultural, land, pension 
and labour market reforms. 
Can also be used for safety 
net, decentralization and 
utility reforms.
B. Measuring Direct Impact– Incidence Tools
Average Benefit
incidence Analysis
*Measures direct benefit 
incidence on households at 
different income levels.
*Any type of policy change 
or public finance reform. E.g. 
tax and expenditure policy 
reform, trade or agricultural 
reform.
Marginal Benefit
incidence Analysis
*Measures marginal benefit 
incidence on households at 
different income levels
*As above for simple benefit 
incidence analysis.
poverty mapping *Computes locality-specific 
benefit incidence by combining 
household-level data with 
census data.
*Particularly useful for 
reforms with regionally
differentiated impacts, e.g., 
decentralization, regionally 
targeted expenditures, etc.
C. Measuring Behavioral Impact – Micro-simulation Tools
Behavioural incidence
Analysis
* Combines econometric 
estimation of behavioural
impacts with benefit incidence 
analysis (simple or marginal).
* As for simple incidence 
analysis. In addition, can be 
used to explain contribution 
of government policy (vis-
a-vis private sector) to 
observed changes.
Demand analysis Measures impact of prices and 
income on household
consumption
*Useful for reforms of goods 
without close
substitutes, e.g., water 
and electricit… and to 
study impact of reforms of 
goods with subsitutes, e.g. 
agricultural subsidies, trade 
liberalization.
*Reforms with limited supply 
responses.
Supply analysis Measures impact of price 
changes on household/labour,
firm supply, and aggregate 
supply.
*Household or firm-level 
production data
depending on unit of analysis
*Typically, time series data 
(panel or cross-
sectional) has been used.
household models Measures distributional impacts 
in a framework in
which households are treated 
as both consumers and 
producers
*Wide range of 
microeconomic reforms: 
price and marketing 
changes, market failures, 
taxation; often used to 
analyse agricultural reform.
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D. Measuring Partial Equilibrium Effects
multi-market models *Measure distributional impact 
of policy changes on prices 
and outputs in one or selected 
sectors
*Combined estimation of 
systems of supply and demand
relationships. Models are solved 
to derive output supply,
input demand, prices, profits, 
and incomes.
*Sectoral reforms; most 
often applied to agricultural
reform
Reduced Form models *Systems of supply and 
demand equations are solved 
to yield reduced form equations 
which are then estimated.
*Used to estimate the impact 
of past  policy changes on 
welfare
*Often used to examine the 
determinants of poverty/
income; or  to examine income 
growth rates.
* Any policy change; e.g. 
used to analyse civil service 
reforms, general structural 
adjustment, and shocks.
E. Measuring Economy Wide-Impacts – General Equilibrium
tool What it does? Reforms
Social Accounting
matrices and
input-output models 
(SAm-io)
Measure distributional impacts 
using policy simulations
*Sectoral reforms
Computable general
equilibrium (Cge) 
models (e.g., 1-2-3
model, immpA, etc)
*Measure distributional impact 
of policy reforms in a
completely specified model of 
economy
*Can be as simple as the 1-2-3 
model (one country, 2
activities, 3 goods)563
*A more complex example 
is the IMMPA model which 
captures features ‘typical’  of 
a developing country, such as  
labour market segmentation, 
informal employment, and 
financial accounts.
*Wide range of reforms, 
e.g., prices, taxes, subsidies, 
public expenditure, 
stabilization and adjustment, 
trade.
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F. Microeconomic Simulations Linked to Macroeconomic/Sectoral Models
linking macro-frame-
work to reduced form
estimation of poverty
*Simulates (using a reduced 
form estimation) the impact on 
poverty reduction of various 
macro variables
*Sim-SIP is a specific tool that 
examines how changes in
macro variables (e.g., growth 
rates, sectoral growth rates) 
may affect income distribution 
and poverty. Uses the country-
specific distribution as the 
starting point.
*Wide range of reforms, 
e.g., labour and wage 
policies, taxation, prices, 
changes 
in public spending, trade, 
macro stabilization.
linking macro-frame-
work to behavioural
analysis estimated for
representative
households (e.g. 1-2-3 
pRSp, pAmS).
*Simulates the impact of macro 
variables on household welfare, 
allowing behavioural changes. 
Micro-level parameter changes 
are estimated for representative
household groups.
As above
linking macro
framework to
micro-simulation
*Simulates distributional 
impacts on welfare at the level
of individual households.
As above
561
5.19 the optimAl mix oF methoDS 
The analysis of the poverty and social impacts of policy as described above can 
be extremely – if not prohibitively - data-intensive. Especially for technocratic 
organisations, such as the World Bank, whose staff members are predominantly 
mathematically oriented economists, the multi-dimensionality of poverty and the 
consequent vast range of different assessments that are needed to assess the policy 
impacts on the various population groups and on their various dimensions of pov-
erty can turn out to be an almost unmanageable task, if every cause-and-effect rela-
tionship is expected to be measured in exact numbers. There is then the risk that in 
the name of convenience and ‘pragmatism’ the factors and relationships that cannot 
be (easily) measured are tacitly ignored and that the PSI-analysis focuses only on 
those factors that are amenable to measurement and quantitative analysis.562
Chambers recommends that it is always better to have approximately correct 
knowledge about the relevant questions than to have exact data about the irrele-
vant questions. “Appropriate imprecision” is how he calls this principle. It should be 
a good guide also for PSIAs too. The authors of World Bank’s PSIA-Guide suggest 
that there may be much benefit in flexibly mixing – case-by-case - the quantitative 
561 Whether models can be artificially simple depends of course, whether the main objective is to pro-
duce an elegant theoretic paper for an academic conference or to understand a real economy consisting 
of real people. The former objective often motivates the work of economists working on CGE-models.
562 Chambers (1997, p. 42) has rhymed : “Economists have come to feel: What can’t be measured, isn’t real. 
The truth is always an amount. Count numbers, only numbers count.”  
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and qualitative methods, as well as among preconceived structured question-
naire surveys and more open-ended key informant, focus group and community 
interviews and participatory assessments. Moreover, analytical methods could 
be mixed sequentially (e.g. with qualitative analysis informing the design of a 
close-ended (preconceived) data collection instrument or the specification of an 
econometric model) or in parallel over time. 
5.20 the poWeR oF ComBiNeD methoDS: 
ppA iN tANZANiA 
The World Bank’s Participatory Poverty Assessment (PPA) in Tanzania in mid-
1990s563 was instrumental in giving evidence of the strength of a combined use of 
qualitative participatory rural appraisal (PRA) methods and traditional quantitative 
survey methods. The Tanzania-PPA conducted carefully-selected PRAs and a 
medium-scale household survey designed specifically to collect sociological data 
about households in communities that had only a year before been covered by a 
previous Human Resource Development Survey. As Booth et al. noted: 
“The Tanzania-PPA represented a significant breakthrough for the design of poverty as-
sessment work, demonstrating in particular the nesting of a specifically-designed survey 
within a larger survey of a more conventional type, permitting the econometric modelling 
and testing of hypotheses derived from general analytical literature and nuanced by focus-
group enquiries in the same sites.” 564
By using this combined and contextual approach the Tanzania-PPA was able to reveal, 
among other highly relevant and interesting findings, that there are intangible as-
sets – especially, social and political capital – that are critical for poverty and vulner-
ability analysis. The conclusions of the Tanzania-PPA565 were quite striking. After 
controlling for a range of other variables that might be expected to explain away the 
relationship, and giving due consideration to the possibility of reverse causality, the 
investigators concluded that village-level social capital was a powerful determinant 
of levels of individual income. The quantitative effect was, moreover, large: a one 
standard deviation increase in village social capital was associated with a 20-30 per 
cent increase in expenditure per village inhabitant. This was equivalent to tripling 
the level of education, or the stock of non-farming physical assets. 
The policy implications of this finding were important: It was suggested that 
more attention needs to be given in development policy making to not unwit-
tingly destroying or ‘mining’ social capital – e.g. through the adoption of an 
unduly technical and bureaucratic approach by sectoral ministries. For Booth 
et al. this represented a singularly powerful example of the potential for re-ori-
enting poverty-assessment work within an ‘access-to-assets framework’, where 
563 Narayan (1997a, b).
564 Booth et al. (1997). See also Norton et al (2001), p. 35, 39, 79.
565 Narayan (1997a, b).
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especially ‘political capital’ should be seen as a ‘gatekeeper-asset’, permitting or 
preventing the accumulation of the other capitals/assets upon which successful 
poverty-reducing growth depends. 566
5.21 ADvANCeD SoCiAl ANAlYSiS oR SoCiAl 
eNgiNeeRiNg? 
My feelings about the Bank’s PSIA User’s Guide567 are mixed: The approval and 
support given by the Bank now to the use of participatory, contextual – and com-
bined - methods is a very positive piece of news: it would not have been possible 
ten years ago. A lot of innovative thinking and hard work has been invested into 
developing the wide variety of tools, that will, if well used, surely assist national 
policy-makers in their consideration of the various policy options.  
What makes me doubtful is the tone of social engineering and unconditional 
technocratic optimism in the PSIA-Guide about the manageability of the exercise: 
The first (2002) PSIA-Guide lists and describes 33 different types of reforms that 
are – or may be – required from the government of a poor country to reduce the 
poverty of its people – and then goes on to suggest 17 different analytic tools that 
are to be used in different combinations to assist the design of those reforms. 
Good enough: I do believe that many of those reforms and analytic tools are 
useful. However, the Bank’s version of a PSIA is such a complex ‘package’ that 
the only conclusion poor countries can make about it is that again they will need 
new expert inputs from the World Bank or other donor agencies – still at least for 
another generation or two - to be able to do their PSIAs ‘properly’.  And this gives 
yet another legitimate reason for the World Bank NPPEs to continue intervening 
into the analytic and policy processes of poor countries.
Yet, if various stakeholders and interest groups are given a genuine op-
portunity to express and discuss their opinions of proposed reforms openly, 
democratically elected decision-makers will be able to get a comprehensive 
and balanced picture of the potential impacts of various reform alternatives 
(including the zero-option of no reform at all). In most countries, many (if not 
most) ordinary people do know, more or less intuitively (and even without the 
computable general equilibrium models, and other sophisticated diagnostics of 
Washington-based povoerty economists) many steps that should be taken to 
move towards a future beyond poverty. But often they do not dare, or else have 
the opportunity, to express their opinions, or have their voices heard. In most 
cases the real constraints are much more political and psychological than techni-
cal. The excessively technical character of the analytic package authoritatively 
566 The complementarities and remaining tensions between the qualitative and quantitative approaches 
to poverty appraisal were discussed in a workshop with a funny name‘Q Squared, or Qual-Quant’, held 
at Cornell University in March 2001 among a small group of leading thinkers of the two methodological 
cultures. The contributions have been documented and edited into a highly interesting volume by Ravi 
Kanbur (ed.2003). See also Kanbur (ed. 2001). 
567 World Bank (2002c). 
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suggested by the Bank’s PSIA-Guide carries the danger that the governments, 
opposition parties and citizens of the poor countries unnecessarily hesitate to 
start to argue for – and to take - their steps towards poverty reduction according 
to their best knowledge, while waiting for the technical analyses of their (and 
the Bank’s) experts to show them the path. 
Fortunately, as a joint effort between the World Bank Social Development 
Department, the British aid agency DFID and a team of University of Swansea, 
a new parallel PSIA-Guidelines with less technical (more qualitative) tools of 
ex-ante institutional, political and social impact assessment has been developed, 
with methods that should not alienate non-econometricians so easily as the origi-
nal World Bank PSIA-Guidelines.
My second doubt concerns the Bank’s own commitment to assessing the 
poverty and social impacts of the policies, reforms and projects that it imposes 
on poor country governments. The unfortunate truth is that in spite of the ex-
cellent efforts by the brilliant PSIA-champions of the Bank568, PSIA is not yet 
fully mainstreamed as part of the Bank’s so called ‘Economic and Sector Work’ 
(ESW), or country-level analytic work. The new World Bank ‘Operational Policy 
on Development Policy Lending’ (OP 8.60) gives a highly authoritative support to 
the idea that PSIAs should be conducted – but not in the case of every World Bank 
funded reform and intervention, but only “when necessary”. Thus, the status of 
PSIAs is still secondary compared to the economic analysis which is obligatory 
in the case of every loan given by the Bank.569 
In the IMF the status of PSIAs is even weaker: A May 2003 review of 11 PRGF 
agreements found that PSIAs were not being carried out for the majority of re-
forms in new PRGF programmes. Although macroeconomic reforms were un-
dertaken in 94% of all PRGFs, none of the documents presented a rigorous study 
analyzing the impact of these reforms. In addition, although privatization was a 
structural reform in 83% of programmes, only 14% of the documents contained 
some form of PSIA done in advance of these privatizations.570 
Why don’t the poverty economists of the World Bank and the IMF analyze 
the ex ante poverty and social impacts, although they must know that lack of 
such analysis has led to major mistakes in development lending in the 1980s and 
1990s? The US General Accounting Office GAO found it relevant to ask the same 
question. Don’t they want to? Don’t they know how to? Or why? 
The IFI staff explained that poverty and social impact assessment was to them 
a ‘grey area’. The poverty economists consider macroeconomic stability to be a 
primary prerequisite for economic growth and poverty reduction, although not 
sufficient on its own to achieve those goals. Countries that experience macroeco-
nomic instability, such as high inflation rates, have also tended to experience low 
or even negative growth rates. This is the World Bank poverty economists’ main 
concern: policies should work to maintain stabibity, once achieved.  “However”, 
568 E.g. Steen Jorgensen, Anis Dani, Reiner Forster, Stefano Paternostro, and others in the Social 
Development department.
569 World Bank (2004c). 
570 Gomes and Lawson (2003).
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the GAO report cautioned, “policies that are overly concerned with macroeconomic 
stability may turn out to be too austere, lowering economic growth from its optimal level 
and impeding progress on poverty reduction.”571 
According IMF and World Bank documents, there is a substantial ‘grey area’ 
between those policies that may be considered too austere and those that cause 
macroeconomic instability. The US General Accounting Office GAO questions this 
as the poverty economists’ excuse: 
“First, precise identification of the bounds of the grey area is beyond the current under-
standing of the economics profession. For example, many economists, including some at the 
Fund, think that inflation above a 7-11 percent range is risky, whereas others think the level 
can be between 20-40 percent before it starts to endanger economic growth.”572
The really important point here is, that despite the difficulties of defining the 
boundaries of the grey areas, CSOs and Parliamentarians involved in the PRSP 
process should be given acceess to effective PSIA tools and the freedom with which 
to publicly weigh and debate a broad array of various policy options. The IFIs’ fa-
voured structural adjustment policy models could be among a set of many various 
options that ought to be weighted and debated in full and open PSIA analyses.573
Another weakness is that the World Bank itself does not use anything like the 
PSIA yet as a tool in its own administrative decision-making about the allocation 
of its funds to poor country governments. Instead, it uses a set of completely 
different tools, such as the CPIA, ARPP, and the so called Governance discount/
factor to judge which countries are to receive more and which are to receive less 
funds from the Bank each year. In the next section we shall take a brief look into 
Bank’s own, so called ‘Performance Based Allocation’ (PBA) system. CPIA is its 
central element. 
5.22 hoW the WoRlD BANK juDgeS WheRe to 
put itS moNeY? - CpiA 
The overall mission of the World Bank is to “fight poverty with passion and profes-
sionalism, for lasting solutions”.574 After 50 years of trial-and-error, and after vol-
umes of research work done, the Bank in late 1998575 concluded that the Northern 
taxpayers’ money can, in fact, have a large impact in reducing poverty – but only 
in countries with sound management. Up until the early 1990s, however, devel-
opment finance had gone in equal amounts to well managed countries and to 
poorly managed ones. If anything, it had been geopolitical interests (halting the 
571 GAO (2001). See also Action Aid (2004).
572 Ibid.
573 Action Aid (2004). 
574 See e.g. World Bank (2000a), p. v. See also Our Dream in Websources .
575 In the famous and widely publicized ‘Assessing Aid’ study authored by David Dollar: World Bank 
(1998a), p. x, 2.
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spread of Communism) that had influenced which countries received relatively 
more or less grants and loans. In 1998 the Bank decided that to make development 
aid effective, it should target its support more selectively to ‘credible reformers’, 
i.e. poor country governments with a strong track record of concrete actions of 
domestically initiated and/or owned reform efforts.576 
To improve aid effectiveness, the World Bank therefore assesses every year the 
quality of each borrower’s policy and institutional performance in areas ‘relevant to 
economic growth and poverty reduction’. Some kinds of country policy assessments 
had been carried out by the Bank staff annually since 1980, but the criteria and meth-
odology of these exercises were not disclosed to anybody outside the Bank. By 1999 
the criteria and methods – as well as the Bank’s thinking about the confidentiality 
of its own decision-making procedures - had evolved to the extent that the Bank for 
the first time felt it appropriate to disclose, on its internet page, the criteria it used 
in what had in 1998 been renamed Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA) 
- and broadened to assess not only the quality of the country’s policies, but also of 
the institutions that the country had for implementing the policies.577 
The CPIA underpins the Bank’s (IDA’s578) Performance Rating but is not its 
only determinant. Two additional process steps are included (see Figure 14. be-
low). First, to capture the important dimension of quality of development project 
and program management, the Bank’s ‘Annual Report of Portfolio Performance’ 
(ARPP)579 is used to determine a score for each country’s implementation perfor-
mance. On the basis of these measures, a weighted average rating is calculated 
of the CPIA (80% weight) and the ARPP measure (20% weight). Second, this rat-
ing multiplied by a ‘governance discount factor’580 to produce the country’s IDA 
Performance Rating581, which is then used as the main determinant of the next 
year’s allocation of IDA’s limited resources. This system of resource allocation is 
aimed at concentrating resources where they are likely to have the most impact 
on poverty and to ensure consistent treatment among IDA-eligible countries.582
576 World Bank (1998a), p. 4.
577 World Bank (2000c). See also CPIA in Websources. 
578 IDA = International Development Association, i.e. that part of the World Bank that helps the world’s 
poorest countries reduce poverty by providing ‘credits’, which are loans at zero interest with a 10-year 
grace period and maturities of 35 to 40 years. See IDA in Websources. 
579 The basic measure of ‘portfolio performance’ is the number of projects ‘at risk’ of not achieving 
their development objectives. Projects at risk consist of actual and potential problem projects. Actual 
problem projects are those for which Implementation Progress (IP) is unsatisfactory or Development 
Objectives (DO) are not likely to be achieved. Such ratings are generally updated every six months in 
the context of Bank staff supervision reports. See World Bank (2001f), p. 20. For 2003 ARPP-ratings, 
by quintiles, see ARPP in Websources. 
580 The ‘governance discount’ is applied to the ratings of countries with severe governance problems. 
It is derived from the country’s average rating for seven governance criteria that are part of the 
performance based allocation (PBA) system, i.e. the six governance-related CPIA criteria (#4 and #16-
20), plus the procurement practices criterion included in the ARPP rating. This system has changed a 
little, but not significantly in 2004.  See Governance discount in Websources. 
581 For the IDA Performance ratings in year 2003 by country quintiles, overall, plus in terms of the 
“clusters”: (a) economic management; (b) structural policies; (c) policies for social inclusion and equity, 
and (d) public sector management and institutions, see CPIA in Websources.
582 There are today 81’ IDA-eligible’ countries. See IDA in Websources.  
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Figure 14. World Bank’s IDA Country Performance Rating
(A) Economic Management
1 Management of Inflation and Macroeconomic Imbalances
2 Fiscal Policy
3 Management of External Debt
4 Management and Sustainability of the Development Program
(B) Structural Policies
5 Trade Policy and Foreign Exchange Regime
6 Financial Stability and Depth
7 Banking Sector Efficiency and Resource Mobilization
8 Competitive Environment for the Private Sector
9 Factor and Product Markets
10 Policies and Institutions for Environmental Sustainability
(C) Policies for Social Inclusion/Equity
11 Gender
12 Equity of Public Resource Use
13 Building Human Resources
14 Social Protection and Labor
15 Monitoring and Analysis of Poverty Outcomes and Impacts
(D) Public Sector Management and Institutions
16 Property Rights and Rule-based Governance
17 Quality of Budgetary and Financial Management
18 Efficiency of Revenue Mobilization
19 Quality of Public Administration
20 Transparency, Accountability and Corruption in the Public Sector
Text box 2.  The Rating Dimensions of World Bank’s CPIA583
583 World Bank (2001g), p. 1. See also CPIA in Websources . The number of rating dimensions was 
dropped from 20 to 16 in 2004, by dropping dimensions Nr. 4, 9 and 15 and by  merging dimensions 
6 and 7. 
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While some INGOs have criticized the CPIA scoring system heavily,584 the 
CPIA is - in my view - a broad and well-balanced tool for assessing the quality of 
a country’s policy and institutional framework, and particularly pertinent for our 
discussion about the ‘pro-poorness’ of policies and institutions, because ‘quality’ 
in the CPIA is meant to be understood in terms of how conducive the policy and 
institutional framework is to fostering poverty reduction.585 The Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment has this far consisted of a set of twenty criteria586 
that capture a broad range of policy dimensions of an effective poverty reduction 
and pro-poor growth strategy. While this number has no special significance, it 
has represented a fair balance of adequately detailed criteria, without making the 
assessment process too arduous. The twenty CPIA criteria (See Box 5.1. above) 
- each with a 5 % weight in the total score - are grouped in four categories: (A) 
economic management; (B) structural policies; (C) policies for social inclusion 
and equity; and (D) public sector management and institutions. According the 
Bank’s CPIA-guidance, “each aspect of policy should be considered in light of its impact 
on poverty reduction.”587
Few donor poverty professionals, Parliamentarians or CSO-activists under-
stand what the CPIA is about and why it should be taken seriously. I believe it 
should, because it is – unlike the PSIA-tools – an instrument that the Bank not 
only recommends for others (e.g. poor country governments) as a theoretically 
interesting toolbox. The CPIA is  but an instrument that the Bank actually uses 
every year in deciding where money should go, i.e. the allocation of IDA credits 
among the low-income countries. The CPIA-score of a poor country government 
actually determines: (a) The volume of assistance the country will get; (b) The 
policy prescriptions and conditions that the World Bank and the IMF will impose 
on the government. The CPIA may thus be more influential than the (broadly 
consulted) PRSP in determining which policies a government must adopt in order 
to obtain IMF and World Bank financing. E.g. regardless of what the country’s 
PRSP says about privatization and the role of government, loan conditions im-
posed by the IMF or the World Bank may require further market-oriented reforms 
if the government receives a low CPIA rating in a particular area (e.g. privatiza-
tion of public services.
I have suggested elsewhere588 that it should be considered, whether this as-
sessment could gain in credibility, if it were done not by the World Bank staff 
alone, but by the wider donor community together. The CPIA-ratings are based 
on the World Bank country team members’ subjective assessments, which are 
then peer-reviewed in the World Bank headquarters in Washington D.C. Such 
World Bank internal judgments often face political resistance in low-income coun-
tries, because many opinion-leaders there think (often not completely without 
584 E.g. Alexander and Kessler (2004) (cited in Action Aid 2004) have stated as follows: “The CPIA is 
very fundamental in determining the actual level of World Bank lending and setting subsequent loan conditions. 
However, a high CPIA score may not correlate with successful poverty reduction, or even high economic growth.
585 World Bank (2001g), p. 1. 
586 The number of criteria was dropped to 16 in 2004, but the changes were otherwise insignificant.
587 World Bank (2001g), p. 1. 
588 Voipio (2002b, 2003b). 
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reasons) that the judgments of the Bank staff are not only neutral expert opin-
ions but ideologically biased statements advocating a shift of policies towards 
the neo-liberal stance favoured by the Bretton Woods institutions, despite more 
or less clearly stated reservations in the nationally owned strategies. Were the 
CPIA ratings, however, to be based on the judgments of staff members of all the 
international donors present in a country, the country’s government and other 
opinion leaders could perhaps more easily regard the rating as a balanced ex-
ternal bona fide view. In principle, the same instrument could also be used in a 
peer review conducted by representatives of other poor countries589, if that option 
would be more acceptable to governments concerned about external intrusions 
into national sovereignty. 
Some well-informed critics have portrayed the CPIA as one of the key drivers 
of the neo-liberally biased ideological domination by the World Bank over the 
low-income countries. Nancy Alexander argues590 that instead of measuring a 
country’s policy and institutional development framework for poverty reduction, 
sustainable growth and effective use of development assistance, the CPIA in fact 
rates the extent to which a government has: (a) adopted neo-liberal economic poli-
cies (i.e., liberalization and privatization in the context of strict budget discipline), 
and (b) developed institutions, particularly those that protect property rights and 
promote a business-friendly environment.591 
I also have some critical remarks to make about the CPIA, and especially 
about the new plans to change the CPIA-criteria and their relative weights.592 
However, what makes the CPIA, in my view, interesting, widely applicable and 
potentially useful for different kinds of assessors, is the fact that its procedure is 
clear and its rating criteria very well defined.593 Unlike some of the PSIA-tools, 
the CPIA does not hide behind some quasi-objective statistical data and techni-
cal modelling calculations: It is frankly and honestly based on subjective judg-
ments by some more or less well informed outsiders, and this is a good thing. It 
is then up to the nationals of the country concerned either to take advantage of 
these external views, or to ignore them. The external aid community, to carry 
its accountability towards the Northern taxpayers’, anyway needs to be able to 
show that its allocation decisions are not arbitrary but based on a systematic and 
589 E.g. the NEPAD countries among themselves.
590 E.g. Alexander (2004a). See also CPIA – CSO-views in Websources. 
591 In this sense, Alexander (2004a) argues, the CPIA in fact derives its prescriptive approach from 
the World Bank Group’s ‘real mandate’, which is not what President Wolfensohn says in his public 
speeches but what is articulated in the Bank’s recent Private Sector Development (PSD) Strategy: “ 
to improve the climate for businesses; to expand the privatization ‘frontier’ into basic services - health care, 
education, and, particularly, water and energy, etc.”  
592 In the context of discussions within the World Bank Board of Executive Directors in early 2004 about 
broadening the disclosure of the CPIA ratings, the Bank management assembled an “Independent Panel” 
to review the CPIA ratings and methodology. The External Panel recommended, among other things, 
that the number of CPIA-criteria could be reduced from 20 to 15, thereby reducing the weight of some 
of the essential poverty related criteria (e.g. The Quality of the Country’s Systems for Monitoring and 
Analysis of Poverty Outcomes and Impacts’), and increasing the relative weight of the basic neo-liberal 
economic and structural policy ‘fundamentals’ (e.g. ‘Monetary and Exchange Rate Policy’, ‘Fiscal and 
Debt Policy’, ‘Trade Policy’, ‘Financial Sector’, and ‘Business Environment’).  The number of CPIA 
criteria was dropped to 16 in 2004. See: External Panel (2004). 
593 See World Bank (2001g). See also CPIA in Websources. 
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transparent instrument such as the CPIA. Then again, if the taxpayers and their 
representatives feel that the World Bank is using wrong criteria to assess the poor 
country governments’ performance, clear criteria can be easily contested, debated 
and perhaps renewed, if necessary.
Countries are supposed to be rated in the CPIA on their current status in rela-
tion to these dimensions and to benchmark countries selected for each geographic 
region, for which the ratings have been provided by the Bank HQ-staff. The idea 
is not to assess the amount of improvement a country has made since the previous 
year, nor its intentions for future change, but to assess the currently observable 
policies and institutions. 
All the 20 (or 16, since 2004) criteria are weighted equally in the overall CPIA 
rating. Each criterion is rated on a 1 to 6 scale. A rating of ‘5’ corresponds to a 
status that is good today. If this level has been sustained for three or more years, 
a ‘6’ is warranted, signifying a proven commitment to and support for the policy. 
Similarly, a ‘2’ rating represents a thoroughly unsatisfactory situation today. A ‘1’ 
rating signifies that this low level has persisted for three or more years, and there-
fore that the resulting problems are likely to be more entrenched and intractable. 
For instance, in the case of dimension number 12, which is “Equity of Public 
Resource Use” (which by the way is a great assessment criterion, I think) the evalu-
ators are supposed to assess the extent to which the pattern of public expenditures 
and revenues of the government favours the poor. National and sub-national (lo-
cal) levels of government should be appropriately weighted.594 According to the 
short and readable guidance given by the Bank to evaluators, a low rating ‘2’ is to 
be given to a country in which:
“Most public expenditures for economic and social services do not benefit the poor more 
than the better off. The government has not identified individuals, groups or localities that 
are poor, vulnerable, or have unequal access to services and opportunities, does not have 
appropriate programs, and has no plans. Spending on economic and social services targeted 
to the poor is inadequate. The overall incidence of revenues is regressive.”
A high rating ‘5’ is in place in countries where…
“Key public expenditures for economic and social services are well targeted to benefit the 
poor. There are few, if any, egregious regressive expenditures. The government has identi-
fied individuals, groups or localities that are poor, vulnerable, or have unequal access to 
services and opportunities, and has designed appropriate programs. Spending on economic 
services targeted to the poor is broadly adequate. The overall incidence of revenues is pro-
gressive, and there are few, if any, egregious regressive revenue sources.”
That is all. No proposals of complex technical surveys or analyses, the comple-
594 Based on available poverty analysis, public expenditure reviews (PERs), and other relevant analyses, 
as well as on the country owned PRSP, or, if not available, informed judgement based on existing 
information and analysis. See: World Bank (2001g), p. 15.  
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tion of which would require the parachuting of Washington-based experts into 
the country (like in the case of PSIA). The World Bank country office staff, with 
their year-round observations at the country level will be able to rate countries 
according to these criteria. Also the other donors’ country-based staff members 
could. And so could peer reviewers from other developing countries, e.g. in the 
frameworks of regional integration bodies such as SADC, ASEAN, MERCOSUR, 
etc. – or national parliamentary auditors and inspectors and civil society watch-
dogs of the country concerned. In fact, the wider – and diverse – the group of 
evaluators would be, the more credible – and convincing - would their average 
judgment on the equity of the country’s public resource use be. But the tool is 
good.
Or look at the criteria for bad and good performance in the area of “Social 
Protection and Labour Market Regulation”595 whose purpose is to reduce the risk of 
becoming poor and to assist those who are poor to mitigate and cope with further 
risk to their well-being. The policies to be observed under this dimension include, 
e.g.: regulation which minimizes segmentation and inequity in the labour mar-
ket; protection of the basic labour standards; social safety nets; community-driv-
en development projects; and active labour market programmes such as public 
works or job training.  The CPIA guidelines suggest the following descriptions 
for bad and good performance: 
2 (bad): 
“Government programmes (social safety nets, targeted interventions, etc.) fail to reach 
chronically poor, vulnerable, and /or elderly. Excessive or inappropriate government labour 
market regulation discourages employment or fails to minimally protect workers. Labour 
codes and/or government policies and programmes fail to address harmful child labour.596 
Labour codes and/or government policies fail to address discrimination (on the basis of gen-
der, age, ethnicity, etc.) in the labour market. Government programmes and policies impede 
development of community initiatives.”
5 (good) 
“Government policies and programmes are in place which, in combination with private 
systems, are designed to protect chronically poor and vulnerable, including the elderly. 
Labour market regulation, including the application of core labour standards, promotes 
broad access to employment and reflects a balance between social protection and job crea-
tion objectives in accordance with the economic circumstances and values of the country. 
Government policy and programmes work toward the elimination of harmful child labour, 
including appropriate incentives for children to remain in school. Government policy en-
courages civil society and local government involvement in projects to reduce child labour. 
Labour codes and/or government policies promote reduction of discrimination in the labour 
595 See World Bank (2001g). See also CPIA in Websources.
596 See the definition used by the World Bank for ‘harmful child labour’ in Fallon and Tzannatos (1998), 
which is in accordance with the 1999 ILO Convention No. 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms 
of Child Labour. The basic idea in these documents is that harmful child labour is that which inhibits 
the child’s growth and development, and has negative implications for social and human development 
in countries.
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market. Government policies and programmes are in place to support the poor communi-
ties’ own development initiatives (e.g. allocation of resources to communities and their local 
governments for building infrastructure, providing services, or supporting other develop-
ment initiatives.”
The good and bad performance criteria are well described for the 18 other dimen-
sions of the CPIA-framework, as well. Of course, my criteria for the ‘goodness’ of 
trade policy, fiscal policy or factor and product market regulation might not be 
exactly the same as those of the World Bank’s poverty economists. But the beauty 
of the CPIA is, that World Bank poverty economists’ criteria are clearly defined in 
the CPIA, and if I or – more importantly,  if e.g. the Parliamentarians of Tanzania, 
Cambodia, or any other poor country – would want to challenge the World Bank 
economists’ criteria, we/they could easily do it, because the criteria are openly 
and clearly defined. 
Of course, if other bilateral donors would also take part in the Country Policy 
and Institutional Assessment, they would also want to suggest some changes to 
some of the criteria descriptions. But I believe that even as they stand today, the 
CPIA rating criteria could be accepted by most international donors. A joint, har-
monized and transparent CPIA based on the assessments of all donors engaged 
in a country would be much more convincing to the poor country governments 
concerned. And it would surely also be much more convincing and motivating 
to the parliaments and taxpayers of the individual donor countries, upon whose 
generosity also the World Bank’s financial might depends. I trust that even the 
global dialogue that would thereby be opened about what constitutes good (i.e. 
pro-poor) performance in, say, social protection and labour market policies, gen-
der policies, banking sector efficiency, trade policy, management of external debt, 
policies for environmental sustainability, and the management of inflation and 
macro-economic imbalances, would be useful, as it would strengthen the global 
consensus on poverty reduction, and above all, make the consensus much more 
tangible and transparent than it is today. 
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6 Ten Years After                 
–  From Poverty Economics 
to Global Social Policy
6.1 the WoRlD BANK No moRe hAS ANSWeRS 
to poveRtY – But the uN-SeCRetARiAt AND 
uN-ReSeARCheRS, mARgiNAliZeD iN the pASt 
30 YeARS, Do.   
Chapters 3-4 provided an analysis of the emergence and characteristics of the 
‘Global Millennium Consensus’ on poverty reduction around year 2000. Although 
remarkable progress had been achieved by the global community of professional 
poverty reduction planners by the turn of the 3rd Millennium, the Millennium 
Consensus account ended with uncomfortable questions. Something was still 
wrong when the World Bank published its flagship report 2000 , dedicated to the 
theme of poverty reduction. Behind the conceptual convergence, the thinkers and 
practitioners of different professional, national and organisational backgrounds 
were still attaching different meanings to the common concepts and using re-
markably different logics to link reality, theory and action. As a result of this, 
global efforts towards poverty reduction have not been as coherent and effective 
as they could have been: We should have achieved more in terms of poverty 
reduction. MDG-tracking in 2010 shows that we are failing on our promises.597 
This does not go unnoticed by the people in the world’s low-income countries, as 
exemplified by the cartoon by the famous Tanzanian political cartoonist GADO 
in Figure 15 (below).
WDR-2000 was the third in a series of World Development Reports at the 
beginning of a new decade (1980, 1990 and 2000), that the Bank had decided to 
dedicate to poverty reduction - the raison d’être of the Bank.  As we discussed in 
the empirical part of this study, a clear conceptual and intellectual progression 
could be observed by tracing the way the World Bank economists discussed the 
challenge of poverty reduction in the WDRs 1980, 1990 and 2000. WDRs were 
not yet published in 1970, but through a reconstruction of the poverty reduction 
discourse used in a few other flagship reports of the Bank in the 1970s we were, 
however, able to make the surprising observation of ‘non-linearity’ in the pro-
gression of WB-economists’ thinking about poverty reduction: The conceptual 
597 See Millennium indicators in Websources.
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frameworks used in the 1970s were much more well-developed and comprehen-
sive than in the 1980s and 90s. 
Figure 15. Failing on the MDGs598 
We also identified a curious mix of ideological, ideational and identity-related 
reasons why not only the World Bank but many other international development 
cooperation agencies, too - including the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland 
(MFAF) – bought into the degraded conceptual approach to poverty reduction 
in the 1980s and 1990s, and still far into the 2000s. Some of UN-agencies599 didn’t 
– but kept insisting on their own conceptual frameworks, based on a strong de-
velopmental state committed to a comprehensive and balanced set of social and 
economic policies, where the well-being of people is seen both as an intrinsic 
value and goal of public policy as well as the best thing one could do to promote 
the economy: an investment into the most important productive factor of the 
economy: the human being.
In 2010, ten years after the Millennium Consensus – and Conflicts - a great 
Confusion reigns among the World Bank poverty economists: revealingly, they 
decided to discontinue the tradition of dedicating the first World Development 
Report of the decade to the theme of poverty reduction.  As if other topics – cli-
598 GADO (2007), available at: www.ethiosun.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/11/MDG.bmp .
599 E.g. ILO, Unrisd, Unicef, UNDP, Unctad.
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mate, migration and conflicts600 – had become more important than poverty, or as 
if the World Bank poverty economists would be tacitly admitting that there are 
problems with the approaches and theories they have been imposinig on devel-
oping countries for the past 30 years and that honestly speaking they just do not 
have much to say about poverty reduction at the moment.601 
The shift in the global intellectual leadership on poverty reduction cannot go 
unobserved: The UN agencies and UN research institutes that were marginalized 
over the past quarter of a century of neoliberal domination are now speaking out 
on poverty reduction through developmental state and comprehensive socio-economic 
policies: UN-DESA – the UN-Secretariat in New York – filled the gap left by the 
World Bank and published in 2010 a flagship report on poverty reduction. The 
UN-DESA ‘Rethinking Poverty’ report does not hesitate to judge the World Bank-
led poverty reduction approaches of the past decades as a failure. It calls for a 
major rethinking of strategies and policies for poverty eradication.
6.2 the uN-SeCRetARiAt CAllS FoR A RethiNKiNg 
oF poveRtY    
The UN-DESA’s ‘Report on the World Social Situation’, titled ‘Rethinking 
Poverty’602 points out that global leaders had, only fifteen years ago, in the 
Copenhagen World Summit for Social Development 1995, described poverty 
eradication as an ethical, political and economic imperative of the mankind. Yet, 
global poverty levels have changed very little since Copenhagen, except in China 
and East Asia, which have been remarkably successful, and, to some extent, in 
India. Viewed in terms of the wider definition of poverty adopted by the 1995 
Social Summit, which includes deprivation, social exclusion and lack of partici-
pation, the situation today may be even more deplorable than a money income 
poverty line would suggest. Poverty levels remain stubbornly—and unaccept-
600 The topics of the WDRs 2009, 2010 and 2011 are, respectively: climate, migration and conflict.
601 Anything critical I say here is about the World Bank as a huge collective of poverty economists. 
Individuals within that huge system do have lots and lots of important things to say about poverty 
and poverty reduction. But as an institution, the World Bank seems to be ‘taking a timeout’. I know 
that some of  the leading poverty economists in the World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Group, e.g. Ana 
Revenga and Jaime Saavedra, are moving forward and producing important new research on the 
linkages between poverty and gender and other forms of inequality. The fact is that their thinking in 
2010 is light years apart from that of – for instance – Lawrence Summers, David Dollar & co.  in the 
first years of the Millennium. Ana Revenga,  Director of World Bank’s Poverty Reduction Group is at 
the moment the Chief Editor of WDR-2012 on the topic of Gender Equality. She is not only a brilliant 
Spanish labour and social protection economist, but also a human rights lawyer from the University 
of Geneva. (See: go.worldbank.org/B7B8RW8FQ0). Jaime Saavedra is also originally labour economist, 
from Peru, and has published extensively on topics such as gender and racial discrimination, social 
spending and taxation. The “Poverty Reduction Group” is a small unit within PREM (Poverty 
Reduction and Economic Management Sector of the Bank), with the main responsibility for poverty 
analysis in the World Bank. 
602 UN-DESA (2010). DESA is ’Department for Economic and Social Affairs’, the UN-secretariat in New 
York, in charge of preparing most of the background documents for and facilitating the organisation 
of all major UN-meetings under the UN Economic and Social Council ECOSOC and its subsidiary 
commissions, such as e.g. the Commission for Social Development, CSocD. See: UN-DESA in 
Websources. 
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ably—high in sub-Saharan Africa, and in South Asia, despite rapid and sustained 
growth.603
The mixed record of poverty reduction calls into question the efficacy of 
conventional approaches involving economic liberalization and privatization. 
Instead, the UN-DESA argue, governments need to play a developmental role, 
with implementation of integrated economic and social policies designed to sup-
port inclusive output and employment growth as well as to reduce inequality and 
promote justice in society.
Such an approach needs to be complemented by appropriate industrial invest-
ment and technology policies as well as by inclusive financial facilities designed 
to effectively support the desired investments. In addition, new potentially viable 
production capacities and capabilities need to be fostered through developmen-
tal trade and other complementary policies. Structural transformations should 
promote decent work, while governments should have enough policy - especially 
fiscal - space to enable them to play a proactive developmental role and to provide 
adequate universal social protection.
The recent food, energy and financial crises (2007-) made hundreds of millions 
more vulnerable to hunger and poverty and have threatened to wipe out much 
of the modest gains in poverty reduction since the 2000 Millennium Summit - 
while climate change increasingly threatens the lives of the poor. The negative 
economic and social impacts of these crises highlight vulnerability to poverty, 
and call into question the sustainability of global poverty reduction. This further 
underscores, the UN-Secretariat argues, the need to rethink poverty reduction 
strategies and, more broadly, the underlying development paradigm.
The ‘Report on the World Social Situation’ contributes to this rethinking of 
poverty and its eradication. It affirms the urgent need for a strategic shift away 
from the market fundamentalist thinking, policies and practices of recent decades 
towards more sustainable development- and equity-oriented policies appropriate 
to national conditions and circumstances. Responsible development and counter-
cyclical macroeconomic policies to foster productive investments and generate 
decent employment must be at the core of this effort.
6.3 FRom gRoWth optimiSm to DevelopmeNtAl 
StAte  
Since the adoption of the United Nations Millennium Declaration in 2000, many 
countries in Africa and Latin America have experienced rapid economic growth, 
often benefiting from higher commodity prices. Most developing countries have 
achieved macroeconomic stability, and their public finances had achieved some 
degree of balance, after two decades of austere adjustment programmes. Global 
financial markets have been awash in liquidity, with investors ready to invest in 
developing-country debt and equity. Foreign direct investments (FDI) have also 
603 UN-DESA (2010), p. iii.
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been rising strongly, especially in resource-rich countries, as mining companies 
had raced to take advantage of higher mineral commodity prices. Strong growth 
in China and India had helped further to bring down global poverty rates, not 
only in their own economies but also in the economies of their main trading 
partners. As noted by Addison: “For those convinced that economic growth offers the 
main route to poverty reduction, that the market mechanism works wonders, and that the 
poor always benefit from globalization, the world looked good.”604 
However, this optimism started to crumble with the global food, energy and 
financial and economic crisis. The dominant growth-based paradigm which 
underpinned poverty reduction strategies in the past two to three decades has 
come under serious scrutiny. Further, the World Bank has revised its ‘dollar-a-
day’ methodology and its own poverty estimates,605 but criticisms continue to 
highlight their methodological problems and the implications of such problems. 
Thus, controversies about actual trends in global poverty continue, while rais-
ing, in the process, serious doubts about the effectiveness of poverty reduction 
strategies.
The ‘Rethinking Poverty’ report of the UN-Secretariat makes an impressive 
contribution to this debate. It first reviews the global poverty trends, and reflects 
on issues of measurement, arguing strongly for a widening of the understanding 
of poverty. Taking into account – also in statistical measurements – all the mul-
tiple, and equally important  dimensions of poverty makes the issue of poverty 
reduction a great deal more nuanced and complex than the narrow technocratic 
vision underlying the conventional wisdom. The report then moves on to a criti-
cal analysis of the conventional policy framework and popular poverty reduc-
tion programmes in the context of the persistence of poverty, rising inequality 
and lacklustre growth performance in many developing countries until very 
recently. It argues that a commitment to eradicating poverty and to enhancing 
equity and social integration requires persistent actions directed towards sustain-
able economic growth, productive employment creation and social development, 
entailing an integrated approach to economic and social policies for the benefit of all 
citizens. Moreover, it calls for more developmentally oriented and progressive 
state activism and universalism – as opposed to selectivity - in the approach to 
social policy. By highlighting the moral obligation to address poverty as a human 
right, the UN-DESA report argues against the temptations to cut social spending 
during the period of economic hardship related to the financial, economic and 
social crisis.606 
604 Addison (2009) p. 174.
605 See: Ravallion and Chen (2008). 
606 UN-DESA (2010), p. 11.
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6.4 NeeD to uNDeRStAND Who the pooR ARe 
AND hoW theY expeRieNCe poveRtY 
UN-DESA’s critique of poverty economists’ conventional monetary-based meas-
urement using poverty lines suggests that it is not enough to define and aggregate 
‘poverty’ in the abstract, as if it were a commodity measurable in dollars and 
cents. What is essential is to progress from an abstract focus on the incidence of 
poverty to an empathetic understanding of the lived experience of poverty. To do 
this, “it is necessary to identify people who are in poverty”.607 
It is also necessary to recognize the multiple and distinct dimensions in which 
people - both those above and those below any stipulated poverty line - experi-
ence deficits in well-being, whether or not they can be quantified in monetary 
terms. Conventional basic needs are critical, but do not exhaust the necessary 
areas of concern. Furthermore, it is essential to move away from approaches 
dominated by a focus on outcomes to those where monitoring the outcomes is 
just the starting point for an exploration of the “structures and dynamic processes” 
that produce them. In other words, diagnoses of the problems are needed, not 
just snapshots of outcomes.
The poverty-line approach limits the field of vision to individuals and house-
holds below the prescribed poverty line, ignoring the fact that there is a large 
share of the population above the poverty line who are highly vulnerable to pov-
erty. Many households enter and exit poverty as defined by a poverty line as 
their circumstances and fortunes fluctuate, such fluctuations being a hallmark 
of deprivation. This calls for a dynamic analysis that investigates vulnerability, 
household socio-economic mobility, and movement of households into and out 
of specific states of deprivation.
Taken together, these observations of the UN-Secreariat’s ‘Rethinking 
Poverty’ report constitute an effective critique of the World Bank’s conventional 
dollar-a-day poverty-line approach and underscore the value of more universal 
approaches to human and social development. “It is therefore imperative to develop 
alternative conceptual perspectives and strategies”, the UN-DESA report concludes.  
Indeed, a lot of work with such an objective has been on-going during the 
first decade after the Millennium turn, both within and especially outside the 
World Bank. These alternative approaches have seldom received the same global 
publicity as the reports of the World Bank poverty economists, but – as Robert 
Chambers says – “good ideas fly with wind”:608 These alternative views, conceptual 
perspectives and strategies are being widely shared and used in networks of de-
velopment practitioners, to whom they give hope and inspiration: alternatives to 
the neoliberal poverty economists’ narrow money-metric approaches exist, and 
can be used and further developed. In what follows, some of the most promising 
examples are presented.
607 UN-DESA (2010), p. 63.
608 Chambers (personal communication).
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6.5 voiCeS oF the pooR 
Deepa Narayan, an Indian social anthropologist working for the Social 
Development Department of the World Bank has led, with colleagues, two heroic 
efforts to increase our understanding about who the world’s poor women and 
men are, how they perceive poverty and how they believe that poverty could be 
reduced. The first of these largest ever ‘participatory poverty assessments’ was 
the “Voices of the Poor” -study that we reported about already in the previous 
chapters, in connection to the World Development Report 2000, to which it was 
a contribution. That study collected the voices of more than 60,000 poor women 
and men from 60 countries, and reported about their struggles and aspirations 
for a life of dignity.609
One of the key findings of the ‘Voices’ study was that the poor women and 
men view well-being ‘holistically’. For them, poverty is much more than low in-
comes alone. For the poor, the good life or wellbeing is multi-dimensional with 
both material and psychological dimensions. Wellbeing is peace of mind; it is 
good health; it is belonging to a community; it is safety; it is freedom of choice 
and action; it is a dependable livelihood and a steady source of income; it is food. 
The ‘Voices’ also revealed that poor people felt that they had not been able 
to take advantage of new economic opportunities because of lack of connections 
and lack of information, skills and credit. Unemployment and lack of food and 
money appeared as problems in many communities. The poor, who worked pri-
marily in the informal sector, reported experiencing life as more insecure and 
unpredictable than a decade or so ago. This was linked to unpredictability of 
agriculture, jobs that are unreliable and with low returns, loss of traditional liveli-
hoods, breakdown of the state, breakdown of traditional social solidarity, social 
isolation, increased crime and violence, lack of access to justice, extortion, and 
brutality from the police rather than protection. Illness was dreaded and lack of 
affordable health care pushed many families into indebtedness and destitution.
With increased economic hardship and a decline in poor men’s income earn-
ing opportunities, poor women across the world reported “swallowing their 
pride” and going out to do even demeaning jobs to bring food to the family. In 
their struggles to adapt to changing economic roles in the household, women 
widely reported greatly increased work burdens; and men in many communi-
ties expressed frustration and humiliation with the lack of livelihood opportuni-
ties. This loss of traditional male ‘breadwinner role’ and female ‘caretaker role’ 
was traumatic for both genders, and family breakdown, domestic violence and 
increased alcoholism among men were often mentioned. In some communities, 
awareness- raising by NGOs, churches and women’s groups was contributing to 
changing social norms and eventually to harmony and equity within the house-
hold. Corruption also emerged as a core poverty issue.
609 On the Voices of the Poor study, see: Narayan et al. (2000a,b, 2002). See also Voices of the Poor –study 
in Websources.
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6.6 moviNg out oF poveRtY 
Why and how do some poor people move out of poverty and stay out of poverty 
while others remain trapped in chronic poverty? ‘Moving out of Poverty’ - a follow-
up to the ‘Voices of the Poor’ -  was a global study that explored how women and 
men in poor countries had moved out of poverty or remained trapped in chronic 
poverty from the perspectives of the men, women and youth who have lived 
through these experiences. The study sought to understand from the bottom-up 
factors that unleash poor people’s economic potential in diverse environments 
and support their transitions out of poverty.610
If we want to understand how to reduce poverty, we should indeed seek to 
learn from the life experiences of those who have been able to move out of pov-
erty, as well as those who have fallen into or remained in poverty. The ‘Moving 
Out of Poverty’ distills life stories, discussions and questionnaires collected from 
over 60,000 poor people and recently poor people in more than 500 communities 
in 15 low and middle income countries in South and East Asia, Africa, and Latin 
America. The materials and findings are extremely rich, and certainly difficult to 
summarize. The following were among the key findings, as presented by the pro-
ject’s brilliant and highly dedicated director, Deepa Narayan, at a donor agency 
‘Social Development Advisers’ Network’ (SDAN) meeting in 2010:
Although poor people often find themselves excluded from social, political 
and economic institutions, they nevertheless have strong aspirations that drive 
their efforts to improve their own situation and lay the foundation for a better 
future for their children. Despite the difficult conditions which they face, poor 
people demonstrate considerable initiative and take many risks, as much as the 
well-off, in an active search for opportunities to improve their welfare.
Yet poor people frequently fail because they confront exclusionary markets, 
and lack resources. They face many barriers, including informal networks that 
protect local markets. As a poor man in Bangladesh said, “To gain success in busi-
ness, political favor is needed.” Poor people rely on hard physical labor, with their 
physical health strength as their only capital. And despite the micro-credit revo-
lution, poor people remain starved for credit and excluded from other financial 
services. 
In spite of the many obstacles poor people confront, many do escape poverty. 
But poverty reduction remains a challenge because many people fall back into 
poverty. Across the studied communities in the world, close to half the popula-
tion is moving up or down, often with the same people falling and rising at dif-
ferent times. There is great variation across countries, with the highest falling 
rates in Africa. But worldwide, 23 per cent moved out of poverty while almost 
the same number – 22 percent - fell into poverty. Just by stopping the falling we 
could dramatically affect poverty rates. 
610 The Moving Out of Poverty study produced four published books: Narayan and Petesch (2007), 
Narayan, Pritchett and Kapoor (2009a), Narayan (ed. 2009) and Narayan and Petesch (2009b). See: 
go.worldbank.org/8K2Q8RYZ10
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The extent of downward mobility reveals that vulnerability is a key issue. We 
need new strategies to increase people’s resilience611, first, by helping them reach 
an asset threshold that would allow them to survive shocks such as illness, crop 
failure, and the recent dramatic price increase for food and fuel. Second, poverty 
can be dramatically decreased through social and health insurance programs that 
would help people deal with shocks, particularly ill health, one of the most fre-
quent triggers for descent into poverty. 
It is important to expand economic opportunities locally so that people can 
accumulate assets. Expanding opportunities means addressing the investment 
climate faced by these tiny entrepreneurs, and liberalizing it from the bottom up: 
removing government regulations that restrict investment by poor people and 
businesses in rural areas, increasing poor people’s ability to access markets on 
fairer terms, and increasing the availability of ‘decent work’ and jobs. 
Poor people all over the world also remind us of their isolation and the im-
portance of the basics - roads, water, electricity and telephones. As a poor woman 
in Assam, India said, “There is no problem in doing business. All can do it. But where 
there is no light, no bridge, and no roads, what business will you do.
Local governments that are responsive and accountable can have a critical 
role in expanding local markets and opportunities. Greater participation, more 
information, particularly about local government activities, and the actions of 
poor people’s organizations have all helped increase local government account-
ability. When local governments function in a responsive, democratic manner, 
they help create the conditions of trust, unity, and opportunity that help poor 
people escape poverty. 
Poor people express a strong desire for democracy and the opportunity to 
exercise their rights as citizens. They associate local democracy with freedom 
and dignity, right to vote, to participate in civic life, to be accorded justice, to par-
ticipate and hold local politicians and government representatives accountable. 
Whether in Afghanistan or Tanzania, Mexico or Morocco, poor expressed their 
desires for freedom in similar phrases: “free to decide; freedom to dare to talk; dare to 
express ideas and opinions; live with dignity; know your rights; dare to protest; to live in 
peace; free to travel; justice.”
Poor people don’t just rely on government – they also turn to each other for 
help. In Bufkaro village in Uganda, poor men noted that “if you do not belong to any 
group in this village you cannot survive.” Yet with their limited resources, connec-
tions, and market skills, there are limits to how much poor people can help each 
other break into local markets or access financial services. Thus, only 0.3 percent 
of respondents mentioned NGOs as helping them move out of poverty (although 
NGOs do play other important roles). Nevertheless, society gains from their tradi-
tions of solidarity, which can potentially build trust, unity, and can promote civil 
society and civic behavior.
Imaginative new strategies are needed to scale up poor people’s enterprises; 
integrate them into production and procurement models of mainstream busi-
611 ‘Resilience’ seemed to be the global poverty economists’ Nr. 1 catchword in 2010.
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nesses on fairer terms; and move from cooperatives of the poor to corporations of 
the poor. Poor people’s economic organizations have been an area of investment 
failure by civil society, businesses and the state. It is time for civil society and 
business groups to come together in new ways to support and create economic 
organizations of these millions of tiny entrepreneurs. In a government supported 
program in Andhra Pradesh, India, millions of poor, often illiterate women have 
joined federated self-help groups and are changing their economic, social and 
political lives. As they say, “now we know no fear.” 
Wide coalitions of poverty professionals – mainly non-economists, but also 
large numbers of highly dedicated and broadly thinking economists within and 
outside the World Bank have been monitoring and learning from participatory 
poverty studies such the ‘Voices of the Poor’ and the ’Moving out of Poverty’ over 
the past decades. 
The Internet has made it possible also for poverty professionals based in the 
Global North to follow more closely than ever before the findings of research-
ers and practitioners, who report from their first-hand encounters with poor 
people and communities. South-based networks such as Network-Ideas, IPC-IC, 
Wahenga, EPRI, Pambazuka, TGNP, TWN, South Centre612 and many others – na-
tional, regional and global - have taken over much of the global leadership in the 
generation of new evidence and thinking about poverty and the effectiveness of 
various types of interventions by the non-poor aimed at supporting the struggles 
of poor people, communities and countries. Yet, it must be admitted that also the 
World Bank and the leading anglophone development research institutions, such 
as IDS-Sussex, ODI, CPRC613 still play a key role in influencing our worldviews 
and our knowledge about poverty and poverty reduction.
6.7 CompReheNSive SoCiAl poliCieS FoR 
DevelopmeNt - StReNgtheNiNg the 
SOCIAL DIMENSIONS oF All poliCieS  
Most importantly, in terms of a real rethinking of poverty - and also for the over-
riding argument “From Poverty Economics to Global Social Policy” that I have been 
developing in this essay - is the way the UN-Secretariat’s ‘Rethinking Poverty’ 
report argues about the need for a new “Social Policy Approach” in poverty analysis 
and policy making, based on a serious consideration of deprivation, vulnerability 
and exclusion.614 ‘Social policy’ here should not be misinterpreted as ‘social sec-
tors’, or ‘social services’ only, since one of the most important ways how good, 
developmental social policy can contribute positively to both poverty reduction 
612 Network-Ideas: www.networkideas.org , IPC-IC: www.undp-povertycentre.org , Wahenga: www.
wahenga.net  , EPRI: www.epri.org.za , Pambazuka: www.pambazuka.org , TGNP: www.tgnp.org 
, Haki Kazi: www.hakikazi.org , Haki Elimu: www.hakielimu.org , Haki Ardhi: www.hakiardhi.org 
TWN: www.twnside.org.sg , TWN-Africa: www.twnafrica.org  ,   South Centre: www.southcentre.org.
613 IDS: www.ids.ac.uk , ODI: www.odi.org.uk , CPRC: www.chronicpoverty.org .
614 UN-DESA (2010), p. 63.
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and to sustainable economic development of a society is by strengthening the 
social qualities of the ‘non-social’ sectors of development. 
This same argument had been constructively developed already in 2005 in the 
‘Arusha Declaration’, resulting from the Arusha Conference on ‘New Frontiers of 
Social Policy’, organised by Anis Dani, social policy adviser of the World Bank (co-
financed by the Government of Finland)615 - as well as by the book “Comprehensive 
Social Policies for Development” that I wrote with Ronald Wiman and Matti Ylönen 
in 2007,616 based on the outcomes of the ‘Kellokoski Experts’ Meeting’ that we or-
ganised in Finland in 2006 as a contribution to discussions in the UN Commission 
for Social Development in 2007.
The Arusha Declaration had argued that development policy is always si-
multaneously economic and social policy. Mainstreaming social policy involves 
recognizing and drawing on the social dimensions of all policies and programs. For 
instance:
•	 Strengthening assets and institutions to enhance market access for the poor; 
•	 Fostering more accessible and accountable institutions for providing infrastruc-
ture, utilities, and social services to all citizens.
•	 Strengthening partnerships between public institutions and representative citi-
zens’ organizations to address the challenges of human settlements in the context 
of rapid urbanization and growth of urban slums.
•	 Using the instrument of the law to empower the poor.
•	 Addressing the spatially-induced challenges of rural areas.
•	 Deploying fiscal policy to achieve economic and social development.
•	 Considering the challenges of citizenship in an era of rapid globalization and 
international migration.
 
The participants of the Arusha Conference had emphasized two other key re-
quirements of successful social policies for poverty reduction in the age of glo-
balization: ‘context-specificity’ and the ‘global dimension’:
•	 “We can learn more from analysis when cross-country comparisons are grounded in an 
understanding of the country context, including history, as well as social and institu-
tional structures.”
•	 “The unit of analysis for social policy does not have to be the nation-state; some social 
policy concerns are better addressed at sub-national levels and others at trans-national 
levels.”617
615 See Arusha Declaration in Websources. The outcomes of the Arusha Conference were documented 
also in three books edited by Anis Dani, World Bank Advisor for Social Policy, with other contributors 
to the conference:  Bebbington et al. (2008), Dani and de Haan (2008) and See also:  go.worldbank.
org/JSJ8M9ZDR0
616 Wiman, Voipio and Ylönen (2007). Kellokoski Experts’ Meeting (2006). See also: info.stakes.fi/ssd/
EN/comprehensive/index.htm 
617 See: Arusha Declaration in Websources.
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The main concerns addressed by the Kellokoski Experts’ Meeting on Compre-
hensive Social Policies for Development were the following: 
•	 The limited progress in achieving the main development goals of the Copenha-
gen Social Summit: poverty eradication, full productive employment, and social 
integration.
•	 The failure of current policies and fragmented projects to reduce poverty, global 
and national inequality, unemployment, informality, social exclusion, vulner-
ability, social conflict and the feminization of poverty as one of the striking indi-
cators of failure.
•	 The imbalance of donor financing between the UN and development banks, and 
the proliferation of narrow mandates given to the UN by member states, with no 
matching funding to promote comprehensive social and employment policies at 
national, regional and global levels.
•	 The lack of a social dimension in the regional economic integration arrangements 
and processes and the marginalization of the social dimension in globalization.
Also the “Comprehensive Social Policy for Development Agenda” developed at 
Kellokoski argued that social policy is not only about the basic social services 
(education, health and social protection), although they remain important in 
every society. Social policy is also about the – more or less socially sensitive – 
strategic orientations and impacts of macro-economic policies and infrastructure 
investments. The ‘3R’ rule of thumb was presented by Prof. Bob Deacon as a good 
checklist for analyzing the ‘social dimensions’ of all policies, i.e. what impact do 
the various policies and reforms have on the Social Rights, Social Regulation and 
Social Redistribution nationally, regionally or globally?618
Mainstreaming social policy would involve recognizing, assessing and draw-
ing on the social dimensions of all policies and programmes, not only on the 
national, but also on the regional and global levels. This had also been the main 
message of the “World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization”, co-
chaired (under ILO-support) by President Tarja Halonen of Finland and President 
Benjamim Mkapa of Tanzania.619
The Kellokoski outcome document “New Consensus on Comprehensive Social 
Policies for Development”620 recommended that to reduce poverty effectively and 
sustainably – respecting the imperatives of context specificity and country own-
ership -  each developing country should be supported in building “ambitious and 
equitable National Development Strategies” with prioritized action plans for com-
prehensive social and decent work policies, including the following elements in 
context-specific, tailored combinations:
618 Wiman, Voipio and Ylönen (2007). Deacon has used this ‘3R’ definition of ‘Social Policy’ earlier, e.g. 
in Deacon (1997). 
619 World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004).
620 Kellokoski Experts’ Meeting (2006).
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1) Employment, including entrepreneurship and employability
2) Basic social services: social protection, education and health
3) The specific challenges of disadvantaged population groups, e.g. women, 
youth, older people, people with disabilities, etc.
4) Equity-orientation, empowerment, social inclusion, social dialogue, social 
risk management and accountability in all policies and at all levels of 
governance, including pro-poor growth and taxation.
5) Social and distributional impact assessment and risk/vulnerability analy-
sis of all policies and all governance
6) Multi-disciplinary approach and methods to analysing society, economy, 
culture and environment.
7) Enhancing private– and public– sector social responsibility
6.8 SuStAiNABle DevelopmeNt ShoulD Be 
BALANCED DevelopmeNt 
What, then, were the intellectual, political and institutional constraints hindering 
the operationalisation of such a comprehensive social policy strategy for poverty 
reduction and sustainable development? 
The development and social policy experts convening in Kellokoski were 
convinced about the need to revisit the outcomes of the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development of Rio de Janeiro (1992) and the Copenhagen 
Summit for Social Development (1995), respectively: Rio had introduced the 
concept of sustainable development, and emphasized the need for a balance be-
tween the social, economic and environmental dimensions of sustainable devel-
opment. Timo Voipio, one of the two main conveners of the Kellokoski meeting 
illustrated the balanced Rio approach to sustainable development by using the 
PowerPoint slide shown in Figure 16.
6.9 poveRtY ReDuCtioN hAD CRoWDeD out 
emploYmeNt AND SoCiAl iNtegRAtioN 
In Copenhagen the governments of the world had agreed that poverty eradica-
tion, full productive employment and social integration are the three most impor-
tant challenges of social development in the world. The Copenhagen Declaration 
had called for a people-centred and equity-oriented approach to meet the chal-
lenges in all these three areas. Voipio illustrated the Copenhagen Agenda in 
Kellokoski as shown in Figure 17.
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Figure 16. The RIO Agenda for Sustainable Development: Balance Between the 
Economic, Social and Environmental Dimensions621
Figure 17. The Copenhagen Agenda Revisited: Poverty Reduction, Full Productive 
Employment and Social Integration622
Since the Social Summit the global development aid donor community had sys-
tematically focused on poverty. The Kellokoski Experts’ Meeting concluded, in 
retrospect, that donors had probably made the mistake of isolating poverty too 
strictly from the other main goals of sustainable development: employment, so-
cial integration, sustainable consumption and production patterns, equity, em-
powerment and a people-centred approach.623
Since  Copenhagen, there had been a growing international consensus about 
the multi-dimensionality of the poverty challenge, and about the complemen-
621 Voipio (2006b). See also: Wiman, Voipio, Ylönen (2007).
622 Voipio (2006b). See also: Wiman, Voipio, Ylönen (2007).
623 Kellokoski Experts’ Meeting (2006). See also: Wiman, Voipio, Ylönen (2007).
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tarities and interdependencies between social and economic development. 
However, the tension between the economic vs. social and environmental ap-
proaches to development and poverty eradication had remained a problem, es-
pecially as an economistic ‘growth first’ thinking had continued to dominate in 
the World Bank and the other large development funding institutions, tacitly 
assuming that equity, decent work and sustainability could be achieved only after 
economic growth has first been achieved. The experts convened in Kellokoski 
were convinced that good social and employment policies are an essential ingre-
dient of good economic policy, and vice versa.624 
The “liberalisation-privatisation-deregulation” -approach that dominated de-
velopment policies in the 1980s and 1990s favoured minimal state involvement 
and led to the marginalisation of social and employment policies and ministries, 
starving national capacity for comprehensive social policies. That capacity must 
be urgently re-built within government, social partners, the wider private sector, 
civil society organisations and research centers. Comprehensive social policies 
must be based on a multi-disciplinary, inter-sectoral and inter-ministerial ap-
proach. This would require capacity building in the weakly resourced social, 
labour and community development ministries, as the urgent priority of donor 
support. Efforts to tailor and operationalise equitable development approaches in 
national contexts, including the ILO/UN/EU Decent Work Agenda, the UN Policy 
Guidance Notes, the OECD-POVNET Guidelines on Pro-Poor Growth and the AU 
Social Policy Frameworks should be supported.625
6.10 DeCeNt WoRK – AN ilo CoNtRiButioN to mul-
ti-DimeNSioNAl gloBAl SoCiAl poliCY FoR All 
‘Decent Work’ became the main conceptual motto and organizing framework 
of the International Labour Organization (ILO), when Mr. Juan Somavia – a for-
mer UN-Ambassador of Chile, and the ‘main brain’ behind the UN Copenhagen 
Social Summit – started as Executive Director of the ILO in 1999.626 
The Decent Work Agenda has thereafter gained gradual-
ly widening support as a viable comprehensive policy framework 
where the economic, social and ecological dimensions are well balanced. 
Employment, entrepreneurship and economic growth are promoted in the Decent 
Work Agenda side by side with social protection, social rights and social dialogue 
(See Figure 18. ). 
624 Kellokoski Experts’ Meeting (2006).
625 On the Decent Work Agenda, see: http://www.ilo.org/global/About_the_ILO/Mainpillars/
WhatisDecentWork/lang--en/index.htm  . On the UN Policy Guidance Note on Social Policy, see: 
Ortiz (2007). OECD (2006a, b, 2009a,b,c). Various drafts of the AU Social Policy Framework were in 
circulation already in 2006. The document was officially approved in 2008. See: Social African Union 
(2008)
626 The concept of decent work was invented by Mr. Guy Standing, who was member of Mr. Somavia’s 
Cabinet. He proposed if first in the form “dignified work”, which attrackted Mr. Somavia’s attention. 
Later, however, Mr. Somavia changed it to “decent work-“. Standing (personal communication 2009).
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Figure 18. The Decent Work Agenda by ILO, UN, EU, African Union, and Others627
The conceptual framework and agenda of Decent Work has since then been 
endorsed not only by the ILO, but also by the UN, the EU, the African Union, 
and many other international organizations and bilateral governments. The 
World Commission for the Social Dimension of Globalization, co-chaired by the 
Presidents of Finland and Tanzania – Ms. Tarja Halonen and Mr. Benjamin W. 
Mkapa – used the Decent Work conceptual framework as a starting point, and 
recommended that “Fair Globalization” could and should be promoted by means 
of “Global Social Policy”.
6.11 gloBAl SoCiAl poliCY AS A ReSpoNSe 
to gloBAliZAtioN
In the 19th and 20th centuries industrialization emerged as a technology-driven 
change that carried with it a ‘promise’, that the new efficiency of mechanized 
production could potentially provide an opportunity for increased prosperity 
for all citizens of the industrializing societies. However, it was also well known 
that industrialization created lots of social and environmental costs: men, women 
and even children were working on the conveyer belts and in other parts of the 
new factories, often for way too long working hours, in working conditions that 
were hazardous for the health of the workers as well as of the environment. The 
industrializing societies invented new political institutions called ‘social policies’ 
and ‘environmental policies’, in order to guide and manage industrialization in 
627 Illustration developed by the author.
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such ways that the social and environmental costs of industrialization could be 
kept smaller than the benefits that industrialization was providing (see Figure 19. 
below).  A major risk for the progress of industrialization was that wide groups of 
people were resisting industrialization because they felt that its costs and benefits 
were unequally divided. In order to gain broad social acceptability for the indus-
trialization process societies had to innovate redistributive equalization policies 
and institutions, whose aim was to make sure that the social and environmental 
costs – and benefits - of industrialization could be divided acceptably equally 
among individuals, households and social groups in the society. 
Figure 19. Comparing National and Global Social Policies as Responses to 
Industrialization and Globalization628
In a similar way, globalization is actually a technology-driven process that carries 
with it the promise of – potentially – higher productivity and prosperity for all. 
Due to electronic real-time communication it has become possible to divide work 
processes globally so that capital can be ‘put to work’ always in that part of the 
globe where it is day-time. Global production chains and processes have, how-
ever, created also lots of social, equality and environmental costs, most of which 
become manifest in the developing countries of the ‘Global South’. In argue, in 
line with the World Commission for the Social Dimension of Globalization, that 
in order to be able to gain broad global acceptance for the globalization process, 
we (the global society) have to invent “global social policies”, that have the capac-
ity to keep the costs of globalization lower than its benefits, and to divide the 
social and environmental costs and benefits of Globalization as equitably as pos-
sible among individuals, groups and nations of the world. 
628 Voipio (2006c).
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6.12 oeCD-povNet guiDeliNeS oN pRo-pooR 
gRoWth 
Having negotiated, approved, published and disseminated the OECD-DAC 
Guidelines on Poverty Reduction, the DAC Poverty Reduction Network – POVNET 
– continued its work 2003-2010 by developing Guidelines a set of guidelines on 
‘Pro-Poor Growth’. 
The idea here was that while a wide consensus had been reached that pov-
erty is not only about economic growth but rather a multi-dimensional challenge 
that requires multi-dimensional solutions, growth, employment, production and 
structural change were still important and desirable aspects of economic devel-
opment for poverty reduction that should not be ignored. Yet, aid statistics were 
showing that aid spending on economic development, e.g. agriculture and infra-
structure, had been dropping throughout the 1990s. It was understood that this 
drop had not happened by accident. For one reason or the other donor agency 
decision-makers and their partners in developing country governments had not 
been convinced about the poverty reducing impacts of our spending on agricul-
ture and infrastructure and other sectors aimed at promoting economic growth. 
The benefits of growth were clearly not ‘trickling-down’ to the poor, as the so 
called ‘trickle-down theory of growth’ had assumed. So, a question emerged: are 
we spending our ODA resources aimed at economic growth in an optimal way, 
or is there room for some rethinking? How could we make sure that the economic 
growth that we are promoting benefits also the poor people in poor countries, 
not only the privileged elites?
POVNET decided to start to work on ‘Pro-Poor Growth’. First three task teams 
were set up to rethink how donor action on (a) agriculture, (b) infrastructure and 
(c) private sector development could be changed in order to increase the poverty 
reducing impacts in the lives of the poor people. Through a lot of sometimes 
tense, but often extremely enlightening interaction between donor experts with 
economics and other social science backgrounds a consensus view emerged that 
a good definition for pro-poor growth would be that “growth is pro-poor when (also) 
poor people can participate in, contribute to and benefit from it.”
The POVNET Task Teams on Agriculture, Infrastructure and Private Sector 
Development produced highly useful guidelines629 on how to rethink donor ac-
tion in those sectors in order to make sure that also the large majority of poor 
people could be seen as active agents of growth in agricultural, infrastructure and 
private sector development. In addition to that, a fourth Task Team on Poverty 
Impact Assessment produced a guideline advising donor agencies on how to 
assess – ex ante – the poverty reducing impacts of their planned projects and 
programmes in whatever sector.630
629 OECD-DAC (2006c,d,e).
630 OECD-DAC (2007).
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6.13 povNet guiDeliNeS oN SoCiAl pRoteCtioN, 
emploYmeNt AND empoWeRmeNt 
One of the main messages emerging from the OECD-POVNET Guidelines on 
Agriculture and Private Sector Development was that a major reason that pre-
vents the poor people from participating in, contributing to and benefiting from 
growth is their high vulnerability and low tolerance for risks. The poor people do 
know that by investing in higher yielding crops, tools and methods, or by moving 
from their current petty businesses to some higher productivity (and profitability) 
businesses they could move forward in life, gain better incomes for themselves 
and even contribute to the growth of the local and national economy. But they 
don’t – for the simple reason that such investments involve risks which the poor 
mothers and fathers cannot tolerate because there is no credible social protection 
as a fall-back option for them in case the investments aimed at moving forward in 
life would fail. Therefore, it is only highly rational that poor Tanzanian mothers 
keep on farming the low-nutrition cassava instead of maize or rice, just because 
the crop-loss risks related to cassava are substantially lower than those of the 
more nutritious – but more sensitive – maize or rice.
POVNET decided to start a new Task Team on Social Protection to study – and 
then to recommend to DAC-donors -  ways by which they could best support the 
efforts of poor people and developing country governments to manage the social 
lifecycle and livelihood related risks, in order to unlock the human entrepreneur-
ship and all human potential of all people for pro-poor growth and multi-dimen-
sional poverty reduction. It was quickly realized that while some people in each 
society are too young, old or ill to work themselves out of poverty, decent work 
is the – by-far – most effective and reliable form of social protection for all those 
poor people who are in working age, and capable of working. Therefore, social 
protection and employment were considered as the “two sides of the same coin”, 
and a parallel Task Team on Employment was therefore started to study and to 
recommend how donors could best promote poverty reducing decent work and 
sustainable livelihoods among the poor people in developing countries. 
The POVNET Guidelines on Social Protection and Employment were pub-
lished in 2009.631 They provided strong arguments about the essential role of de-
cent employment and credible social protection both as key pillars of inclusive 
and sustainable pro-poor growth strategies, as well as important elements of the 
human rights based development agenda.
Work is still ongoing in the OECD-POVNET on another donor guidelines on 
yet another important dimension of the pro-poor growth agenda: the POVNET 
Guideline on ‘Empowerment’ and Pro-Poor Growth will be published in 2011. 
Thereafter the POVNET agenda in 2011-2012 will focus on the following three 
main themes: (a) Making Green Growth Pro-Poor; (b) Global Food Security; (c) 
Global Social Protection Floor(s).632
631 OECD-DAC (2009 a,b,c)
632 OECD-DAC (2010).
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6.14 the WAY FoRWARD
As noted above, the UN-Secreariat’s ‘Rethinking Poverty’ report constitutes an 
effective critique of the World Bank poverty economists’ conventional dollar-a-
day approach to defining poverty, as well as to the neo-liberal ‘one-size-fits-all’ 
policy recommendations imposed by the World Bank on poor country govern-
ments. UN-DESA calls for the development and use of alternative conceptual 
perspectives and operational strategies. What do they then have in mind? How 
could global poverty be more effectively reduced? The alternative approach that 
the UN-Secretariat has in mind emphasizes social inclusion, decent work and a 
developmental role of the state in promoting structural transformations.633 
First, poverty reduction strategies should be developmentally oriented so as 
to promote structural transformations that will generate decent work opportunities 
for all. There is more to poverty than just insufficient income. In fact, a higher 
proportion of the populations of most countries would be perceived as living in 
poverty if other aspects of deprivation were taken into account. This calls into 
serious question the usefulness of approaches to poverty reduction that focus on 
‘poor people’ identified by a dollar-a-day measurement. A more encompassing 
approach should be adopted towards provision of essential social services such 
as basic health care and primary education, safe water and sanitation, and basic 
social protection.
Second, a high premium must be placed on interventions that correct inequalities 
in the initial distributions of assets, including human resources, in order to foster 
more inclusive growth. A high degree of initial inequality in property and asset 
ownership is a crucial indicator of the social and economic exclusion inherent in the 
socio-economic system. Such high initial inequality would limit the possibilities of 
pro-poor growth within such a system. The greater the initial degree of inequality 
and exclusion, the weaker the beneficial impact of any increased rate of economic 
growth on poor people.  And the less is done in correcting initial inequalities, the 
more will have to be accomplished via the growth process in order to reduce pov-
erty - but the less likely the possibility this could be achieved. This aspect of policy 
has been seriously underemphasized and corrections are long overdue.
Higher initial inequalities, and less inclusive growth processes, could lead to 
correspondingly larger deficits in the ability of vulnerable households to satisfy 
their basic needs. Therefore, progressive redistributive policies would become 
more difficult to implement. Poverty economics of the World Bank variety has 
tended to accept the notion that neither the initial structural inequalities nor 
inequalities in the growth process can be addressed. Development progress 
has been measured in terms of GDP growth rates, and unequal growth has come 
to be accepted because it has in the short term led to growth. In theory, the as-
sumption has been that fiscal surpluses generated by the GDP growth could 
subsequently be used for secondary redistribution through various tax-and-
transfer processes.  
633 UN-DESA (2010), p.. 156.
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However, there are several difficulties with such a strategy. For one, it is 
based on the premise of a trade-off between curbing inequality (and social ex-
clusion) and accelerating growth. For another, a system biased against correct-
ing inequalities is also likely to resist redistributive transfers in favour of poor 
people. In poor countries with weak administrations, also the redistributive 
institutions seldom have the capacity to implement the redistribution even if 
there would be political will for it. Third, even progress in improving asset 
distribution and opportunities to participate in the economic process might 
not have the desired outcomes in respect of eliminating bias and discrimina-
tion against disadvantaged individuals, and especially social groups, based on 
identity. All too often, differences among individuals and groups have led to 
the implementation of policies demanding that the excluded groups display 
conformity with the mainstream, while leaving the underlying discrimination 
unaddressed. This is a crucial area of policy reform that tends to be overlooked, 
but that should be addressed.
UN-DESA calls for a discourse on poverty reduction that centres on inclu-
sive development and the ending of social exclusion. This would require focusing 
on structural change and transformation. The neoliberal poverty economists’ 
agenda of the past three decades has been based on the assumption that struc-
tural change in the poorest countries should prioritize private goals and be 
focused on encouraging international ‘comparative advantage’ based on low 
levels of skills and technology. The UN-Secretariat argues, instead, that struc-
tural change should involve a transformation that shifts economies from low-
productivity, low-technology paths of development to technologically dynamic, 
skills-intensive paths towards the generation of equitable growth and develop-
ment that benefits all. 
In most low-income developing countries, the charting of such dynamic 
growth paths must be based on speeding up agricultural productivity growth 
and boosting non-farm economic activity in rural areas in such a way as to pro-
vide incomes and livelihoods for the rural poor and other excluded people. It is 
important to recognize, however, that there is no single policy approach to achieving 
this type of transformation. The process will differ from country to country and 
will depend on initial conditions, social structures, patterns of asset ownership 
and institutional frameworks. 
In the dominant World Bank policy discourse, state activity in the economy 
is seen as distorting the market mechanism, crowding out private investment 
and being misguided or based on inaccurate information. Such a conceptualiza-
tion needs to be re-examined. The experience of countries and regions that have 
achieved rapid growth and relative success in poverty reduction has shown that 
the state can deliberately intervene in the economy and even distort market-based 
incentives in such a way as to promote inclusive growth and development. It 
is necessary, therefore, to consider the role of a Developmental State which can 
promote sustained economic growth, structural transformation and inclusive 
development. 
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Coherence in policymaking is also crucial for achieving sustained inclusive de-
velopment. Economic and social policies have to be made to converge around the 
goal of poverty reduction so that they do not have opposing effects on poor peo-
ple. For instance, poverty-reducing effects of programmes designed to minimize 
risks faced by poor people, such as those entailing social cash transfers or the 
provision of microfinance, will have limited positive effects on poverty if rapid 
trade liberalization leads to the collapse of nascent manufacturing sectors and 
the loss of employment and incomes, as has been the case in many sub-Saharan 
African countries in the past two decades. To avoid these types of countervailing 
effects, a coherent policy approach that clearly targets structural transformation 
and inclusive development is required.
6.15 RethiNKiNg poliCieS 
The ‘Rethinking Poverty’ report points to several policy areas where rethinking is 
required in order to generate transformations and growth that bring sustainable 
benefits to poor people.
6.15.1. Stability of Employment, Incomes and Real Output 
It is important that macroeconomic stabilization not be seen as restricted only to 
controlling inflation and trade and fiscal deficits, as has been typically the case 
in the adjustment packages imposed by the Bretton Woods institutions on the 
developing country governments. Stabilization should focus on the stability of 
employment, incomes and real output. To reach this outcome, it is necessary to relax 
unnecessarily stringent fiscal and monetary restrictions and enable countries to 
use counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policy to boost incomes and reduce pov-
erty. This is an urgent need especially in the context of a financial crisis. Devising 
stabilization policies that promote inclusive growth should entail looking be-
yond the crisis situation, however, and considering the challenges of promoting 
longer-term growth in employment, incomes and real output. In this regard, it is 
important that lending to poor countries not continue to overly emphasize infla-
tion control and fiscal stringency as a form of policy conditionality.
6.15.2 Country-Specific, Selective Protection 
It should be recognized that the trade policy effects on poverty reduction and 
structural transformation are contingent on a host of other factors which are 
country-specific, such as pre-trade employment patterns, social sector policies, 
levels of social development, landownership patterns and rural power relations, 
export supply capacities, technological skills and the existence of well-developed 
markets. The present World Trade Organization agenda allows little room for 
selective protection. Yet this type of protection has been used very effectively by 
virtually all countries that have left poverty behind, to gain competitiveness in 
export markets and to enable structural transformation. Most developing coun-
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tries today lack the skills bases, technologies and capabilities needed to com-
pete successfully in international trade. Developing these assets is essential for 
structural transformation and this may require both time-limited infant industry 
protection and interventionist industrial policies. At least this possibility should 
be acknowledged and explored in each case. Devising an agenda for inclusive 
development requires a serious rethink of the dogma of free trade. A pragmatic 
approach which allows countries to devise trade policy so as to develop compara-
tive advantage in new areas in order to move up the ladder of competitiveness is 
required for broad-based development.
6.15.3 A Developmental State for Structural Transformation 
Structural transformation in low-income developing countries that raises growth 
rates and productivity in agriculture is needed to reduce poverty and exclusion. 
A developmental state that recognizes the need to invest in key inputs such as 
irrigation and is able to engineer long-lasting institutional change to counter 
problems such as inefficient landholding size and weak or non-existent markets 
for inputs such as credit - and risk management - can be central to agricultural 
transformation. Strategies for inclusive rural development need to take account 
of how climate change affects the rural poor and incorporate measures to counter 
negative effects and to adapt to changing environmental circumstances in such a 
way as to both be sustainable and promote dynamic output and income growth.
6.15.4 Investment Policy to Stimulate Investments by the Poor 
Policy should focus on stimulating investment – not only by external investors 
but also by the poor people themselves - through the creation of conditions that 
ease credit constraints and improve predictability. Financial liberalization often 
falls short of achieving such conditions. Increasing the availability of agricultural 
finance should be a priority if financial sector reform is to be directed at promot-
ing inclusive growth. Conventional economic thinking - à la World Bank - has 
proclaimed the virtues of privatization in promoting growth and development. 
The results of waves of privatization in developing countries challenge this view 
on several fronts. Privatization does not always bring fiscal gains and can some-
times even drain the government purse. The privatization of utilities such as 
water and sanitation can be harmful to the poor. The same argument applies 
to other key liberalization policies such as financial liberalization and financial 
globalization. The financial crisis 2007-2010 made it strikingly evident that the de-
veloping countries that were the least financially globalized, in particular India 
and China, were shielded to a significant extent from negative shocks of capital 
outflows. This highlights the need to time financial liberalization carefully and to 
institute necessary regulations to safeguard financial stability. Both economic 
theory and empirical evidence point to a weak link between financial liberaliza-
tion and economic growth. Policies aimed at structural transformation should 
recognize that financial liberalization could depress investment and technologi-
cal change. More fundamentally, the usefulness of this type of liberalization in 
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countries with weak or non-existent credit markets must be reconsidered. Along 
the same lines, Governments should rethink privatization policies. In deciding 
the fate of a State-owned enterprise, policymakers should take into account a 
range of considerations, including its ‘social’ role as an employer, and as a pro-
vider of social protection and services  towards the employees, their families and 
the community. 
6.15.5 Comprehensive Pro-Poor Social Policy 
Social policy must be seen as integral to the development process and to structural 
transformation. Comprehensive social policy covers not only a broad range of 
provisions such as education, health, social insurance, cash transfers, credit and 
housing but also the social dimensions of economic policies. Progress in provid-
ing accessible education and health services to the poor has been hindered by 
inadequate financing and regressive policies such as the introduction of user 
fees. While microfinance and safety nets for poor people have reduced absolute 
poverty in specific project contexts, the reach and impact of these programmes 
are limited. All of this points to a need to adopt a coherent approach to social 
policy, taking into account the interactions among its component areas (such as 
education and health) and devising strategies that take these interactions into 
account. Social policy should not be seen as a set of ameliorative measures de-
signed to correct for market and institutional failures and to temporarily manage 
the household risks of the poor, but rather as involving the provision of basic 
needs and public goods which remains primarily the responsibility of the state. 
State provision for the welfare of the poor is a part of structural transformation. 
Inclusive development cannot be achieved when such provision is inadequate, 
uncoordinated and piecemeal.
6.15.6 Equitable Distribution Through Decent Work for All 
Experiences from many countries show that decent work is central to the inclu-
sive growth that leads to poverty reduction. The promotion of full and productive 
employment and decent work for all should be a key objective of macroeconomic 
policy. This will help ensure the consistency and coherence of economic and 
social policies. It will also lead to a more equitable distribution of the benefits of 
economic growth, and thus to a reduction of both inequality and poverty.
6.15.7 Social Protection Floor for All 
Basic social protection for all is a must in an era of increased economic insecurity 
due to globalization and accompanying informalization and casualization trends 
in the labour market. The current global crises and the impact on workers in 
developed and developing countries alike further underscore the importance of 
providing a social protection floor for poor people as well as for the non-poor. For people 
living in poverty, the extension of some form of basic social protection will help 
avert their falling deeper into poverty. For the non-poor, such protection will re-
duce their vulnerability to poverty. Extending basic social protection to all should 
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be a component of all stimulus packages. In the short term, benefits will allow the 
people who need assistance the most to support their consumption, generating 
much needed aggregate demand in the economy during economic recession, thus 
supporting economic growth. In the long run, social investment in human capital 
(nutrition, health and education) will strengthen future growth.
6.15.8 Prioritize Social Expenditures for Structural Transformation 
Public social expenditures should be safeguarded, and even increased in times of crises, 
so as to protect investment in human capital. They should also be incorporated in 
stimulus packages and international support to low-income developing countries. 
The challenges ahead for poverty reduction are numerous and difficult and are 
made more intense by the global economic crises. It is imperative that the gravity 
of this crisis lead to a serious rethinking of the policy approaches that have domi-
nated the discourse on growth and poverty up to now. The findings of alternative 
analyses in support of prioritizing the need for the kind of structural transfor-
mation that brings about the sustained growth of real output and incomes, and 
promotes inclusive development so as to benefit the poor, must be brought to the 
forefront and built upon at this historic juncture.
6.16 uNRiSD: RethiNKiNg DevelopmeNt 
eCoNomiCS – AND poveRtY  
A core argument of this essay is that differences between ideas are still at the heart 
of all the global disagreements – and failures – in poverty reduction. We have 
discussed the ‘Post-Autistic Economics Network’ and many other networks and 
campaigns aiming at reforming the way economics is taught and used to solve 
societal and global problems. Also in the global community of development – and 
poverty – professionals the need to rethink development – and poverty – econom-
ics has been strongly felt. We have reported about intense discussions about this 
within the World Bank. My sense, after all these years of hard reading and think-
ing, is that the change that the world needs is not going to emerge from within 
the World Bank. But I am much more optimistic about the UN.
The United Nations Research Institute on Social Development, UNRISD, is 
a small institute in Geneva, with a core staff of about eight full-time research-
ers – only (!) But UNRISD has, over the years, had an incredible capacity to pool 
wonderful groups of excellent researchers from all over the world, mainly from 
the ‘Global South’ into its very carefully selected ‘flagship’ research projects. The 
amazing ‘convening power’ of UNRISD has to a large extent been thanks to the 
most inspiring and brilliant Director of the institute, Thandika Mkandawire, but 
another key factor has probably been also UNRISD’s unfailing credibility as a 
representative of the principles of social justice and multi-disciplinarity in its 
approach to research. Large numbers of excellent scholars from all parts of the 
world have volunteered to contribute to UNRISD projects for free, or for very low 
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fees, because they have trusted the institute’s dedication to social justice, and its 
preparedness to challenge any institutionalized paradigms when necessary.
‘Rethinking Development Economics’ was one of these UNRISD flagship pro-
jects, which UNRISD started at the time when the disagreements about the WDR-
2000 were at their most intense in the World Bank, at the turn of the Millennium. 
Based on what I have read and learned during the 17 years of my own research 
project, my intuition tells me that it is worth keeping an eye on the new thinking 
emerging from the circles around UNRISD and UN-DESA. The world needs new 
ideas to break out of the outdated poverty economic paradigm. The fact that the 
World Bank failed to publish yet another decadal WDR on the topic of Poverty 
Reduction in 2010 (after 1980, 1990 and 2000) is to me an indication that even the 
World Bank’s best poverty experts today know that the crucially important new 
ideas about global poverty reduction – as Global Social Policy - now seem to be 
coming from somewhere outside the  Bank  - perhaps from the kinds of circles 
that UNRISD (and UN-DESA) have been able to convene, or perhaps from the 
emerging powers such as Brazil, China, South Africa and India?
 UNRISD unfortunately has ridiculously low budgets and minimal capac-
ity – e.g. compared to the World Bank – to publish and disseminate its, as such, 
highly valuable research. But as I have said – citing Robert Chambers – good 
ideas fly: UNRISD research reports, even in their ‘work-in-progress’ form are 
very intensively read and used both by the developing country governments 
and intellectuals, as well as by the staff of the UN-, EU- and AU-secretariats, who 
use UNRISD findings and ideas when drafting  the  background documents and 
resolution drafts for the various intergovernmental negotiations in the UN, EU 
and AU. Also the UN-DESA flagship report on ‘Rethinking Poverty’ draws heav-
ily from this UNRISD research project.
Many of the concerns I have had with the main object of research in this study 
of mine – World Bank poverty economics around the Millennium turn are exten-
sively discussed in the UNRISD Flagship Report on Poverty, which was published 
too late for me to really be able to benefit from it in writing my own essay. Most 
of the questions that I have been unable to find satisfactory answers to, are much 
more elegantly and clearly answered by the UNRISD. The Outline of the UNRISD 
Report gives an indication of the topics that UNRISD considers central to discuss-
ing Global Poverty Reduction in 2010: :634 
Section One: Socially Inclusive Structural Change 
1. Structural change and poverty reduction  
2. Income inequalities and redistribution 
3. Gender inequalities 
4. Spatial and ethnic inequalities 
The main messages here are as follows: Poverty eradication is always embedded 
in social and development policy. Effective social policy against poverty must ad-
634 In April 2010. See: UNRISD Flagship Report on Poverty and Inequality in Websources. 
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dress issues of redistribution, production, protection and reproduction. Poverty 
reduction is centrally about socially inclusive structural change and is inextrica-
bly intertwined with inequality reduction. Of key importance for poverty reduc-
tion are: employment, redistributive, human capital and macroeconomic policies 
that are sensitive to low-income households. Even when economies grow, and 
employment and incomes expand, benefits are rarely gender equal or distributed 
fairly across ethnicity and location.
Section Two: Transformative Social Policy and Poverty Reduction 
5. Social protection 
6. Basic social services 
7. Care and well-being in a development context 
8. Financing social policies 
The understanding of social policy must be broadened: as state intervention that 
directly affects social welfare, social institutions and social relations, and has an 
integral role in growth and structural transformation. For social policy to serve 
as a transformative instrument against poverty, it must transcend its residual 
role of safety nets and deal with four broad concerns: distribution, protection, 
production and reproduction. The tasks of social policy are multiple, including 
social protection, social services and care regimes.  In their financing, the fiscal 
effort and patterns of taxation vary considerably across countries with similar 
income levels, revealing laggards and good performers alike.  The financing of 
social expenditures has implications for income distribution, welfare develop-
ment and poverty reduction.
 
Section Three: The Politics of Poverty Eradication 
9. State capacity for structural change and poverty reduction 
10. Business and poverty reduction 
11. Democracy and the politics of poverty reduction  
Power relations lie at the centre of development. State capacity is of central im-
portance to overcome critical market failures, regulate business, establish social 
compacts for managing the process of development, as well as to fund, provide, 
and regulate services and social programmes to deliver welfare-enhancing struc-
tural change. Institutional reform, particularly to redress dramatic losses to insti-
tutional capacity in the social sector vis-à-vis the technocratic capacity of sectors 
dealing with the economy and finance, is important. International development 
policy can engage the private sector more directly in strategies to reduce poverty. 
Some varieties of state-business relations can be more conducive to inclusive de-
velopment and poverty reduction.
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6.17 AFRiCAN uNioN SoCiAl poliCY FRAmeWoRK
Meanwhile in Africa, the OAU (Organisation for African Unity) had been transformed 
into a closer Union between 53 African member states in 2002. As with the European 
Union, also in the AU cooperation was initially mainly economically oriented, but has 
since then been extended to cover also political, security and social affairs. 
In 2006 the African Union, in collaboration with HelpAge International, DFID 
and GTZ, organized two informal conferences of African Social Ministers in 
Livingstone, Zambia and in Yaounde, Kameroon. Social protection was one of the 
main topics in these meetings, and during the Livingstone conference a ‘field day’ 
was organized to allow participants to familiarize themselves with the social cash 
transfer pilot programme in the nearby Kalomo and Kazungula districts. Soon, 
thereafter, the UN-DESA organized a forum for the social ministers of SADC-
governments of Southern Africa in Johannesburg in November-2006, the outcome 
of which was a document titled: “Towards an African Regional Social Policy”. 
The ‘African Regional Social Policy’ became an official reality in Windhoek 
in 2008, when the 1st (official) regional Conference of the African Ministers in 
Charge of Social Development approved the final draft of the ‘African Union 
Social Policy Framework’ (AU-SPF).635 This document was later formally adopted 
by the African Heads of Government in January 2009. In 2010, an Implementation 
Strategy and a Capacity Building Strategy for the African SPF were discussed and 
approved by the 2nd Conference of African Ministers for Social Development, in 
Khartoum.636 The purpose of the Implementation Framework is to provide for an 
African Union Commission (AUC) regional social policy637 role of: 
a. Building the knowledge base and sharing social policy best practice for Africa, 
while providing a channel for Member State peer leadership on:
1. Progressive social policy for transformation;
2. Country-defined affordable minimum social protection floors;
b. Creating low-maintenance mechanisms, fit for purpose, for an AUC enabling 
role within the principle of subsidiarity to generate regional social policy coher-
ence across Member States that provides the framework for emerging continen-
tal integration;
c. Building capacity for mutual AUC and Member State monitoring of commit-
ments and progress that will in turn highlight to the world Africa’s progress.
 
635 African Union (2008).
636 African Union (2010a, b, c).
637 “Regional social policies address issues that require intergovernmental cross-border cooperation 
on issues of rights, regulation and redistribution in the areas of (a) social sector investments, (b) social 
issues at a cross-national level and (c) human rights and empowerment. Common positions are also 
important to strengthen Africa’s voice in world affairs and reinforce Africa’s role in international 
decision making”. See the outcome document of the SADC Social Ministers’ Meeting Nov 2006, in 
Johannesburg “Towards an African Regional Social Policy”, UN-DESA (2006). This formulation is inspired 
by Deacon, Ortiz and Zelenev (2007). Deacon et al. have continued important theorizing about the role 
and potential of regional integration and cooperation formations in creating and building regional 
social policies. See e.g. Deacon et al. (2008, 2009). 
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According to the AU-SPF Implementation Framework, there are four func-
tions of Social Policy that are important for achieving progressive development: 
Reproduction; Production; Redistribution; and Social Protection.638 The detailed dis-
cussion on the operationalization of each of these four functions in the particular 
African contexts is interesting, but cannot be reproduced here. Suffice, for our 
purpose, to provide the summary conclusion: 
“Together these (4 functions of social policy) can contribute to a dynamic economy, sup-
porting economic growth while increasing participation of all people in generating that 
growth and benefiting from it with equality of opportunity and relatively low levels of 
inequality in outcomes639. This transformative view of social policy requires that the social 
dimensions of development are put back centrally in development policy, rather than as a 
corrective to economic policies. In turn, this requires that capacities for social policy analy-
sis are located at the centre of economic and social planning in Ministries of Finance and 
Planning Commissions.”640 
“One of the greatest challenges for Africa is achieving gender equality so that women and 
girls are equally part of investing in and benefiting from growth. Africa has too much fo-
cused on economic growth that has failed to deliver for those with limited assets (social and 
physical) and has been weakened by the lack of broad human development, which, with raw 
materials, is Africa’s greatest asset. Social policy has tended to be seen as policy for social 
consumption, not investment. This strategy will redress this failure of vision.”
6.18 SoCiAl pRoteCtioN iN SuB-SAhARAN AFRiCA 
AS the mAiN theme oF the eu FlAgShip RepoRt oN 
DevelopmeNt, eRD-2010
Social policy in general, and social protection in particular, is high up also on the 
development policy agenda of the European Commission and the European Union 
at large. The Development Directorate (DG-DEV) of the European Commission 
started in 2009 to publish its own annual ‘Flagship Reports’ on development 
policy, much inspired by the example of the World Development Reports (WDRs) 
of the World Bank, and the Human Development Reports (HDRs) of the UNDP.641 
In 2010 the European Report on Development (ERD-2010) focuses on the theme 
of “Social Protection for Inclusive Development – a New Perspective to EU Cooperation 
With Africa”.642
638 This is borrowed from Mkandawire (2001c, 2004) as well as from UNRISD (2010, above). Jimi 
Adesina 2010 in a Background Report for the European Report on Development adds a fifth function 
of “Social Cohesion & Nation-Building”.
639 Thandika Mkandawire explains the various theories relating sustainable economic growth to 
social policy and benefits of redistributive social policy in “Social Policy in a Development Context”. See 
Mkandawire (2001c, 2004).
640 African Union (2010b).
641 See ERD in Websources.
642 European Commission (2010).
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The ERD-2010 examines the need, potential, feasibility and likely develop-
ment impact of an agenda to expand social protection in Sub-Saharan Africa. The 
report recommends that the EU should make social protection a key element in 
its approach to development policy in the coming years. 
According to the ERD-2010 many Africans live in risky environments that are 
constantly threatening their livelihoods. Reducing these risks - and cushioning 
their impact - is thus a critical development issue. Indeed, the lack of social protec-
tion forces poor African households to adopt risk mitigation strategies that can 
undermine their opportunities to escape poverty. Well-designed social protection 
can have a large impact on reducing the vulnerability and destitution of African 
households. It can also promote poverty reduction and inclusive growth: 
“Complementing health and education spending, the build-up of sustainable social protec-
tion systems can be among the most productive investments for growth, poverty reduction 
and accelerating progress in meeting the Millennium Development Goals. If designed well, 
those systems can also be an important element in a strategy to empower the poor, particu-
larly poor women.”643 
Based on the lessons from new broad-based national experiences of social pro-
tection programmes in Asia, Latin America and increasing numbers in Africa, 
the ERD-2010 considers that time is ripe to promote a broad social protection 
agenda in Africa, as enshrined in the AU Social Policy Framework for Africa, 
combining elements of social assistance (including cash transfer programmes) 
with extending the coverage of access to social insurance. Rural employment and 
public works programmes, school and child feeding programmes and contribu-
tory health insurance schemes are examples with high benefits, and with proven 
potential in a number of settings. 
“The build-up of non-contributory social pensions, universal or at most very lightly target-
ed, would be suitable for many African countries. Given the experiences of Latin America 
and Southern Africa, such programmes generally are administratively feasible (particular-
ly with technologically innovative cash delivery systems). They can also be fiscally sustain-
able, have few negative incentive effects and garner broad and sustainable political support, 
including the middle classes.” 
The ERD-2010 provides evidence on the potential impact of social protection on 
creating a social contract in African societies. “By providing more social protection 
and therefore delivering on its end of the social contract, the state can enhance its legiti-
macy and foster social cohesion and stability.” 
ERD identifies six priorities for the EU in supporting the development of per-
manent national systems of social protection, namely: 1) Promote and support do-
mestic processes; 2) Provide appropriate financial support; 3) Tailor approaches 
to specific contexts and needs; 4) Knowledge-building and lesson sharing; 5) 
Improve coherence of EU action; 6) Ensure EU commitment in the long-run.
643 European Commission (2010b).
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6.19 BY WAY oF CoNCluSioN – mKANDAWiRe iN 2001 
It is vastly interesting to re-read Mkandawire’s  2001 paper now in the post-
Washington Consensus and post-financial crash world of 2010 when many of 
the ‘sacred truths’ of the mainstream neoclassical economics – and neoliberal 
ideology – have been discredited by the turn of events, and called into question 
even by its former high priests. There is hardly a better way for me to summa-
rize – and conclude – my account about the Great Confusion of global poverty 
economics around the turn of the 3rd Millennium, than to cite selected extracts 
from Mkandawire (2001b). The paper is worth reading in full, too.
“Up until the 1970s, problems of welfare and unemployment in the developed countries, and 
those of poverty and underdevelopment in the developing ones, were interpreted through 
the lenses of...Keynesian economics and development economics, respectively. Although 
there was little in common between the actual analytical content of Keynesian doctrine and 
that of development economics, the two approaches shared critical views of neoclassical eco-
nomic theory, and the related acceptance of state intervention. They also had in common the 
understanding that the economy described by neoclassical economists was a special case, 
and there were many other economies that could be stylized by entirely different models 
because they were characterized by different structural features. Furthermore, they shared 
the view that the state could play an important role in addressing these structural features, 
which often resulted in market failures. Both were induced by the need to solve policy prob-
lems and were not merely formal theoretical disciplines whose modelling was based on real 
economies trapped in a particular equilibrium (unemployment or underdevelopment) from 
which they had to be extricated. These positions opened them to attack from neoliberalism.”
“For the neoliberal economists, development economists falsely denied the universality of 
rational economic behaviour and... opened doors for dirigisme... The death of development 
economics was not merely an academic paradigm shift. It was given official sanction by the 
United States government. United States completely reject(ed) the idea that there (was) 
such a thing as development economics. The Spartan certainty of the ascendant neolib-
eralism as to what was required left no room for specialized knowledge of the problems of 
development. Mrs. Thatcher’s strident ‘There is no alternative’ was echoed in international 
financial organizations through a standardized set of policies that was applicable to all 
economies.”
6.20 NeW iNteReSt iN DevelopmeNt eCoNomiCS 
There are new signs of revival of interest in development economics. The most 
immediate reason is the failure of the Washington consensus. The adjustment 
programmes have failed to induce the kinds of structural changes associated with 
development.  Writes Mkandawire:
240
“The call for development economics is not informed by nostalgia. Rather, it is informed by 
the impasse of the Washington consensus and the immediacy of the agenda that develop-
ment economics sought to address: eradication of poverty through economic development 
and equitable distribution.“644
However, in the light of changed circumstances and accumulated experiences, 
Mkandawire sees new tasks for the new development economics, in a changed 
global environment: 
6.20.1. The Changed International Context
The view today is that the kind of autonomy enjoyed by early developmental 
states is no longer possible under the global WTO trade regime. The simplistic 
advice has been that developing countries should ’open up’ to trade and adjust to 
globalization. The policies recommended have tended to assume applicability in 
all countries. But it would be necessary to consider what kind of global ‘architec-
ture’ would be developmental, and what strategies individual countries should 
pursue in order to benefit from whatever new order emerges. 
6.20.2 Changes in Economics 
On the neoclassical front, the dominant growth model (by Solow) did not leave 
much room for deliberate action by the state, suggesting, as it did, that growth 
was determined by exogenously given technology. However, a growing number 
of economists accepted that the developmental state had been instrumental in 
the high-performing East Asian economies, Mkandawire points out. They agreed 
on the need to take on board a number of issues: economies of scale, imperfect 
information, learning by doing and structural rigidities, problems of missing 
markets, coordination problems, the importance of regulation and the inherently 
imperfect nature of financial markets, etc. 
There are, however, (still) a number of issues that were central to development 
economics that have yet to be theorized in these new approaches. One major la-
cuna is the whole question of structural transformation. Mkandawire cites Vernon 
Ruttan’s categorical statement: 
“An attempt to analyze economic development with a model in which there is no mecha-
nism to generate structural transformation can hardly be regarded as serious. It resembles 
an attempt to perform Hamlet with no role for the Prince of Denmark.”645 
6.20.3 New Views of the State 
One of the criticisms levelled against development economics was its failure to say 
much about the social base of the state, and the power relations that it reflected or 
accommodated. Mkandawire admits that much of the early work in this area was 
premised on the notion of a benevolent state that selflessly pursued developmen-
644 Mkandawire (2001b).
645 Mkandawiwre (2001b).
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tal goals on behalf of society. The approach also tended to underestimate the vital 
role of the market in the development process, either as a disciplining device on 
individual actors (including the state) or as an instrument available to the state for 
allocation of resource and monitoring performance. There is now greater sensitiv-
ity to the need to understand the political and institutional constitution of states, 
partly as a result of the failure of a wide range of developing countries, the crisis 
of the welfare state and the public choice critique of policy making. 
“However, the wide recognition of ‘government failure’ has been used to override any ar-
gument for the need to correct for ‘market failure’... arguing that...the likely outcome of 
government failure would be worse than that of market failure”, Mkandawire complains. 
6.20.4 The New Social Agenda 
One of the greatest challenges in development policy, Mkandawire states, is the 
edification of a state - society nexus that is developmental (in the sense that it facili-
tates and promotes economic growth and structural transformation), democratic 
(in the sense that it derives its legitimacy through popular participation and elec-
toral process) and socially inclusive (in the sense that it pursues social policies that 
ensure equitable entitlements) of all its citizens, to ensure that their capacities and 
functionings are adequate for decent inclusion. 
The centrality of these values and concerns is clearly spelled out also by 
Amartya Sen in his ’Development as Freedom’.646 In addition, there is the aware-
ness that such social orders must be attentive to the environmental sustainability 
of their policies. 
6.20.5 Social Equity 
The problems of equity and growth have been at the heart of development eco-
nomics. Early literature was characterized by a ‘distribution pessimism’ often as-
sociated with the view that greater inequality facilitated higher savings, because 
the rich had higher propensity to save than the poor. In the era of neoliberalism, 
Mkandawire explains, distribution issues were left to the market and any activi-
ties, such as social policy, were seen as either likely to distort the market or scare 
investors. 
More recent empirical and theoretical development has shown persuasively 
that equity has facilitated growth in some of the most recent success story coun-
tries. Embedded in the policies of late industrializers were social policies that 
served as key instruments for development. Consequently, new thinking in de-
velopment will have to integrate issues of social equity much more closely. The 
integration of economic and social policy will be a central preoccupation, since social 
policy not only addresses the normative content of development but contains 
within it crucial instruments for economic development.
646 Sen (1999).
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6.20.6 Sustainable Development 
An additional concern that the new development economics must take on board, 
Mkandawire suggests, is that of environmental sustainability. Environmental 
economics has been focused on inter-temporal or inter-generational issues, which 
are politically much less charged than the intra-temporal and intra-generational 
issues that characterize development economics. The failure of environmental 
economics to address some of the intra-temporal concerns of development eco-
nomics may account for the reservations of the (Global) South over the inclusion 
of environmental issues in development debates. A revival of development eco-
nomics can, therefore, enrich environmental economics by making it sensitive to 
developmental issues, Mkandawire suggests. 
6.20.7 A New Generation of Development Economists 
The ‘newness’ of ideas is no guarantee for quality in economics, as I argued in 
Section 2.2.1 of this book. ‘Forgetting’ old wisdoms is as common as inventing 
new ideas. Therefore, while Mkandawire’s 2001 ideas are not the ‘latest’ in the 
progression of economic thinking, they are perfectly up-do-date now, almost 
a decade later, and highly relevant for the main arguments of my dissertation: 
Like Mkandawire, I am also convinced that the world needs both (a) a revival of 
development economics, and (b)  a new generation of development economists. 
“The fall from grace of development economics in policy circles reflected itself in the dra-
matic changes in the teaching of economics, with neoclassical economics extending into all 
areas of social life, totally oblivious to the structural characteristics and historical origins of 
the phenomenon under study.”647 
“The demise of development economics and its marginalization in economics departments 
has produced a dearth of competence. Much of the funding for the training of economists in 
the 1980s and 1990s was guided by the need to build capacity in the areas that orthodoxy 
felt were important. These evolved around issues of stabilization and trade liberalization. In 
Africa, vast amounts of money have been spent to produce competence in these two areas. 
Yet as disillusionment with SAP as a development strategy grows, there is a furtive search 
for knowledge in producing ‘comprehensive development frameworks’, reminiscent of de-
velopment planning, of institutional design, of growth economics, poverty reduction, etc. 
The danger is that much of this knowledge will be produced as an appendage to the corpus 
of orthodox views of the economy, and without the kind of fundamental questioning of the 
neoclassical paradigm that Keynesian economics and development economics entails.” 
647 Mkandawire (2001b). 
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7 Conclusions –               
An Institutional Analysis 
of Ideas, Identities and 
Interests 
7.1 FRom methoDologiCAl NAtioNAliSm 
to methoDologiCAl gloBAliSm 
In my theoretical Chapter-3 I wrote that this study would be questioning the fea-
sibility of strict methodological individualism and methodological nationalism in 
social sciences. I argued in favour of methodological globalism – a research approach 
that treats the entire world as the basic unit of research. 
My empirical enquiry into poverty economics at the World Bank around the 
turn of the Millennium raised serious concerns about the appropriateness of the 
methodologically nationalistic research approaches used by poverty economists 
who were seeking the reasons and remedies for poverty in any single country 
only from market failures or institutional failures within that one national econo-
my. We found that at least some World Bank poverty economists648 - armed with 
their powerful computers - kept running endless rounds of cross-country regres-
sions, ‘torturing’ the statistical data as long as was needed in order to be able to 
finally generate ‘evidence’ to support the politically correct policy prescriptions 
which were based not on the realities in the countries concerned but on assump-
tions based on unquestioned - axiomatic - ‘truths’ derived from the disciplinary 
tradition of mainstream neoclassical economics or the political ideology of the 
leading shareholders of the World Bank.649 
Also high-caliber evaluators commissioned by the World Bank,650 and inde-
pendent academic researchers651 have conducted extensive evaluations and analy-
ses of the quality of World Bank research in the period 1998 to 2005. The official 
evaluation team, chaired by Angus Deaton, professor of economics at Princeton 
University, found that World Bank researchers are “under pressure from the Bank 
presidency and elsewhere not to say things that go directly against the broad policy line 
648 E.g. Burnside and Dollar (1997), Dollar and Kraay (2000, 2001).
649 Broad (2006), George (2007), Bretton Woods Project (2006, 2007). 
650 Banerjee et al. (2006). See also: go.worldbank.org/U6VB00O7X1
651 Robin (2006). See also: brettonwoodsproject.org/art.shtml?x=546206
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that the Bank is espousing.” Robin Broad, professor in the School of International 
Service at American University concluded that, “through its research, the World Bank 
has played a critical role in the legitimisation of the neo-liberal free-market paradigm over 
the past quarter century and its research department has been vital to this role.”
I am not claiming that forging of data would be a common habit among the 
World Bank poverty economists. However, the tendency to seek for the single 
crucial ‘Factor-X’ – from within the national economy - that would explain the 
successes or failures of the country clearly seems to be an institutionalised routine 
for most of the mainstream economists - and it is only at the level of epistemol-
ogy that this problem can be solved, by questioning the exclusive methodological 
nationalism in economic analysis. 
We found that the World Bank team drafting the WDR-2000, led by Ravi 
Kanbur, tried to open the tightly closed door to methodological globalism in 
poverty economics by suggesting that ‘International Dimensions’ (Global 
Governance) should be added as a fourth key pillar to the new World Bank ap-
proach to attacking global poverty. This way the role of international trade, capi-
tal and institutions in perpetuating poverty in developing countries could have 
been incorporated into the poverty analysis, as had been strongly emphasized by 
NGOs during the consultations organised by the WDR-2000 team. This, however, 
was not OK for Lawrence Summers, the US Treasury Secretary, because he saw 
it as a threat to (a) the global free trade ideology and (b) the unquestioned IMF-
authority in macroeconomic policy-making that were – axiomatically – assumed 
and argued by the mainstream economists to be “good for the poor.” 
As we learned in the Chapter-6 “Ten Years After” the leading UN-analysts652 
have shown that it is possible for economic research to integrate the international 
dimension into poverty analysis. A more global methodological stance no doubt 
makes research difficult, but it certainly also provides a deeper and more accurate 
understanding of the causes and effects of poverty and other important phenom-
ena that we observe in our increasingly globalizing world. 
7.2 WoRDS ARe DeeDS – CoNCeptS AND iDeAS 
AS moveS iN ARgumeNt 
In the theoretical Chapter-3 I also introduced some of the key ideas of concep-
tual history. As argued by Austin (1962), language not only reflects things that 
people think and do, but language can also be used to do things (‘speech acts’). 
I argued that reading and analysing a text, e.g. a World Development Report or 
an article published by Dollar et al., in itself would be insufficient as the object of 
our inquiry aimed at understanding the thinking of World Bank poverty econo-
mists. From Skinner we learned that ideas can be used as ‘moves’ by the agents 
in arguments, like moves in chess and other games, to alter a constellation.653 
652 UN-DESA (2010), UNRISD (2010c).
653 Skinner (1969), p. 35. p. 35. Palonen (2003a), p. 36-37. 
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Dollar’s work on trade and economic growth654 was, for instance, transformed by 
the World Bank research and external affairs departments into a widely-cited, 
‘empirically-proven fact’ – or ‘move’ – to convince developing country govern-
ments that ‘globalisers’ - countries wedded to the Washington Consensus, espe-
cially to liberalised trade – would experience higher economic growth rates than 
‘non-globalisers’. 
As we learned from the Millennium Conflict narrative, what the World Bank 
and IMF poverty economists recommend to developing country policy makers 
may not always be exactly what they – on the basis of the best collective wisdom 
of the economic science – believe to be exactly the correct course of action for 
the country concerned, but what they expect to be the best (tactical) moves in 
arguments with those representing opposing views. If the World Bank economist 
wishes to achieve N, he may argue for N+1 in one type of a constellation where 
the opponent strives towards N-1. But in another constellation, where the opposite 
view is further away from N (e.g. at N-3), it may be in the interest of the Bank econ-
omist to argue for N+3. Ravi Kanbur gave a good example of how the politically 
and ideologically biased ‘mindset’ and ‘negotiation stance’ of the World Bank and 
IMF poverty economists worked when they were trying to persuade unwilling 
African policy-makers to deregulate, privatize and liberalize their national econo-
mies, and to dismantle their hard-won national systems of basic social protection 
and services. Kanbur explained that many (poverty economists) interpreted their 
main task to be to storm the citadel of statist development strategies (rather than 
to recommend policies that would be optimal for the reduction of poverty):
 
“...In this mindset...they suspected, perhaps rightly, that those on the other side, were hell 
bent on preserving the status quo. In this setting, a negotiating stance, rather than a dialogue 
based on mutual comprehension, was appropriate. So the negotiators from Washington 
always took a more purist stance, a more extreme stance than even their own intellectual 
framework permitted…’Give them an inch of nuance, and they’ll take a mile of status quo’, 
seemed to be the mindset and the stance. ‘If you want 28 enterprises privatised, start by 
asking for 56’, seemed to be the opening gambit.’655
It seems reasonable to conclude that a ‘move’ is an excellent metaphor for the uses 
of ideas, theories and concepts, and provides an interesting link to the life-world 
of professional planners of poverty reduction. If we want to understand what 
kinds of ‘futures beyond poverty’656 poverty economists and other poverty pro-
fessionals really have in mind, we can get only halfway by analyzing what they 
actually say and write about poverty and its reduction. A fuller understanding 
requires a historical-institutionalist analysis that not only looks for empirical laws 
governing ‘all events of that type’ but illuminates the specific speech act from 
654 Dollar and Kraay (2001). 
655 Kanbur (2000a, 2001a). This expression “those on the other side”, reflects the negotiating stance of the 
staff of the Washington institutions, and refers, probably, to the poor country governments and to the 
international NGOs criticizing the structural adjustment programmes. 
656 Malaska and Voipio (1997).
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inside: What goal were the concepts used tools for? To which argument did the 
words contribute as deeds, or speech acts?
Collingwood657 probably had it right already in his book ‘Map of Knowledge’ 
(1924) where he argued: “There is, properly speaking, no such thing as timeless economic 
principles; Economist’s theories are merely a description of the economic principles ac-
cepted at that time and place.”658 To understand a concept – e.g. ‘poverty’, or ‘poverty 
reduction’ – it is necessary to grasp not merely the meanings of the terms used 
to express it, but also the range of things that can be done with it, i.e. the potential 
‘illocutionary forces’ in a given situation. An example of this could perhaps be 
the way how a technocratic organisation, e.g. the Ministry for Foreign Affairs of 
Finland, or the World Bank, can use the concepts of ‘poverty’ and ‘poverty reduc-
tion’ not only to describe – and to genuinely seek to change - the living conditions 
of African people, but also to legitimise the claims of these large technocratic 
organisations to have access to ever increasing shares of public budgets.
The ‘political move’ that I have wanted to use this essay for is to challenge 
and inspire social policy professionals to conceive global poverty as the primary 
social injustice of our globalizing world, which they shouldn’t leave for the global 
poverty economists (or diplomatis) to solve alone, but which the professionals of 
care, too, should attack with all their energies, professional capacities and moral 
rigour – and make a difference to.
7.3 iNStitutioNS, iDeAS, iNteReStS AND 
iDeNtitieS 
In Chapter-3 I introduced an interesting analysis of ideas and power in multi-
lateral institutions by Bøas’ and McNeill659. I suggested that conclusions of Boas 
and McNeill would provide an interesting starting position for my study. Bøas 
and McNeill had written that powerful – hegemonic – states (notably the USA), 
hegemonic organizations (such as the IMF and the World Bank) and even hegem-
onic disciplines (economics) exercise their power largely by framing. Bøas and 
McNeill, however, had kept the door open also for more ideational, constructivist 
and realist explanations. They had suggested that the current multilateral system, 
including the World Bank, the IMF, the MFAF660, etc. should be seen as a social 
construction, not as a pre-existing entity. Institutions within this system take a 
life of their own. They may also become battlefields of opposed ideas, and rival 
institutions may reflect different ideas. 
My account of the Millennium consensus and disagreements provided a good 
number of examples of such ideational battlefields between development institu-
657 Robin G. Collingwood (1889–1943) was a British philosopher and historian, best known for his book 
‘The Idea of History’ (published post-humously 1946, revised edition 1993). The book has been a major 
inspiration for philosophy of history in the English-speaking world.
658 Collingwood (1924), p. 208.
659 Bøas and McNeill (2004).
660 MFAF = Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland.
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tions. There was the fight between the World Bank and the Unicef about struc-
tural adjustment with and without a ‘human face’.661 UNDP had a battlefield of 
ideas with the World Bank about whether GDP-growth or Human Development 
Index (HDI) should be used as the primary measure of national progress. The bat-
tles between the World Bank and the ILO were waged issues such as (a) whether 
protection of labourers vs. protection of jobs should be given a priority in labour 
market policies, and (b) whether the primary objective of pensions should be ‘fi-
nancial sector deepening’  or protection against old-age poverty. And, as we have 
seen, there were numerous battles between opposed ideas between the World 
Bank and the IMF, and within the World Bank, too.
The issues of knowledge, power and political bias enter the frame in these 
conflicts. The World Bank programmatically builds legitimacy for its develop-
ment advice by claiming that it reflects the “best” technical research, a justifica-
tion readily echoed by borrowing governments when imposing Bank policies on 
their unwilling populations. The production of knowledge in the World Bank 
is therefore produced within a frame of reference that embeds certain cognitive 
interests, meaning that knowledge becomes an instrument, a tool for the identi-
fication of manipulative variables.662
In order to understand the relationship between knowledge, ideas and the 
power of the World Bank in global poverty politics, we have to come to terms 
with the role of the hegemonic position of (a certain type of) economics not only 
in the Bank, but through the strong influence of the Bank also in most other global 
development policy-making. In the analysis, publications and prescriptions that 
come from the World Bank – and that effectively fill the minds and agendas of 
economists and other poverty professionals in most other development agencies 
and poor country ministries all over the world – economics is presented as an 
objective discipline that provides a value-free and correct picture of poverty in the 
world. This means that poverty reduction becomes a technical question and not 
a political one. The only valid evaluations are those built on economics, because 
this is assumed to be an objective science. As argued by Teivainen this transna-
tional ‘politics of economism’ significantly restricts the exercise of democracy.663
Bøas and McNeill suggest that it would be an oversimplification to claim that 
the idea of SAPs was imposed by the hegemonic government of the USA and 
associated neoliberal forces. A much more important role was played by the eco-
661 In 2010, in the aftermath of the global financial, economic and social crisis 2007-2010 Unicef launched 
a similar ideational battlefield with the IMF, World Bank and the G20 about the need to put a human 
face to the crisis recovery. Interestingly, Unicef managed to attract the same old vanguard - Sir Richard 
Jolly, Frances Stewart and Giovanni Andrea Cornia – to lead the battle. See: Unicef - Recovery With a 
Human Face in Websources.
662 For an example of how lightly World Bank makes ‘slogan-like’, un-substaintiated claims about the 
‘excellence’ of the World Bank staff, the ‘rigor’ of the Bank’s analysis, and the ‘intellectual leadership’ 
of the World Bank among the world’s poverty professionals, see: Kagia (2005b), p. 144-146. 
663 Teivainen (2002) explores the redefinition of the boundaries of the economic and the political 
spheres. In examining how and to what extent it is taking place, he takes the case of the periodic Latin 
American debt crisis in the 20th Century, and further argues that the transition to and consolidation 
of ‘economism’ in Peru in the late 1980s and the early 1990s is illustrative of more general tendencies 
in Latin America and across the world.
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nomic-technocratic nexus, i.e. the professional community of IMF/World Bank 
economists. The norms of institutions, and identities among groups of profession-
als within them, are of great importance: The dominant liberal approach to the 
study of economics assumes that economics is an objective, ‘value-free’ scientific 
discourse. The ‘laws’ of economics, it is argued, are universal and it is the task of 
economic theory to discover these laws.664
There is clearly an enforcement potential in the power relations that lie under 
the social structure of the World Bank, but most often this enforcement takes 
the form of more nuanced mechanisms than simply an open disciplining of the 
weak by the strong. Neo-liberalism became the ‘collective common sense’ among 
the World Bank’s economists during 1980s and 1990s. Yet, as individuals many 
of them were engaged in a difficult balancing act - keeping with the identity of 
the organization, but at the same time defending their own sense of professional 
purpose. Such a tension can gradually change organizations. Even huge organiza-
tions like the World Bank do change, and so do the collective identities which they 
embody; Ideas play an important role in these processes of change. 
7.4 A tYpologY oF gloBAl poveRtY ReDuCtioN 
iDeAS AND ACtoRS
In Chapter-3 we identified Campbell’s typologies of ideas and ideational actors 
as potentially useful heuristic devices that could be used to make sense of the 
otherwise rather complex and confusing conflicts among the networks of poverty 
professionals in and outside the World Bank during the Millennium turn. 
Campbell divided policy ideas into a matrix of four boxes: 
(a)  Public sentiments, e.g. public opinions, values, norms and identities are norma-
tive background assumptions that constrain decision making and institutional 
change by limiting the range of frames and programmes that decision-making 
elites are likely to perceive as acceptable and legitimate. 
(b)  Paradigms are cognitive background assumptions that constrain decision making 
and institutional change by excluding information that does not fit the decision-
makers’ mental models, world views or cognitive architecture, and thereby limit-
ing the range of alternatives that are likely to be perceived as useful and worth 
considering. 
(c)  Frames are simplified normative concepts (e.g. symbols, slogans and mission 
statements) in the foreground of decision-making debates.  They enable decision-
makers to legitimize their programmes, policy recommendations and related in-
stitutional changes to their constituents, clients and occasionally to each other. 
(d)   Programmes and policy conditions are simple and clear ‘policy prescriptions’ or ‘road 
maps’ in the foreground of decision-making debates. They are cognitive concepts 
and theories that offer convincing directions out of a particular problem, or ideas 
that have enough appeal to facilitate coalition building and political support. 
664 Bøas and McNeill (2004), p. 214-215.
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How did ideas influence institutional change in the World Bank and among other 
institutions of poverty professionals around the Millennium? Could Campbell’s 
typologies be used to classify the ideas and roles of the various actors?
A large variety of ideas were used as tools and weapons in the Battlefields of 
Knowledge about Poverty Reduction around the turn of the Millennium Some of 
the ideas were cognitive, others were normative. Some were clearly concepts and 
theories in the foreground of the debate. Others were underlying assumptions 
in the background – but no less influential. Ideas can both constrain and facilitate 
institutional change. Sometimes ideas constrain change in ways that channel it 
along evolutionary tracks or block it completely. Sometimes ideas facilitate more 
revolutionary tracks of change.  Because background ideas are so often taken 
for granted, they tend to constrain change. Because foreground ideas are con-
tested and often used to challenge the status quo, they tend to facilitate or enable 
change. I have classified some of the important poverty reduction related ideas 
around the Millennium into Table 8, in order to better understand what roles and 
functions did the various ideas have in either facilitating or constraining change 
in the way poverty and poverty reduction are conceived in global development 
policy-making. 
7.4.1 Public sentiments
Public sentiments were strongly divided: The mainstream public and media 
opinion in the Western world still conceived the challenge of global poverty re-
duction as a modernization challenge: the Western societies were considered the 
model, which the poor countries of the ‘Global South’ should try to ‘catch-up’. 
Since the Thatcher-Reagan era, the market had been dominating over the state as 
the preferred coordination mechanism, and mainstream opinions towards mixed 
models were intolerantly negative. Neoliberal ‘market fundamentalism’ was the 
mainstream ideology among the powerful decision-makers, and neo-liberally ori-
ented neoclassical economists within and outside the World Bank were the ‘high 
priests’ of this ideology, expected to have the correct answers. Yet, also a strong 
opposing sentiment was brewing not only in the Global South but also among the 
broad public, opinion-makers and political decision-makers in the Global North. 
A technological change – the ICT-revolution – had brought enormous efficiency, 
networking and visibility gains to the resistance campaigns of the global civil 
society movement. The street demonstrations during the WTO, IMF and World 
Bank summits in Seattle, Prag, Genova, Gothenburg, etc. turned out historically 
successful, and attracted a lot of media visibility and public interest all around 
the world.  
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Table 7. Examples of Various Types of Poverty Reduction Ideas Around the 
Millennium
Concepts and Theories in the 
Foreground of the Debate
Underlying Assumptions in the 
Background of the Debate
programmes
(policy conditions)
paradigms
(World views, institutional logics)
Cognitive 
level
- Structural Adjustment 
Programmes, and
- Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers,                                                       
aand the ‘race-to-the-bottom’ 
economic and social policy 
conditions thereof
- MDGs
- One-UN Social Protection Floor 
Initiative
- ‘Economism’ (neo-classical version)
- Market Integration is the solution 
(Ricardean Trade Theory)
- Human Development
- Keynesian economics
- Labour/Feminist Economics
- Post-Autistic Economics
- Human Rights-based development
Frames
(Discourses)
public sentiments
(identities, Cultures)
Normative
level
- Growth is Good for the Poor !
- Liberalization is Good for the 
Poor !
- Comprehensive Development 
Framework !
- 1.Empowerment; 2. 
Security;  3.Opportunities; 
4.International Action
- Decent Work Agenda
- Pro-Poor Growth agenda 
- Global Social Protection Floor
- The West is Best 
- Dev’t = modernization
- Big government is bad
- Market is good
- Economists/WB are ‘serious’
- 50 Years of WB is Enough
- Jubileum, Live Aid
- Make Poverty History
- All different, all equal
- Society for All
- Human Rights
Churches, trade unions, rock musicians  and political movements joined in, and 
soon a wide range of pro-poor and human rights –based public campaigns were 
launched, demanding a New Global Deal in the context of the Jubilee-2000, with 
a variety of slogans such as: ‘Live Aid’, ‘Making Poverty History’, ‘All Different, 
All Equal’, and ‘Society for All’,  ‘Another World is Possible’.  
7.4.2 Paradigms 
Paradigms were being developed in line with the public sentiments: ‘Economism’ 
of a neoclassical variety was the leading paradigm of the mainstream.  A variety 
of arguments based on the Ricardean trade theory were used to explain that 
ultimately the best way for global poverty reduction would be to help the poor 
countries to integrate themselves to the global markets. A highly fragmented uni-
verse of alternative paradigms (Keynesian, human, feminist, labour, post-autistic, 
etc. economics and human rights based theories) existed, but lacked the critical 
mass needed to make a dent to the status quo. 
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7.4.3 Frames 
A great variety of ideational frames for poverty reduction were developed by 
a large number of ‘policy entrepreneurs’ to support the translation of theories 
into programmes, by providing simplified normative concepts for the decision-
making debates in the foreground.  Dollar and Kraay, for instance, took a lot 
of trouble to develop the ‘Growth is Good for the Poor’ –frame to support the 
neo-liberal policy recommendations of the World Bank at a time when evidence 
was mounting against their assumed pro-poorness. Unconvinced of the standard 
‘Washington Consensus’ –frame, World Bank President James Wolfensohn intro-
duced an alternative frame, the ‘Comprehensive Development Framework’ in 1999. 
Soon thereafter, it was Ravi Kanbur’s turn to introduce a new poverty reduc-
tion frame in the consultation draft of the WDR-2000: He had listened carefully to 
the concerns of poor country governments, global civil society and economists 
and other social scientists outside the conventional circles of Washington-based 
poverty economists, and concluded that it would be possible to leave behind the 
unfruitful conflicts and to integrate the economic and social elements of poverty 
reduction into one balanced framework consisting of the following four pillars: 1) 
Empowerment; 2) Security; 3) Opportunities and 4) International Action. 
At the same time, in Europe, Juan Somavia, the new Executive Director of the 
ILO665 had launched the ‘Decent Work Agenda’ – consisting of four pillars: Rights, 
Employment, Social Protection and Social Dialogue - with similar objectives to 
bridge the unconstructive divide between the economic and social dimensions of 
sustainable development. The OECD-POVNET subsequently did the same: inte-
grated the economic and social elements of poverty reduction into one balanced 
framework under the rubric ‘Pro-Poor Growth’. 
7.4.4 Programmes 
Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) with their extensive policy conditions 
based on neoclassical theories and neo-liberal ideology were the simple and clear 
‘policy prescriptions’ or ‘road maps’ imposed by the IMF and the World Bank on 
the developing country governments, with more or less open/tacit support by the 
bilateral development agencies of the OECD-governments. Intensive criticism by 
the developing country governments, several UN-agencies and the increasingly 
noisy global civil society movements forced the Bretton Woods institutions to of-
ficially discontinue the SAP-framework into what was called ‘Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Papers’ (PRSPs). The main declared change was the stronger poverty 
focus and higher degree of country ownership in the PRSPs.  
In closer analysis by researchers and lobbyists from the Global South, UN-
agencies and academia, the PRSPs were, however, found to have brought little 
change to the main economic and social policy prescriptions as compared to the 
SAPs. Developing countries were still being advised and required to engage in a 
race-to-the-bottom in their social policies in order to better compete and succeed in 
the global market integration, the main neo-liberal recipe for poverty reduction. 
665 Advised by skillful framers such as Guy Standing, Michael Cichon and Rolph van der Hoeven.
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The Millennium Develoment Goals, MDGs, were the successful counter-pro-
gramme introduced in 2000 by the human development focused UN-agencies 
- UNDP and Unicef – with important support from the OECD-DAC. 
Later, in response to the global financial, economic and social crisis of 2007-
2010 the UN Chief Executive Board CEB – chaired by Juan Somavia of the ILO 
- in 2009 launched a new global programme, under the name ‘One-UN Social 
Protection Floor Initiative’ (SPF-I) which conceived poverty reduction as human-
rights based challenge of securing for all of human kind the essential social rights, 
services and transfers necessary for dignified living in line with the Articles 22-28 
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
7.5. AgeNCY iN iDeAtioNAliSm: Who ARe the 
ACtoRS AND WhAt ARe theiR RoleS? 
In the theoretical Chapter-3 we argued that ideas do not emerge spontaneously 
or become influential without actors. Therefore, for an institutional analysis it 
is important to identify the key actors, to situate them correctly into ‘schools-of-
thought’ or political or institutional ‘camps’, and to analyse their roles in generat-
ing, maintaining or changing the various theories, frames, programmes or public 
sentiments. 
Figure 20. World Bank and the Global Poverty Reduction Agenda – Examples of Influ-
ential Actors and Their Ideational Realms
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Decision makers / PROGRAMMES, e.g. 
(a) Top Leaders: McNamara, Wolfensohn, 
Summers, Brown, Somavia, Mandela, 
Mkapa, Lula, Halonen, Robinson, Clinton,  
(b) Senior bureaucrats: Stiglitz,  
Bourguignon, Ocampo, Jomo, 
Cichon, Nicol 
 
Theorists / PARADIGMS, e.g.  
WB: Stiglitz, Kanbur, Seraggeldin, Dollar, Easterly, 
Ravallion, Narayan, Holzmann, Jorgensen, Norton, 
Reinikka, Bourguignon, Dani, Collier, Deaton 
UN: Mkandawire, Ocampo, Jomo, Ortiz, ul Haq, 
Sen, Berg, Vandermoortele, Sachs, Jolly, Cornia,  
    Stewart, Addison, van Hoeven, Rogers, Standing, 
van Ginneken, Razavi 
Other: Rodrik, Chang, Klasen, Thorbecke,  
Mosley, Adelman, Tarp, Townsend, Deacon, 
Birdsall, McNeill, Chambers, Eyben, Devereux, 
Sabates-Wheeler, Maxwell, Booth, Healey, Cox, 
Voipio, Samson, Escobar, Rahnema,  
Ghosh, Khor, Tandon, Adesina, Riesco, Kwon 
                                                                                   
Constituents /  
PUBLIC SENTIMENTS,  
e.g. 
 
G8/G20 
The Economist, The Nobel Committee 
IMF-WB-WTO Annual meetings 
OECD-DAC, MFA-Finland 
50 Years is Enough, Seattle, etc. 
World Economic Forum / World Social Forum 
 B.Geldof, Bono, D.Tutu 
Jubilee-2000, Making Poverty History 
Framers / FRAMES, e.g.  
WB: Stiglitz, Kanbur, Seraggeldin, 
Dollar, Holzmann, Narayan, Dani,  
Jorgensen 
UN: Jomo, Ortiz, Vandermoortele, Fajth, 
Razavi, van Hoeven, Cichon, Hagemejer, 
Wodsak, Gentilini 
Other: Kidd, Krech, Voipio, Wiman, HAI/Beales, 
van Ginneken, Samson, Sabates-Wheeler, Wilks, 
Correll, Deacon, Khor, Jomo, Ghosh, McNeill, 
Robinson 
Brokering networks: 
WB: WDR, ABCDE, TFESSD, Arusha, 
SDAN 
UN: ECOSOC, CSocD, CEB, ILC, 
WCSDG, UNRISD, WIDER, SP 
Show&Tell, One-UN SPF-I 
Other: OECD-POVNET,  
DFID, GTZ, Nordics, HAI, ICSW, 
GASPP/GSP, RC19, Bretton Woods 
Project, Eurodad, Helsinki Process, 
Ethical Globalization Initiative 
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In Figure 20 666 I have attempted to situate a number of key actors, real-life ‘in-
stitutional entrepreneurs’ in the policy struggles about global poverty reduction 
– into the various roles in generating, embracing, manipulating and carrying the 
different types of poverty reduction ideas introduced in Table 8 More important 
than the names in Figure 20. is the observation, that decision-makers, theorists, 
framers, constituents and brokers can be identified and named in Global Poverty 
Politics, and that this analytic tool is a useful one.
Such a mapping of policy entrepreneurs is obviously highly subjective, reflect-
ing the actors of the global poverty policy struggles as I have seen them from my 
own, biased perspective as one of the participating framers (and as a theorist, 
too).. Another analyst, or actor, observing the same struggles from another per-
spective, would obviously fill in (partly) other names into the boxes, and undoubt-
edly leave e.g. my names out. The main point here is not who are included and 
who are not. What I mainly try to show here is just that it is possible and helpful in 
institutional analysis to use Campbell’s typology (Figure 2) of policy ideas and 
actors.
7.6 pRoCeSS tRACiNg, pAth-DepeNDeNCieS, RARe 
momeNtS AND CRitiCAl iDeAtioNAl juNCtuReS 
What originally motivated my research, were the embarrassing confrontations 
and ideational disagreements that I observed between some of the world’s lead-
ing poverty economists, other poverty professionals, developing country govern-
ments and the emerging global civil society.
I decided to take these confrontations seriously. The main focus of my work 
has been on analysing the ideational substance – and roots – of these disagree-
ments. From the point of view of institutional theory it is also interesting to 
analyse the temporal context of the Millennium conflicts on poverty reduction. 
Pierson’s “Politics in Time” (2004) was a landmark that facilitated the combination 
of macro-sociological and historical analysis of institutional, social and political 
processes. In line with his thinking I have argued that there was a rare moment 
or critical juncture around the Millennium turn, when two factors – the internet 
and a change in the World Bank’s disclosure policies – made visible to interested 
observers conflicts that had never before been accessible to anybody else but a 
small inner circle within the Bank. 
Disagreements about the correct course of action on poverty reduction have 
probably always existed not only between economists and other social scientists 
but also among World Bank poverty economists. We just have had no way of 
knowing. What made the rare moment around the Millennium turn so interest-
ing was that it surprised also the World Bank economists. They may have known 
about the Bank-internal disagreements before, but never before have they been 
forced to come to the open to defend their policy recommendations in ways that 
666 Based on Campbell’s (2004, p. 101) original typology as introduced in Figure 2. in Chapter-3.
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revealed so clearly the axiomatic assumptions that they were based on. More 
important than a final verdict as to who was right or wrong is the fact that these 
embarrassments around the turn of the Millennium have generated a rethinking 
process among the most serious development economists. More recently the col-
lective shame of mainstream economists about the failure to foresee the global 
financial crash of 2007 has given a reason for a similar soul-searching exercise for 
the entire economics profession.667 
As Ravi Kanbur argued, the root of the poverty economists’ problem was that 
development economics had become too much like economics. Mainstream develop-
ment economics today has all the strengths and all the weaknesses of the current 
economic way of thinking.668 The real problem lay in the fact that the ‘mother sci-
ence’, i.e. economics itself, had over the years become something that would be 
unrecognisable to its founding fathers such as Adam Smith, Marie-Jean-Antoine 
Condorcet, Friedrich List and Karl Marx, or to its past heroes such as Max Weber, 
Thorstein Veblen, John Maynard Keynes or Gunnar Myrdal. 
Realizing this, I had developed an interest in understanding how the found-
ing fathers and latter generations of economists had in fact conceived the problem 
of poverty, and the role and opportunities they saw for public action in poverty 
reduction. This was my motivation for making a lengthy ‘intellectual journey’ 
into the ‘History of Poverty Economics’.  Time has been on my side on this matter: 
Before the financial crisis of 2007-10 I would have hardly dared to claim that the 
entire economics profession has to change the way it works. Now I do not need 
to make that statement, because the leading economists are making it for me: 
Nobel laureate Paul Krugman (2009): “It’s hard to believe now, but not long ago 
economists were congratulating themselves over the success of their field... Last year, 
everything came apart...Few economists saw our current crisis coming... As I see it, the 
economics profession went astray because economists, as a group, mistook beauty, clad in 
impressive-looking mathematics, for truth... Economics, as a field, got in trouble because 
economists were seduced by the vision of a perfect, frictionless market system.”669 
Nobel laureate George Akerlof, writing with Robert J. Schiller (2009): “The 
public, the government, and most economists had been reassured by an economic theory 
that said that we were safe....But that theory was deficient. It had ignored the importance 
of ideas in the conduct of the economy...According to traditional economics, free market 
capitalism will be essentially perfect and stable. There is little, if any, need for government 
interference...But this thought experiment fails to take into account the extent to which 
people are also guided by non-economic motivations.”670 
William Easterly, long time Lead Growth Economist of the World Bank, writ-
ing in 2009 in a book published to commemorate the 30 years of World Bank World 
Development Reports:671 “The intellectual tragedy of 30 years of World Development 
Reports (WDRs) is that they never accepted the reality of the great unpredictability and 
667 See e.g. Krugmann (2009), Akerlof and Schiller (2009).
668 Kanbur (2001a), p. 2.
669 Krugman (2009).
670 Akerlof and Schiller (2009).
671 Easterly spent 16 years as a Research Economist at the World Bank. Yusuf (2009). 
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uncertainty of economic growth in the short to medium run. The WDRs kept trying to 
find ways to raise growth...when the economics profession does not have this knowledge...
They (the WDRs) fall prey to many of the classic heuristic biases about randomness (à 
la Kahneman and Tversky), including frequent use of circular reasoning...In defence of 
the WDRs, the economics profession was also slow to admit the inexplicability of growth 
fluctuations. However, a wide spectrum of economists has by now conceded we don’t know 
how to raise growth in the short to medium run.”672 
Title of an article published in 1997 by Nobel laureate Robert Solow: “How did 
economics get that way and what way did it get?”673
Title of an article published in 2006 by Dani Rodrik, Harvard professor of 
economics: “Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion? A Review 
of the World Bank’s Economic Growth in the 1990s: Learning from a Decade of Reform.”674
Nobel laureate Joseph E. Stiglitz, writing in 2009 in a book published to com-
memorate the 30 years of World Bank World Development Reports (WDRs):675  
“The messages (in WDRs) were...intended to set the policy agenda: they were messages that 
the World Bank staff could bring to developing countries around the world...I was worried: 
It smacked too much of a “one-size-fits-all” cookie-cutter approach...Even before I came to 
the Bank, I was convinced that the Washington Consensus doctrines represented the wrong 
approach, at least for many countries. The economic doctrines on which the Washington 
Consensus rested had long been discredited. My own work on imperfect and asymmetric 
information and incomplete markets had contributed to undermining the theoretical foun-
dations. And the World Bank’s own report on the East Asian Miracle – on which I had 
worked – had shown that the most successful countries had not followed these recipes...My 
own research...had ended the theoretical debate about Adam Smith’s invisible hand: markets 
were not, in general, efficient...To me, the issue of privatization of social security was an 
intensely political matter.”
“Every 10 years, the Bank has been doing a WDR on poverty...a focus that increased with 
the Millennium Development Goals...The WDR (2000) was a natural follow-up to Voices of 
the Poor676 ...We had asked: What aspects of their lives contributed most to the suffering of 
the poor? We discovered...that the poor were concerned not only about their lack of income 
but also about their lack of security and lack of voice. We had concluded that the exclusive 
focus on income (as in the 1990 WDR) was wrong, and under the direction of Ravi Kanbur, 
we decided to take a broader perspective. Not surprisingly, again, the approach drew politi-
cal criticism – including from the U.S. secretary of treasury (and former World Bank chief 
economist), Lawrence Summers.”
672 Easterly (2001a), Lindauer and Pritchett 2002, Rodrik 2006, Solow 2007, Spence Commission (2008), 
and Barcelona Consensus (2004). The Barcelona Consensus, or Barcelona Development Agenda is a 
consensus document resulting from a meeting of economists in Barcelona, Spain, in 2004. Signatories 
of the document include Olivier Blanchard, Guillermo Calvo, Stanley Fischer, Jeffrey Frankel, Paul 
Krugman, Dani Rodrik, Jeffrey Sachs, and Joseph Stiglitz. 
673 Solow (1997).
674 Rodrik (2006).
675 Yusuf (2009). 
676 Narayan et al. (1999, 2000, 2002).
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Stiglitz pointed out that the debate was part of a broader development contro-
versy where  some argued for trickle-down economics: countries should maxi-
mize growth, and that would be the most effective way of reducing poverty. 
“Most of those within the Bank had moved away from that view. The evidence was over-
whelming that growth did not necessarily reduce poverty. Trickle-down economics did not 
necessarily work. If growth was accompanied by increasing inequality, poverty could actu-
ally increase.” 
According to Stiglitz’s retrospective assessment the problem was that many of 
the Washington Consensus policies that the Bank and the IMF had argued for 
in the past had contributed to – or had at least been associated with – increasing 
inequality. And that was especially true of policies like capital market liberaliza-
tion, which the U.S. Treasury had advocated. Such policies had not led to any or 
much increased growth677 but had led to more instability, and the greater instabil-
ity had led to more inequality – which was particularly pronounced in the context 
of the East Asian crisis. 
“To be sure, one could not have sustained poverty reduction without growth, which was 
why we had begun to focus on poverty-reducing growth strategies...The WDR-2000 em-
phasized that ... one had to look for growth policies that alleviated poverty and enhanced 
equity. In the case of some policies, a trade-off between growth and equality may not even 
exist. One example is providing universal education. Making sure that every child can live 
up to his or her potential reduces poverty, enhances equality, and promotes growth.”
The Comprehensive Development Strategies on which the Bank was then focus-
ing678 called attention to important complementarities that had often been missed 
in the past: that trade liberalization might, for instance, by itself lead to more 
poverty, because jobs were destroyed faster than they were created. 
Thus, the WDR-2000 suggested not only that the policies being pushed by 
the U.S. Treasury might be bad for poverty in the narrow income sense, but also 
that they were even worse if poverty was more broadly conceived. For if capital 
market liberalization or trade liberalization was associated with greater economic 
instability, then the insecurity to which it gave rise might contribute even more 
to the worsening plight of those at the bottom. 
Other policy controversies were also directly implicated. The Washington 
Consensus policies had argued for privatization of social security, but private 
social security accounts left individuals exposed to the vagaries of the market (all 
too evident in the 2008 market crash) and did not even insulate against the risks of 
inflation. Unionization and collective bargaining, part of the core labor standards 
around which broad global consensus existed, had attempted to increase worker 
677 Footnote in Stiglitz (2009): This view has now  become accepted even by the IMF (see Prasad and 
others 2003, Stiglitz and Ocampo 2008, Stiglitz et al. 2006). 
678 The intellectual foundations of these strategies were, in part at least, provided by my Stiglitz’s 
Prebisch lecture (Stiglitz 1999b).
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security. Yet Washington Consensus policies had often argued for greater labor 
market flexibility, code words for eliminating or reducing hard-fought-for social 
protections. Although the evidence and the theory of the effects of such policies 
on growth or stability were ambiguous679, such policies clearly may contribute to 
greater poverty in the broader sense.  
A healthy humbleness was creeping into the minds of the leading economists, 
as Nobel Laureate Stiglitz explained in 2009. Perhaps also the World Bank didn’t 
have all the answers, and needed to listen more and prescrible less: “Our commit-
ment to giving more voice to those in the developing countries was reflected in the process 
of writing the WDR. We had organized extensive consultations throughout the world, 
posting each draft of the WDR on the Internet. This approach served us well in the ensu-
ing controversy.” The U.S. Treasury demanded that the income aspect of poverty be given 
primacy. This demand went against the global consensus that had been generated in the 
process of our global discussions. Ravi Kanbur’s resignation created a global furor. In the 
end, the Bank was forced to accept as the final draft a version that was close to that before 
the U.S. Treasury had unilaterally demanded its invasive changes.”
One of the most serious mistakes made during the heyday of market funda-
mentalist Washington Consensus period was the outright elimination of public 
social insurance in those developing countries  that had had national social in-
surance systems, and the unwillingness of the World Bank and IMF advisers to 
include social protection development into the Structural Adjustment Policies 
imposed on the governments of the poorest countries. Writing in 2009, Stiglitz 
regrets this: 
“The 1997 WDR argued that developing countries suffered as often from too little gov-
ernment action, from a failed state, as they did from too much government. The 1998/99 
WDR helped to explain one pervasive source of market failure of particular importance in 
developing countries: imperfect information. This is of especial importance in helping to 
explain the absence of insurance markets. Finally, the 2000/2001 WDR emphasized the 
importance of security – including health and economic security – as an aspect of poverty. 
Together, these three WDRs provided a compelling case for government action in the area 
of social insurance.”
The debate on social protection has not been easy within the World Bank, with 
some arguing for more limited role for the state – and the Bank - than others 
do.680 Driven by an ‘anti Big Government’ ideology, the Bank had pushed many 
countries to privatize their social security systems, but the outcomes of the pri-
vatizations were mostly miserable. The problems in transition were not trivial. 
Because the government was deprived of essential cash flows, severe fiscal prob-
lems were artificially created, in some cases contributing to severe economic 
crises. Argentina is an admittedly controversial case in point. Many blamed its 
679 Stiglitz, Easterly and Islam (2001), Stiglitz and Rey (1993). 
680 A sense of the debate is given by New Ideas About Old Age Security (Holzmann and Stiglitz 2001), 
and especially chapter 1 (Orzag and Stiglitz 2001). 
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crisis on its fiscal problems, but had it not privatized its social insurance system, 
its budget would have been nearly in balance. Transaction costs turned out to be 
large. And the imposition of burdens of risk on individuals was far from trivial. 
When the United States had a national debate on privatization of its social secu-
rity system, support was overwhelming for keeping it public, Stiglitz points out. 
In the 2007-2010 crash, there was a national sigh of relief that social security had 
not been privatized. 
Throughout their history, the WDRs - Bank’s flagship publications - have 
played an active role in shaping thought and policy, both within the World Bank 
and in the wider development community. They were sometimes overly ambi-
tious, hoping to be able to summarize in a few clear messages the received wis-
dom on a key aspect of development. The world is too often too complicated for 
that to be done, Stiglitz argued in 2009: “Occasionally, the WDR became the publica-
tion vehicle for official Bank doctrines – a summary of beliefs of the moment.” 
In retrospect, we can assess even those cases more positively: At least for those 
of us interested in the evolution of economic thought, the WDRs have played a 
helpful role, showing us how thinking about development has evolved over the 
years.
7.7 DemoCRAtiZiNg DevelopmeNt eCoNomiCS  
Finally, the most recent highly interesting case in the long chain of profession-
ally self-critical assessments by the world’s leading development economists is 
a paper written in 2010 by and ‘under the leadership of’  the World Bank’s new 
Chief Economist and Senior Vice-President, Mr. Justin Lin. What makes this case 
particularly interesting politically is the fact that Mr. Lin is the first ever Chinese 
national at the helm of  development economics research at the World Bank.681 
In the paper titled ‘Research for Development – A World Bank Perspective 
on Future Directions for Research’682 Mr. Lin and his team683 provide an over-
view of the history of development research at the World Bank and point to new 
681 Scholars of International Politics will be interested to know that also at the United Nations Secretariat 
in New York (UN Department for Economic and Social Affairs, UN-DESA) the top Director of the 
UN’s leading economic and social policy analysts is now a Chinese national, Mr. Sha Zukang, Under-
Secretary General of the United Nations on Economic and Social Affairs.  
682 World Bank (2010). Normally – as a disclaimer rule printed on the inner cover of all papers published 
in the ‘World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series’ these papers are supposed to “carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly”. This is so, because the papers are intended 
“to disseminate the findings of work in progress”. Thus, the findings, interpretations, and conclusions 
expressed in these papers are entirely those of the authors, and “they do not necessarily represent 
the views of the World Bank”. Interestingly, in the case of this particularly critical and ‘un-orthodox’ 
paper written “under the leadership of” the first-ever Chinese Chief-Economist of the World Bank, 
this disclaimer rule is not applied. Instead, the paper is published under the name of “The World 
Bank Development Economics Senior Vice Presidency” (rather than under the name of Mr. Lin). We 
can only speculate whether this is an effort to hide the ‘Chineseness’ of the thinking, and to make 
the messages more palatable to the World Bank economists and to the entire global community of 
economists, whose worldview is – or has at least for long been – instinctively reserved to any thinking 
coming from outside the ‘Anglo-American’ circles, not to speak of China.
683 Primarily Mr. Martin Ravallion, Mr. Alan Gelb and Ms. Ann Harrison. 
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future directions in both what and how the Bank researchers should research. 
According to the paper:  “Development thinking is in a state of flux and uncertainty; it 
is time to reconsider both the Bank’s research priorities and how it does research. A more 
open and strategic approach to research is needed - an approach that is firmly grounded in 
the key knowledge gaps for development policy emerging from the experiences of develop-
ing countries, including the questions that policy makers in those countries ask.” 
I hope that I am not exaggerating the ‘Chinese value added’ of the paper but 
after many years of ‘Washington Consensus’ as the single one ‘Truth’ in global 
development policy it, indeed, sounds refreshing to me to read the following new 
argument in Mr. Lin’s paper: “A new multipolar world requires a new multi-polar ap-
proach to knowledge; the Bank must learn from, and collaborate with, developing-country 
researchers and institutes.”
According to the paper four major sets of problems merit high priority for 
future research by the World Bank: (i) securing economic transformation; (ii) 
broadening opportunities to participate in the benefits of, and contribute to, such 
transformation; (iii) dealing with emerging risks at all levels; and (iv) assessing 
the results of development efforts, including external assistance. 
Reading this, I am pleased to recognize that Mr. Lin and his team seem to lis-
tened to the ‘Voices of the Poor’ and studied – thoughtfully – the main arguments 
of the UN Secretariat (UN-DESA), UNRISD and OECD-POVNET reports that I 
have introduced and synthesized in the preceding chapter of this book. 
As we have read, both  the ‘Rethinking Poverty’ report of  UN-DESA684 and the 
UNRISD flagship report ‘Poverty and Inequality’685 strongly argued for a struc-
tural tranformation that shifts economies from low-productivity, low-technology 
paths of development to technologically dynamic, skills-intensive paths towards 
the generation of equitable growth and development that benefits all. Mr. Lin 
seems to be in agreement with this (first of his four points). 
Mr. Lin’s second point – “broadening opportunities to participate in the benefits of, 
and contribute to, such transformation” - gives me even greater pleasure, because it 
is almost word-by-word the same as the main argument of the OECD-POVNET’s 
‘Pro-Poor Growth Guidelines’, to which I personally made a non-insignificant 
contribution: “Pro-poor growth is growth that also poor people can participate in, con-
tribute to and benefit from.”686
I also feel strong sympathy with – and some degree of ownership of – the third 
main argument of the World Bank’s current Chief Economist, on the priority of 
“dealing with emerging risks at all levels”. This was the observation I made in 1993-
1994 and 1999-2000 when working as a socio-economist and facilitator of partici-
patory planning among the women and men of the remote villages of Mtwara 
and Lindi regions of Tanzania. This was also the argument behind the initiative 
I made in the OECD-POVNET in 2004, together with my German and British 
partners Rüdiger Krech and Stephen Kidd, which then led to the launching of a 
684 UN-DESA (2010).
685 UNRISD (2010c).
686 OECD-DAC (2006a, b). 
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new work stream on ‘Risk, Vulnerability and Social Protection’ in POVNET. This 
work, conducted by the POVNET Task Team on Social Protection (that I chaired) 
resulted in the ‘OECD Guidelines on Social Protection’ in 2009,687 and continues 
also in the new work programme of the OECD-POVNET for years 2011-2012 un-
der the heading ‘Global Social Protection Floor’, as a contribution of bilateral aid 
donors to the joint effort of the UN-Agencies, including the IMF and the World 
Bank, under the ‘One-UN Social Protection Floor Initiative’ (UN SPF-I).688
In response to the intuitive die-hard assumptions of some economists Mr. Lin 
argued in his paper that instead of considering safety nets (the word economists 
tend to use for social protection) as harmful,  or at best neutral, to economic 
growth, “recent research suggests that efficient safety nets (i.e. social protection) may 
actually foster longer-term growth by addressing market failures, and that lack of op-
portunities for managing risk is an often bigger efficiency concern than moral hazard.”689
In the paper Mr. Lin also promised that the Bank’s research department 
will take seriously the criticisms articulated for instance by the Independent 
Evaluation Panel led by Professor Angus Deaton in 2006 about the way the Bank 
has been using research to proselytize on behalf of Bank policy. He also admitted 
that all too often, many research economists do not start with the key knowledge 
gaps facing development practitioners but rather search for questions they can 
answer with the field’s currently favored tools. All in all, bearing in mind what 
we have learned in the previous chapters of this book about the disagreements 
among World Bank economists at the turn of the new Millennium, we could 
almost conclude that the think-piece of the World Bank Chief Economist Justin 
Lin in 2010 passed a sentence – or at least took a clear stand - against the neo-
liberal orthodoxy represented in 2000 by David Dollar, Aart Kraay & co, and in 
favour of the heterodox thinkers such as Ravi Kanbur, Joseph Stiglitz and Bill 
Easterly – and many other advocates of less narrowly economistic and broader, 
more balanced, multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary approaches to solving 
the challenge of global poverty. 
“A consensus has evolved among development economists that there is no simple recipe 
for development, applicable to all countries and situations. Some countries appear to have 
done well with policies that involve a more active role for the state than envisaged by the 
Washington Consensus. Markets and states need to complement each other. Addressing 
many key development issues requires a broad range of skills, including insights from dis-
ciplines other than economics.690”
Also with regard to the trade policies imposed by the World Bank on poor coun-
tries during the Washington Consensus years, there is now, according to Chief 
Economist Justin Lin, “a perception that orthodox prescriptions have paid too little atten-
tion to managing the risks posed by globalization. Some of the accepted policy orthodoxies 
687 OECD-DAC (2009a).
688 See Social Protection Floor(s) in Websources.
689 World Bank (2010).
690 World Bank (2010).
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of the past will need to be revisited in the light of new ideas and information, including 
knowledge from the broad range of experiences of developing  countries.”
This rethinking requires, according to the September-2010 paper, that World 
Bank economists must challenge themselves as well as reach out to other dis-
ciplines and practitioners in the field. This includes, Lin writes, working with 
experts in history, political science, sociology, anthropology, psychology, political 
economy, and sometimes the physical and biological sciences.
The impacts of policies and economic changes on the poorest, “once routinely 
neglected”, as Mr. Lin & co. say, have to be given higher priority in research now. 
Inequality (the main focus of Ravi Kanbur’s research work) is now seen as an 
important problem constraining growth and poverty reduction: “We have learned 
that inequalities of opportunity lie at the heart of inequitable growth processes in devel-
oping countries. Lack of access to opportunities, particularly for investing in education, 
health, and other forms of human capital, stifles growth and makes the growth that does 
occur less effective in reducing poverty.”691(Just like we in the OECD-POVNET argued 
in our ‘Pro-Poor Growth Guidelines’ published in 2006.)
One implication of this research agenda is, according to the current Chief 
Economist of the Bank,  the need for differentiated policy recommendations for 
countries at different stages of development (a central argument of the ‘50-Years-
Is-Enough’ protest movement against the World Bank in the 1990s). 
Chief Economist Justin Lin uses arguments very similar to the those that have 
brought over 20 UN-agencies together in support of the ‘One-UN Social Protection 
Floor Initiative’. “Ensuring better services for poor people is one key element.” Another 
one is “the need of improved means to meet existing and new risks facing economies and 
people at local, regional and global levels.  Our world is riskier than many of us thought. 
Recent history has confirmed that a large fraction of the developing world’s population 
remains vulnerable to shocks. These can be myriad in form, ranging from natural disasters 
(earthquakes, tsunamis), to health pandemics, to wars and civil strife, to economic crises 
such as the East Asian financial crisis of the 1990s, oil and food price shocks of 2007-08, 
and the global economic crisis of 2008-09.”692
One important area of research is the identification of safety nets at reason-
able costs. Like the ILO and the Nordic social policy professionals, Justin Lin, too, 
emphasizes that this does not necessarily mean better targeting, because strict 
targeting “can come at (often hidden) costs, including to poor people.” In Lin’s view past 
work has focused (too much) on the problem of avoiding ‘leakage’ to the non-
poor and given too little attention to other issues, including assuring better social 
protection coverage, maintaining incentives for escaping poverty by other means, 
and devising permanent national social protection policies and systems that can 
act as more automatic stabilizers. “Such stabilizers do not require long lead times to 
provide help and do not inhibit access for those in need. The scope for nongovernmental 
partnerships in social protection has also been under-emphasized.”
691 World Bank (2010).
692 World Bank (2010).
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7.8 the pRopoSitioNS ReviSiteD
As I wrote in the Introduction, this is a historical-institutionalist essay about pover-
ty reduction as a policy-making, planning and management problem at the turn 
of the 3rd Millennium. The people whose life-worlds and ways of thinking we 
have sought to understand are primarily not the poor, but the non-poor poverty 
reduction professionals: economists and other social scientists. The World Bank 
economists – the hegemonic leaders of the global poverty reduction effort – have 
been particularly in focus in this study.
It is very difficult – and daring – to say anything definitive about issues as 
complex as poverty and how it should be reduced. We just don’t have certain 
knowledge. In situations of great uncertainty, it is typical for all human beings to 
use ideas such as standard operating procedures, routine, imitation, prejudices, 
belief, professional conventions and identities as shortcuts or coping devices that 
allow us to overcome our cognitive limits and to arrive at judgments and to be 
able to make decisions.693 
It is my duty in my job to advise my government on how best to reduce global 
poverty. Which approaches and instruments to use? Which sectors to prioritize? 
Which international organisations to support?  Which organizational scripts, 
policy frames, disciplines and theories to trust? In Chapter-3 where I was map-
ping out my place in the broad landscapes of historical-institutional research I 
developed nine propositions that had started to look to me as potentially useful 
coping devices, that might help me to cope with my own cognitive limitations, 
and to make some sense out of the chaotic overflow of information about world 
poverty and its remedies that overwhelms me daily through emails, websites, 
official documents, meetings, seminars, conferences, etc. 
Table 8. Propositions Made in Chapter-3
1) Ideas are important economic goods – but the markets of ideas are highly 
asymmetrical.
2) Institutional factors and professional identity constrain the effective use of 
ideas.
3) Not only material interests (on the left-right axis) but also professional identities 
and interests determine how agents behave.0
4) Interests are socially constructed – strong organizations can change what 
individuals, or even what states want, i.e. the ideas about state interests.
5) Individuals, organisations and governments are motivated by a complex mix of 
sometimes conflicting preferences.
6) In situations of ‘Knightian uncertainty’ ideas and identities, rather than interests 
determine how agents act.
7) Aid implementation should not be left to economists and diplomats alone.
693 See Proposition-6 in Chapter-1, Introduction.
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8) A ‘rare moment’ at the Millennium turn cracked the illusion of consent among 
the development economists and made the controversies known to non-
economists.
9) Professionals of development and care should be aware of the crisis within the 
economics profession – and not take for granted routine assumptions based on 
outdated economics.
Some of these propositions concerned ideas about poverty and international aid, 
others had more to do with ideas about ideas, interests, identities and institutions. 
In what follows, I am going review these propositions once again, now in light 
of what I learned during the empirical part of my work, and to assess to what 
extent the propositions turned out to be relevant, i.e. how far they can  help us 
understand the disagreements behind the facade of the Millennium Consensus 
on poverty reduction. 
7.8.1 Proposition-1
Proposition-1 suggested that ideas and their origins are well worth a study. Ideas 
are important economic goods, but their markets are highly asymmetric. This proposi-
tion seems to hold on the basis on the empirical case study of poverty reduction 
thinking within and outside the World Bank around the Millennium turn. 
Working from the recognition that the ‘knowledge gap’ between the rich and 
the poor is as significant as the ‘savings gap’ or the ‘foreign exchange gap’, the 
World Bank decided in the late 1990s to turn itself into a ‘Knowledge Bank’, not 
just a bank for infrastructure finance.694 As Joseph Stiglitz, Chief Economist of 
the World Bank observed in 1999: ”Today the World Bank has shifted much of its 
emphasis to the intangibles of knowledge, institutions, and culture...”695 
As an ’enlightenment person’, I warmly welcome this shift of emphasis. In re-
ality the motivations for this shift may have been less noble, as revealed already in 
1991 by Lawrence Summers, Stiglitz’s politically well-informed predecessor, who 
later became the Treasurer of Clinton’s Government in the USA, who then used 
this position to try to change the main messages emerging from the World Bank’s 
WDR-2000, and who is today head of the team of President Obama’s economic 
advisers. Summers declared, during his period as World Bank Chief Economist 
in 1991: “[Our] strategies must rely, to a greater extent than before, on the transfer and 
transformation of knowledge, so as to compensate for the expected paucity of development 
assistance (finance)...To put it bluntly, since there will not be much development money 
over the next decade, there had better be a lot of good ideas.”696  
The past fifty years of ‘adventures and misadventures in the tropics’ have 
gradually tempered the Bank economists’ ‘elusive quest for growth’,697 and paved 
694 The World Bank dedicated its World Development Report (WDR) in 1998/99 to the topic: ‘Knowledge 
for Development’. See World Bank (1999). See also: King and McGrath (2000).
695 Stiglitz (1999).
696 Summers (1991), p. 2.
697 A leading World Bank growth researcher, William Easterly, published a book titled: “The Elusive 
Quest for Growth - Economists’ Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics.” Easterly (2001).
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the way for a vague inter-subjective confession among economists of the ecologi-
cal limits of physical growth. But could immaterial ideas be the long-sought ‘Elixir 
of Life’ or the ‘X-factor’698 of pro-poor development? 
This is possible, but should we not be concerned about the fact that the finan-
cial resources that Western donor governments make available to knowledge-in-
tensive work by World Bank poverty economists are completely out of proportion, 
as compared to the research budgets of UN-agencies representing broader multi-
dimensional perspectives to development, not to mention the meagre resources 
available for national researchers in developing countries? 
As argued by Branislav Gosovic,699 the world-wide homogenisation of think-
ing, analysis and prescription, coupled with the de-legitimisation of social cri-
tique, dissent, and alternative thinking in the 1990s, has been key characteristics 
of globalisation in the current international system. The homogenisation is the 
outcome of global geopolitical changes and the end of the Cold War, with the 
ascendance of a victorious paradigm. The resulting global intellectual hegemony 
(GIH) is of special concern to developing countries and to the United Nations. 
It has undermined the goals and aspirations of the former and contributed to 
their intellectual disarmament and disempowerment; it has undermined the 
mandate and role of the latter. Gosovic argues that the mechanisms at work are 
well-known in national politics, in particular in undemocratic societies, and are 
now projected worldwide by new technologies and through the global domina-
tion by those with power, a task made easier by the lack of organised and credible 
opposition. Gosovic suggests the need for further study and policy debate of this 
global phenomenon, which seems to have largely passed unnoticed in academic, 
policy and public opinion circles.
This question is a double-edged sword: I am proud of some of the highly 
innovative and important research and piloting done by brilliant World Bank re-
searchers on funds provided by the Governments of Norway and Finland through 
the ‘Trust Fund on Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development’ 
(TFESSD) in the World Bank. For instance, the PSIAs (Poverty and Social Impact 
Assessments) were first tested and piloted with TFESSD-funding, and later in-
cluded into the regular budgets of several World Bank projects.700 Also, the ‘Voices 
of the Poor’ and ‘Moving Out of Poverty’ studies701, largest ever conducted partici-
698 According to Irma Adelman (2001), Professor of Economics at University of California at Berkeley 
the discipline of development economics has enshrined the ‘KISS-principle’ (= ‘Keep it simple, stupid’). 
This principle demands simple explanations and universally valid propositions. In Adelman’s view 
the KISS-Principle has led to three major fallacies, with significant deleterious consequences for both 
economic theory and policy: (1) Single-cause (‘Factor-X’) theories of underdevelopment and poverty; 
(2) A single-figure-of-merit criterion for poverty; and (3) The portrayal of development as a log-linear 
process. 
699 Gosovic (2000, 2001, 2008). At the time of writing, Gosovic was Head of the South Centre secretariat. 
South Centre is an intergovernmental organisation of developing countries, with a secretariat in 
Geneva, Switzerland. The South Centre has grown out of the work and experience of the South 
Commission and from recognition of the need for enhanced South-South cooperation. It functions 
as an independent policy think tank, whilst also holding Observer Status at the United Nations and 
other development agencies.
700 On PSIAs, see Chapter 4. 
701 On ‘Voices of the Poor’ and ‘Moving out of Poverty’, see Chapter 5.
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patory poverty assessments were to a large extent funded by the TFESSD, which 
was development cooperation money very well spent.
However, the development budgets allocated – for instance - by the 
Governments of Norway and Finland to World Bank research are annually 10-30 
times larger than the sums we use to sponsor multi-disciplinary research by the 
UN Research Institute for Social Development UNRISD, or by the International 
Institute for Labour Studies of the ILO, or the Innocenti Research Institute of 
the Unicef, research commissioned by the UN-Secretariat (UN-DESA), or the 
research funding we provide to the South Centre or the national research insti-
tutes of our partner countries in the Global South. This is neither right, fair nor 
constructive. Ideas are important economic goods, and one key objective of development 
cooperation should be to correct the existing asymmetries in the markets of poverty re-
duction ideas. 
7.8.2 Proposition-2
Proposition-2 suggested that institutional factors and professional identify might con-
strain the effective use of ideas. There has indeed been a lot of interest recently in the 
subjects of aid effectiveness, good governance, and management reform in devel-
opment co-operation. It is today difficult to find a development project without a 
sub-project on ‘institutional development’. Donors like it because it provides jobs 
for consultants, and recipients like it because it provides daily subsistence allow-
ances (DSAs) for the training participants and more computers to the offices. In 
several developing countries public sector wages have been cut to a very low level 
as an outcome of the policy conditionalities imposed by the IMF/World Bank. In 
those countries the DSAs from donor-funded trainings constitute often a very 
high proportion of the effective take-home pay of civil servants.
But as I assumed in Chapter-3, poverty professionals belonging to different 
professional groups, organisations and networks still largely only talk to and 
learn from their peers – missing the positive learning opportunities in the pro-
fessional and disciplinary border-zones. As argued by two rare non-economist 
social scientists among World Bank researchers, Rao and Woolcock: “Development 
is about a lot more than economics. Accordingly, economics should not have (as it currently 
does at the Bank) a near-monopoly on determining the content and validity of development 
research.“702  
Development is a diverse field speaking to virtually every aspect of human 
endeavor.  No single discipline can or should expect to be able to speak in an in-
formed way to this diversity, yet at present all but four of the Bank’s 83 fulltime 
research staff are economists. Like any other discipline, economics is limited in 
its ability to understand questions. While economists have made a lot of progress 
in recent years to understand key issues like institutions, collective action and 
politics, the vast majority of non-economist social scientists (and indeed many 
economists) would argue that areas of social, cultural and political action are 
best studied by the other social sciences who specialize in these topics, namely 
702 Rao and Woolcock (2007). 
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anthropology, sociology, political science and psychology. Development studies 
provides key insights into areas that are of fundamental importance to poverty 
reduction, such as governance, participatory development, understanding well-
being, and culture. Development policy left only to the hands of economists ig-
nores these ideas at its peril.703 
The institutional structure -  disciplinary monopoly - within the World Bank 
makes the Bank’s development thinking  reflect the fads, fashions, controversies 
and debates of one discipline only. Competing perspectives from other disci-
plines are simply not available to refute (or endorse) the economists’ viewpoint 
or to provide other key insights that are simply absent from the tool kit of econo-
mists (or are precluded, by the prevailing assumptions, from even being con-
sidered).
Professional identity also affects the language used by this most powerful 
development institution to describe and analyze poverty and to prescribe pov-
erty reducing policy action to poor country governments: Over the years, gen-
erations of economists who have been recruited by the Bank have created an 
argot within the Bank that is closely aligned with the argot of economics, which 
in turn creates high entry costs for other disciplines. Competing perspectives 
cannot enter without translation, which dilutes their clarity and effectiveness; 
this, in turn, only reinforces the (often disdainful) views of economists regard-
ing the rigor and relevance of other social science disciplines, thereby creating 
a vicious circle. 
I conclude: Institutional factors and professional identify do constrain the effective 
use of poverty reduction ideas. This vicious circle needs to be replaced by a more 
virtuous one, in which disciplines respect one another’s expertise and seek to 
find constructive ways of integrating and learning from one another for the bet-
terment of poverty reduction theory, policy and practice.
7.8.3 Proposition-3
Proposition-3 suggested that not only material interests (on the left-right axis) but also 
professional identities and interests determine how agents behave. The structures and 
actions of multilateral development institutions are determined by shared ideas 
to a larger degree than by shared material interests, and, equally importantly: the 
identities and interests of the actors within this system are constructed by social 
interaction around opposed and contested ideas, or competing interpretations of 
the same ideas. The process through which this happens is called framing, and its 
outcome is called hegemony. An effective frame is one which makes favoured ideas 
seem like common sense, and unfavoured ideas as unthinkable. Such processes 
cannot be explained in disregard of the distribution of power.
In the World Bank and the IMF the process of framing often involves two 
steps: depolitization, and a tendency for economics to become the dominant disci-
pline. For a scholar of new institutional analysis, it is hardly surprising that an 
703 Scott (1998). 
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organization called the World Bank, consisting of over eight thousand econo-
mists and less than 1000 other professionals, conceives poverty primarily as an 
economic problem- and seldom suggests any other than economic recipes to 
solving it. 
It is hard not to think that it would be in the institutional interests of the 
World Bank, a vast technocratic organization, to be able to define world poverty 
as a technical problem to be solved primarily by the intellect of the Bank’s bril-
liant economists (preferably at their computers in the Bank’s HQ in Washington 
D.C. through sophisticated quantitative analysis of rich and accurate data sets), 
rather than as a political problem to be solved only at country levels through local 
political struggles (which are too messy to be forced into the regression models 
of WB-econometricians). The wide use of GDP-based and other money-metric 
definitions of poverty maximizes the role, budgets, power and status of the World 
Bank in global governance processes where the leaders of the rich countries pre-
fer to think that they can ‘buy’ themselves out from their moral and political 
responsibilities. 
This was again shown during the G20 financial crisis summit in London in 
April-2009 where the world’s largest governments – irresolute as they were about 
how to show their concern not only for their own banks but for the poor majority 
of mankind – decided to allocate a new ‘global rescue package’ of $ 50 billion for 
the poorest countries - not as direct budget stimulus to poor country governments 
or through the UN-agencies but - through the IMF and the World Bank.704 
In other words, the Bretton Woods institutions IMF and World Bank emerged 
as the greatest winners of the London Summit Deal, which will treble the total 
resources of the IMF (to the level of 750 billion USD) and bring at least 100 bil-
lion USD in additional lending to the multi-lateral development banks, primarily 
through the World Bank’s new ‘Vulnerability Framework’.705 
This was a major piece of good news for the economists in Washington. During 
the past five or so years many middle-income countries (MICs) had started to turn 
away from the Bretton Woods institutions¸ claiming that their advice and policy 
conditions were pro-cyclical and biased, ignoring the risks of financial liberaliza-
tion.   This had already reflected in the balance sheets of the IMF and World Bank. 
IMF’s income from charges and interest payments had shrunk from 3.2 billion 
USD in 2005 to about one-fifth of that in 2009. Since the Bank and the Fund gain 
their main profits from the interests paid by MICs, the fact that countries such 
as China, India, Indonesia and most Latin American countries had decided to 
repay their outstanding debts prematurely had started to cause trouble among 
the Bretton Woods institutions.
704 50 billion USD is, indeed, a major boost to global official development assistance which totals some 
120-130 billion USD annually. Contrast that, however, with the estimated 8400 billion spent by G20 
during 2008-2010 for bailing out banks, or the extra 1100 billion USD promised by the G20 in the 
London Summit for global recovery. 
705 See: www.londonsummit.gov.uk/en/summit-aims/communique-explanation/ and www.eurodad.
org/aid/article.aspx?id=132&item=3587 
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Prior to the London Summit developing country governments and global 
civil society organisations had made numerous pleas and recommendations 
to the G-20 stressing the imperative of reforming the international ‘financial 
architecture’, including Bretton Woods institutions. Yet, the final outcome was 
that instead of reforming and democratizing global financial governance and 
rescuing the developing countries from joblessness, poverty, malnutrition, in-
fant mortality, conflict and political instability, the G20 was in fact bailing out the 
IMF and the World Bank. The G20 was “breathing artificial life support for a dying 
neo-liberal economic model”, warned ActionAid, one of the largest pro-poor civil 
society organisations.706 
So, coming back to my original propositions in Chapter-3, I now have to admit 
that political interests, too, (i.e. not only professional identities and interests) play a major 
role in the way international development funding – supposedly meant for global pov-
erty reduction – is allocated by the governments of the industrialized countries. 
Leading western governments control the Bretton Woods institutions (where the 
largest shareholders -  i.e. richest governments -  have a majority of votes). The 
rich country governments feel that the World Bank and IMF serve their interests 
best in global governance. In the United Nations a one-vote per government vot-
ing rule is applied, and therefore the developing countries would prefer the UN 
as the major forum of global decision -making. 
But I do insist that there is also a seed of truth in my original hypotheses ac-
cording to which also the professional identities and interests play an important role 
in all of this: The ultimate decision-makers about the allocation of financial rescue 
packages and development funding are the ministries of finance. In situations of 
‘Knightian uncertainty’ – such as how to go about a major global financial crisis – 
even if no-one really has any evidence that the Bretton Woods institutions would 
know better than e.g. the UN-agencies how to support the developing countries 
and their poor people in a vulnerable global financial situation, the ‘least risky’ 
option for the economists in Western ministries of finance is to hand over the 
responsibility to the economist-dominated World Bank and IMF.
And in the case of the World Bank/IMF directors – economists – this proposi-
tion clearly holds: Their professional and institutional interests determine their behav-
iour. Their existential imperative to ‘stay-in-business’ makes them portray them-
selves to G20-leaders as the best hope that mankind has to reduce global poverty 
and stimulate the global economy.707 Even in a situation where their most highly 
respected professional colleagues – Nobel laureates such as Stiglitz, Akerlof and 
Krugman, and senior economists such as the evaluation panel chaired by Agnus 
Deaton – have just recently declared that not only World Bank poverty econom-
ics but the entire economics profession are in deep crisis, the unwavering profes-
sional identity of World Bank economists gives them the amazing (desperate?) 
urge to claim they know it all, at least better than all other poverty professionals 
combined.
706 See: www.actionaid.org/main.aspx?PageID=1325 
707 See e.g. go.worldbank.org/76E1GRKBN0.
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Also the monopolistic behaviour of Finnish career diplomats in the Finnish 
development administration is easy to explain in the interest-framework.  It 
has been frequently proposed by various reviewers and evaluators708 that the 
quality and effectiveness of Finnish aid management could be considerably im-
proved by freezing the rapid circulation of career diplomats (who are not devel-
opment policy experts) in the aid policy posts and by establishing institutional 
arrangements that put more responsibility into the hands of more permanent 
development professionals in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs (MFA). For the 
top-management of the MFA (consisting exclusively of senior career diplomats) 
the quality of the aid administration in terms of its effectiveness in poverty 
reduction is, however, only a secondary concern compared to their priority con-
cern (from their ‘guild’ or ‘trade union’ interest perspective) which is to conserve 
the privileged right of the career diplomats to control the decision-making about 
the allocation of Finland’s ODA (which is - by-far – the largest budget-line of the 
Ministry.)709 
7.8.4 Proposition-4
Proposition-4 suggested that interests are socially constructed – strong organizations 
can change what individuals, or even what states want, i.e. the ideas about state interests. 
This seems to be true: both MFA-Finland as well as the World Bank successfully 
manipulate ideas about state interests. 
As defined by the Finnish Parliament, global poverty reduction is, indeed, in 
the interests of the Finnish state. But whether leaving Finnish government’s – or 
tax -payers’ - foreign aid money exclusively in the hands of the career diplomats710 
is the most effective way to reach that goal can be questioned. If global poverty 
reduction were really the defining objective, many other equally – or more – ef-
fective arrangements could certainly be used. But development cooperation is a 
difficult field, taking place very far away, out of the sight of most Finnish politi
cians and tax-payers. Therefore, it’s difficult for the Finnish Parliament to 
708 E.g. OECD-DAC 1999c, 2003b, Voipio 1998a, 1999b&f, Saasa & al. 2003, Holkeri 2003.
709 The Official Development Assistance (ODA) budgets are by far the largest budgets the MFAF has 
control over. The relative status (and budgets) of the old core of diplomacy, i.e. security and foreign 
trade, has suffered a substantial relative decline in Finland, as a result of (a) the end of the Cold War, 
(b) the end of state-coordinated barter-trade arrangements with the Soviet Union and (c) Finland’s 
membership in the EU, and the consequent shift of the main functions of trade policy negotiations from 
the Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs to the EU-Commission. Therefore, the relative importance of 
the large (and growing) ODA-budgets for the MFAF has grown in recent years, and the Ministry has 
been innovative in finding ways to extend the definition of “development work” so as to be able to 
use ODA-funds as operational budgets for an ever growing proportion of the Ministry’s departments, 
units and staff. The MFAF obviously also resists (openly or tacitly) any initiatives that contain the 
idea that the management of Finland’s poverty reduction efforts in the poor countries of the Global 
South could be decentralized away from the MFAF to the various sector ministries (of education, 
environment, labour, and social affairs and health) who already now carry the main responsibility for 
the poverty reduction efforts in Finland.
710 Of course, officially, all the foreign aid spending decisions in the MFAF are done by a minister 
responsible for development cooperation (in Finland’s case at the moment, strangely, Minister for 
Foreign Trade and Development Cooperation). But in reality, the capacity of the minister to direct 
Finnish aid spending against the will of the senior management (consisting exclusively of career 
diplomats), is limited.
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conceive other options in a situation where nearly everything they hear about 
development cooperation comes to them through the channels of the MFAF, fil-
tered in a way that portrays the current arrangement as the ideal – or the only 
one conceivable. This, of course, serves well the utilitarian interest of the bureau-
cratic aggrandizement of the role, budgets and organization of the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs.
Equally, the World Bank poverty economists have succeeded in manipulating 
the World Bank shareholders - including the governments of Finland and other 
rich and poor countries – to believe that it is in the interest of these governments - 
and the people of the world – that poverty be defined in the narrow money-metric 
way – as 1 USD/day, based on official national GDP-statistics. If the more multi-
dimensional poverty definitions would be used and taken seriously – including 
the human, socio-cultural, political, protective, gender and environmental – it 
would emerge much more clearly to everybody that the challenge of global pov-
erty reduction couldn’t possibly be left so exclusively into the hands of the World 
Bank, an organisation with such an extremely biased economistic staff, compe-
tence and ideology. 
The ‘constructivist’ argument that Finnemore711  introduced – and which I 
have applied in this study – is that large technocratic organizations (such as e.g. 
the World  Bank and the MFAF) have the skill and – above all the capacity - to 
‘socialize’ political decision makers and the large public to accept worldviews 
and perceptions of interest that serve the institutional interests of these tech-
nocracies.  
The broad family of UN development agencies would provide much more 
expertise on many of the other important dimensions of poverty, and could be 
much more effective channels of poverty reducing development cooperation – but 
their smaller public information budgets do not give them the same capacity as 
the World Bank has to influence the way governments think about poverty, and 
how they perceive their own interests.   Also, many developing country govern-
ments – and numerous aid evaluations and development research reports712 - have 
argued that instead of channeling development aid through the World Bank, a 
more effective way would be to provide direct budget support to allow the gov-
ernments to spend the funds for poverty reduction and development through the 
national budgets and administrative channels. But they, too, lack the means to 
change the way the key decision-makers in rich country governments conceive 
the root causes and key solutions to global poverty.
This finding has important implications for the way we think about interna-
tional politics: We have usually taken states (governments) as the starting point 
for the analysis of international politics, and examined the ways in which the 
states create international organizations, treaties, legal structures, etc., in order to 
further the state interests. Finnemore’s finding – confirmed by this study - makes 
711 Finnemore (1996), p. 5.
712 See e.g. Cox et al. (1999, 2000), OECD-DAC (2001), DFID (2002). See also the entries for Budget 
Support, Paris Declaration and Accra Agenda for Action in Websources. 
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us focus our attention on the way that the strongest international organizations 
may change what the states of the world want - thus actually reconstituting states. 
In the same way, institutional analysis may turn the arrows around in the analy-
sis of national politics: Instead of analyzing only how the MPs, parties, trade 
unions, employers’ associations and NGOs have influenced the ideas (e.g. policy 
documents and strategies) that guide the work of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland (MFAF), we may have to track the processes through which the MFAF 
has socialized the MPs, parties and various organizations to conceive their inter-
ests (and policy positions) in a way that suits the MFAF best.
Yet, I do not personally think that the direct self-interest framework – used by 
populist writers such as Hancock713 - is the correct way to explain why the bright 
development economists of the World Bank (or any of my other highly competent 
development economist colleagues, for that matter) do not themselves regard the 
nearly monopolistic position of neo-classical economists on the market of poverty 
reduction ideas as problematic. My reading of Marshall, Myrdal and Easterly714 
gives me reason to think – and that was one of the hypotheses I wanted to test 
in this study – that we need to look more closely into the professional identities 
of poverty economists to understand why they really seem to believe that the 
ideas of other development professionals are so irrelevant and that their own 
ideas about poverty reduction so exhaustively superior compared to all other pro-
fessional groups, that they see simply nothing wrong in their single-profession 
dominated institutional strategies of poverty reduction.
From where do professional identities emerge? They are also socially constructed 
and education is probably the most important channel of creating and reproduc-
ing professional identities. From this point of view the way economics is taught 
in universities has raised major concerns recently. The fact that in most cases the 
713 Graham Hancock (1989, Introduction) grossly exaggerated the public choice argument when he 
mercilessly attacked the selfishness of the ‘Lords of Poverty’, i.e. the non-poor poverty economists and 
other poverty professionals: “Garnered and justified in the name of the destitute and the vulnerable, aid’s 
main function in the past half-century has been to create and then entrench a powerful new class of rich and 
privileged people. In that notorious club of parasites and hangers-on made up of the United Nations, the World 
Bank, and the bilateral agencies, it is aid - and nothing else - that has provided hundreds of thousands of ‘jobs-
for-the-boys’ and that has permitted record-breaking standards to be set in self-servicing behaviour, arrogance, 
paternalism, moral cowardice, and mendacity.” 
714 Myrdal (1970, p. 440) repeated Albert Marshall’s criticism (1885) about the reluctance of conventional 
economists to give their backing to distributional reforms and about the fact that they “appeared cold” 
to the needs of the poor. World Bank’s leading growth economist Bill Easterly (2001, p.3) rejected 
Myrdal’s and Marshall’s accusations, claiming that the economists’ problem is not lack of motivation 
to help the poor: “As I pursue my career as a self-anointed expert on poor countries, the differences in the 
lives of the poor and the rich supply motivation. We experts don’t care about rising gross domestic product for 
its own sake. We care because it betters the lot of the poor and reduces the proportion of people who are poor. We 
care because richer people can eat more and buy more medicines for their babies.” Easterly, however, made a 
personal decision, and published two highly critical books The Elusive Quest for Growth (2001a) and 
The White Man’s Burden. Why the West’s Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good 
(2006) is which he analyzes the reasons why foreign aid to many third world countries has failed to 
produce sustainable growth. Easterly distinguishes two types of poverty reduction professionals: 
Planners, who believe in imposing top-down big plans on poor countries, and Searchers, who look for 
bottom-up solutions to specific needs. Planners are portrayed as utopian while Searchers are more 
realistic as they focus on piecemeal interventions. In 2009, in an article assessing the 30 years of World 
Bank World Development Reports, Easterly (2009) concluded that “...the economics profession does not 
have this knowledge.”
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teaching offered is limited to the neoclassical thesis is questionable also on ethi-
cal grounds.  Students are led to hold the false belief that not only is neoclassical 
theory the only scientific stream, but also that scientificity is simply a matter of 
axiomatics and/or formalized modeling.  To quote Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel laureate 
in economics: “[Economics as taught] in America’s graduate schools... bears testimony 
to a triumph of ideology over science.”715  
Against this background, an interesting and important process for the revival 
of economics was launched in June 2000 by a group of French economics students, 
under the banner ‘Post-Autistic Economics Movement’.716 They published a peti-
tion on the web protesting against: 
•	  Economics’ ‘uncontrolled use’ of mathematics as ‘an end in itself’, and the 
resulting ‘autistic science’, 
•	  The repressive domination of the neoclassical theory and derivative ap-
proaches in the curriculum, and
•	  The dogmatic teaching style, which leaves no place for critical and reflec-
tive thought.
The petition of the French economics students soon received support both from 
French teachers of economics as well as from economics students in the US and 
many other countries. Despite a ‘counter-attack’ of the mainstream led by eco-
nomics teachers and students of the MIT in the USA, the Post-Autistic Economics 
Movement spread rapidly from France to Britain, the USA (including the Harvard 
University) and to over 100 countries of the world. 
Similar criticisms against – and positive alternatives to – neoclassical economic 
theory have been and are being developed by a great number and variety of other 
alternative schools of thought, including, for instance the ‘Evolutionary Political 
Economy Movement’, Network-IDEAs (International Development Economics 
Associates), the Other Canon, Feminist Economics’ networks, Macroscan, 
Cambridge Realist Workshop as well as the ‘Rethinking Development Economics’ 
programme of the United Nations Research Institute for Social Development 
(UNRISD) – and many others.717
So, should we be optimistic or pessimistic about the future of the econom-
ics profession?  There is, indeed, a lot of good rethinking going on. But at the 
same time, economics teaching in the universities has changed much less than 
the post-autistic economics movement had hoped. Hundreds of economics de-
partments in universities all over the world put out tens of thousands of new 
neoclassical economists every year. Most of them have learned very little about 
the history of economic thought, institutional economics or about the various 
715 See Post-Autistic Economics in Websources.
716 Fullbrook (ed. 2003, ed. 2004)  See also:  Post-Autistics Economics in Websources.
717 See: eaepe.tuwien.ac.at/ ; www.networkideas.org/ ; www.othercanon.org/ ; www.iaffe.org/; 
www.feministeconomics.org ; www.macroscan.com/ ; www.macroscan.com/ ; www.unrisd.
org/80256B3C005BB128/(httpProjectsForResearchHome-en)/50917829FB15FFA180256B74005FDB39?O
penDocument&category=About+the+Project . See also: Moghadam (2005), Folbre (2001, 2004), Razavi 
and Hassim (2006) – and : Alternative schools of economic thought in Websources. 
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other alternatives that exist today to the dominant mainstream of neoclassical 
economics.718
7.8.5 Proposition-5
Proposition-5 in Chapter-3 argued that individuals, organizations and governments 
are motivated by a complex mix of sometimes conflicting preferences. The point was that 
unlike rational choice institutionalists who assume – in the same way as utili-
tarian neo-classical economists - that political and economic actors are rational 
and always act to maximize self-interest, historical institutionalists take the ques-
tion of how individuals and groups define their self-interest as problematical, 
arguing that not just the strategies but also the goals actors pursue are shaped 
by the institutional context.719 Each individual, organization and government 
maneuvers in a dense matrix of institutions, motivated by a complex mix of 
sometimes conflicting preferences. This makes multiple logics available to in-
dividuals, organizations and states. This applies as well to the choices made by 
poor people as well as to organisations of poverty professionals such as MFAF 
or the World Bank.
Where groups have multiple, often conflicting interests, it is necessary to ex-
amine the political struggles and processes out of which particular coalitions are 
formed. This is unfortunately an area where the poverty analyses of the World 
Bank are at their weakest. The analytic reports of the World Bank hardly ever 
have anything to say about ‘coalitions’, ‘parties’, ‘trade unions’ and ‘employers’ 
associations - social institutions that have been indispendable in all empirical 
cases of successful poverty reduction processes all over the world, at all times. 
Non-economist social scientists are good at analyzing these, while economists 
are neither interested nor competent in analyzing such issues. In the professional 
culture of neo-classical economics it is perfectly in order to extrapolate the inter-
718 As pointed by Hodgson (2009, at: rwer.wordpress.com/2009/10/22/the-economics-profession-of-the-
future ) there is ground for concern: Following the announcement that institutional economists Elinor 
Ostrom and Oliver Williamson had been awarded the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economics, the following 
comments were posted on the ‘Economics Job Market Rumors’ blog, (www.econjobrumors.com/topic.
php?id=5151) which is read by economics PhD students, post-docs and young faculty. Needless to say, 
the contributors were anonymous: 
1) Nobel BULLSHIT!!!! Who the fuck are these idiots? Never heard of them ... ever. 
2) Well, they had to give it to a woman at some point. Why not just throw a dart at a board. I never saw 
their work on any reading list during PhD. 
3) This girl seems to be a political scientist. I dont think she has published original research in any 
major economics journal. 
4) Multidisciplinary?? Other disciplines are all rubblish. Why let them conteminate our purity? 
5) Economics is superior. Don’t let political science conteminate us! 
6) You’ve never heard of Oliver Williamson? Then you need to march into your chair’s office and 
demand they take back your PhD as you’re an ignorant loser.
7) These postings really do show the narrow training of many economists. In fact, economics departments 
in most universities are highly isolated places in the larger world of social science. To trash a scholar 
as serious and insightful as Ostrom is a shame.
8) What if the commons is actually an important field of study and the fact that most of us never read 
anything about it during graduate school is something that economic theory lecturers should take 
into account when formulating their syllabi?
9) Maybe, but she still got it only because she’s a woman.
719 See e.g. Steinmo (1993). 
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ests and preferences of such coalitions and groups from the assumed interests of 
rational individuals. 
This is why I argue that social policy professionals and other professionals of 
care should not accept their current marginalized position in the global poverty 
policy-making process? The core of their professional identity and mission is to 
reduce social injustices, poverty and inequality. And they have the right kinds 
of knowledge and skills to contribute to solving those problems, also globally. 
But what locks the social policy professionals out? I would argue that they, too, are 
motivated by a very complex mix of conflicting preferences: 
At least the Finnish experts of social policy – the global crème-de-la-crème in 
poverty research on many accounts – have been relatively hesitant to engage in 
global social policy research, for various reasons. They complain about lack of time 
and resources. Yet, a comparison of the numbers of full time researchers and 
other resources available to the UN social research institutes720  on the one hand, 
and the Finnish university departments of social policy, KELA,721 ETK,722 THL,723 
TTL724, and the research units of a large number of Finnish labour market institu-
tions and social policy CSOs combined shows clearly how vast  resources – both 
human and financial – the Finnish social policy researchers have. The Finnish 
social policy professionals are, understandably, very busy with their research 
projects, in a situation where the EU integration, demographic ageing, neo-liberal 
tendencies, increasing immigration, climate change and the global financial crisis 
create mounting financial pressures on the structures of the Finnish welfare state.
Yet, as I have argued elsewhere,725 a deeper engagement in global social policy 
research could be seen by Finnish social policy researchers not only as an extra 
burden on top of all of the existing tasks, but rather as a new eye-opening, in-
spiring and useful perspective that would help the Finnish social policy profes-
sionals better understand the ideas, forces and trends that also very strongly 
impact on the contemporary Finnish society. Now that our economy is completely 
globalized, and our most serious security threats (e.g. climate change) are global, 
we should observe also the Finnish social policy challenges and opportunities 
in a global context: Social policy research that analyzes only the fine-tuning of 
social policies on the national, Nordic or EU contexts will fail to serve its purpose, 
unless it sees and recognizes also the real global ‘tsunamis’ that send their tidal 
waves deep into the Finnish mainland. A closer engagement in global poverty 
research would give to the professional community of Finnish social policy re-
searchers a privileged ring-side position to monitor the trends and factors that 
impact developments also in Finland.
720 E.g. United Nations Research Institute for Social Development UNRISD, International Institute for 
Labour Studies IILS (of the ILO), International Poverty Centre for Inclusive Growth IPC-IG (of the 
UNDP) and Innocenti Research Institute (of the Unicef).
721 KELA, Kansaneläkelaitos is the Finnish Social Insurance Institution.
722 ETK, Eläketurvakeskus is the Finnish Centre for Pensions.
723 THL, Terveyden ja hyvinvoinnin laitos is the National Institute for Health and Welfare of Finland.
724 TTL, Työterveyslaitos is the Institute of Occupational Safety and Health of Finland.
725 Voipio (2009, 2010a).
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I conclude: The proposition-5 that individuals, organizations and governments are 
motivated by a complex mix of sometimes conflicting preferences holds.
7.8.6 Proposition-6
Proposition-6 suggested that in situations of ‘Knightian uncertainty’ ideas and identi-
ties, rather than interests determine how agents act. The challenges of global poverty 
and sustainable development put us all in a situation of  ‘Knightian uncertainty’: 
No-one really knows how to eradicate global poverty and how to make sure that 
we can leave to our children a world at least equally good as the world we in-
herited from our parents. We know that the situation is not good: every day over 
20.000 people die from poverty, and as moral beings, we have to react somehow, 
although we do not even know what our true interests are, let alone how best to 
act to realize them. Knightian uncertainty is qualitatively different from gambling 
and other risk situations where the probabilities can be assigned to possible out-
comes. In cases of Knightian uncertainty they cannot, because these situations 
are always unique: the world has never before been as it is now.726
Organisational institutionalists, e.g. Herbert Simon727 have shown the serious 
limitations of the rationality assumption of mainstream neoclassical economics. 
When we do not have enough time and information to calculate our preferences 
based on a full weighing of all alternatives and their consequences, we resort to 
a range of shortcuts of bounded rationality to overcome our cognitive limits, Among 
such coping devices we use are standard operating procedures, routine, imitation, 
prejudices, professional conventions and identities, etc. These allow us to make 
decisions, whether as individuals or as organisations. 
Ideas are at the centre of all this: My key thesis is that our interests can be de-
fined only in terms of the ideas that we have about the causes of the uncertainty 
that we live in, and the ideas we have about future outcomes we have reason to 
value.728 Without ideas as to how the world is put together, why poverty exists 
and how various policies could either reduce or increase poverty, it would be 
cognitively impossible for us to act in the world in any meaningful sense.
In sum, the ideas held by agents are often more important in understanding 
how they behave, than their structurally derived interests. Indeed, the explanatory 
importance of ideas cannot be fully appreciated as long as the analyst maintains 
a separation of ideas and interests. Instead, we should see interests as being nec-
essarily ideationally bound, and sometimes bound to identities. When reconcep-
tualized in this way, ideas are indeed intimately related to interests but are not 
reducible to them. 
Figure 21 illustrates this. According to the more conventional structural-ra-
tional thinking interests are at the root of all action: like homo economicus, actors 
are expected to choose their actions by rationally calculating which action best 
726 Knight (1921), p. 229, quoted in Blyth (2002), p. 31.
727 Simon (1957).
728 Instead of  ’good outcomes’ I am deliberately using this expression ’outcomes we have reason to 
value’. This is influence from Sen (1999) in my thinking. 
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maximizes their interests. Although this is the standard approach in economists’ 
equations, things seldom happen this way in reality. In this way of thinking 
institutions are conceived mainly as ‘constraints’ on the way, between interests 
and actions.
In the emerging new ideational-institutional thinking advocated in this study, 
there are more factors in the chain of influence, and their order is reversed: Ideas 
are at the centre. They strongly influence how the actor perceives his or her in-
terests, and also how the actor conceives the actionable options. Thus, interests 
and ideas jointly determine the actions. The ideas, on the other hand, are strongly 
influenced by the actor’s identity, and also by institutions. Institutions also con-
tribute to how the interests are perceived. A scholar seeking to explain observ-
able action has to move backwards in the chain of influences: Action cannot be 
satisfactorily explained by interests, alone. The researcher has to dig deeper, and 
try to understand the interactions -  and combined impact – of ideas, identities 
and institutions.
 
Figure 21. Interacton of Institutions, Identities, Ideas, Interests and Actions
This essay deals with the ideas of poverty economists and other poverty profes-
sionals. Behind the global consensus on poverty reduction, we have found serious 
disagreements and bitter controversies. Ideational-institutional analysis can help 
to explain those disagreements by highlighting the differences in the ideas and 
identities of the various kinds of poverty professionals, who all understand that 
poverty reduction is crucially important for the sustainable futures of the world. 
No-one, however, has certainty about correct answers to how poverty should 
be reduced. In situations of ‘Knightian uncertainty’ where no probabilities can be 
assigned to the possible outcomes, actors use ideas and identities, rather than their 
calculable interests as coping devices to determine how to act. 
7.8.7 Proposition-7
Proposition-7 in Chapter-3 suggested that aid implementation should not be left to 
economists and diplomats alone. World Bank poverty economists tend to instinc-
tively use coping devices from the standard toolboxs and textbooks of economics 
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and therefore to overemphasize the income dimension of poverty, even if they 
officially – politically correctly - agree with the more balanced multi-dimensional 
conception of poverty. 
Most career diplomats, for their part, take a more instrumental - Pro Patria ! - 
stand to development cooperation: whether or not it really succeeds in reducing 
poverty in the Global South, is secondary, as long as it can be used to generate 
positive visibility, political goodwill and commercial advantages for Finland. One 
of the safest ways to attract the MFAF career diplomats’ positive attention to a 
poverty oriented project proposal would be to argue that the project might help 
Finland buy votes from developing countries in the next UN election for seats in 
the UN Security Council.
As I said in the beginning, I enjoy working with economists and career dip-
lomats. I have worked among career diplomats for almost my entire career. I 
use the concepts from economics all the time in my academic and non-academic 
work. However, I seriously question the assumption that a few months’ diplo-
matic training course in the Finnish MFA, or a university degree in economics – 
the way economics is taught in universities today729 – would give someone better 
skills in analysing poverty, its causes and its proposed solutions than almost any 
other social science degree. Poverty reduction is a multi-dimensional challenge, 
including major issues related not only to (a) opportunities, growth, distribution, 
and equality, but also related to (b) rights, power, empowerment, democracy, par-
ticipation and governance, and to (c) vulnerability, security, respect, self-respect, 
gender and sustainability…
Unfortunately, very few non-economists seem to be aware of the enormous 
difficulties that development economists are currently facing when trying to ad-
dress and operationalize any of the issues in groups (b) and (c). The ideas and 
tools they borrow from the ‘Mother Science’, i.e. general neo-classical economics 
are highly inadequate for analyzing, predicting or advising poor country govern-
ments’ policy action on most of the dimensions of the multi-dimensional poverty 
challenge. 
As argued by President of the World Bank Mr. Robert Zoellick in his speech 
on 29 Sep. 2010,  a new multi-polar global economy requires multi-disciplinary 
and multi-polar knowledge. We need to democratize and demystify development 
economics, recognizing that the World Bank economists do not have a monopoly 
on the answers. The World Bank President – lawyer himself by education - urged 
the Bank economists to work more with experts in economic history, government, 
political economy, anthropology, psychology, and sometimes the physical and 
biological sciences.730
Most economists are particularly weak on all those issues which are difficult 
to measure. They say: “What you cannot measure, you cannot manage”, and 
use this as an excuse for focusing their attention only on the easily measurable 
729 See e.g. Fullbrook (2003, ed.2004, ed.2007), Keen (2001), Chang (2003), Vartiainen (2004), Vihanto 
(2001).  See also: Post-Autistic Economics in Websources.
730 Zoellick (2010).
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elements of poverty, development, and life. Unfortunately, very few economists 
seem to be aware of some basic issues which for instance professionals of care are 
probably very familiar with, such as this: 
The fact that you cannot quantitatively measure hope or commitment does 
not make hope or commitment irrelevant for political struggles of poverty reduc-
tion. – But how do you measure them? What is the correct unit of measurement?
Neither do I believe that many economists would say that love does not ex-
ist, or that it is irrelevant. Yet, how to measure the intensity of our love to our 
spouses, children, parents? How many kilograms, miles, or decibels more do 
you love your own child than an African or Asian child whom you do not know, 
for instance?731
In the political struggle that poverty and poverty reduction is all about, there 
are many more hard-to-measure factors, which the economists normally tend 
to assume away and ignore - note the words ‘Ceteris Paribus’, (‘other things be-
ing equal’) in their statements: pride, shame, dignity, humiliation, anxiety, solidarity, 
nationalism, fear, confusion – just to mention few. There are many more critically 
important factors that influence individuals’, groups’, nations’, and various global 
common interest alliances’ attitudes, choices and behaviour – factors that econo-
mists and development economists are either ignorant of, or familiar with, but 
unwilling to touch because they have no concepts, tools or measures to deal with 
them. In fact, the academic economists’ approach to complex questions – assume 
the complexity away - seems highly dubious a guide for the complexities of real 
life.732 
In sum, it is definitely good for global poverty reduction to have economists 
and diplomats as members in multi-disciplinary teams working on poverty. But 
it would be a mistake to expect economists or diplomats alone to be able to solve 
the global poverty problem. We all depend daily on some of the extremely useful 
heuristic concepts developed by economists. And the world needs the negotiation 
skills of professional diplomats.  But poverty reduction is too important a goal 
to be left to economists or diplomats – or to the World Bank, or to Ministries of 
Foreign Affairs - alone. Poverty is a multi-dimensional problem and it requires 
multi-dimensional and multi-disciplinary solutions. Instead of an ‘imperialistic’ 
mission-creep by economics733 to areas whose importance the economists have 
only gradually recognized (e.g. empowerment, institutions, social cohesion, 
culture), a balanced and mutually respectful cross-disciplinary cooperation is 
needed: professionals of care and other non-economists will also be needed – to 
play an active part in this cooperation.
731 The absurd fact is that the European Union pays each year more than two times more euros for the 
basic needs of each European cow than for the basic needs of each African or Asian child.
732 Booth et al. (1999) provide a convincing argument about the ways how e.g. anthropological work 
can help to enrich economists’ statistical poverty profiling, and still more importantly, in  “documenting 
the variable, fluid, complex and contested categorizations and relationships that constitute the reality that 
poverty-reducing efforts must contend with on the ground.”
733 Fine (2001, 2002b) writes about the economists’ ‘imperialistic’ mission creep. 
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7.8.8 Proposition-8
Proposition-8 identified a ‘rare moment’ at the Millennium turn that cracked the illu-
sion of consent among the development economists and made the controversies known to 
non-economists.  ‘Critical junctures’ – or ‘rare moments’ - are a crucial element of 
social science accounts that center on historical causation.734 As argued by Soifer 
the critical feature of a critical historical juncture is the loosening of the constraints 
of structure to allow for agency or contingency to shape divergence from the past, 
or divergence across cases.735
In 1995 the World Bank had been an institution under siege. NGOs had heav-
ily criticized its environmental and structural adjustment policies, poor country 
clients had expressed dissatisfaction with the Bank’s business approach, and the 
major shareholders had showed frustration at the Bank’s perceived inefficiency. 
Its 50-year celebrations in 1994 were followed by a ‘rare moment’ at the Millennium 
turn, during Wolfensohn’s Presidency, when a clear divergence of Bank thinking 
from the frames of the ‘old orthodoxy’ could be observed.  But did the constraints 
of the same old frame tighten up again when the tide turned, or were there other 
explaining factors?
The most important factor was probably the realization within the World Bank 
leadership of the widescale global disillusionment with the ‘mono-dimensional 
economistic’ structural adjustment programmes driven by the Bank in the 1980s 
and 1990s.  As the ‘Reputation Study’ conducted by A.R.C for the Bank in 1994 had 
shown the global public reputation of the Bank had been remarkably low in 1994. 
But a similar  Reputation Study in 1998 had shown that a striking improvement 
had already taken place, and the majority of the 1998 respondents reported that 
they had perceived a movement in the Bank away from the traditional mono-
dimensional approaches towards a much broader understanding of development, 
including an appreciation of the social, cultural and political dimensions and 
complex, multi-sector approaches.
So, in short: the World Bank really seemed to be changing, and although the 
contents of the official discourse and President’s speeches had probably changed 
more than the policy conditions the Bank was imposing on developing countries, 
it seems fair to me to conclude that some of the individuals much discussed in 
this essay, e.g. Wolfensohn, Stiglitz and Kanbur played a strong agency role in 
changing the way the Bank worked – and how it thought about poverty and de-
velopment. The loosening of the constraints of structure took place in Wolfensohn’s 
mind. He was an investment banker, not an academic economist. For him any-
thing that was pragmatic, and worked, was OK – even if it would mean loosening 
the constraints of the traditionally highly disciplined intellectual structure of the 
official doctrine in the Bank.
The second major factor was a combination of clear agency (a management 
decision to loosen the structures, i.e. policies regarding the disclosure of official 
World Bank documents) and a contingency that just happened to coincide with 
734 See e.g. Collier and Collier (1991). 
735 Soifer (2009).
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Wolfensohn’s Presidency:  the information and communication technology revo-
lution that democratized the use of the internet and cellphones globally. Through 
the internet – and thanks to the liberalized disclosure policies - government of-
ficers, researchers, journalists and activists even in far-away countries could all 
of a sudden access most World Bank documents almost as easily as any of the 
Bank staff. This was a huge change since secrecy and disclosure had been de-
fining characteristics of the World Bank for decades. A small NGO in London 
called “The Bretton Woods Project”736 became a self-anointed and un-official (but 
extremely efficient) clearinghouse of Bank related facts and rumours – between 
Bank insiders and outsiders. 
Emails and especially cell phones made it possible for civil society organiza-
tions from all parts of the world to find each other and to mobilize a series of in-
credibly and historically successful street demonstrations almost every time when 
the World Bank/IMF or the WTO organized a high level meeting anywhere. The 
demonstrators and CSO-networks in the cyberspace managed to draw the atten-
tion of the world’s media, governments and the wide public to the serious disagree-
ments within the World Bank as well as between the World Bank and nearly all of 
its potential partners in global development: the IMF, the UN-agencies, the CSOs, 
the developing country governments and finally also the OECD-governments that 
had traditionally been the World Bank’s most reliable partners. 
Optimism was again rising all around the world, when the WDR-team led 
by Ravi Kanbur exposed its first draft report for broad global consultation. The 
draft was most promising, and still a chance was given to suggest improvements 
to it. This was, indeed, a classic case of loosening the constraints of structure to 
allow for agency... to shape divergence from the past... But optimism was prema-
ture, as we have learned: Lawrence Summers wanted to turn back the clock of 
progress – to the times when the US-Treasury dictated the official doctrine of the 
World Bank. His efforts to tighten the constraints of the political power structure, 
however, succeeded only partly: Ravi Kanbur refused to cooperate, resigned and 
went public – on the net – about the political manipulation. To repair the damage 
done David Dollar & co. were asked to produce evidence that could justify the in-
clusion into the WDR-of the neo-liberal core messages that Summers insisted on. 
But UN-researchers (and later World Bank’s own evaluators) criticized – again 
publicly, on the internet - Dollar about an unethical manipulation of data aimed 
at generating support for the neoliberal ideological stance driven by Summers.
So, we can safely conclude that the Proposition-8 holds: a ‘rare moment’ at the 
turn of the Millennium cracked the illusion of consent among the development economists 
and made the controversies known to non-economists.
But the story didn’t end there. Long before Jim Wolfensohn’s Presidency at the 
World Bank ended, the Presidency had changed also in the USA. President Bush 
Jr. nominated Paul Wolfowich, a neoconservative architect of the Iraq war to head 
the World Bank, a move that made the World Bank’s credibility plummet lower 
than ever in the eyes of its longtime critics. Worse was still to come: President 
736 See: Bretton Woods Project in Websources. 
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Wolfowich got mixed up in a corruption scandal and was forced to resign from 
the World Bank. 
Mr. Wolfowich was replaced at the World Bank helm by Robert Zoelleck on 1 
July, 2007. Many observers feared that things in the World Bank would get even 
worse. Mr. Zoellick was widely known as former main US Trade Representative 
in the WTO (2001-2005), and as Deputy Secretary of State in the US-Government 
of  President George W. Bush. In both these jobs Mr. Zoellick was perceived by 
many as a fierce defender of the narrow unilateral self-interest of the USA against 
balanced multilateral solutions in global governance.
As World Bank president Mr. Zoellick took a cautious start and kept a low 
profile until September 2010, when he surprised the world with his interesting 
speech titled ‘Democratizing Development Economics’, building largely on the 
arguments of the research paper by the World Bank Chief Economist  Justin Lin.737 
7.8.9 Proposition-9
Proposition-9 in Chapter-3 suggested that professionals of development and care should 
be aware of the crisis within the economics profession – and not take for granted routine 
assumptions based on outdated economics. Although the world as a whole has made 
some reasonable progress in reducing levels of absolute poverty, many countries 
are not on track to meet the Millennium Development Goals by 2015. Countries 
such as China and, to some extent, India, and regions such as East and South-
East Asia, have managed to significantly reduce poverty levels, but not every 
region or country has recorded such remarkable progress. In fact, the absolute 
number of poor people has gone up in several countries in sub-Saharan Africa, 
Latin America, the Middle East and Northern Africa, as well as in Central Asia. 
Economic growth in many developing countries, particularly the least developed 
countries, has not translated into poverty reduction. 
The global economic crisis has shown that the premises of the prevailing eco-
nomic policies, in particular the belief in the primacy of the market mechanism 
to optimize resource allocation and maximize welfare, were faulty. This failure, 
however, had been evident long before the crisis hit. It had been demonstrated 
by the inability of the prevailing approach to economic policymaking to deliver a 
significant and sustained reduction in global poverty and deprivation. The analy-
sis in chapters 4-6 has shown that macroeconomic policies imposed by the World 
Bank and IMF poverty economists on the developing countries, focused on keep-
ing inflation and fiscal deficits under control, and economic liberalization osten-
sibly to enhance the efficiency of markets and national comparative advantage, 
have not reduced poverty. Instead, they have often reduced growth and increased 
inequality. Thus, inclusive economic development, which would bring dividends 
to poor people and the marginalized, has been elusive.
Chapters 4 and 5 reported about serious conflicts and disagreements among 
World Bank poverty economists and between them and their counterparts in the 
IMF and the leading UN-agencies. Several rigorous and courageous individuals 
737 Zoellick (2010). World Bank (2010). 
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within the community of poverty economists have taken great personal efforts 
and risks trying to question – and to correct – the faulty theories, institutional-
ized axiomatic assumptions and ideologically motivated doctrines. The global 
community of poverty economists has learned lots of important lessons through 
these conflicts. 
The global financial crisis, that nearly none of the world’s leading professional 
economists saw coming, has brought not only the poverty economists but the 
entire economics profession into a state of disarray and confusion. 
All this is vastly confusing also to the global community of non-economist 
poverty professionals and other professionals of care. Economists have been the 
leading professional group in global development. Also non-economist develop-
ment professionals have taken for granted the validity of the advice and prescrip-
tions received from the economist colleagues, especially in matters concerning 
the “Big Issues” of macroeconomic, financial and trade policy. But in fact in nearly 
all sectors of development policy choices of non-economist professionals have 
also – at least to some extent – relied on the conceptual and theoretical frame-
works provided by economists. How wise is this? 
We have learned that there are several different schools of economic thought 
and several ways to think about economic issues. However, the teaching of eco-
nomics in the economics departments of world’s universities has ignored most 
of the alternative schools of thought and concentrated nearly exclusively on one, 
the neoclassical economics. In the ideological atmosphere that has dominated 
the world over the past few decades the neoclassical doctrine has still been fla-
voured by one particular type of an ideology, that of neoliberalism. Every year 
new graduates from these economics departments get recruited to the World 
Bank and other development agencies. Should that not give cause for concern for 
the non-economist poverty professionals?
On the other hand, a healthy process of self-reflection is going on among the 
world’s economists, and that will probably also reflect to the way economics is 
taught at universities. The economists are, on average, intelligent people, and 
most of them are as highly dedicated to the cause of social justice and all the other 
good values as social policy professionals and other professionals of develop-
ment and care. So there are good reasons to believe that the global community of 
poverty economists will gradually find a way to correct the faults and unfounded 
axioms in the economic theories and to develop new ones – or to adopt some of 
the more realistic existing alternatives. In fact, no-one else can do this rethinking 
for them. They will have to – and they will – do it themselves. The Real-World 
Economics Movement, as well as the feminist and many other alternative streams 
of economists are showing the way. So are the brilliant economists who authored 
the recent UN-DESA and UNRISD poverty reports, as well as those numerous 
economists within the World Bank (including the current Chief-Economist) who 
have the courage and the mental energy required to think independently and to 
challenge the worldviews, assumptions and professional interests that so often 
come instinctively with the professional identity as an economist. 
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So, we have reasons to believe that - in the long run - things will get better. 
This would be a nice ‘End-of-History’ type of ending for my essay. However, 
the end of history is not in sight. We have not reached the apex of the linear 
progress of ‘socio-ecolo-nomic’ thought on poverty reduction and sustainable 
development. Our inter-subjective wisdom is going to evolve in cycles, as always 
before, not linearily. In this respect, the phenomenon of ‘inter-generational forget-
ting’ – of which this essay has given lots of examples - makes progress in social 
sciences (including economics and political economy) fundamentally different 
from those natural sciences, where the un-ending sophistication of measuring 
instruments really seems to give us the opportunity to learn more and more 
about the ever smaller – and larger – units of our universe. 
This suggests an interesting future research agenda on the evolution of ‘socio-
ecolo-nomic’ thinking – and action - on poverty reduction and global social policy. 
My essay could not possibly have revealed the ‘Ultimate Truth’, because there is 
none.  In my view the most important contribution that this essay makes is to show 
that in the politics of global poverty reduction Thinking is Action (Words are Deeds), 
and that not only actors’ material interests but also their ideas – and especially their 
professional identities – drive their action, through worldviews, subject-positions, 
path-dependencies and other mechanisms that can – and should – be further stud-
ied with the various tools, methods and approaches of institutional analysis.
In the ‘real world’ of development agencies, neither the current economic crisis 
nor the crisis in the economics profession have, so far, substantially altered the 
dominance of the ‘economic-growth-first’ policy paradigm. Not all professional 
economists follow the developments in the frontiers of economic thought. In this 
essay we have reported extensively about various sincere efforts by many leading 
economists to rethink economics and development economics. But it is going to 
take a long time before this rethinking has reached all our economist colleagues 
‘on the factory floor level’ of development policy and development cooperation. 
(And even all of the non-economist professionals of care and development who 
have studied some economics¸ albeit not as a major. There is a little ‘instinctive 
economist’ in each of us...) In some sense these colleagues are less of a concern, 
because they have always blended their economist identities and thoughts with 
large amounts of common sense. But on the other hand, the ‘instinctive econo-
mist’ in them (and in most of us) still builds on the axiomatic assumptions learned 
in the economics departments at the university. These identities die hard, even if 
they would be based on faulty, outdated theories. 
Being paranoid doesn’t help, however. Open discussion helps. My ninth prop-
osition in Chapter-3 was that “professionals of development and care should be aware of 
the crisis within the economics profession – and not take for granted routine assumptions 
based on outdated economics”. I believe that I have reasons to think that also this 
proposition holds. The crisis in economics and poverty economics should lead 
to a serious rethinking not only of economics and poverty economics, but also 
to a rethinking of all development policy doctrines and approaches based on – 
potentially – faulty or outdated economics. 
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My expected primary readership are social policy professionals, whom I 
would wish to take an increasingly active role in development cooperation, devel-
opment policy and in Global Social Policy.  For them it is good to know that other, 
highly rigorous alternatives to the World Bank poverty economics do exist, e.g. 
the Rethinking Poverty report of the UN-Secretariat (DESA) and the forthcoming 
Flagship Report on Poverty by the United Nations Research Institute for Social 
Development, UNRIDS, and others.  
Poverty is fundamentally a social policy challenge. In those societies of the 
world that have best succeeded in reducing poverty it has been achieved through 
‘Comprehensive Social Policies’, by ‘unlocking’ the human potential and entre-
preneurship of all citizens through decent work, social protection and social ser-
vices for all. In order to succeed in global poverty reduction we have to find the 
means to globalize the ‘Society for All’ principle. This will require local, national, 
regional and global action to equalize empowerment, security and opportunities 
for all, globally.  How to do this, is a vastly interesting – and important – agenda 
for future research, into which I wish to invite all the readers of this essay. 
If the damage inflicted by the multiple crises (of economics, development eco-
nomics, food, fuel and financial markets) on the lives of poor people of the world 
is to be contained, there must arise a greater willingness to change. Willingness 
can be created by political pressure. Competent social policy professionals can 
play a role also in generating such pressure. Credible and workable alternatives 
do exist and, indeed, have been proposed for decades. “The difficulty lies”, as John 
Maynard Keynes noted, “not in the new ideas, but in escaping from the old ones.”738 
738 Keynes (1936), p. viii.
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